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BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER, OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
APPOINTED DECEMBER 19, 1881. 
IMPORTED LEAF TOBACCO. 
Clause in Schedule F of the act 6f March 3, 1883, chapter 121, imposing 
a duty upon "leaf tobacco,'' considered and commented on; and ad-
vised that the duty attaches to tobacco of the statutory description, 
irrespective of the bale or package in which it is imported, and that, 
consistently with the terms of the statute, bales and packages may be 
broken up in order to sort such different grades of leaf tobacco as may 
be contained therein. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.April 23, 1884. 
SIR: In yours of the 21st instant my attention is called to 
a clause in Schedule F of the act of 1883, chapter 121 (22 
Stat., 503), which imposes duty upon "leaf t\)bacco." With-
out asking a direct question thereupon, you state a doubt, 
from which I gather that you desire advice whet~er that 
clause regards a bale or package as the dutiable unit of such 
leaf tobacco; and, if so, whether there is enough upon the 
face of it to indicate that Congress intended to refer to that 
bale or package which was known to commerce in March, 
1883, so that a subsequent change thereof, with a view to 
avoid the duty imposed, may be regarded as fraudulent, 
and therefore be met by such counteracting administrative 
methods as may be found practicable. 
The clause in question is as follows: ''Leaf tobacco, of 
which eighty-five per cent. is of the requisite size and of the 
necessary fineness of texture to be suitable for wrappers, 
and of which more than one hundred leaves are required to 
weigh a pound, if not stemmed, seventy-five cents per 
pound; if stemmed, one dollar per pound." 
I observe that nothing is said in the act as to packages or 
bales, or any other merely commercial form in which the 
1merchandise is imported. Wholly irrespective of such com-
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mercia! form, the duty is levied directly upon the article 
rated by its qualities for certain sort of consumption; i. e., 
into wrappers. A like remark is true of each of the seven 
paragraphs imposing duty upon tobacco. 
Upon the face of the provision, therefore, I submit that 
the duty will attach to tobaeco of the statutory description 
therein given, no matter what be the vehicle in which that 
tobacco is imported. 
I submit further that such questions as arise touching the 
best way of administering the above statute, however im-
portant they may be practically, are at least inferior in de-
gree to such as are presented by the words that convey the 
will of the legislature, and therefore give way to that. will. 
No mere regulation can defeat a statute. So far as in any 
reasonable way is practicable, effect is to be given to the very 
words of the act; but no method that is impracticable will 
be supposed to have been intended. 
I understand that no case has been presented within 
the exigencies of public business, and making use of the 
machinery of the custom house, to identify the boundary 
line betwixt such leaf tobacco as is dutiable at 75 cents per 
pound and such as is dutiable at 35 cents. If hereafter, in 
consequence of a co-operation by producers of tobacco in the 
evasion presented by your letter, the original hands shall be 
manipulated so as to mix light and heavy leaves in a man-
ner that will practically prevent an identification at the cus-
tom-house of the above-mentioned bottndary line, the matter 
will need interposition by Congress. At present, however, 
disregarding, as I think we may, certain terms (viz, bale, 
etc.) introduced into the discussion apparently because at 
one period in the administration of the law these were very 
properly supposed to meet questions then arising upon cer-
tain cargoes, etc.,-I say disregarding such terms, I ad vise 
that there is no reason in the words of the statute why ba,les 
and packages, etc., may not be broken up in order to sort 
such different grades of leaf tobacco as may be contained 
tllerein. 
v err respectfully' 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRE'l'A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
TO THE PRESIDENT. 3 
H o I d i n g 8 tate 0 ffl c e s. 
HOLDING STATE OFFICES. 
The holding of a State office by an officer or employe in the civil service 
of the United States is not prohibited by any act of Congress. 
But by executive orders dated January 17 and 28, 1873, which have not 
been revoked, persons holding any civil office under the United States 
are expected, w bile holding such office, not to accept or hold any State, 
Territorial, or municipal office, with certain exceptions; otherwise 
they will be regarded as having resigned the office held under the 
United States. 
In the case of an employe of the United States Fish Commission, not in 
the service by appointment, who holds the office of village constable: 
Advised that he may properly exercise the functions of the latter office, 
provided this does not interfere with the regular and efficient dis-
charge of his employment under the Government. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
. April 26, 1884. 
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the letter of 
Prof. Spencer F. Baird, Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries, 
addressed to you under date of the 11th instant, which at 
his request and by your direction was referred to me for an 
opinion upon the inquiry therein submitted, namely, 
"Whether an employe of the United States Fish Commis-
sion, stationed in Massachusetts, is authorized to exercise 
the function of village constable with or without pay." 
There is no act of Congress which forbids an officer or· em-
ploye in the civil service of the U n~ted States to hold a 
State office. But by an Executive order, dated January 17, 
1873, issued from the Department of State, notice was given 
t hat from and after the 4th of March, 1873, except as therein 
mentioned, "Persons holding any Federal civil office, by ap-
pointment, under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, will be expected, while holding such office. not to 
accept or hold any office under any State or Territorial gov· 
ernment, or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal 
corporation; and, further, that the acceptance or continued 
holding of any such State, Territorial, or municipal office~ 
whether elective or by appointment, by any person holding 
civil office as aforesaid under the Government of the United 
States, other than judicial offices under the Constitution of 
the United States, will be deemed a vacation of the Federal 
.office held by such person, and will be treated as a resigna-
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tion by such Federal officer of his commission or appoint-
ment in the service of the United States." From the pur-
view of this order, however, certain State offices, such as • 
justices of the peace, notaries public, commissioners of deeds, 
etc., were excepted. Certain Federal officers were also ex-
cepted from its operation, so far as to permit them to accept 
and hold State offices where the same do not interfere with 
the discharge of their duties. 
The above-mentioned order was supplemented by another 
Executive order, issued from the same Department, dated 
January 28, 1873. This second order further defines what 
offices and positions under the State, Territorial, or munici-
pal governments are within, and what are not within, the 
scope and prohibition of the first order; and it declares that 
"'employment by the day as mechanics or laborers in the 
armories, arsenals, navy-yards, etc., does not constitute an 
office of any kind, and those thus employed are not within 
the contemplation of the executive order;" but that'' mas-
ter workmen and others who hold appointments from the 
Government or from any Department, whether for a fixed 
time or at the pleasure of the appointing power, are em-
braced within the operatio:r;t of the order." 
I am not aware of any other regulations than those found 
in the executive orders aforesaid which apply to the hold-
ing of State offices by persons who are in the civil service of 
the United States. Nor am I aware that those orders have 
ever been revoked. 
While the office of village constable, whether with or with-
out pay, would seem to be of the class of offices which such 
· orders forbid the holding of, yet unless the employe referred 
to in the inquiry of the Commissioner be an officer of the 
United States, unless he is in the service of the Government 
by appointment from some officer or Department thereof in-
vested with the appointing power, be does not appear to 
come within the prohibitiQn. Assuming that he is not in 
the service by appointment as above, I am of opinion that he 
is authorized (i.e., not forbidden) to exercise the functions of 
the local office mentioned, and that he may properly do so, 
provided it does not interfere with the regular and efficient 
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discharge of his employment under the Government, of which 
the Commissioner or officer by whom he is employed can 
well be the judge. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDEN1'. 
CLAIM OF V ANN A\D ADAIR. 
Upon the facts presented in the mattN of tbe claim of Vann and Adair 
for compensation for their services rendered the Osage Indians in 
1869 and 1870 respecting the disposal of the lands of the latter : Ad-
vised, that the payment of· the $50,000 awarded by the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the Interior in 1874 
was a satisfaction in full of any claims that the said Vann and Adair 
had for their services. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 30, 1884. 
SrR: I have given attentive consideration to the claim of 
Vann and Adair, and to the questions in connection there-
with, presented in yours of the 1st ultimo. 
After the very careful statements of fact which accompa,ny 
your letter, it is unnecessary that I shall do more than al-
lude to such outlines thereof as are relied upon to support 
my conclusions. 
It seems then that in 1868 the Osage Indians had entered 
into a project of treaty for the sale of 8,000,000 acres of 
land lying in Kansas to certain railroad companies at the 
price of $1,600,000, and that in November, 1869, this project 
was still pending unratified by the United States. Accord-
ingly, during this last-mentioned month, the Osage tribe, hav-
ing· become dissatisfied with the bargain, employed V ann 
and Adair "to represent their interests before the Govern-
ment of the United States at Washington, and in that con-
nection to make effort to have set aside and annulled" the 
above treaty; and stipulated to pay them as compensation 
"one-half of any sum that through their efforts and repre-
sentations might be allowed for the lands * * * beyond 
the amqunt stipulated for in said treaty." Thereupon the 
treaty was withdrawn by President Grant about the first of 
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the next session of Congress, and one bill, which proposed 
to give the Osages about 12:Z cents for their land, having 
been defeated in January, 1870, an amendment was adopted 
to an appropriation act in July, 1870, which had the effect 
of giving to the Indians $1.25 per acre for the same. All 
occasion for effort by the claimants ceased in about eight 
months after their employment. 
I do not find it asserted that the efforts of Vann and Adair 
as agents, etc., upon the subject-matter of their contract 
during the period important to the transactiOn by which the 
Indian Osages escaped from the toils of their treaty of 1868 
and secured a position by which necessarily they in the 
course of time would receive for their lands some $10,000,000, 
or thereabouts-that is, from November 10, 1869, to July 15, 
1870-were directed to any other matters than those men-
tioned above. A voiding all appearance of meeting the 
strong terms in which the merits of Vanu and Adair towards 
the Osages are characterized in some of the papers in the case 
by other strong terms which the law often applies to such 
transactions betwixt attorneys on the one hand and clients 
inopes consilii, and laboring under a notorious civil imbecility 
and inability upon the other, I content myself with saying that 
the arrangement of 1869 must be treated now as absolutely 
null and void. It lacks legal obligation, because it was never 
approved by the United States, acting through the Presi-
dent or otherwise; and it lacks moral obligation,. because 
it displays upon its face that improvidence, the attribution 
of which to Indian tribes, by a general presumption of law, 
has given occasion for the necessity of approval as above. 
The treaty against which it was directed hardly awaited a 
first push. A pin prick seems to have disposed of it at once. 
Nor is there any appearance that the subsequent legislation-
that, I mean, abandoned in January and that adopted in 
July....:...required important special prosecution. It seem:; 
that all this must easily have been anticipated by intelligent 
persons acquainted with the circumstances in November,. 
1869, and accordingly that to such the chances at that time 
appeared good for making under the terms of their contract, 
with but little trouble and in no long time, a fee of from one 
to several millions of dollars. 
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It is significant of the validity of this contract in point of 
fairness that the claimants appear never to have asked for 
its approval, and that they abandoned all claim thereunder 
as soon as they set about discussing with their clients the 
claim for compensation. 
It is necessary to have a definite view of the character of 
the agreement of 1869 in order properly to judge of that of 
1873. It is suggested on behalf of Vann and Adair that the 
former was binding upon the Osages, and therefore that they 
appear in this contention upon the footing of p~rsons who 
have displayed great generosity-having voluntarily yielded 
up more than $2,000,000 of a justly earned compensation and 
contented themselves under the agreement of 1873 with less 
than 10 per cent. of what was fairly due. In my opinion 
there is, upon the contrary, no ground upon which the con-
tract of 1869 can be considered to have imposed upon the 
Osages the debt therein defined, either as a legal or equitable 
obligation. 
'rhe most that can be said about it is that it created are-
lation because of which Vann and Adair bad a right to be 
paid by the Indians whatever their services should be fairly 
estimated at after these had terminated. In other words, by 
performing services for which they had been asked, they 
were entitled afterwards to an account upon the footing of a 
quantum meruit. They must be regarde(l and treated as rea-
sonably intelligent persons. They evidently claim at least so 
much in the present transaction. By failing, then, to submit 
their contingent compensation to the judgment of the Presi-
dent during the time that the contingency existed, they must 
be taken to have waived a consideration of that element, and 
to have put their case simply upon, as it were, a count for 
work and labor done. 
That was really their situation before the Osage council 
in February, 1873, as well as before the Secretary of the In-
terior, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in July, 1874. 
In this connection I cannot avoid saying that their profes-
sions (conveyed in the agreement of February, 1873), that it 
was because of "sympathy and brotherly feeling" towards 
the Osages that they were willing to reduce their first fee 
and to accept of $330,000 (again reduced by the council to 
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$230,000), as if it were a modest compensation ex mquo et 
bono for what they had done, partakes strongly of the farci-
cal. They seem to have partaken of the delusion that by this 
latter transaction they were themselves benefactors, and not 
beneficiaries; were surrendering, and not receiving, a thing 
of value. 
This view, as I have already said, is plainly inadmissible. 
Supposing (as I shall for this argument admit) that all 
other requisites, except approval, for a valid contract under 
section 2103, Revised Statutes, exist here, I think that the 
mere circumstance that the present contract at the time of 
its presentation for approval in 187 4 had been executed did 
not except it (as is suggested in the papers) from the oper-
ation of that section. It was at that time a contract requir-
ing the special approval in that section provided; the ques-
tion· presented being whether the services of Vann and Adair 
were worth ex WQUO et bono $230,000, or if not so much, then 
what? 
I am not called upon to rejudge the terms of the approval 
that was given. The claimants received $50,000 for services 
the substantial part of which was included within nine 
months. Let it be allowed that those services were faithful 
(although the virtue of faithfulness to a cause in which one 
reckons one's self to be an equal partner is neither very re-
fined nor very heroical) intelligent, and valuable, yet $25,000 
apiece compensation seems handsome. And if we allow that 
the pregnant period betwixt November, 1869, and July, 1870 
(during which as we have seen all that was substantial must 
have been done), was followed by a sequel of some months' 
attendance, ex abundanti, at the Indian Office; during which 
Commissioner Parker enjoyed an opportunity of forming a 
favorable opinion as .to their qualities and conduct, neverthe-
less that compensation does not become inadequate, or indeed 
less than ample, by being extended so as to cover even that. 
I mention this in order to say that the extent to which the 
approval of 1874 was given was to all appearance based upon 
arguments which might well control men of good sense and 
intelligence, and therefore, having been decided by persons 
whose duty it was to decide, it established the operative form 
of the contract, and made au end of contro,Tersy. Evidently 
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there was no place for protest by either party against pay-
ments thereunder. Thai would be mere idle grumbling. 
The approval determined all, and was a transaction as to 
which protest meant nothing. 
It is said, however, that the Acting Secretary, who par 
ticipated in this approval, afterwards stated that he under 
.stood his action therein not to be final, but only to warrant 
.a payment upon acco·ttnt; and besides that, still later he 
stated in an official letter that after such approval the Com-
missioner· and he had opened the approval for further evi-
dence, etc. 
A question is made as to the effect of these declarations. 
As to the Secretary's statement of his understanding of 
what he and the Commissioner had done, I submit that it is 
without effect. Their act was required to be in writing, and 
also to be indorsed upon the writt~n contract. That in-
dorsement must speak for itself. This would be so even if 
both parties had expressed their understanding. Much more 
then when only one has done so. 
Upon the face of the indorsement I think there is no room 
for doubt. The transaction is, although joint, a single one, 
and it is to be assumed that the parties united therein. If 
the words of one party be clear and those of the other not 
so clear, the latter would be referred to the former, and not 
vice versa. I sub mit that the language of the Secretary is 
not doubtful; but if it be so to any one, then, inasmuch as the 
language of the Commisioner cannot be so, this draws to its 
own the meaning of that of the Secretary. The case, it is 
to be observed, is not one of plain contradiction, for if it 
were there could have been no approval for any purpose. 
'rhen as to the alleged reopening. If there be no evidence of 
a joint reopening beyond what was stated as above by the 
Secretary, I should doubt the competency thereof. I see no 
reason why rules upon like matters which have long pre-
vailed on other tribunals of justice to the end of securing 
certainty and consistency in their action should not apply 
here, to the effect that an important quasi-judicial joint act 
in writing can be undone only by another joint act in writ-
ing, and that also indorsed upon the contract affected; that 
is, upon the original paper itself, or upon one duly attached 
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thereto. It is difficult to draw a line amongst the require-
ments of section 2103, and pronounce that those upon one 
side are essential, the others not. If, however, such a one 
be practicable, I am of opinion that an indorsement of all 
action that approves, or that qualifies approval, is essential. 
I gather from the papers that there is no such indorsement. 
I am inclined to doubt whether section 2103 intends that 
there shall be a rehearing as to an approval once indorsed 
and acted upon. The circumstances here do not require 
this point to be thoroughly considered; but as the courst · 
of the argument might otherwise intimate an opinion by me 
that repeated extensions of approval are competent, I may 
be allowed to enter this protest thereabout and save it for-
another occasion. 
I may also add that if reopenings by action aliunde be 
competent, the action of Secretary Chandler, in December,. 
1875, put an end to the one under consideration. His 
pointed and vigorous language imports a review of the case 
upon the merits and a determination thereof. 
I need hardly add that the joint approval made in 187 4, 
supposing it not to have been opened by the parties thereto, 
is now beyond the control of any successors of those who 
gave it~ 
Upon the whole, then, I submit, in reply to your first ques-
tion, that Vann and Adair never had a legal claim against 
the Osages under the contract of February 8, 1873, for the 
sum of $230,000; and, in reply to your second question, that 
the approval of that contract by the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the Interior (July 8 and 
July 21, 187 4, respectively) was an authoritative definition 
of the same, so that the payment and receipt of the $50,000 
thereby awarded was a satisfaction in full of any claims that 
Vann and Adair had for their services, and so of that for 
$230,000 mentioned in the contract of 1873 as ratified by the 
Osage council. 
I understand that as a consequence of the above answers 
you desire no notice by me of the other questions propounded. 
It may be that I should add, in connection with the appli-
cation (May 21, 1877) of the governor, chief counsellor, and 
business committee of the Osages addressed to the President, 
asking tllat the claimauts sllouhl ht~ paid t!H' n·m~inr1er due 
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upon the contract of 1873, which was subsequently trans-
mitted by the President to Congress with a statement that 
there was no fund out of which the Execut.ive can order pay-
ment, etc.; that it was wholly irregular; and was given 
proper direction by the President-who does not appear to 
have considered whether, if there had been a fund, such pay-
ment could have been ordered by ~' the Executive," meaning 
I suppose such part of the executive department as had ju-
risdiction of such questions. I doubt whether the President 
intended by the words used by him to claim that he could 
decide upon or review an approval of the contract of 1873, 
or indeed that he intended anything whatever more than a 
good-natured reference of the attorneys for the claim to Con-
gress, where such claims generally sleep soundly . 
.And as to .Attorney-General Pierrepont's succinct opinion 
transmitted by you, I have to say that no copy thereof was 
_preserved or probably taken in this Department, nor have I 
been able to find here the letter to which it was a reply .. 
The opinion is short, entirely in his own handwriting, stat-
ing results only, and apparently given in haste. The state 
of facts therefore upon which it was given does not appear 
to me; and, besides, it seems based upon the theory adopted 
by Mr. Cushing in 1853 (6 Opin., 49), without adverting to 
the fact that in the mean time the act of 1872 had relieved 
the President of the trouble of considering Indian contracts 
for the payment of money, etc., and had vested that duty 
elsewhere. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ARMY OFFICER HOLDING CIVIL OFFICE. 
Where an officer of the Army was tendered a place on a "board of ex-
perts," created by a city ordinance to determine the most durable and 
best pavement for the streets of the city: Advised that, in view of the 
provisions of section 1222, Revised Statutes, the place be not accepted 
by the officer. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 9,1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 7th ultimo asks whether the case therein. 
stated would constitute a violation of Revised Statutes, sec· 
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tion 1222, which, upon pain of forfeiting their commissions, 
forbids officers of the Army to accept or exercise the fu,nctions 
of a civil office. 
The case is that the mayor of Philadelphia has selected 
Col. Q. A. Gillmore, Corps of Engineers, one of " a board 
of experts" to examine and report upon a pavement in that 
city, the authority for such selection having been conferred 
by an ordinance of the city of the 28th of May, 1883, which 
defines the duty of the board to be that of "pointing out to 
the councils the defects of the present system of paving the 
streets of Philadelphia, and, in comparison with the advan-
tages of the Belgian block system, making a thorough and 
exhaustive report of the most durable and best pavement 
that can be devised by them for said streets, particular re-
gard being had to its healthfulness, economy, smoothness, 
durability, and drainage, and estimating the probable cost of 
a better system;" the compensation of each member of the 
board not to exceed $10,000, inclusive of all individual ex-
penses. 
The question put by you on behalf of Colonel Gillmore, 
who solicits your instructions in that regard, is whether by 
taking a place upon that board he will be chargeable with 
having accepted or exercised the functions of a civil office 
within the meaning of section 1222, cited above. 
I have read the papers connected with certain other such 
applications in the past, which you have transmitted along 
with that of Colonel Gillmore. I own that I should have 
found difficulty in coming to the conclusion which seems to 
have been reached in some of them-particularly that of Colo-
nel Mendell. But as these have passed, I need say no more. 
It is plain that the board in question bas been constituted 
with reference to important public needs and is to discharge 
an important public duty. In the most comprehensive sense 
of the word office, therefore, places upon that board will be 
offices, and of course "civil offices." 
Are they such within the purview of section 1222 ' 
It seems to me that notwithstanding the gravity of the 
penalty therein inflicted, the policy of section 1222 points to 
a very liberal interpretation of the phrase "civil office." In 
Evans's case (74 Pa. St. Rep., 124), the question was 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 13 
Duty Act of 1\larcb 3, 1883. 
whether a person who had been appointed by the governor 
of the State " to collect a single claim, or rather a set of 
claims, against a particular debtor" (the United States) was 
a public officer. The court decided that he was; Sharswood, 
J. saying, arguendo: "Can it make any difference that a 
person is commissioned by the governor as a general agent to 
collect all claims of the Commonwealth, or as a special agent 
to collect only one particular claim." 
I quote Evans's case not because the present question can 
be made to turn upon any special view as to the meaning of 
the word office in the courts of Pennsylvania, but because I 
understand the above language to convey t!J e general legal 
meaning of that word. (15 Opin., 551.) 
I have considered the provisions of the acts of 1838, 1868, 
1870 and 1877, which now appear in sections 12!~2, 1223, and 
1224, Revised Statutes, together, in coming to a conclusion 
upon the question put by you. That conclusion is advice 
that Colonel Gillmore do not accept appointmen~ as a mem-
ber of the board of experts in question. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DUTY ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883. 
Goods which arrived in a port of the United States on the 30th of June, 
1883, and from want of time to make other disposition of them re-
mained on board ship until the next day, are to be regarded as in a 
public storll or bonded warehouse within the meaning of section 10 of 
the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 13, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 8th has been considered. It mentions 
the recent decision in the cases of Frank A. Sartori and John 
B. Sartori against Hartranft, collector, and in connection 
therewith asks in effect whether that shall be acquiesced in. 
The principle therein expressed is, that goods which arrived 
in a port of the United States upon the 30th of June, 1883, 
and from want of time to make any other disposition of them 
remained on board ship until the next day, are to be re-
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garded as in a public store or bonded warehouse within the 
meaning of section 10 of the customs duties act of March 
3, 1883, and therefore are subject to the less rate of duty im-
posed thereupon by that act. 
I observe and appreciate what you say as to the practical 
difficulty in which you have been placed in settling the opera-
tion of that section upon goods situated like the present, 
the new duties being in some cases greater and in others less 
than the old. 
Upon the whole, however, I advise that the rule laid 
down in the cases of Sartori be acquiesed in. 
I may add that there is some color in its ianguage for 
thinking that section 10 is to apply only in cases where the 
new duty is less than the old: the expression ''shall be sub-
ject to no other duty than, " etc., imports a favor; and this 
view accords with the fact that the act of li583 in general re-
duced the rates of duty theretofore imposed ; and perhaps 
the expression would have been made clearer if Congress had 
not anticipated that, because of the three months which were 
to elapse before the statute went into effect, importers would 
take care to leave in warehouse none of that class of goods 
upon which the duty would be increased. A positive provis-
ion of that sort would probably have had little effect; so that, 
inasmuch as de minimis non cura,t lex, Congress may have in-
tended to leave the exceptional cases of a transition from less 
to greater duty to the operation of existing general law, 
which determines the rate by the date of importation. 
I suggest this qurere as an obiter d·ictum pertinent to cases 
vice versn to those of the Sartoris and alluded to in yours. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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STATE QUARANTINE GHOUNDS. 
Inspectors of customs can not lawfully be prevented by the local health 
officers from landing at quarantine stations in the discharge of their 
duties; but the former, while visiting and remaining at such stations, 
should observe all reasonable regulations in the interest of public 
health. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 5, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the 26th ultimo, asking whether 
the health authorities of the State of South Carolinia can 
legally prevent an inspector of customs of the United States, 
who has been assigned to duty at the quarantine grounds, 
from landing at that place, I answer that the duty of a State 
to police its navigable waters and coasts in the interest of 
health does not conflict with the duty of the United States 
to police the same grounds in the interest of their revenue. 
There is no conflict in point of theory upon these matters, 
and the good sense of the officers intrusted with these duties 
respectively will no doubt prevent any collision in point of 
fact. Such I understand from a recent note to be the gen-
eral experience of your Department upon the present matter. 
The United States have a clear right to see for themselves, 
and by the eyes of their own officers, whether their customs 
laws are enforced at quarantine stations as well as at other 
places. They direct their officers to execute this duty with 
a reference to the State health laws and regulations. Such 
conformity, however, is not to amount to an abstention from 
official duty. 
Upon the other hand, that universal rule by which, upon 
conflict between State and United States law~, the former 
necessa,rily give way would not justify customs officers from 
excluding health officers from policing places which the former 
might have found jt, necessary to occupy in the course of 
duty. 
Questions of some delicacy as to relative precedency and 
superiority of function may arise between these two classes 
of officials. Their happening need not be anticipated; and 
they will probably be settled, as generally heretofore, by an 
exercise on both sides of liberality and good sense. 
The present, however, is not a doubtful matter. Obviously, 
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health officers can not prevent inspectors from landing at the 
quarantine station. Although inspectors must conform their 
official action whilst visiting and remaining at such stations 
(as well as elsewhere) to all reasonable regulations jn the 
interest of public health, no regulation which forbids their 
enjoying ample opportunities for then and there protecting 
the public revenue is reasonable. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
INSPECTION OF STEAM FERRY-BOATS. 
The word "charter" covers the case of boats licensed, under a general 
law, by a county court to traverse ferry routes established by such 
courts. 
Steam-vessels plying regularly between Albany and Troy, in New York,. 
for freight and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the second 
clause of rule VII, paragraph 2, of "General Rules, etc., of the Board 
of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels." 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 7, 1884. 
SIR: 1 have considered the questions which by yours of 
the 3d instant are stated in connection with cert.a;t.in sections 
of the Revised Statutes upon the subject of inspecting steam 
ferry-boats, and with paragraph 2 of rule VII, "General 
Rules, etc., of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam 
Vessels" (form 2101), pages 183 and 185, and I now submit 
a reply. 
First. I am of the opinion that the word "charter," rule 
VII, paragraph 2, as above, covers the case of boats licensed, 
under a general law conferring that power, by a county 
court to traverse ferry routes established by such court. 
''Charter" seems to be a proper word to express a power 
of granting to individuals rights which otherwise belong to 
the public, whether such grant by the State is made directly 
or indirectly. 
I submit this upon general principles; but if this proposition 
were more doubtful than I apprehend it to be, the regulation 
in question is not to be construed as intended to narrow the 
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legal meaning of the word ferry-boat in sections 4426, etc, 
for regulations can not change the meaning of legal terms in 
the statute which authorizes such regulations. They have 
a well-established but a narrower scope of operation than 
this. ·I co-nceive that those who framed rule VII did not in-
tend to limit the meaning of sections 4426, etc., but only to 
· convey to subordinate officials engaged in enforcing the in-
spection laws their own view of that meaning. 
By chartered ferry, therefore, I submit is intended any 
ferry established in accordance with law. 
Second and third. What I have said above probably ren-
ders it unnecessary to reply more particularly to your second 
and third questions. I observe that the language of sections 
4405 and 4462 varies from that of the act of 1870, which is 
the basis of those sections. Whether under 4462 the Secre-
tary can modify a regulation really authorized by 4405 may 
demand more consideration than seems to be here demanded, 
inasmuch as I think that rule VII, paragraph 2, is even now 
to be read as if the word license were added to the word 
charter. 
Fourth. I am of opinion that steam-vessels plying regu-
larly between Albany and Troy, in New York, for freight 
and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the second clause 
of rule VII, paragraph 2, above referred to. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRI~ BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
POSTMASTERS' SALARIES. 
Opinion of February 13, 1884 (17 Opin., p. 658), on the subject of there-
adjustment of postmasters' salaries, referred to and explained. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 14, 1884. 
SIR: Your letter of this date states that it is claimed under 
the acts of 1864, 1866, and 1883 (relating to postmasters' 
salaries), as interpreted by my opinion of February 13 ultimo, 
that a postmaster whose salary was duly readjusted on July 
1, 1868, for the ensuing biennial period, and whose readjusted 
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salary during that period was 10 per cent. less than the com-
pensation which he would have received during such period 
if computed ripon the basis of commissions under the act of 
1854, is not entitled to be paid the difference between such 
salary received and such computed compensation for the 
period in question. 
In my judg·ment the claim is not well founded, and there 
is nothing in the opinion that was intended to sustain such a 
conclusion or that seems to me to have that effect. 
In McLean's case (95 13". S., 753), referred to in my ' opin-
ion, the court declared that the readjustment directed by 
the legislation of 1864 and 1866 "takes effect in all cases 
prospectively." The above claim is for a retrospective settle-
ment; a proceding not warranted by the said acts, according 
to my understanding of them and of the opinion of the 
Supreme Court. 
Very respectively, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PosTMASTER GENERAL. 
RELIDF OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
The bill "For the relief of Fitz John Porter," passed at the first session 
of the Forty-eighth Congress, considered, and objections thereto, con-
stitutional and other, stated. 
DEPARTMENT OF JU.STICE, 
June 23, 1884. 
SIR: In-compliance with your request I have examined 
the bill for the restoration of Fitz John Porter to the Army, 
and now have the honor to submit to you my views thereon. 
In March, 1878, an application was made to the President 
by Fitz John Porter for relief in his case. Subsequently, in 
April of the same year (to the end that the President might 
be fully informed of the facts of the case, and be enabled to 
act advisedly upon said application), a board of Army officers 
was convened to examine, in connection with the record of 
the trial by court-martial of Major-General Porter, such new 
evidence relating to the merit,s of said case as is now on file 
in the War Department, together with such other evidence 
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as may be presented to said board, and to report, with the 
reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their 
opinion, ''justice requires should be taken on said application 
by the President." 
The board so convened made a report to the Secretary of 
War, dated ~larch 19, 1879, in which, after giving the result 
of their investigation, they state that, in their opinion, 
"justice requires at his (the President's) hands such action 
as m~y be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and 
sentence of the court-martial in the case of Maj. Gen. Fitz 
John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which 
that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect 
from the date of his dismissal from service." 
On the 5th of June, 1879, the proceedings and report of 
the board were transmitted to Congress by the President, 
who, in his accompanying message, said: ''I have given to 
this report such examination as satisfies me that I ought to 
lay the proceedings and conclusions of the board before Con-
gress. As I am without power, in the absence of legislation, 
to act upon the recommendations of the report further than 
by submitting the same to Congress, the proceedings and 
conclusions of the board are transmitted for the information 
of Congress, and such action as in your wisdom shall seem 
€Xpcdient and just." 
On the 4th of May, 1882, upon the application of said Fitz 
John Porter, the President, by pardon, remitted so much of 
the sentence of said court-martial as forever disqualified him 
from holding any office of trust or profit under the Govern-
ment of the United States. 
Such being the condition of his case, a bill ''for the relief 
of Fit.r. John Porter" was passed at the present session of 
Congress, and is now with the President for his approval. 
The bill contains a preamble which recites the fact that 
the board of Army officers, convened as aforesaid, stated in 
their report of March 19, 1879, that in their opinion "justice 
required at his (the President's) hands such action as may 
be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sen-
tence of the court-martial in the case of Maj. Gen. Fitz John 
Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which the sen-
tence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the 
20 HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER 
Relief of Fitz John Porter. 
date of dismissal from the service," and also the fact that 
the President, on the 4th of May, 1882, remitted so much of 
the sentence of said court-martial as forever disqualified the 
said Fitz John Porter from holding any office of trust or 
profit. The preamble then concludes: "Therefore, that jus-
tice may be done the said Fitz John Porter, and to carry into 
effect the recommendation of said board.'' Following this is 
the enacting clause. 
The enacting words of the bill read thus: ''That the 
President be, and he is hereby, authorized to nominate and, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint 
Fitz John Porter, late a major-general of the United States 
Volunteers and a brevet brigadier-general and colonel of the 
Army, to the position of colonel in the Army of the United 
States of the same grade and rank held by him at the time 
of his dismissal from the Army by sentence of court-martial 
promulgated January 27, 1863, and, in his discretion, to 
place him on the retired list of the Army as of that grade, 
the retired list being thereby increased in number to that 
extent; and all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith 
are suspended for this purpose only: Provilled, That said 
Fitz John Porter shall receive no pay, compensation, or 
allowance whatsoever prior to his appointment under this 
act." 
The end proposed by this bill, as declared in its preamble, 
is "that justice may be done to the said Fitz John Porter, 
and to carry into efl'ect the recommendation of said board." 
The recommendation of said board is "to annul and set 
aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial" in his 
case, and ''to restore him to the positions of which the sen-
tence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the 
date of dismissal from the service." 
In an opinion dated March 15, 1882, which I had the honor 
to give, at your request> upon the application for relief made 
by Fitz John Porter in his letter to you of December 23, 
1881 (the relief there being asked in the following words : 
"To annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the 
court-martial and to nominate me to the Senate for restora-
tion tom~' rank in the Army," etc.), I considered the subject 
of the power of the President to grant the relief thus sought, 
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and, after an examination of authorities, reached the con-
clusion that where the sentence of a legally constituted 
court-martial, in a case within its jurisdiction, has been 
approved by the reviewing authority and carried into execu-
tion, it can not afterwards be reviewed and set aside; that 
the proceedings are then at an end-the action thus had 
upon the sentence being, in contemplation of the law, final; 
and accordingly that the President, in the case under con-
sideration, could afford the applicant no relief through a 
revision of the sentence. 
Without assuming to enter into the merits of the charges 
submitted to and determined by the court-martial which 
tried and convicted Fitz John Porter, I may, in this connec-
tion, observe that those charges were preferred in due form, 
and that the court, which was ordered on the 1st of Decem-
ber, 1862, was composed of two major-generals and seven 
brigadier generals, and continued in the performance of its 
duties until the lOth day of January, 1863, when it made its 
findings and sentence, and adjourned. .As its records will 
show, by it there was a thorough investigation, and the ac-
cused was heard fully in his defense. The findings of the 
court were then submitted to President Lincoln, and after 
careful consideration by him were finally approved, and the 
sentence of the court duly executed. 
This ended the whole subject in law and in fact; for, as has 
been said by a judicial writer of the highest authority, when 
such is the result, and" when judgment is once pronounced, 
both law and fact conspire to prove the accused completely 
guilty." The rank of these officers and their eminent char-
acter at that time secured for their findings the approval of 
the public, and the known mildness and benevolence of 
Abraham Lincoln satisfied the people of the United States 
that he would have disapproved any unjust or harsh judg-
ment. 
A court-martial is to be respected in its judgments the 
same as any other court. Its findings, when rendered and 
approved according to the due forms of that law which creates-
it, are to be treated as would be the final judgments of a court 
Qf final jurisdiction in the law. The Supreme Court of the 
United States has recently declared that a court-martial 
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such as this was "is the organism provided by law and 
clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of 
cases. Its judgments, when approved as required, rest on 
the same basis and are surrounded by the same considera-
tions which give conclusiveness to · the judgments of other 
legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest, 
under like circumstauces." Such a judgment the President 
has no power to review and annul or set aside. Neither has 
Congress a right to review and annul or set aside the find-
ings and sentences of such a court. 
The people of the United States in their Constitution have 
said that one of the first objects of creating that Government 
wa~ to" establish justice," and to that end by the Constitu-
tion they restrained the authority of Congress, and for the 
safety of the people excluded it from assuming any of the 
absolute power possessed and exercised -by the Briti8h Par-
liament. The safety and peace of society stand only on the· 
stability of the law and its judgments. 
Certainty is the mother of repose and peace, and it is that 
which all human law seeks to arrive at; and uncertainty is 
the mother of contention. It is all-important that no final 
judgment should ever be held precariously at the .fluctuating 
discretion of any power. The certainty of the law gives it 
its sanction. 
However, notwithstanding the declaration in the preamble 
above referred to, it will be observed that the enacting clause 
of the bill does not directly purport to annul and set aside 
the sentence. 
When that sentence was passed, Fitz John Porter held 
three commissions in the milita1y serviee-one as colonel of 
a particular regiment of infantry in the regular Army, an-
other as brevet-brigadier-general in the regular Army, and a 
third as major-general of Volunteers-and its execution in-
volved not only the loss of each of these three commissions, but 
subjected him to the further penalty of being" forever disqual-
ified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Gov-
ernment of the United States." Through the exercise of 
the pardoning power of the President he has been relieved 
from the latter penalty and thereby become restored to the 
right to hold office formerly enjoyed by him. The enacting 
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clause does no more than provide tor restoring him to the 
position of colonel in the Army formerly held by him. But 
this, if accomplished, would not relieve him from all the con-
sequences of the sentence, as, for instance, the loss of the 
brevet commission of brigadier-general, and also the major-
general's commission. In providing for such partial resto-
ration to his status in the m_ilitary service which was lost by 
operation of the sentence, and leaving some portion of the 
punishment thereby incurred to stand untouched, the bill can 
not be regarded as an attempt to directly annul or set aside 
the sentence, but it evidently is an attempt to flo so in an 
elusive way. 
The effect of the bill, then, is. to authorize the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint Fitz 
John Porter to the position of colonel in the Army of the 
same grade and rank held by him at the time of his dismissal 
therefrom by the sentence, leaving it discretionary with the 
President to also place him on the retired list of the Army as 
of that grade. It supplies the President and the Senate with 
the authority, to that extent, to "carry into effect the recom-
mendation of said board" through the exercise of the ap-
pointing power. 
Such authority either is or is not coupled with a duty to 
exert it. If not, the bill partakes of the character of recom-
mendation or advice only, as it would leave the exercise of the 
appointing power in the particular case thereby authorized 
wholly dependent upon ~he pleasure of the President and 
Senate. On the other hand, could the President and Senate 
be required, as in duty bound, to exercise that power, and ap-
point Fitz John Porter to the position of colonel in the 
Army under the authority thus imparted~ In answer to 
this it is submitted that Congress cannot impose such re-
quirement, and thus virtually assume a power (that of mak-
ing an appointment to office) which does not constitutionally 
belong to it. Furthermore, if the bill be viewed as making 
it imperative upon the President to appoint, it must be 
deemed to make it equally imperative upon the Senate to 
"advise and consent" thereto. But these terms imply the 
right to exercise judgment and discretion, with which right 
such requirement would be inconsistent. 
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I am aware that the power of Congress over military and 
naval appointments has been put upon grounds not applicable 
to civil appointments. During the administration of President 
Monroe a difference of opinion upon that subject was de-
veloped between the Executive and the Senate upon the 
occasion of carrying into effect the act of March 2, 1821, for 
reducing the military establishment. The President sub-
mitted to the Senate certain no{ninations (viz, James Gads-
den, to be adjutant-general, awl Nathan Towson, to be col-
onel of artillery), accompanied by a message explaining his 
views of the act and principles adopted by him in executing 
it. In this message he observed: "In filling original 
vacancies in the artillery and in the newly-created office of 
adjutant-general, I consider inyself at liberty to place in 
them any officer belonging to any part of the whole military 
establishment, whether of the staff or line. In filling origi-
nal vacancies, that is, offices newly created, it i!::! my opinion, 
as a general principle, that Congress has no right under the 
Constitution to impose any restraint by law on the power 
granted to the President, so as to prevent his making a 
free selection of ilroper persons for these offices from the 
whole bod.Y of his fellow-citizens." .And further on he 
again observeu: "Having already suggested my im·pres-
sion that in filling offices newly created to which, on no 
principle whatever, any one could have a claim of right, 
Congress could not~ under the Constitution, restrain the free 
selection of the President from the whole body of his fel-
low-citizens, I shall only further remark, that if that im-
lJression is well founded all objections to these appointments 
must cease. If the law imposed such restraint it would in 
that case be void." 
The Committee on Military .Affairs 'of the Senate, to whom 
these nominations and the message of the President were 
referred, in their report dissented from the above doctrine, 
remarkiug: ''The Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that 'Congress shall have power to make rules for 
the government auu regulation of the land and uaval forces.' 
Under this article of the Constitution it is competent for 
Congress to make such rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of the Army and Navy as they may thmk will pro~ 
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mote the service. This power has been exercised froin the 
foundation of our Government in relation to the Army and 
Navy. Congress has fixed the rules-in promotions and ap-
pointments. Every promotion is a new appointment, and is 
submitted to the Senate for confirmation. In the several 
reductions of the Army and Navy Congress has fixed the 
rules of reduction, and no Executive heretofore has denied 
this power in Congress, or hesitated to execute such rules as 
were prescribed." 
The committee having recommended that the Senate do not 
advise and consent to the nominations mentioned, they were 
rejected by the Senate. (See Niles's Reg., vol. 22, pp. 406-423.) 
One of my predecessors, in an opinion dated January 9, 
1873 (14 Opin., 164), in which the same subject is considered, 
after reviewing the action of both the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the Government in regard to the promotion 
.and appointment of officers in the Army, concludes thus: HIt 
may therefore be regarded as definitely settled hy the prac-
tice of the Government that the regulation and government 
.of the Army include, as being properly within their scope, 
the regulation of the appointment and promotion of officers 
therein. And as the Constitution expressly confers upon 
Congress authority to make rules for the governn~ent and 
regulation of the Army, it follows that that body may, by 
virtue of this authority, impose such restrictions and limita-
tions upon the appointing power as it may deem proper in 
regard to making promotions or appointments to fill any and 
all vacancies of whatever kind occurring in the Army; pro-
vided, of course, that the restrictions and limitations be not 
inconsistent or incompatible with the exercise of the appoint-
ing power by the department of the Government to which 
that power constitutionally belongs." 
Conceding, however, all that is here claimed for Congress 
under the provision of the Constitution adverted to, it does 
not follow that the right to regulate appointments to offices 
in the Army can be carried to the designation of particular 
individuals to fill such offices, without imposing an unconsti-
tutional restriction upon the appointing power. The right 
of Congress to regulate is itself limited by the necessity of 
leaving Llue scope to the appointing power for the exercise 
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of judgment and will in perrormiug its functions, as contem-
plated by the Constitution. As was observed by Chief-
Justice Marshall, d~livering the opinion of the court in 
Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 53, 54), the clauses of the 
Constitution relating to that power "seem to contemplate 
three distinct operations : First. The nomination: this is 
the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary. 
Second. The appointment: this is also the act of the Presi-
dent, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be per-
formed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Third. The commission: * • * The last act to be done 
by the President is the signature of the commission. He has 
then acted on the ad vice and consent of the Senate to his 
own nomination. The time for deliberation has been passed. 
He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent 
of the Senate concurring with his nomination, has been made,. 
and the officer is appointed." Farther on he also observed: 
''The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until the 
appointment has been made." 
Whatever powers Congress has upon the subject of ap-
pointments in the Army must be derived from some one or 
more of the following clauses of the Constitution: ''The 
Congress shall have power" * • * "to declare war," etc. 
"To raise and support armies," etc. "To make rules for the 
go~rnment and regulation of the land and naval forces." 
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers," etc. (Sec. 8, 
Art. I.) 
But another clause of the Constitution, already adverted 
to, declares that the President ''shall nominate and, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint am-
bassadors, • * * and all other officers of the United States, 
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by law," etc. (sec. 2, Art. II). 
This is a power expressly given to the President by the same 
instrument which gives to Congress the powers above men-
tioned, namely, to make rules for the government and regu-
lation of the land forces, etc. 
From the "foregoing powers" conferred upon Qongress,. 
the power to designate b:v law a person to fill a military 
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office can not be implied; since this would be in direct con-
flict with the power of appointment expressly given the Presi-
dent as above. Regarding the bill as imposing, or attempting 
to impose, upon the President a duty to appoint the person 
designated therein, it is' without any support in the Constitu-
tion. It is an assumption of an implied power which is not 
based upon any express powrr, and clearly invades the con-
stitutional rights of the President. 
Congress has no right to enact as a law that which will be 
ineffectual. It can not enact advice or counsel. It must 
make laws that are. rules of action, not "expressions of will, 
that may or may not be followed." Counsel is a matter of 
persuasion, law is a matter of injunction; counsel acts upon 
the willing, law upon the unwilling also. (Blackstone's 
Commentaries, 44.) If, then, this bill be an injunction com-
manding the President to appoint, it is a usurpation; and if 
it be only counsel, it is without the essential element of a law; 
and Congress can enact nothing but that which is to have 
the full vigor and effect of a law. 
But, again, the bill is subject to objection upon the ground 
that Congress thereby in effect creates an office only upon 
condition that it is to be filled by a particular individual 
named. If this principle were adopted generally in the crea-
tion of offices, it would obviously result in constraining the 
appointing power to accept the condition imposed and fill the 
offices with the individuals designated by Congress; thus 
frustrating the design of the Constitution, which is that offi-
cers must be alone selected according to the judgment and 
will of the person and body in whom the powers of nomina,. 
tion, advice and.consent, and appointment are vested. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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FILLING VACANCIES IN OFFICE. 
The provisions of section 1769, Revised Statutes, relat1ve to filling vacan-
ciel:i during a recess of the Senate, are limited to vacancies happening by 
death or resignation or expiration of term of office, but do nvt apply 
to original vacancies. 
When an office is created by a law taking effect during a session of the 
Senate, and no nomination is made thereto, the original vacancy thus 
existing may be filled by the President during the ensuing recess of the 
Senate by a temporary appointment. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 25, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to your inquiry, I have the honor to state 
that the provisions of section 1769, Revised Statutes, for 
filling vacancies during recess of Senate, are limited to those 
that happen by reason of death or resignation or expiration of 
term of office, and do not apply to original vacancies-i. e., 
vacancies existing in newly created offices, where the offices 
have never b~en filled. 
The provisions of the tenure of office act of March 3, 1867, 
for filling vacancies during recess of Senate, were even more 
restrictive; they extending only to such va~ancies as happen 
by death or resignation. Yet in an opinion dated August 17, 
1868 (12 Opin., 455), while that act was in force, Attorney-
General Evarts held that where an office is created by a law 
taking effect during a session of the Senate ~nd no nomination 
is made thereto, the original vacancy thus existing in the office 
may be filled by the President during the recess of the Senate. 
The case considered by Mr. Evarts was that of the collector-
ship of customs for Alaska, an office then .recently created, 
but to which no nomination had been made prior to the ad-
journment of the Congress creating it. His opinion concludes 
with the remark: ''I do not find this case embraced within 
the operation of the tenure of civil office act, and, under the 
accepted construction of the constitutional authority of the 
President, I have no doubt of his power to grant a commis-
sion to a collector of customs for Aiaska \\:hich shall expire 
at the end of the next session of the Senate." · 
In the above view of the constitutional authority of the 
• 
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President to fill an original vacancy during the recess of the 
Senate, which existed while the Senate was in session, I 
concur. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
VACANCIES IN OFFICE. 
The power of the President to fill vacancies in office by temporary 
appointment, derived under section 2, Article II, of the Constitution, 
comprehends all vacanCies that may happen to exist in a recess of the 
Senate, irrespective of the time when such vacancies first occur. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 25, 1884. 
SIR: The provision in the · Constitution (Art. II, sec. 2), 
giving the President "power to fill up all vacancies that may 
happen during the recess of the Senate," etc., as construed 
by Attorney-General Wirt, in an opinion given to President 
Monroe in 1823 (1 Opin., 631 ), comprehends all vacancies 
that may happen to exist in a recess of the Senate, irrespect-
ive of the time when such vacancies first occurred ; and 
this construction has been reaffirmed by later Attorneys-Gen-
eral, among whom may be named Attorney -General Taney, 
Legare, Mason, Cushing, Bates, Stanbery, Evarts, Will-
iams, and Devens. Moreover, the pract,ice of the Executive 
has, as it appears, uniformly accorded with this view. 
The whole subject is elaborately reviewed in an opinion of 
Attorney-General Devens, dated June 18, 1880 (16 Opin., 
523), given upon a question which then arose as to the 
authority of the President to fill~ during a recess of the Sen-
ate, a vacancy in the office of collector of the port of Phila-
delphia caused by expiration of term while the Senate was in 
session. The opinion holds that the President had power to 
fin the vacancy by a temporary appointment; and General 
Hartranft was appointed to fill the vacancy, his commission 
to expire at the next session of the Senate. 
The considerations which support the construction men-
tioned are so fully presooted ic that opinion, that I deem it 
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unnecessary to undertake to restate them here. I will 
merely add that I am impressed with their weight, and am 
entirely satisfied as to the soundness of that construction. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF STEAM-VESSELS. 
The provision for assistant inspectors in section 4414, Revised Statutes, 
is not <;!On trolled by the details of section 4415, as to either the method 
of their appointment or the professional qualifications which may be 
required by the appointing power. 
Should an inspection of life-preservers be found necessary, and in order 
to effect this some assistant to the local board must needs be appointed, 
the appointment of such assistant would be warranted by law. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Ju-ly 3, 1~84. 
SIR: Yours of the 30th ultimo calls my attention to a 
recent recommendation Jo you by the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors of Steam-Vessels to appoint an "assistant in-
spector," under the provisions of section 4414, Revised Stat-
utes, whose duty it shall be personally to inspect life-preserv-
ers. Thereupon you ask : 
:First. Can the Secretary of the Treasury, under the stat-
utes, appoint an additional inspector ot,her than of hulls or 
of boilers ~ 
Second. Can he appoint an additional inspector of hulls 
(or of boilers) and detail him to life-preserving work? 
Third. Is he required in the appointment to conform to 
section 4415, so as that the appointee shall have the qualifi-
cations there named ~ 
I observe that by sectio·n 4421 the local inspectors are re-
quired to inspect and give a certificate as to (amongst other 
matters) the" equipment" of steam-vessels, and that by sec-
tion 4482 ''good life-preserv·ers, made of suitable material," 
are a part of such equipment. It may be taken for granted 
that such inspection, in order to be effective, should be made 
by experts. But section 4415, which gives a detailed state-
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ment of the qualifications required for local inspectors, is 
silent in respect to those obviously needed here. · 
The provision for assistant inspectors in ·section 4414 is not 
controlled by the details of 4415 as to either the method of 
their appointment or the professional qualifications which the 
appointing power shall demand. All that is ne~essary for 
these is that they shall be qualified to assist their principals 
in official duties, and that they shall be "actually required." 
Therefore if experience has shown that an inspection of life-
preservers is necessary, and that in order duly to effect it 
some assistant to the local board must be appointed, I am of 
opinion that Title LII of the Revised Statutes warrants such 
appointments. 
I therefore submit the following answers to the questions 
which you put: 
· First. The person appointed by the Secretary will be not 
a member of the "local board", but merely an assistant to the 
inspectors of hulls and boilers in such of their official duties 
as the Secretary may designate. 
Second. He will not be an '' additional inspector"; and 
his assignment to duty will properly be . made a matter of 
express designation, as suggested by· you. 
Third. He need not have the qualifications mentioned in 
section 4415. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHARWIN LAND GRANT. 
An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by the 
Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or validity of a re-
survey of a private land claim. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 10, 1884. 
SIR: The communication addressed to you by Messrs. 
Ewing and others, representing the claimants under the 
"Charwin grant," dated the 4th of May, 1883, together with 
the papers accompanying the same and referred to me for 
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my opinion as to the action desired by the said claimants at 
your hands, has received my consideration. 
On the 26th August, 1879, an order was issued by the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office for a resurvey of 
the "Charwin grant." This resurvey was made and re-
turned to the Commissioner, who is at the same time acting· 
surveyor-general of Missouri, the State in which lies the land 
alleged to be covered by the grant. 
The Commissioner was of opinion to approve tbe resurvey 
made under the order of the 26th of August, 1879, but did 
not feel warranted to do so because a previous resurvey cor-
responding exactly with the one in quest.ion had been disap-· 
proved by a former Secretary of the Interior. 
Impressed with the correctness of this resurvey, the Com-
missioner addressed a communication on the subject to the 
Secretary of the Interior, dated the 27th of September, 18so; 
a copy of which is among the papers transmitted to me. 
In reply to that communication the then Secretary, the 
Ron. C. Schurz, went into an elaborate consideration of the 
validity or correctness of the resurvey in the light of certain 
alleged new evidence, and also considered the question 
whether the decision of his predecessor on a similar resurvey 
was a bar to action on his part touching this one, and arrived 
at the conclusion that on both grounds the resurvey should 
be rejected. 
Application to you is now made to set aside this action of 
Secretary Schurz, on the ground that the case was before the 
latter only on tLe question whether the decision of his pre-
decessor was a bar to action on his part and not on the 
alleged new evidence, and that therefore his act in passing 
on this evidence was an exercise of original jurisdiction, and 
for that reason void. 
I am of opinion that an appeal to ;you does not lie in this. 
matter. If an appeal lay in such a case, it is apparent that 
it would lie in every case and from all the Executive Depart-
ments, and soon you would be overwhelmed with the details 
of administration. 
In the exercise of an admitted power Congress has com-
mitted the subject-matter involved in this case to the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of 
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the Interior, but has not provided for an appeal to you from 
the action of those officers. 
It has been repeatedly held that the observance of ~·our 
constitutional duty of taking care that the laws be faithfully 
executed does not of itself warrant your taking part in the 
discharge of duties devoh·ed by law upon an exEcutive officer. 
Upon a question so well settled I do not deem-it necessary 
to do more than to refer to the opinion of Mr. Attorney Gen-
eral Bates on the Illinois case (11 Opin., p. 14), where will 
be found references to other opinions on the same point. 
The delay in sending you this opinion is the result of my 
compliance with the request of the counsel prosecuting this 
appeal that action might be suspended to allow further 
discussion. 
I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
HOSPITAL PATIENTS. 
Under a statutory provision making an appropriation "for the care, sup-
port, and medical treatment of seventy-five transient paupers, medical 
and surgical patients in the city of Washington, under a contract t~ 
be made with such institution as the Surgeon-General of the Army may 
select," etc., that officer may, within the limits of such appropriation,. 
contract with one or more hospitals, as in his judgment will best ful-
fill its purposes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 12, 1884. 
SIR: Your letter of the 11th instant directs my attention 
to the following provision in the act making appropriation 
for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1885, and for other purposes, viz : 
''For the care, support, and medical treatment of seventy-
five transient paupers, medical and surgical patients in the 
city of Washington, under a contract to be made with such 
institution as the Surgeon-General of the Army may select," 
etc., and also presents for my consideration the question 
"whether it would be competent for the Surgeon-General to 
make one contract for twenty-five patients with the Garfield 
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Memorial Hospital, and another contract for the remainder 
with some other hospital to be selected by him, if he shall be 
of opinion that such a division of the appropriation is for 
the public interest." 
I have the honor to submit, in reply, that the provision re-
ferred to does not require the Surgeon-General, in exercising 
the authority thereby conferred, to select and contract with 
but one hospital for the care and treatment of patients. 
Under some circumstances (e. g., where suitable accommoda· 
tions could not be had in any one institution for the whole 
number) such requirement might partially defeat the chari-
table purposes of the statute; and a construction admitting 
this result under any circumstances must be rejected, unless 
it is imperatively demanded by the language of the law, 
which I do not fiud to be the case. The provision may well 
be construed to authorize the Surgeon-General, within the 
limits of the appropriation, to contract with one or more hos-
pitals, as in his judgment may best fu1fill its purposes, 
namely,'' the care, support, and medical treatment of seventy-
five transient paupers," etc. 
I accordingly answer the question submitted by you in the 
affirmative. 
I am, sir, with great respect, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Ron. ROBERT T. LINCOLN, 
Secretary of War. 
CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW PERMIT LAWS. 
In the absence of treaty or statutory provisions to the contrary, the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have power to regulate their own 
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein l)nd upon 
what conditions; and hence may require permits to reside in the na-
tion from citizens of the United States, and levy a pecuniary exaction 
therefor. 
Treaties of 1855 and 1866, in so far as they relate to this subject, consid-
ered and construed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 19, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 9th instant states a question as to the 
validity of the Choctaw and Chickasaw permit laws; and in 
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that connection asks whether, supposing these laws to be 
valid, the United States, through the proper Department, 
have power to revise them so as to s~cure reasonableness in 
the amount of the fees which they require from persons who 
apply for permits. 
I observe your reference to the fact that an opinion in 
favor of the validity of these laws has already (July 25, 1881) 
been rendered in this Department; and that the present re-
view thereof is asked in consequence of earnest protest 
against that opinion from among the people of the two na-
tions concerned-the more because such protest is in accord-
ance with the judgments of some members of' Congress and 
,other prominent gentlemen from StateJS adjoining. 
I have therefore carefully considered the matter so sub-
mitted. 
I have before me no authenticated copy of the permit law 
in question. I assume that it is substantially that which is 
contained in Senate Report No. 698, Forty-fifth Congress, 
third session, and that it is admitted that such law has been 
duly adopted by the authorities of both nations. 
The copy before me contains nine sections, substantially 
and in brief as follows : 
(1) Citizens of the United States wishing to rent land, or 
to be otherwise employed in the nation, shall enter into con-
tract with a citizen, who shall report the same to the clerk 
of the county where he resides. 
(2) The citizen shall apply to the clerk for permits for male 
non-citizens over the age of eighteen years in his employ, 
and for each permit the non-citizen shall pay $25, which 
shall be paid into the national treasury. 
(3) Foreigners coming into the nation in order to farm, or 
be employed, without authority of the United States, shall 
be intruders" by virtue of" Revised Statutes, section 2134. 
(4) Licensed residents, teachers, and physicians (non-citi-
zens) shall procure permits, and shall pay for such $25. 
(5) Permits shall be annual; "and in case of violation of 
any law of this nation the offender shall be ordered out of 
its limits." 
(6) If a non-citizen having a permit shall leave the employ 
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of the citizen without his consent, he shall forfeit the permit 
and he incapable of receiving another. 
(7) Regulating number of cattle, etc., which a person hav-
ing a permit may hold. 
(8) Certain freedmen to procure permits. 
(9) Conflicting acts repealed. 
The general question, therefore, is whether the nations have 
the power to require permits to reside from citizens of the 
United States, and to levy a pecuniary exaction therefor r 
and, if so, whethe-r that power is absolute, or is liable to re-
vision by the United States. 
That question may arise from the fundamental relations 
betwixt the United States and such nations, or because of 
the terms of some treaty or statute. 
(1) In the absence of a treaty or statute, it seems that the 
power of the nation thus to regulate its own rights of occu-
pancy, and to say who shall participate therein and upon 
what conditions, can not be doubted. The clear result of aU 
the cases, as restated in 95 United States Reports~ at page 
526, is, ''the right of the Indians to their occupancs is as 
,sacred as that of the United States to the fee." 
I add, that so far as the United States recognize political 
organizati<;ms amongst Indians the right of occupancy is a 
right in the tribe or nation. It is of course competent for the 
United States to disregard such organizations and treat In-
dians individually, but their policy has generally been other. • 
wise. In such cases presumptively they remit all question 
of individual right to the definition of the nation, as being 
purely domestic in character. The practical importance here 
of this proposition is that in the absence of express contra-
dictory provisions by treaty, or by statutes of the United 
States, the nation (and not a citizen) is to declare who shall 
come within the boundaries of its occupancy, and under 
what regulations and conditions. 
What has thus been said will of course be understeod as 
having no application to cases in which the United States, in 
connection with their own paramount rights, authorize em-
ployes of their own to enter such boundaries. The present 
question concerns only such persons as have no employment 
within the nation upon behalf of the United States. 
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(2) I am now to consider the provisions of the statutes of 
the United States, and their treaties with the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Nations. 
My attention has not been called to any statutory pro-
vision by the ·united States which is thought to apply here, 
nor upon examining the United States statutes have I found 
such. I have therefore assumed that there is none. 
The treaties of 1855 and 1866 show, of course, by their 
very existence, an intention by the United States to resort 
to the national organization of these Indians as a means of 
their civilization. In other words, the existence of these 
treaties indicates a general purpose by the United States to 
leave to these nations control of that clas.s of questions which 
in ordinary diplomatic intercourse is styled domestic. In 
the absence of a contrary intent expressed or strongly im-
plied from the "dependency" of Indians, questions of Choc-
taw and Chickasaw policy are domestic where they would 
have been so in case of a foreign nation. 
I understand that such contrary intent is thought to be 
shown in article 7 of the treaty of 1855 and the correspond-
ing provision in article 43 of the treaty of 1866, an intention 
to the same effect appearing also in article 4 7 of this latter 
treaty. 
(a) Article 7 (1855) secures to the Choctaws and Chicka-
saws, amongst other things, "the unrestricted right of self-
government and free jurisdiction over persons and property 
within their respective limits, excepting, however, all per-
sons or their property who are not by birth, adoption, or 
~therwise citizens or members of either tribe," etc. 
I submit t.hat whatever this may mean it does not limit the 
right of these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of per-
sons indifferent to the United States, i. e., neither employes, 
nor objectionable) shall share their occupancy and upon 
what terms. That is a question which all private persons 
" .are allowed to decide for themselves; and even wild animals, 
not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct which in 
this respect t;hey share with man. The serious words "juris· 
diction" and "self-government" are scarcely appropriate to 
the right of a hotel-keeper to prescribe rules and charges for 
persons who become his fellow occupants. It is therefore im-
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probable that the above proposition in the treaty of 1855 has 
any relation to this plain natural right and natural instinct 
of an Indian nation. • 
(b) By article 43 (1866) the United States promise that no 
white person, except their officers, etc., shall be permitted to 
go into the territory of the two nations, unless formally in-
corporated and naturalized by the joint action of such nations; 
such promise, however, not to affect parties already adopted, 
or white persons temporarily employed as teachers, mechan-
ics, or as skilled in agriculture, etc. 
It is not necessary to say more about the meaning of 
this article than that it has no bearing upon the question 
whether the nations may not themselves, and at their own 
discretion, exclude from their boundaries persons whom 
th~ United States have not promised to exclude-so that 
these be not persons that the United States have licensed. or-
otherwise authorized to enter. It is to be borne in mind that 
however true it may be that the United States recognize that. 
residence among the Choctaws of teachers, etc., will be a bene-
fit to them, they do not appear to intend that such residence 
shall be licensed by themselves without the consent of the-
nations, or that education and agriculture, etc., shall be fur-
thered by white residents at the will of the United States and 
individual Indians without consent of the nation. Whilst 
the United States might have so provided, it seems that as 
yet they have not. 
(c) Nor has the provision in article 47 (1866) any bearing 
upon the right of the nation to require the exaction in ques-
tion. The condition that the President should approve of 
the tax there mentioned depends upon the circumstance that 
its levy was to have the effect of diverting from its original 
purpose a certain trust fund in his hands. That before pay-
ing that fund out, the President was to be satisfied of the 
propriety and efficiency of the tax whose procetds were to be-
substituted to the public ends theretofore served by the fund, 
does not argue that such supervision is to be general, or that 
as respects other matters a right to tax does not belong to 
the nation. The presumption indeed is to the contrary. 
In the same connection article 39 of the same treaty (1866) 
may be referred to. In that power is given to tax traders,_ 
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i. e., even persons licensed by the United States. A ud to 
the same effect is article 16 of the treaty of 1855. The pe-
culiar ground of exemption in which licensed intercourse 
with Indian nations stanlls in this respect in general has 
been well understood, as I suppose, ever since the opinion of 
Attorney-General Wirt in 1824. (1 Opin., 645.) 
As I have already said, there is not in these treaties-or, 
as J gather, anywhere else-action by the United States 
licensing the intercourse upon which the exaction in question 
bas been imposed. All to that effect which appears is au 
exception of such intercourse from a prornise that the United 
States will exclude certain white persons from the Indian 
Territory. 
In conclusion I have to say, that my attention has not been 
called to any statute by which Congress has delegated to a 
Department or officer of the United States its power to con-
trol such taxation. I therefore conclude that p.o Department 
or officer has such power. 
I believe that th~ above opinion substantially covers all 
that you have asked in relation to the perrnit laws or to the 
former opinion of this Department. 
Seven papers transmitted by you are herewith retul'ned. 
With great respect, your obedient servant, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE IN'rERIOR. 
WIDOW'S PENSION. 
A pensioner, previous to his death, was in receipt of a pension of $72 per 
month under the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, chapter 236, 
and after his death a pension certificate granting $30 per month was 
issued to his widow under section 4702, Revised Statutes; but the lat-
ter claims to be entitled under that section, as widow, to the same 
amount of pension which her husband was in receipt of, viz: $72 per 
month: Held that the widow's pension is limited to the amount given 
for "total disability" by section 4695, Revised Statutes. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 26, 1884. 
SIR: By your letter of the 23d inst. it appears that Gen-
eral Ward B. Burnett, at his death, was a pensioner, in re-
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ceipt of $72 per month, under the provisions of the act of 
June 16, 1880, chapter 236, and that a pension certificate 
granting $30 per month has since been issued to Mrs. H. A. 
Burnett, as his widow; under the provisions of section 4702, 
Revised Statutes, but that Mrs. Burnett claims to be enti-
tled under that section, as widow, to the same amount of 
pension which her husband was in receipt of, namely, $72 
per month. 
Section 4702 declares that the widow "shall be entitled to 
receive the same pension as the husband would have been 
entitled to had he been totally disabled," and the question 
suggested by the present case is, whether this provision is 
limited to the pension of" total disability" given by section 
4695, Revised Statutes, or extends to pensions given for the 
class of disabilities mentioned in section 4698, and elsewhere 
described in the statute as ''permanent specific disabilities." 
I understand that, in the practice of your Department, the 
provision referred to has heretofore been construed to give 
the widow a pension for" total disability" as granted by sec-
tion 4695, and no other, and that the pension certificate 
issued to Mrs. Burnett is base.! upon t.his construction. 
Upon examination of the pension laws I perceive no . 
grounds for adopting a different construction. 
In section 4692, Revised Statutes, three distinct classes of 
disabilities are designated, namely : "total," 41 permanent 
specifict and "inferior," and for each of these classes sepa-
rate rates of pension are provided. Going back to the act of 
July 14, 1862, chapter 166, we find but two classes of disa-
bilities mentioned: "total disability" and "inferior disabil-
ity"; the pension given for the latter being, of course, less 
in amount than that allowed for the former. The provision 
for the widow's pension in that act (sec. 2) was similar to the 
provision in 4702, Revised Statutes. It entitled her to "the 
same pension as the husband would have been entitled to 
bad he been totally disabled"; and that was fixed by a pro-
vision in the same act (section 1) prescribing the rate of 
pension for "total disability." In other words, the amount 
of the widow's pension was to be ascertained by reference 
to the provision for a ''total disability" pension. 
Subsequent acts made separate provisions for particular 
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disabilities : as the loss of both feet, both hands, or both eyes 
(sec. 5, act of July 4, 1864, chap. 247), the loss of one foot 
.and one hand (sec. 3, act of March 3, 1865, chap. 84. See, 
also, act of June 6, 1866, chap. 106, sec. 1; act of ,June 8, 
1872, chap. 342; and sees. 3 and 4 of the act of March 3, 
1873, chap. 234; sees. 4697 and 4698, Rev. Stat.; act of 
June 18, 1874, chap. 298; act of ,June 16, 1880, chap. 236.) 
Thh; legislation, however, made no change in the law as 
regards the amount of the widow's pension. The partic-
ular disabilities described therein form a distinct class, 
termed" permanent specific." The widow's pension is not 
governed by the rate provided for a disability of that class, 
but by the rate provided for a "total disability," as distin-
guished in the statute from a "permanent specific disabil-
ity" or an "inferior disability." 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
TRANSPORTATION OF INDIAN SUPPLIES. 
The provision in the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 101, requiring certain 
contracts for the transportation of goods for Indian tribes, etc., to be 
let to the lowest bidder after advertisement, does not supersede or 
repeal the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 133, section 5260, Revised Stat-
utes, touching payments to land-grant railroads for services to the 
Government. "" 
Wherever it is practicable to obtain for the Government the benefit of 
the act of 1877, without yielding the benefits secured to it by the other 
legislation referred to, this should be done. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 8, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 29th ultimo calls attention to the stat-
. utes of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 291); March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 
453); and to Revised Statutes, section 5260, and asks whether 
the first named, by requiring certain contracts for the trans-
portation of goods for Indian tribes, etc., to be let to the 
lowest bidder after advertisement supersedes or 'repeals the 
two latter, which to a certain extent prohibit payment to 
land. grant railroads for services to the Government; and 
whether contracts for transportation as above can he made 
• 
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irrespective of any obligation to the Government upon the 
part of railroads which may or must be made use of by the 
contractor. 
In reply I submit, in the first place, that that statute of 
1877 neither repeals nor supersedes the others. Upon the face 
of the three statutes it does not appear that a joint effect may 
not well be derived from all for any cases that in one respect 
or another are affected by all, and where this can be done it 
should be done. 
Again, wherever and so far as it is practicable to obtain 
for the Government the benefit of the statute of 1877 u,itho1J:t 
yield·ing that given by the others, this is to be done. If trans-
portation by a railroad which receives from the Government 
only 50 per cent. of its charges to the public is lower than a 
lowest "bid," the transportation should be made by the rail-
road. And whatever advantage in any case the element of 
such privilege of the Government provides is to be had if 
practicable. If the routine forms of contracts heretofore in 
use do not secure the benefits of this statutory economy, new 
forms are to be devised, and of course new details in the cor-
responding advertisements also. 
How far, in the great variety of such cases that must occur, 
this rule may be practicable, I do not know, although proba-
bly not in all. This, however, does not forbid its application 
so far as may be. One or other or all of these statutes are 
to be made use of according as the interests of the public 
require. The necessary or probable use of a land-grant road 
may in one case constitute it de facto the lowest statu~tory bid-
der; in another may suggest the breaking up of the trans-
portation into stages and separate contracts; and in a third 
may be so uncertain or so unsubstantial an element as in 
prudence properly to be disregarded. 
These simple examples occur to me as proper to illustrate 
the above views. 
The difficulty seems to be one of administration, rather than 
as to the meaning of the legislature. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting .Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR . 
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APPRAISEMENT OF VARNISH. 
The subject of the proper appraisement of varnish imported into the 
United States from a bonded warehouse in Canada, wherein it had 
been manufactured-a component of such varnish of chief value being 
distilled spirits produced in the United States and exported thence 
into the said warehouse, where it was compounded into the varnish-
considered. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 18, 1884. 
SIR: I have attentively read and considered yours of the 
12th instant and its inclosures. 
The question which you present concerns the proper 
appraisement of'' varnish" that has been imported from a 
bonded warehouse in Canada, having been manufactured there-
·in, a component part thereof of chief value being 4' distilled 
spirits" produced in the United States and exported thence 
into the wgrehouse, from which, after being compounded into 
varnish, it is now returned. 
Three theories as to such appraisement have been hereto-
fore presented : 
(1) That the varnish is to be taxed as "a compound of dis-
tilled spirits." 
(21 That, inasmuch as "varnish" is mentioned in the cus-
toms act and has a particular duty imposed upon it by that 
name, no attention can be paid to its character as a compound; 
but, following herein a well-known rule of statutory interpre-
tation, varnish duty alone can be exacted. 
(3) Inasmuch as varnish duty is in part an ad valorem duty, 
a secondary question arises as to the rule of appraisement; 
i.e., does that rule refer to (a) values in the general markets 
of Canada, or (b) values in the bond market, it being shown 
thaii_ varnish made with distilled spirits is largely, if not gen-
erally, sold in Canada in bond. 
The importers press the theory of a bond-market valua.tion. 
for the article considered as ''varnish." 
For the Government it has been argued heretofore that 
the article should be treated with a reference to the "dis-
tilled spirits" which it contains. If that theory is untenable, 
then it is said that appraisement should be according to the 
general Canada market, and not under this or that special 
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condition to which the article in question may in fact have 
been subjected. 
But for what has passed in court upon this matter, I should 
adhere without hesitation to the conclusion suggested to you 
by Attorney-General McVeagh in his letter of May 28, 1881; 
or, in other words, that in view of the very special revenue 
policy of the United States as to "distilled spirits," articles 
which come within the verge of that policy are to be regu-
lated thereby, and that rules of construction otherwise appli-
cable must give way. I see no reason why the principle upon 
which the Supreme Court has drawn special conclusions as 
regards the treatment of ''cotton," because of the special war 
policy towards that article adopted by Congress (Young's 
case, 97 U. S., 58, etc.), does not apply to the effect above 
suggested as regards "distilled spirits." As a guide to stat-
utory meaning, a clear public policy must be allowed to out-
weigh presumptions arising from the usus loquendi as to 
matters outside of such policy. (De Forest v. Lawrence, 13 
How., 274). The well-known caution against sticking in the 
bark applies here. 
The question is an interesting one, and with all deference 
to the learned court that has held otherwise it seems to me 
that it has not so far been satisfactorily adjusted. 
In this connection I may add that my communication to 
yourself, under date of June 29, 1882, certifying that no writ 
of e~or would be taken from the judgment in Birmingham's 
case, which is the decision just alluded to, was based upon the 
view which generally governs such certificates, viz, that writs 
of error are not to be taken in cases with which the customs 
office and the district attorney do not express dissatisfaction. 
In conne0tion, however, with your recent note, I have 
looked into the question more at large~ and ask your atten-
tion to the following considerations as specially confirming 
the conclusion above drawn in general from _policy. 
The definition of "distilled spirits," for tax purposes, under 
.section 3248, includes all substances into which 4' ethyl alco· 
hoi," etc., is transferred, ''either in the process of original 
production or -bY any subsequent process.'' 
This definition governs through the whole ''act," i. e., as 
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appears by a reference to the :first page of that book, through-
out the whole Revised Statutes. 
Therefore, if varnish could have been made with distilled 
spirits in a domestic warehouse, the product for revenue 
purposes would still be "distilled spirits." Can it make any 
difference that the place of manufacture is a Canadian ware-
house¥ Would a court read this and the connected provision 
as giving protection to the foreign as against the domestic 
manufacturer¥ 
And even if, as is not to be admitted, the word "act" in 
seqtion 3248 is to be restrained to the meaning which it had 
whilst part of the act of 1868, it is to be considered that 
merely as a context, and as declaratory of an important policy 
which otherwise would be maimed, it indicates that the ex-
pression " compounds or preparations of which distilled 
spirits is a component part of chief" value," in paragraph 3 of 
page' 464, Revised Statutes, is in reason to be preferred to the 
name'' varnish" in determining the duty upon that sort of 
varnish of which distilled spirits is such component. This 
conclusion goes upon the ground that whilst for customs pur-
poses the paragraph just mentioned affects the definition of 
"distilled spirits" in section 3248, it does so only by exclud-
ing therefrom those compounds in which it is not a component 
part of chief value. 
The origin of the above paragraph defining the rate of duty 
upon compounds of distilled spirits also shows that it is em-
phatic, and therefore to be excepted from the rule of inter-
pretation applied in Birmingham's case. That paragraph is 
to be found first. in the act of 1866, chapter 298 (14 Stat., 
328), which is entitled "An act to protect the revenue, and for 
other purposes," and imposes duties upon only cigars, cigar-
ettes, and cheroots, cotton, and compounds of which distilled 
spirits is a component part of chief value. It seems plain, 
therefore, that these provisions were inserted ex industria, 
and, as said in a late historical book of great intelligence 
(Mr. Blaine's), were required in order to conform the customs 
law to the internal revenue statute, which had been enacted 
only a few days before. In other words, an independent 
conclusion is to be drawn from its history that the above 
provision for compounds of distilled spirits is not of a merely 
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residuary character, as is the case generally with those 
clauses which come under the rule of interpretation above 
cited, but was intended to furnish an additional and supreme 
regulation applicable to all articles, however otherwise 
named, in which a certain proportion of distilled spirits 
should be found. 
(2) If this be not so, or if there be good reasons for not 
renewing this contention, I submit that t'ahtes, referred to in 
paragraph 3 of page 482, Revised Statutes, are to be appraised 
under sectio~ 2906 according to the market value in the 
general Canadian markets, and not in Canadian markets for 
articles in bond. 
Additio probat minoritatem; i.e., if in section 2906 Congress 
had intended, in cases of questions raised between the prin-
cipal general market values and other special market values 
in which the article in question had in fact bfen sold, to refer 
appraisements to the latter, some additional word would have 
been employed to show it. The value of spirits in the prin-
cipal markets of the United States is not, no more being 
said, the value of spirits as exportable from bonded ware· 
houses, even if more spirits should be exported than is con· 
.sumed. 
The question as to value refers to Canada, and not to any 
limbo within Canada. 
I add that I am not informed of the grounds upon which 
the customs office has decided to refer tbe appraisement of 
tea and malt (as you say) to the value of these articles in bond, 
and therefore do not know whether some special reason may 
not control this action. 
I may also say that Jones's case (103 U.S., 87), referred to 
on behalf of the importers, does not affect the argument 
bere. That was a case of tax against a vendor upon the 
amount of sales by him. It was argued for the Government 
that upon sales in bond the true wmount could be known only 
by adding the tax that would be exacted whenever the goods 
should be taken out of bond. But the court replied that 
"amount of sales" meant actual amount, or what had act-
ually been received; and could not refer to what in addition 
the purchaser might have to pay to the Government before 
hA could reduce the things into possession. Obviously, as I 
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think, this judgment does not bear upon a question as to the 
·market value of an article so sold. For that phrase prima 
facie refers to prices the payment of which gives tile pur-
chaser a legal right to control the possession of the article 
ad libiturn; which is not the case .here, where the only right 
obtained was that of sending out of Canada an article that 
had never been mixed with the general property of that 
countr~', but had existed there only as an ear-marked article 
in close public custody. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting .LJ..ttorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE 'TREASURY. 
DUTY ON PLATED SILVER CORDS, ETC. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 21, 1884. 
SIR: Accepting, as is my duty, the facts stated by you in 
yours of the 18th instant in regard to "certain plated silver 
cords and braids and plated embroideries" recently im-
ported, I hereby submit an opinion that the same are dutia-
ble at the rate of 25 per cent. ad valorem. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY. 
Upon the facts stated : Advised that so much of the road of the St. Louis 
and San Francisco Railroad Company as lies between St. Louis and 
Pacific (a distance of about thirty-five miles) should not be treated as 
a land-grant road. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 22, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the lOth instant in regard to 
the claim of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Com-
pany that its road shall not be treated as "land grant" be-
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twixt St. Louis and Pamfic-that is, for a distance of thirty-
five miles-! beg to say : That as you make no statement of 
' facts-but for these merely refer to a number of detached 
papers inclosed-inasmuch as it is no part of my duty to 
settle questions of fact, I shall assume that the circumstances 
of the c~se upon which advice is asked are those which ap-
pear, without any special scrutiny Qf these papers, as follows: 
In 1852 a land grant was made by Congress in aid of a 
railroad which afterward was duly located and constructed 
from St. Louis, via Pacific, to Seneca; that subsequently, in 
the course of bona fide business transactions, the title to so 
much of the road as lay betwixt Pacific and Seneca was 
separated from that to the remainder thereof, and became 
vested in the company above mentioned, whose it is yet~ 
that, still subsequently, this company constructed a road 
.. for itself, connecting its terminus at Pacific with the city of 
St. Louis; and that now United States freight, etc., from 
Seneca to St. Louis, and vice versa, is transported by the 
company over its road as thus defined, viz, betwixt Seneca 
and Pacific, over the purchased part, and betwixt Pacific 
and St. Louis, over the part recently constructed. 
Under this state of facts, I advise you that the amount of 
mileage for which the company can be dealt with by the 
United States, upon a land-grant footing, is only that betwixt 
Seneca and Pacific. 
The circumstance that, previously to the completion of its 
Pacific-St. Louis division, the company had, by arrangement 
or otherwise, transported Government freight between the 
points Pacific and St. Louis over the road which formerly 
had been united with that which as above it had purchased 
(the mileage of which at that time therefore, as a matter of 
course, had been reckoned in .<;;ettlements with the Govern-
ment) is a matter of no significance in the present state of 
dealing, which is that of the road aided only so much as 
runs west from Pacific is traversed by the freight, etc., in 
question. 
Very respectfully. 
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF WAR. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
.Acting Attorney-General. 
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REGISTRY OF MAIL MATTER. 
Under the second proviso of section 3 of the act of J nly 5, 1884, chapter 
234, a departmental officer, in the discharge of his official duties, may 
register letters and packets elsewhere than in the post-office at Wash-
ington. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 2, 1884. 
Sm : Yours of yesterday, asking whether the second pro-
viso to the third section of the act of July 5 last, " .Making 
appropriations for the service of the Post-Office Department," 
etc., allows Departments to register "letters and packets" 
elsewhere than in the post-offices of this city, the seat of 
Government, has been received and considered. 
I answer that question affirmatively. 
Understanding a ''Department" as not extending to cer-
tain officers of the Government-such, for instance, as are 
excluded specifically and by . name in the opmion of the 
Attorney-General addressed to the Postmaster-General May 
lG, 1877-I advise you that a "Department" officer who, in 
the course of public business, is called temporarily to dis-
charge his official duties at some place away from the seat 
of Government, during such absence and for such duties. 
comes within the meaning of the words "Executive Depart-
ment or bureaus thereof," as used in the proviso to which 
you call attention; and therefore, if required by such dis-
charge to make use of the facilities of registry, may do so 
without the payment of any fee. 
I have, in this connection, attentively observed that the 
opinion of the 16th of May, 1877, differs with this conclusion 
· as to the rights of a Department to use official postal pn vi-
leges elsewhere than in this city. Whilst it is to be admitted 
that the Departments are, as Blackstone might have said, 
somewhat 'regardant as to Washington, yet it seems that 
such quality is not absolute and for all purposes. It is not 
necessary, perhaps not possible, now to define its extent. 
It is, no doubt, for many purposes, substantial and impor-
tant. Time will gradually establish the boundary of such ex-· 
ceptions thereto as are to be allowed. At present I need 
only say, that the exigencies of public business often require 
that officers strictly departmental shall pass to some other 
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part of the country for its transaction. Where such trans-
action is itself valid, it may be done with the aid of any help 
thereto that Congress bas devised therefor, in general terms, 
as has been done here. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. · 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PERFORMING DUTIES OF VACANT OFFICE. 
Where the office of Sixth Auditor became vacant by the death of the in-
cumbent, and the duties thereof devolved by operation of the statute 
upon the deputy auditor; .Advised that the period during which such 
duties may be discharged by the deputy is limited by statute to ten 
days. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 27, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of this date, referring to the recent death of Mr. 
Ela, the Sixth Auditor, states that 1\{r. Crowell, the deputy, 
is now performing the duties of the office so vacated; and 
asks how long the latter can continue to discharge these 
duties by mere virtue of his place as deputy. 
The statutory deputation created by the act of 1875, chap-
ter 130, for, amongst other officers, Auditors, differs from that 
at common law, and as regards, for instance, the application 
of section 180, Revised Statutes, cannot be referred to for elu-
cidation. 
For instance, these deputies do not at any time represent 
their principals; and they are empowered to fill the offices in 
connection with which they are appointed even although such 
principals are dead. _ 
The only question therefore as to the term of office of a 
deputy after the death of an Auditor is as to the meaning of 
the statute of 1~68, chapter 227, now to be found, so far as 
important here, in sections 178 and 180 of the Revised Statutes. 
The temporary term therein authorized either by the mere 
operation of the statute, or by the action of the President, 
is for no longer period than ten days. 
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The theory seems to be ( and very properly ) that iu its 
normal equipment with Auditors and deputy auditors the Treas-
ury has no more than a sufficiency of officers to transact the 
public business properly; and therefore that in case of death, 
etc., this normal equipment is to be restored within the brief 
period named. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
.1tcting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PRINTING PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. 
'The joint resolution of July 7, 1882, "to provide. for the printing of pub-
lic documents," etc., applies to all documents or reports ordered to be 
· printed by Congress, whether by special act or otherwise, so that 
such legislation does not forbid the printing of the "usual number" 
of the document. 
'The" usual number," within the meaning ofthe resolution, indicated. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Septernber 1, 1884. 
'SIR: You ask whether joint resolution No. 43, approved 
July 7, 1882, entitled ''To provide for the printing of public 
documents," etc., includes such documents as are ordered by 
act or resolution continuous in its authority from year to year, 
or Congress to Congress, as well as those ordered by special 
.act or resolution, the authority of which is exhausted by the 
publication of a single specific edition. 
The resolution is in these words: "That whenever any 
document or report shall be ordered printed by Congress, 
there shall be printed, in addition to the number in each case 
.stated, the ''usual number" of copies for binding and distribu-
tion among those entitled to receive them; and this shall 
apply to all unexecuted orders now in the office of the Public 
Printer." 
Upon a first reading this language appears to be very gen-
eral and comprehensive. 
Upon reference to the debates in Congress for information 
as to the occasion for its passage, I find that it was originally 
introduced into the House by the Committee on Printing, 
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' and that, in reply to repeated questions, it was plainly and 
briefly stated that it had been drawn by the Clerk of the 
House and presented to the committee simply for the purpose 
of restoring a state of things which had existed from early 
times until a short time before, when inadvertently some leg-
islation had changed it. There was no contradiction of this, 
the only question raised thereabout being whether the words 
of the resolution did not go further. In the Senate, the 
chairman of the like committee stated that its purpose was 
to provide for a defect caused by the circumstance that when 
documents were ordered to be printed in an appropriation 
bill, the distribution thereof being fixed by law (so many to 
each House and so many to the Departments), no provision 
arises for what is known as the" usual number," which "usual 
number" is distributable by law, one to each Senator and 
Representative, others to the libraries and document-rooms 
of each House, and others again to the Interior Department 
for transmission to public libraries. 
At the ·time of the introduction of this resolution section 
3792, Revised Statutes, provided that '' 1550 copies of any 
document ordered by Congress shall be printed, and that num-
ber shall be known as the usual number. No greater number 
shall be printed, unless ordered by either House or as here-
inafter provided." 
I understand that this usual number had an express, spe-
cific destination, as stated to the Senate. 
If so, in case any other number were expressly ordered to 
be printed for a different destination, a reasonable construc-
tion would hold such other number to be additional to the 
"usual number," to wit, so many under the special order for 
one purpose, and so many more under the general provision 
of section 3792, or any amendment thereof, for another and 
standing purpose. 
Reconciliation of the explanation given by the House com-
mittee, with that by the Senate committee as above, sug-gests 
that the occasion for the resolution of 1882 was, that the con-
struction above suggested had previously prevailed, at least 
to a considerable extent, but that more recently it had been 
rejected, at least perhaps in the case of some document more 
t}lan ordinarily deGirable. By comparing what theretofore 
TO THE SECRETARY 01!~ THE INTERIOR. 53 
Tonnage Duties. 
--------------------
had occ~red as to some documents with what more recently 
had occured as to others, the Clerk, and following him the 
committee in the House, may have concluded that a change 
had somehow or other been made affecting all documents. 
And therefore the occasion for legislation may have been so 
represented and so met. 
Upon the whole, therefore, the words of the resolution are 
not restrained by the circumstances calling for its adoption, 
and they amount to a construction of section 3792, the pres-
ent " usual number" being 1900. 
The word "document" in the resolution therefore has a 
general application to everything that is a document, no mat-
ter by what kind of legislation ordered, so that such legi.sla-
tion do not actually forbid the printing of the "usual num-
ber" of the document upon which it operates. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-(feneral. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
TONNAGE DUTIES. 
Section 14 of the act of Jm.e 26, 1884, chapter 121, does not subject the 
suspensions mentioned in its first proviBo to the discretion of the Presi-
dent. 
Meaning of the phrase " government of the foreign country," in the same 
section. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 2, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the 30th ultimo, relating to ton-
nage duties upon the '' Tin to" from Trinidad: · 
(1) The shipping act of June 26, 1884, sebtion 14, does not, 
as I understand it, subject the suspensions mentioned in its 
first proviso to the discretion of the President; and there-
fore I am of the opiniou that a right thereto arises upon the 
happening of the condition tllerein mentioned, i. e., the state 
of foreign law which in the opinion of the legislature war-
rants such suspensions. 
(2) The phrase "government of the foreign country," in 
the same section, refers, as appears by the context, to the 
special government of such ~'country," as distinguished from 
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that of the empire or other ultimate sovereignty of which it 
may be a member. 
And it seems to me also that the question in each case is 
as to the tonnage and light-house dues exacted by that ·gov-
ernment at the particular port from which the vessel arrives, 
irrespective of those exacted at other ports of the same '~ coun-
try." . . 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting A ttm·ney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
REGISTRY OF OFFICIAL LETTERS OR PACKETS. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 2, 1884. 
SIR: I am of opmwn that section 3 of ti.Je act of July· 
5, 1884:, entitled" Making appropriations for the service of 
the Post-Office Department," etc., does not authorize Indian 
agents, or receivers and registers of land offices, to free reg-
istry of official letters and packets. Such letters and pack-
ets are not registered by either a Department, or a bureau of 
a Department, within the provisions of that act. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SHIPPING COMMISSIONERS. 
A shipping commissioner bas no authority to ship seamen on "sail or-
steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," unless such vessels come 
within the exceptions of the act of June 9, 1874, chapter 260; nor will 
the consent of the master and seaman operate to give such authority. 
He should not receive fees for shipping seamen on coasting vessels not 
within said exceptions. 
Anything received by a shipping commissioner for such service is not 
required to be accounted for by the terms of section 27 of the act of 
June 26, 188~, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 6, 1884. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August 29 ultimo, inclosing a letter from Shipping 
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Commissioner J. A. O'Brien, of Philadelphia, of date August 
~3 ultimo. 
You say: "The question is submitted for your opinion, 
whether the shipping commissioners may ship such seamen 
when desired to do so by the master and the seamen; whether 
he may collect or accept a fee for the service; and whether 
such fee may be paid into the Treasury of the United States 
under section 27 of the act of June 26, 1884." 
I have to reply as follows: The act of June 7, 1872, com-
monly known as the shipping act, provided, inter alia, for the 
appointment of certain officers to be known as '' shipping 
commissioners,'' for their bonds, oaths, seals, clerks' offices, 
fees, duties, etc. The principal duties prescribed by the act 
for such an officer, and the only ones for which fees were 
provided therein, were those of engaging and discharging 
seamen and for apprenticing boys. For engaging a seaman 
in the manner and form prescribed by the act the commis-
sioner was to receive a fee of $2. This was to be paid by the 
owner, master, etc., of the vessel or the ship engaging the 
seaman, and such owner or master might deduct from the 
seaman's wages 25 cents in part recoupment of this fee. The 
law further made it a penal offense for any shipping commis-
sioner to "demand or receive any remuneration whatever, 
either directly or indirectly, for hiring or supplying any sea-
men for any merchant ships, excepting the lawful fees payable 
under this act." 
The above are among the "provisions'' of the act of June 
7, 1872. These provisions were applicable to all vessels, 
whether engaged in the foreign or coaeting trade. But it soon 
became evident that the operation of the law would become 
very onerous to those vessels of the latter class which matl.e 
short voyages. So that on June 9, 1874, an act amendatory 
thereof was passed. The purpose of this act, as stated by 
Senator Buckingham, at the time of its passage by the Senate, 
was "to relieve men engaged in short voyages and in domestic 
trade from those requirements of the existing law," among 
which requirements was this of paying a fee of$~ for engag-
ing seamen. 
The legislative intent evidently was to permit masters, etc., 
engaged in the coasting trade to ship their own seamen 
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without the intervention of a shipping commissioner. The 
act recites that" none of the provisions of" the act of June 
7, 1872, "shall apply to sail or steam vessels engaged in the 
coastwise trade," excepting certain classes of such vessels 
which are thereafter mentioned in the act. 
From the above recital it will appear what my answer to 
your first question must be. A shipping commissioner has 
no authority under the law, as it now stands, to ship seamen 
on "sail or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade" 
unless such vessels come within the exceptions of the act of 
June 9, 1874. Nor will the consent of the master and seaman 
operate to give him such authority. The jurisdiction of the 
commissioner is exactly defined by the law. No consent of 
parties can operate to enlarge it. 
The act of 1872 gave to this officer authority to ship sea-
men in all vessels engaged in the coastwise trade. The act 
of 1874 took it away again, except in certain stated cases. 
A shipping commissioner can do no more now, by virtue of 
llis office, in respect of shipping sailors on unexcepted coast-
ers, than he could have done in his private capacity prior to 
the act of 1872. 
In regard to your second question, I am of opinion that 
shipping commi~sioners should not receive fees for shipping 
seamP.n on ub.exceptecl coasters. While the act of 1874 has 
declared the penalty provision of the act of 1872 (sec. 7) not 
to apply to these cases, it has also declared the provisions in 
regard to fees to be equally inapplicable. While a shipping 
commissioner probably could not be prosecuted under section 
7 of the act of 1872 for receiving a fee for shipping a sailor 
ou an unexcepted coasting vessel, still, as he has now no 
authority in law for making such shipment, he certainly has 
no warrant for charging or accepting a fee for such service. 
In answer to your third question, I am of opinion that any-
thing received by a shipping commissioner for service of this 
sort is not required to be accounted for to the Secretary of 
the Treasury by the terms of section 27 of the act of June 26, 
1884. This conclusion will naturally follow from what has 
gone before. As I am of the opinion that shipping commis-
sioners have no authority to render such service by virtue of 
their office, ansthing received by them tllerefore would not 
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come under the head of receipts of the office, and it is only 
for such receipts that they are required to account by the act 
of 1864. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Where a question is submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the 
Solicitor of the Treasury for the opinion of the latter thereon, the 
Attorney-General will not, at the request of the Solicitor~ consider 
such opinion and express his views as to its conclusions. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 10, 1884. 
SIR: It is not the usual course for the Solicitor of the Treas-
ury or for the Assistant Attorneys-General assigned to other 
Departments to transmit to the Attorney-General their opin-
ions upon matters submitted to them therefor, in order that 
be shall consider and express his views upon their conclu-
.sions. 
The ''course of office" is that such opinions shall be re-
turned to the Secretary in charge to govern his official action 
if he concurs; as otherwise he may submit the same question 
again to the Attorney-General, giving to the latter, if he so 
choose, the advantage of perusing any opinion already ren-
dered as above supposed. 
Section 369, Revised Statutes, cited by you in this con-
nection, is treated as referring to the officers of this Depart-
ment strictly so called, jnasmuch as the legal gentlemen 
formally assigned as arlvisers, etc., of the Treasury, the In-
terior, and the Post-Office Department are assistant to the 
Secretaries and the Postmaster-General without an interven-
tion by the Attorney-General. 
I therefore herewith return the papers received in connec-
tion with yours of the 6th, being papers relating to Gris-
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wold's case, in order that the routine in such matterR shall 
be observed. 
Very respectfully, 
HENRY S. NEAL, Esq. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
Solicitor of the Treasury. 
PERFORMING DUTIES OF VACANT OFFICE. 
In the case of a vacancy in the office of Secretary of the Treasury, caused 
by the death of the incumbent: Advised that the duties of the office 
can not be performed by some other officer, under sections 177, 179, 
180, and 181, Revised Statutes, for a longer period than ten dayf.i. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Septembe·r 11, 1884. 
SIR: I have examined the legislation which concerns the 
appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury. In general it 
appears not to have been changed since the year 1789. The· 
statutes of that year made provision for the Departments of 
State, War, and Treasury only ( 1 Stat., pp. 28, 49, and 6o). 
As to the method of appointing the respective ''Secretaries" 
.thereof nothing is said expressly. In each this matter is left 
to that bare provision of the Constitution, which vests such 
duties in the President; as follows: 
"There shall be at the seat of Government an Executive 
Department to be known as the Departmp,nt of, etc., and a 
Secretary of, etc., who shall be the head thereof." (Stat. 
of 1789 and Rev. Stat.) 
" He shall nominate, and by and with the ad vice and con-
sent of the Senate shall appoint, * * • all other officers 
of the United States whose appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for," etc. (Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2.) 
Upon consideration, therefore, of the question which has 
arisen upon the rec~nt death · of Secretary Folger, I have 
taken occasion to recur to the opinion which, upon the 31st 
of March, 1883, I submitted to you upon the death of Post-
master-General Howe, and I advit5e you that the conclusion 
in that case applies also in tl1e present-that is, that under 
I 
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sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 of the Revised Statutes no 
statutory succession or assignment of some other officer to 
the vacancy is valid for a longer period in all than ten days. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
· An opinion of the Attorney-General upon any question arising in the 
administration of the Treasury Department can only be had at the 
instance of the Secretary. 
Where a question has been submitted by the Secretary to the Solicitor 
oftbe Treasury for advice thereon, t.be latter is not entitled, by virtue 
of section 361, Revised Statutes, to call upon the Attorney-General for 
his views on such question. 
The Solicitor should, in such case, return his advice directly to the Sec-
retary, who may, if he choose, require an opinion from the Attorney-
General upon the same question. 
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 15, 1884. 
SIR : I observe that yours of the 12th instant, now before 
me, changes the form of your previous application in Gris-
wold's case, and brings it within the practice to which you 
refer as having obtained in four cases entertained here be-
t'Yeen January and October in 1879, whilst Mr. Raynor held 
the responsible place now occupied by yourself. (16 Opin.,. 
259, 385, 571 and 617.) 
I think that such practice should be changed, and will 
state my reasons therefor. 
The question as to Griswold which you state is, of course,. 
one arising within section 356, Revised Statutes, in the ad~ 
ministration of the Treasury Department. 
I observe that the duty in that section imposed upon the 
Attorney-General to give an opinion in such case at there-
quirement of the Secretary of the Treasury implies that be 
is not to give such opinion at the requirement of any other 
officer thereof. 
This conclusion is strengthened by a provision of the 
next section (366), which in the same connection makes an 
express distinction betwixt the War and Navy Departments 
and all others, and directs that all questions arising in the 
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administration of the two former, the cognizance of which is 
not given by statute to some other officer, shall be sent to 
the Attorney-General. 
If it be granted that this allows questions in the War and 
Navy Departments to be sent to the Attorney-General by 
somebody else than the Secretaries, it is evident that it 
makes a distinction therein betwixt these Departments and 
all others, and that for a reason which upon its face it sug-
gests. And if it be not granted that such questions can be 
transmitted otherwise than by the Secretary, then it fo1lows 
that under even a more general provision offic3rs of theW ar 
and Navy Departments, other than their heads, can not regu-
larly ask for opinions by the Attorney-Genm·al. 
Admitting this, it may however be replied that the Solici-
tor of the Treasury is himself expressly an officer of the De-
partment of Justice (sec. 349), and therefore by virtue of sec-
tion 361: which was cited in your former letter, is entitled to 
the direction of the Attorney- General. 
Whatever this direction may include, I am of opinion that 
it does not extend to opinions asked and given in the course 
of a formal correspondence in writing. 
If the Solicitor of the Treasury can authorize such corre-
spondence as to matters which in due course come before 
him, why may not the Solicitor-General do the same~ And, 
if the Secretary of the Treasury ask for an opinion by the 
Attorney-General, why may not the latter (under sec. 358) 
refer the question to be answered by the Solicitor of the 
Treasury~ 
My view is that section 358 does not apply in cases where, 
as in the Department of the Treasury, Interior, etc., the 
Secretary has a right to ask for an opinion from the sub-
ordinate directly; i. e., without an intervention by the Attor-
ney General; i. e., in other words, where for the purposes of 
the particular matter the formal "subordinate" is really not 
.so, but is subordinate to another "head." So whenever, as 
by section 3469, a substantive duty is expressly imposed 
upon the ''subordinate" in regard to some ''bead" of 
another Department, in my opinion such duty is not per-
formed "under the direction of the Attorney-General" within 
the words of section 361. This section, originally enacted in 
1870, was intended, in a quasi residuary character, to cover 
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cases not th~retofore provided for, and therefore not a '' rec-
ommendation" under section 3469; i. e., originally an act of 
1863. 
Without undertaking to state the difference betwixt the 
''opinions," "directions," and "recommendations" mentioned 
in the statutes before me, I think it plainly intended that 
opinions by the Attorney-General upon questions like the 
present, arising in the administration of the Treasury De-
partment, can be had only at the instance of the Secretary. 
There is the same advantage to the Secretary in first ob-
taining a deliberate opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury, 
and in reserving to himself a right of afterwards, by way of 
review, applying to the Attorney-General for another, that 
litigants have in a series of courts before which to contend 
for their rights. And it is the same sort of defeat of public 
policy for a Supreme Court to intervene in proceedings pend-
ing in a superior court, and for an Attorney-General to give 
an opinion to the Solicitor of the Treasury without require-
ment by the Secretary. If the Secretary have a right to the 
opinion of the Attorney-General in such cases by way of 
review, he has equally a right that the latter shall not pre-
viously commit his judgment thereupon. 
This question was not considered in the cases to which 
you refer, and probably did not really occur. It seems to 
me that these cases make a breach of good form, and should 
not be followed. There is some account to be given of their 
passing so easily in that your able and experienced prede-
cessor was known not to have practiced law for perhaps 
forty years, and therefore, if he chose to go outside of his 
own office for aid, to have unusual claim for indulgence upon 
merely technical questions. Now that the office is in the 
hands of a lawyer tout temps prist, the practice may better 
be recalled to its original course. (See 14 Opin., 21.) 
I therefore return herewith the original papers inclosed 
with yours, and await any requirement that the Secretary 
may choose to make. 
Very respectfully, 
HENRY S. NEAL, Esq., 
Solicitor of the Treasury. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney General. 
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INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized, under certain con-
ditions, to cause internal-revenue stamps, for the payment of tax upon 
tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 16, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the 2d instant, asking whether 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized, under 
the appropriate legislation for the present fiscal year, to cause 
certain internal-revenue stamps, for the payment of tax upon 
tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the Bureau of En-
graving and Printing, I have to say that I am of opinion 
that he is so authorized, provided that the United States are 
at no expense thereabout beyond that for the provisional 
payment of the salaries of one stamp agent and one counter, 
"to be reimbursed by the stamp manufacturers." 
The sundry civil act of July 7 last prohibits any expendi-
ture for stamps prepared elsewhere than at the bureau above 
named, but leaves the authority of the Commissioner there-
about in other respects untouched, whilst the provision in 
the act of the same date, providing for the legislative, etc., 
expenses, clearly contemplates a continuance of the practice 
of procuring stamps from ordinary manufacturers, who are 
there required to repay the salaries of officers whose appoint-
ment is rendered necessary by that practice. 
Three original papers inclosed in yours are herewitb. re-
turned. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. 
The "Foxhall" gold and silver cup is free of duty under sections 2499 
and 2502, title XXXIII, Rev. Stat., as enacted by the act of March 3, 
1883, chapter 121. 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
ljeptember 19, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 17th instant, referring to the "Foxhall" 
gold and silver cup won at Ascot, which was the subject of 
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my letter to you of the 2d instant, asks whether it may not 
properly be held to be an article having similitude in " mate-
rial and quality and texture and the use to which it may be 
.applied" to a "medal" made of those materials. and there-
fore whether it is not free under section's ~499 ~nd 2502 of 
the customs act of 1883. 
Upon consideration I answer this question in the affirma-
tive. 
As has been suggested, the purpose of the cup, like that of 
a medal, is to commemorate a particular event. Substan-
tially it is a trophy, and has no other value, except in point 
()f material, and that is free. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
REFUNDING FINE UNDER SHIPPING ACT. 
Section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, does not require that a 
protest shall have accompanied the payment of the fine, etc., a refund-
ing of which by the Secretary of the Treasury is asked. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 19, 1884. 
SIR: In .compliance with yours of the 13th instant, I have 
-examined the question already presentt:d in the case of the 
Bessie May, without regard to the special circumstanees for-
merly (2d instant) stated in that connection. · 
That question is, whether section 26 of the shipping act of 
the 26th of June last requires that a protest shall have accom-
panied the pa~·ment of the fine, etc., a refunding of which is 
sought from the Secretary of the Treasury. 
In my opinion it does not. 
The section under consideration provides in substance that 
whenever any fine, etc., under laws relating· to vessels and 
seamen, has been paid to a.ny collector or consular officer, and 
application has been made within o11e year therefrom for its 
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was illegally imposed, shall have power to refund so much 
thereof as he may think proper. 
This is, therefore, not a case in which the United States 
define the circumstances under which they will submit them-
selves to coercion by a court in respect to money which some 
officer in the executive department may have adjudged to be 
justly due, as IS the case in section 2931, Revised Statutes; but 
it is one in which the executive department is intrusted with 
the power of rejudging its own judgment, and of doing there-
about what~oever it may think right, without control. 
I am therefore of opinion that the omission in the provision 
before me to require a protest by the applicant as a founda-
tion for the refund is deliberate. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS. 
Right of the United States to occupy and use soil within the bed of a 
river for the improvement of its navigation affirmed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 21, 1884. 
SIR: I submit the following opinion in reply to yours of 
the 24th instant, relating ·to the improvement of the Falls of 
the Ohio, at Louisville, Ky., and asking whether the engi-
neer officers of the United States in charge thereof, under 
the act of the 5th of July last, may enter upon certain prem-
ises, necessary to be occupied and used in the course of 
such improvement, without making preliminary compensa· 
tion to the owners under the law of eminent demain. 
It would have been better if the communication of the 
Chief of Engineers had stated the facts as to th.e site of the 
premises directly, so as to avoid all chance of error in consid-
ering the various papers which accompany that letter. 
I gather, however, that the premises are within the bed of 
the Ohio at its average stage, and at that stage are coverrd 
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with water; or, at all events that, but for improvement 
works heretofore erected by the United States, they would 
be so covered. 
In either case I am of the opinion that in the present con-
nection they do not raise any question under tht law of emi-
nent domain, being held by their owners subject to the higher 
rights and duties of the United States in regard to navi-
gation. The exercise of those higher rights is not attended 
by such obligations to the lower as on behalf of these are 
suggested. The latter, so far as. concerns the degree to 
which at any time they may be enjoyed, are contingent upon 
and recede before the development of the former. There is 
consequently no collision betwixt the two. 
If, during the progress of an improvement requiring years 
for its completion, and in consequence thereof a piece of land 
within the bed of a river becomes dry or more dry than be-
fore, I am of opinion that this circumstance does not impair 
the original right of the United State~ to deal therewith. 
In exercising their important rights and duties in respect 
to navigable rivers, the United States may divert the current. 
thereof-the deep wate:rr-to any portion of their beds ; and,. 
equally, they may use any other portion of those beds to 
secure such primary purpose, and both without being amen-
able for a violation of rights of private property. 
The cases in 16 Opinions of Attorneys-General, cited in the 
papers inclosed by you, are in point for this conclusion ; and 
so is the general course of the judgment of the Supreme 
Court in 99 United States Reports, 635. The whole bed of 
the river is a road, and may be improved or be made to con-
tribute to an improvement of the rest. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
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S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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POTOMAC FLATS. 
The existence of certain claims of title to the "Potomac flats" is not 
an obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation made by the act 
of July 5, ltl84, chapter 229. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Sep.temb.er 29, 1884. 
SrR: In reply to your communication of the 20th Septem. 
ber instant, asking whether the existence of certain undet"er-
mined claims of title to the Potomac fiats is an obstacle to 
the expenditure of the appropriation of $500,000 under the 
act of the 5tb of July, 1884, I submit that in the communica-
tion of the 2d of September, 1882, which you cite, the At-
torney-General was of opinion that the claims in question 
were no obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation 
then under consideration. In conformity therewith I now 
advise that they are no more an obstacle to the expenditure 
of the appropriation to which you now refer. 
In addition to the probability of the former opinion of 
itself, the silence of Congress on this matter in thP- act of the 
5th of July, 1884, may very properly be taken as a con firma . 
tion thereof. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
INDIAN TERRITORY-INTERNAL REVENUE IN. 
Internal revenue taxes on distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, 
etc.,-produced in the Indian Territory, and special taxes on the manu-
facture and sale of those articles in that Territory, may lawfully be 
collected within the same. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 29, 1884. 
SIR : I submit the following reply to yours of the 27th inst., 
which asks "Whether the Interilal-Revenue taxes on dis-
tilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuff, and cigars, 
produced in the Indian Territory, and the special taxes on 
the manufacture and sale of those articles in that Territory, 
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can be lawfully collected within said Territory from any per-
son therein who manufactures or sells said articles, notwith-
standing the provisions of article 10 of the treaty of August 
11, 1866, with the Cherokees ( 14 Stat., 799), or of any other 
treaty or treaties now existing between the United States 
and any of the Indian tribes or nations re~iuent in the said 
Territory." 
In that connection I have carefully read the letter and in-
-closure from the Commissioner of Internal Re"euue addressed 
to yourself, which you have done me the favor of transmit-
ting. 
I do not see that the authority of the Cherokee tobacco 
case (11 Wall., 616) has been done away with by anything 
authoritative which has since passed. I feel free to go that 
far, although all that is necessary practically here is for me 
to say that until that decision bas formally been overruled 
it will be the duty of all the authorities of the United States 
to enforce it, and leave to the other side the part of ques-
tioning it by another writ of error. 
The full strength of the case, however, is that the author-
ity of that case for everybody (excepti11g the court itself, as is 
the meaning of Mr. J astice Field's remark in the Forty-three 
·gallon case, 108 U. S., 491 ), so long as it stands, is final; and 
it is an official duty to enforce it. 
For the rest, the judgment in 108 United States Reports, 
491, does not touch the principle involved in the case whose 
authority over the public is now in question. Statutes im-
posing a tax upon licenses import nothing as to whether in 
any special case a license is otherwise valid. Therefore they 
do not conflict with previous police statutes which, operating 
upon their subject-matter from another point of view, render 
licenses in certain cat-ies invalid. Where there is no conflict 
there can of course be no suggestion of an implied repeal. 
Then as to the act of 1880, chapter 123 (21 Stat., 544), for 
the relief of Boudinot, wh~ch is cited as perhaps discrediting 
the principle of the decision in the Cherokee tobacco case 
11ow questioned, I submit that it expressly affirms it, alleg· 
iug that the act superseded the treaty, and as expressly plac-
ing tile relief which it g'i'\es upon a circumstance which it 
a.sserts that the court '~ was not called upon to decide and did 
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not decide; " i. e., whether the United States officials "hail 
taken the necessary steps to make said one hundred and seventh 
section operative in the Oherokee Nation anterior to said seiz-
u.re of the property of said Elias C. Boudinot." lt then pro-
ceeds to find that for that reason a wrong ( i. e., an act which 
for want of the steps required by the tax act was an infrac-
tion of the treaty) had been done t9 Boudinot, and gives 
relief accordingly. 
If the legislature had regarded the principle in the decis-
ion of the Supreme Court improperly applied as between the 
Cherokee treaty and the subsequent internal-revenue act, it 
would have provided for all cases past and to come; but in-
stead of that it not only makes a carefully detailed provision 
for one case, the exceptional features of which are stated, 
but accompanies that provision by an express legislative 
concurrence in the general doctrine of the judgment by which, 
on account of defective administrative action, Boudinot had 
suffered 'wrong. 
I do not find that the specific question in the Cherokee to-
bacco case has been before the Supreme Court since; but that 
decision is quoted as an authoritative announcement of this 
principle by a unanimous court in J.fcBratney's case (104 U.S., 
621). . 
I believe that this will sufficiently indicate my opinion as 
to the question above stated. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTY ON SAWED LUMBER. 
Boards and other articles of sawed lumber of pine are dutiable at $2 .pel" 
thousand feet under the act of March 3, 18R3, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 8, 1884. 
SIR: The question submitted in your communication of 
the 18th ultimo is whether the duty on sawed boards, etc., of 
pine is $1 per thousand, as claimed by the importers, or $2, 
as assessed by the collectors. 
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The question arises upon the following provision in Sched-
uleD, act of 3d March, 1883 (22 Stat., 501): "Sawed boards, 
plank, deals, and other lumber of hemlock, white-wood, syca-
more, and bass- wood, one dollar per one thousand feet, board 
measure; all other articles of sawed lumber, two dollars per 
ohe thousand feet, board i..Jeasure." 
The tariff previously in force provided as follows: "Sawed 
hoards, plank, deals, and other lumber of hemlock, white 
wood, sycamore, or bass-wood, one dollar per thousand feet, 
board measure. .All other varieties of sawed lumber, two dol-
lars per thousand feet, board measure." (Rev. Stat., Sched-
ule K, p. 470.) 
Your interpretation of the latter provision was that the 
duty of $1 applied only to sawed boards, plank, and deals 
manufactured out of hemlock and the other woods specified, 
and consequently that sawed boards, plank, and deals of pine 
wood were subject to a duty of $2 per thousand feet. You 
place the same interpretation on the similar provision in the 
new law. 
I am of opinion that the difference in wording between the 
two acts (i. e., the substitution of" articles" for" varieties"), 
so far as this bears upon the present question, is immaterial, 
and therefore concur in your ruling above stated. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SEIZORS AND INFORMERS IN REVENUE CASES. 
Where a claimant was both seizor and inforruer under the act of June 22, 
1874, chapter 391, in the case of goods forfeited for violation of the cus-
toms laws, compensation may be allowed him by the Secretary of the 
Treasury in either capacity; and the fact that the claimant originally 
presented his claim as seizor does not estop him from subsequently 
changing its form and making claim as informer. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 18, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 11th instant, referring to the ~Jase of 
Egan and Smith, claimants for compensation upon a late 
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seizure of opium at San Francisco, and calling attention to· 
section 4 of the act of June 22, 1874 (Rev. Stat., Supp., p. 77), 
asks the following question: · 
'' If the facts in the case of seizure of goods for violation of 
the customs re\enne laws show that the seizure was .not made 
by a customs officer, but by 'other persons,' and that the 
goods were turned over by the seizors to the customs officers, 
who at the same time gave information of tlle smuggling to-
such officers, is the Secretary of the Treasu~y bound under 
the statute in question, in making an award, to treat them 
as seizors only, or may he at his option treat them as seizors 
or informers~" 
It appears that the claimants, having had information or 
reason to suspect that a considerable quantity of opium was 
about to be smuggled into San Francisco, an option presented 
itself to them under the above-namerl statutes, viz, either to-
"inform" (under paragraph 2, Rev. Stat., Supp.) and there-
upon apply for the $5,000 or less which the Secretary should 
conclude to be a fit compensation therefor, or to "seize'' 
(under paragraph 1), and thereupon entitle themselves to per-
haps one-half of the value of the opium. 
They exercised their option in favor of the second alterna-
tive, and with reasonable prudence, too, inasmuch as the 
value turned out to be some $26,000. 
By some unforeseen and unexplained circumstance, i. e., in 
the language of the law by some accident, it subsequently 
turned out that the opium produced at public sale only some 
$7,000, which was not enough to pay the duty thereupon; 
and so, according to the statute, the claimants can get noth-
ing for their services. 
The question put by you above, when stated in technical 
· form, is substantially, "whether Egan and Smith are there-
upon equitably estopped from go-ing back, as it were, and 
making claim as informers." 
'):here is no appearance or suggestion that the United 
States have been put in any worse condition by the option 
which Egan and Smith exercised as above than if at first 
they had chosen to be informers. Their real merit is in 
bringing the 3,880 boxes to justice, so to say, and that this 
bas been done in one way rather than another is matter of 
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form. If in any case a selection of such forrn Las not preju-
diced the Government in the result, no reason occurs why 
the Secretary, in his discretion, may not allow the claimants 
to change that. 
In this connection it cannot be regarded as prejudice that 
under one form the Government will pay no compensation, 
whilst under the other it will. Congress has said in effect 
that compensation in these cases is for the public good. 
There is no adverse interest in that respect betwixt the claim-
ants and the public. I think that the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary to allow a claim is not defeated by the circum-
stance that since it originated there has be~n a change in 
its form, no harm having come to the public because of the 
original selection or because of such change. The United 
States are to-day, as I understand, just where they would 
have been if Egan and Smith bad by information procured 
a customs officer to seize the opium instead of seizing it them-
selves. -
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
MAIL TRANSPORTATION. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 31, 1884. 
SIR: I have considered your communication of the 22d 
instant, requesting to know whether the construction placed 
by the Post-Office Department on section 4002, subordinate · 
section 2, prescribing the mode in which the average of the 
·weight of mails transported on railroad routes shall be ascer-
tained, is correct, and am of opinion that that construction is 
correct, and that a departure from it would defeat the inten-
tion of the law and cause no little embarrassment. 
I have the honor to be, your ooedient serYant, 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Acting Attm·ney-General. 
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COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS. 
Where judgment was recovered in the name of the United States against 
G. for damages and penalties, under sections 3490, 3491, 3492', and 
3493, Revised Statutes, the action having been instituted and prosecuted 
by D.: .Advised that the Secretary of the Treasury has power, by 
virtue of section 3469, Revised Statutes, to compromise !>uch judgment, 
irrespective of the quasi interest which D. may have therein. 
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE, 
November· 13, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 4th ultimo states the following case: 
"There has been transmitted to me for official action a 
proposition made by one W. C. Griswold to compromise a 
judgment recovered against him in the name of the United 
States in the district court of the United States for the dis-
trict of Oregon. 
"It appears that the original action was for damages and 
penalties provided for in sections 3490, 3491, 3492, and 3493, 
of the Revised Statutes, for acts committed by Mr. Griswold 
which are prohibited by some of the provisions of section. 
5438, Revised Statutes., and that one Dowell instituted the 
action and pro~ecuted the same to final judgment under the 
provisions of the first above cited sections." 
Upon this statement you ask whether such judgment 
comes within the scope of ·section 3469, Revised Statutes, 
which authorizes you to compromise "any claim in favor of 
the United States," after report, etc., the only reason to the 
contrary arising out of the interest which Dowell claims 
therein. 
It appears from the papers that after a large part of the 
judgment had been collected it became, and . remains, a mat-
ter of doubt whether anything more can be made; and t,hat 
the proposed compromise relates merely to this latter part. 
Upon consideration, I advise that this question comes 
within the principle announced in United States v. Morris (10 
Wheat., 246). 
In that case a jud~ont of forfeiture had been entered 
again~t one Ogden; a judgment therefore which,-as might 
have been thought, had conclusively ascertained all matters 
necessary to such forfeiture. The suit had been prosecuted 
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in tl.te interest of certain officers who, under a statute, were 
-entitled to one-half thereof. Nevertheless, the Secretary of 
the Treasury remitted such forfeiture. Thereupon it was 
.argued that after judgment the Secretary had no .such power 
as to the share of the officers. The court, however, held that 
he had, and this under a train of general reasoning which 
seems to be pertinent here. 
It seems that the phrase, "in favor of the United States,?' 
in section 3469, includes judgments like that before you, 
under ·the reasoning in the case in Wheaton. Nor can the 
circumstance that in suits under sections 3490, etc., the pros-
·ecutor is liable for costs, make any important difference in 
poip.t of principle between the case of Griswold and that of 
Morris. 
I therefore advise that you have th power to compro-
mise judgments in the situation of this one, where the only 
.objection arises out of the quasi interest of the prosecutor 
therein. 
Even if this conclusion were somewhat uncertain, I might 
still give the above advice, seeing that if it be mistaken the 
prosecutor may have relief by proceetlings in court; wherea~ 
if the advice were to the contrary and mistaken, Griswold 
.could have no means of so correcting it that occurs to me. 
Very respectfully, 
S. ~'. PHILLIPS, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CLAIM OF MRS. WARD B. BURNETT. 
The claim of Mrs. Burnett for a pension, as widow, considered in con-
nection with the acts of June 18, 1874, chapter 298, and June 16, 1880, 
chapter 236: and held that those acts did not change or increase her 
rights, which are still governed, as to the amount of the pension to 
which she is entitled, by section 4695, Revised Stli.tutes. 
DEP ~RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
- N O'l.,em ber 15, 1884. 
SIR: In the matter of the pension certificate of Mrs. Ward 
B. Burnett I repl} to your reference as follows: 
Congress, by act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 665), directed 
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the name of Ward B. Burnett to be placed upon the pension 
roll 'at the rate of $50 per month, and a certificate was issued 
to him accordingly. In July, 1882, be surrendered his cer-
tificate, relinquishing his claim under the special act and 
electing to receive a pension of $72 per month under the 
general act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat. 281) . . Un the 25t.h 
day of July, 1882, it was enacted that no person who is now 
receiving or who shall hereafter receive a pension under a 
special act shall be entitled to receive in addition thereto a 
pension under the general law, etc. His application for man-
damus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to return the 
certificate issued under the special act was refused by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground that t.be 
act of 1882 forbade payment of a double pension, and there-
fore a judgment ordtring that the certificate be returned to 
him would be futile. (107 U. S., 64.) 
At the time of his death he held a certificate entitling him 
to a ~ension of $72 a month, but the certificate issued to his 
widow, there being no surviving children, is· only for $30 per 
month. 
Upon objection by Mrs. Burnett to this allowance the Sec-
retary of the Interior requested the opinion of this Depart-
ment. His action in fixing her pension at $30 per month re-
ceived the approval of Acting Attorney-General Phillips, as 
appears by the following opinion. 
(Here follows the opinion referred to, which is dated July 
26, 1884, see page 39, supra.] 
I submit also the following considerations: 
Section 4 702, Revised Statutes, under which the certificate 
has been issued to Mrs. Burnett, provides : 
"If any person embraced within the provisions of sections 
4692 and 4693 her~after dies by reason of any wound * * • 
which under * * * said sections would have entitled 
him to an invalid pension had he been disabled, his widow 
* * • shall be entitled to receive the same pension as the 
husband • • • would h~Ye been entitled to had be been 
totally disabled, " etc. 4 
Section 4695 provides that-
" The pension for total disability shall be as follows: For 
lieutenant-colonel and all officers of higher rank in the mil-
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itary service * * * thirty dollars per month," and for 
lower ranks the pension ranges from $20 down to $8. 
Section 4697 and 4698 provide pensions for permanent spe-
cific disabilities irrespective of rank for persons who, if taking 
under section 4695, would, on account of their rank, receive 
less than the amounts provided in sections 4697 and 4698. 
None of the rates mentioned in these sections exceed the $30 
per month which General Burnett could have taken under sec-
tion 4695, except the allowance of $31.25 per month to per-
sons so totally disabled as to require the regular personal aid 
and attendance of another person. To persons totally dis-
abled, but not requiring personal aid and attendance, section 
4698 gave but $24. 
Since December 1, 1883, two statutes have been passed 
amending sections 4697 ~nd 4698. 
The act of June 18, 1874 (18 Stat., 78), gives a pension of 
$50 a month to pensioners so tota1ly disabled as to require 
the regular personal aid and attendance of another person, 
and the act of June 16, 1880, gives to all soldiers and sailors 
receiving $50 per month under the act of June 18, 187 4, $72 
per month. 
Mrs. Burnett claims that instead of receiving the $30 per 
month fixed by section 4695 for lieutenant-colonels and offi-
cert; of higher rank, she should receive the $72 given by the 
act of 1880 to soldiers and sailors, irrespective of rank, who 
were so helpless as to require personal aid and attendance. 
If the acts of 1874 and 1880 had been accompanied by a 
provision defining the rights of the surviving widow and 
children, saying either that the new legislation should not 
affect tbeir pensions, or that the pension given them on the 
death of the husband or father should correspond to the 
amount received by him at his death, tbe case would be free 
from all doubt. But Congress has not done this, and we are 
left to ascertain from the language of the statutes whether 
Congress, in increasing in 187 4 and 1880 the pensions for spe-
cific disabiiity, meant to enlarge and increase the pension for 
the survivors. The key to the solution of this question 
seems to me to be found in that clause of the act of 187 4 
which confers the increa~e only upon those who have been so 
permanently and totally di~abled as to require the regular 
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personal aid and attendance of another person. The certifi-
cate to 'General Burnett for a pension of $72 is sufficient evi-
dence that he did require such personal aid and attendance; 
but if General Burnett had been so stricken as to be unable 
to assist in the least degree in the maintenance or support of 
his family, and yet did not require regular aid and attend-
ance, his pension would have been limited to the $30 fixed by 
section 3695. There seems to be no hardship in giving to 
Mrs. Burnett only that sum which her husband would have 
received if he could have dispensed with personal attend-
ance. 
It is my opinion that if General Burnett had died prior to 
the passage of the act of 187 4 his widow would have been 
entitled to the amount received by him for total disability as 
set forth in ·section 4695, and that the acts of 1874 and 1880 
did not change or increase her rights, t.hough passed in the 
life-time of her husband. 
I have endeavored to answer your inquiry in full 1 but as 
Mrs. Burnett retains the letter of reference, declining to 
allow it to go upon the files of this Department, it is possi-
ble that I have omitted something. If such be the case I 
will be glad to make further answer. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD. 
A tunnel constructed in the manner proposed by the S'taten Island Rapid 
Transit Railroad Company acros8 a part of the light-house grounds 
at New Brighton, Staten Island, is within the provision of the act 
of February 9, 1881, chapter 41, granting right of way through said 
grounds. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 15, 1884. 
SIR : By letter of the 18th ultimo your predecessor in of-
fice called my attention to tbe act of February 9, 188J., chap-
ter 41, which grants to the Staten Island Rapid Transit Rail-
road Company, for the purpose of constructing a railroad, 
"the right of way, by tunnel not exceeding 30 feet in width, 
through the lands of the United States now occupied by the 
United States Light·House Establishment in the village of 
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New Brighton," etc., and after stating that the alJove-named 
company desire " to make an open cut through at least a por-
tion of the light-house grounds, to build a brick or masonry 
arch over this portion of their road, and to then restore the 
surface of the ground to its original level by filling in earth 
above the arch," requested my opinion upon the question 
''whether the method of building referred to should be con-
sidered a tunnel within the meaning of the act." 
I perceive nothing in the terms of the act that forbids the 
construction of a tunnel in the manner proposed, which, I 
understand, meets with no objection from the Light-House 
Board. The substance of the grant is, the right to establish 
a railroad through the light-house grounds by means of a 
tunnel. Whether the tunnel shall be constructed by burrow-
ing under the surface of the ground, or by making an open 
cut, turning an arch, and l'efilling, is not prescribed by the 
statute, but is left to depend upon the topography and nature 
of the ground and other circumstances connected with the 
location of the tunnel, which is placed under the control of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, being subject to his approval. 
To the question submitted I accordingly reply, that in my 
opinion a tunnel built in the manner proposed by the above-
named company may be considered a tunnel within the mean-
ing of the act. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BEN.TAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Bon. HUGH McCuLLOCH, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury upon questions relating to the past action of 
the Board of Supervising Inspectors, which was had on a matter prop-
erly submitted to such board under the provisions of section 4491, 
Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewal?le by the Secretary. 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 19, 1884. 
SIR: In a communication dated the 23d of September last 
the Hon. Charles E. Coon, then Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury, called my attention to a letter inclosed therewith, 
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addressed to your Department by J. Chandler, esq., contain-
ing an extract from the proceedings of the Board of Super-
vising Inspectors at its annual meeting held in January, 
188!, in relation to the "Edson recording steam-gauge," 
which had been submitted for the approval of the board. 
By these proceedings it appears that that instrument was not 
approved, on the ground that it failed to meet all the re-
quirements of the statute (sees. 4418 and 4419, Rev. Stat., 
especially the latter section) as understood by the board. 
Hereupon two questions (suggested by l\Ir. Chandler with 
reference to the view of the board as to the meaning of sec-
tion 4419) are proposed for my opinion in the above-men-
tioned communication. 
By statute, the duty of the Attorney-General to give offi-
eial opinions to heads of Departments upon questions of law 
is limited to such questions as arise in the administration of 
their Departments (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.). The questions pro-
posed to me as above do not seem to be of that character. 
They apparently relate to the past action of the Board of 
Supervising Inspectors, which was had upon a ma.tter prop-
·erly submitted thereto under the provisions of section 4491, 
Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewable by your De-
partment. It is true that, under the provisions of the same 
section, the same matter (i. e., the subject of the approval 
of the instrument aforesaid) may be submitted to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury for his action, in which event~ should sim-
Har questions arise, the opinion of the Attorney-General 
thereon might properly be invoked. But I do not under-
stand this to be the case now. 
While I shall, with great pleasure, respond to any call 
from your Department for an opinion upon questions of law 
arising in tl1e administration thereof, I conceive that, for the 
reason already intimated, I have no authority to pass upon 
the particular questions - ~bove referred to, and therefore 
feel constrained to return the papers which accompanied 
the Acting Secretary's communication without expressing 
any opinion on those questions. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon. HUGH McCuLLOCH, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
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PUBLIC BUILDING AT MINNEAPOLIS. 
The first section of the act of April 11, 1882, chapter 75, authorized a 
public building to be erected at Minneapolis, Minn., limiting the cost 
of the building, inclusive of its site, to$175,000, and the second section 
of same act approprjated $60,000 for ptlrchase of site aud toward con-
struction of building; by act of March 3, 1883, chapter 143, an appro-
priation of $60,000 was made for continuation of the building; and, by 
act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332, a further appropriation of $70,000 was 
made for extension of site and continuation of building-the whole of 
the appropriations aggregating $190,000: .Advised that the limitation 
'fixed by the act of 1b82 as to cost of the building, etc., is not 'repealed 
by the subsequent appropriation acts, the only additionai expenditure 
allowable being for an "extension of site." 
DEP .ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
Novembm· 21, 1884. 
SIR: A note from your predecessor, some weeks since, 
submitted the general inquiry whether, under existing legis-
lation upon the matter of erecting a public building at Min-
:aeapolis, the question hefore yourself as to plans, cost, etc., 
is at large, or lies within certain statutory limits, and, if so, 
what' 
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the meaning of 
the statutes which define your duties therein. These are 
substantially to the following effect: 
Section 3732. No contract for the erection of any public 
building shall bind tile Government to pay a larger sum than 
the amount appropriated therefor. 
Act of 1882, chapter 75, section 1: That the Secretary of 
the Treasury purcllase a site and cause to be erected a .build-
ing for post-office, etc., at Minneapolis, the site and building, 
whe.n. completed upon plans and specifications to be previ-
ously made and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
not to exceed the cost of $175,000 . 
. S~ction 2 appropriates $60,000 for purchase, of site and 
towards construction of building. 
Act of 1883, chapter 143 (22 Stat., 604), appropriates ''For 
post-office, etc., at Minneapolis, Minn., for continuation, 
$60,000." 
Act of 1884 (sundry civil, July 7), appropriates "For post-
office at Minneapolis, Minn., for extension of site and con-
tinuation, $70,000." 
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Upon this it is suggested that inasmuch as regularly, if the 
limitation of the act of 1882 had been observed, the last en-
actment would have provided in terms for a "completion,, 
instead of" continuation," and for an appropriation of only 
$55,000, it is to be concluded that Congress has done away 
with the previous lirnitation entirely, and left the question 
as to the total expenditure for the building at la·rge, to be de-
cided, as in former times, by the executive authority in charge 
upon its own judgment of what the public interests at the 
locality in question demand. This conclusion is thought to-
be made more clear by the significant express provision for-
extending the site of the building. 
In discussing this matter it is to be considered that it 
would have been quite easy, and a matter of course, for Con-
gress, by inserting a proviso of less than a dozen words, ex-
pressly to repeal the limitation in question; and that if it 
had done so it would probably have substituted some other-
limitation. That it did not, but has left the matter under 
the ~horoughly familiar rules as to the extent to which a 
later statute operates upon a previous one merely by incon-
sistency therewith, is noticeable. 
Besides this, the words which impose the limitation are 
plain, deliberate, and peremptory; whilst to these are opposed 
(in order to claim a repeal, I mean, for as to mere rnodi.fication. 
there is no dispute) arguments which at most are only prob-
able. Of itself the word "continuation" does suggest that 
the appropria,tion is not to .finish the building; but if pre-
viously a limitation had been placed upon the cost, and the 
appropriation for ''continuation" had only exhausted such 
limited amount, I suppose that it would not (by reason of 
such word, I mean) be open to the executive to take fresh 
measure for erection, etc., without regard to the original in-
hibition. · 
And inasmuch as "site" does not mean so much ground 
only as is included by the foundation-as indeed is expressly 
provided here by the act first authorizing the erection-an 
appropriation for more than the remnant of the original esti-
mate, when accompanied expressly by a provision "for exten-
sion of site," would throw no valuable light upon the point 
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whether Congress intended thereby that the foundation or the 
superstructure should be enlarged. 
Besides, the short-hand language of the subsequent appro-
. priations is to be read as incidental to ·the original act, so that 
their obscurities are to be cleared up by its fuller and more 
deliberate expressions, and not vice versa. Here, then, the 
"post-office," etc., appropriated for is no other than the one 
defined by the plans and specifications, which had been 
already made in accordan~e with the act of 1882. It is the 
erection so planned and specified that is to be "continued." 
It may be that the original estimate_s for such buildings 
sometimes turn out to have been miscalculated; so that Con-
gress, when the time arrives at which previously it had 
reason to anticipate that what would be needed would be 
only the remnant of the original estimate, finds itself under 
some coercion to go further. 
Or it may happen that the Supervising Architect reports 
that certain changes in construction are demanded, and sub-
mits this to Congress, with estimates therefor. 
In both of these cases, it being entirely competent for Con-
gress to com :ply with the new situation, language like that in 
the appropriation item before me would have a significance 
which in their absence it rloes not have, except by a strain· 
ing, which is wholly inadmissible. 
Upon the whole, I submit that the words of the appropria-
tion of'' 1884" naturally suggest that the only new item of 
expenditure allowable is an ''extension of site"; there be-
ing, besides, a suggestion that the amount appropriated 
for the uses of the building itself-the one, I mean, theretofore 
planned and specified-may not be sufficient for its comple-
tion, in which case of course Congress expected to be 
applied to again. 
Very respectfully, 
I concur. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Solicitor- Gen'eral. 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
273-VOL XVIIT--6 
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CUSTOMS LAWS. 
A lot of rum was exported December 3, 1883, and reimported October 
20, 1884, which had been m~tnufactured within the United States from , 
imported molasses whereon drawback was allowed upon the exporta-
tion of the rum: Advised that the rum is dutiable under section 2500, 
Revised Statutes, and not under the a.ct of March 3, 1883, chapter 121; 
furthermore, that the importers are entitled to remove the same under 
section 3433, Rev. Stat. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 29, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 19th instant states a case of bona fide 
exportation (December 3, 1883), and reimportation (October 
20, 1884:), of rum originally manufactured within the United 
States, under section 3019, Revised Statutes, from imported 
molasses, which was allowed drawback upon the exportation 
ofthe rum. · 
It seems to me that such rum is dutiable under section 
2500, Revised Statutes, and not under the act of March 3, 
1883 ( i. e., "102 T. 1," as the paragraph is designated in your 
letter). It is a manufacture of the United States, notwith-
standing the foreign origin of its material. 
I am also of opinion that the word imported in section 3433 
is used generally, and includes reimported. Section 2500 
forms a context for '' 102 T. 1," and the like provisions, by 
which it is seen that reimportations of distilled spirits are 
not within those other provisions which impose duty upon 
such spirits when imported. But for that context those other 
provisions would include reimported spirits. I see no con-
text, and no reason is suggested why the word "imported" · 
in section 3433 (Revised Statutes, first sentence, beginning 
on page 377) does not include reimported. 
I therefore answer the two questions which you have put: 
(1) The importers are entitled to remove the rum in ques-
·tion under section 3433, Revised Statutes. 
(2) That rum is dutiable according to section 2500, Revised 
Statutes. 
Very respectfully, 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Solicitor- General. 
I concur. 
. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREvVSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CIVIL SERVICE-ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT. 
·where a father and daughter held each au office in the classified service 
in one of the Departments, and another daughter, having passed the 
required examination, was proposed for appointment in another De-
partment: Held that, by force of section 9 of the act of January 16, 1883, 
chapter 27, the last-mentioned daughter, so long as the above state of 
facts exists, is ineligible for appointment to any office or place in the 
-classified service. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 9, 1884. 
SIR: You:- letter of the 8th jnstant presents for my con-
sideration the following case and question: 
A father and one daughter are now employed as clerks in 
the Treasury Department, and the name of another daughter, 
who has passed the required examination for appointment in 
•the classified civil service, has been sent to the Post-Office 
Department by the Civil Service Uommission for appointment 
therein. Both daughters, though of age, live with their 
father and are members of his household. In view of these 
facts and of the provisions of section 9 of the act of January 
16, 1883, chapter 27, you inquire whether the last-mentioned 
-<:laughter is eligible for appointment in the Post-Uffice 
Department. 
The section cited above declares: "That whenever there 
·are already two or more members of a family in the public 
service in the grades covered by this act, no other member 
Df such family shall be eligible to appointment to any of said 
grades." 
This enactment applies to all offices, places, and employ-
ments in the public service which are classified within the 
meaning of the aforesaid act; the words ''grades .covered by 
this act," as employed in said section, manifestly signifying 
the several cla-sses into which such offi~es, places, and employ-
ments are arranged. It virtually prohibits the appointment 
of an applicant to an office or place falling within either of 
these classes where two members of the same family to 
which the applicant belongs are already in the public service 
in any of the same classes; and this prohibition is not 
limited to offices or places in the same Department, but ex-
tends to all offices or places in the public service which are 
-classified as above. 
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In the present case, then, assuming that the father and 
daughter, now employed in the Treasury Department, hold 
offices or places belonging to any of the classes referred to, I 
. am of opinion that, so long as this state of facts exists, the 
other daughter is, by force of the provision above quoted, 
made ineligible for appointment to any office or place in the 
classified service ofthe Post-Office Department. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Ron. JOHN SCHUYLER CROSBY, 
Acting Postmaster- General. 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. 
Consideration of certain propositions relating to the enforcement of judg-
ments of foreign tribunals in civil and commercial matters, suggested 
by a resolution adopted at the Conference held at Milan in 1883 by t,he 
Association for the Reformation and Codification of International Law .. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 12, 1884. 
SIR: I have examined the papers which accompanied your 
letter of the 25th ultimo, relative to a proposed international 
agreement on the subject of the enforcement of the judg-
ments of foreign tribunals in civil and commercial matters. 
A.mong these papers is a resolution adopted at the Con-
ference held at Milan, in 18~3, by the Association for the 
Reformation and Codification of International Law, which 
proposes as the bases of such an agreement the following: 
'' (1) The decision must have been rendered by a competent. 
judge, etc. 
"(2) The parties must have been duly summoned. 
'' (3) In the case of a judgment by default, the party against 
whom it has been rendered must have had knowledge of the 
suit and have had an opportunity to defend himself. 
" ( 4) The decision must contain nothing opposed to good 
morals or to the order or public law of the State in which it 
is to be executed. 
"(5) The judge who is requested to execute the decisiou 
is not to examine the merits of the case, but simply to inquire 
whether the aforesaid legal conditions have been fulfilled. 
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"(6) A decisioll pronounced by a foreign court, and fulfill-
ing these conditions, is to have the same effect as one pro-
nounced by a home court, whether its execution be requested 
or it is to be used as a res adjudicata. 
"(7) The forms and methods of execution are to be regu-
lated by the law of the country in which the execution is 
requested." 
In compliance with your req nest, I have now the honor to 
state my views upon the foregoing propositions, 
The first three propositions quoted relate solely to the 
subject of the competency or jurisdiction of the foreign tri-
bunal. I do not perceive that their adoption by this Gov-
ernment would effect any material change or lead to any 
improvement in the e:8:isting state of our law with respect to 
the enforcement of foreign judgments. 
According to the general current of American authority, 
the judgment of a foreign tribunal having jurisdiction of the 
parties and of the subject matter of the controversy, where 
no fraud is shown, is recognized by the courts of this country 
as creating an obligation upon which an action can be main-
tained, and where an ~ction is brought to enforce the obli-
gation thus created such judgment is taken to be con_clusive 
upon the merits. Among the several States of this Union 
the same doctrine applies to judgments rendered by the 
courts of sister States; so that these judgments practically 
stal)d on no higher or different footing than the judgments 
of foreign courts. The prevailing doctrine just indicated, 
both as regards State judgments and judgments of foreign 
countries, is believed to be as liberal as the interests of jus-
tice require. 
In an action brought here on a foreign judgment, the de-
fendant may show that the foreign court had no jurisdiction 
'of the subject-matter of the suit, or that he was never sum-
moned to answer, and had no opportunity of making his de-
fense. These are facts which go to the question of the com-
petency or the juris<iiction of the foreign court, and, if 
.established, defeat the action. The result would be the same 
under the rules embodied in the three propositions above re-
ferred to. 
The fourth proposition expresses nothing more than what 
I 
, 
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is already implied in our law as a necessary condition for the 
maintenance of an action upon a foreign judgment. It is a 
good defense to such an action that the judgment was ob-
tained by the fraud of the party seeking to enforce it; and, 
moreover, no court will lend its aid to enforce a judgment 
opposed to good morals or to the public law of the State. 
The fifth proposition, in Sltbstance, makes the foreign judg-
ment conclusive upon the merits where the requirements of 
the preceding propositions are fulfilled. I have already 
stated the prevailing American doctrine on this subject. 
The remaining propositions relate to the rrwde of enforcing 
and the effect of foreign judgments. 
Under our law the mode of enforcing a foreign judgment 
(and the same mode exists among the several States of the 
Union with respect to the judgments of other States) is by 
the institution of a suit theraon; and a judgment obtained 
in the suit thus instituted has the same vigor and effect as. 
other domestic judgments, and is executed in the same way. 
The foreign judgment has no effect of itself, other than t() 
create an obligation upon which an action may be brought, 
or to constitute an exceptio rei judiccttm available in defense 
of an action. 
I do not see that the propositions last referred to would, 
if adopted, call for any modification of our law as regards 
the effect and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
The papers received with your letter are herewith re-
turned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon, FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN, 
Secretary of State . 
• 
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DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Attorney-General is not authorized by law to give au official opinion 
to the Honse of Representatives in response to a resolution thereof. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 17, 1884. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
following resolution, dated December 15, 1884: 
''Resolved, That the Attorney-General of the United 
States be respectfully requested· to report to this House, 
whether, in his opinion, the section 3738 of the Revised Stat-
utes with reference to eight hours employment constituting 
a day's labor for all laborers, etc., employed on behalf of the 
United States applies to the letter-carriers of the United 
States." 
To this I must reply that I can not furnish the legal opin-
ion requested. The authority of the Attorney-General to 
give his official opinion is limited by the laws which create 
and define his office, and will not permit him to give advice 
at the call of either house of Congress, or of Congress itself, 
but only to the President or the head of an Executive Depart-
ment. Early in the history of the Goyernment this was estab-
lished and suggested to the Bouse of Representatives by Mr. 
Attorney-General Wirt (1 Opin., 335). When the Depart-
ment of Justice was created the law in this respect was not 
changed. 
This opinion has been invariably observed by many Attor-
neys-General, including Attorneys-General Taney, Critten-
den, Bates, Evarts, Williams, and Devens. (2 Opin., 499; 5 
Opin., 561; 10 Opin., 164; 12 Opin., 544; 14 Opin., 17; 14 
Opin., 177; 15 Opin., 475.) 
Of course it would be my wish to conform to any request 
that the House of Representatives might make, but such 
wish I could not comply with without reversing the law and 
the precedents hitherto established. 
I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SPEAKER OF TRE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
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CONTRACT WITH: SOUTH BO.s'TON IRON COMPANY. 
The contract entered into by the Chief of Ordnance with the South 
Boston Iron Company in October, 1880, and subsequently transferred 
by that company to the South Boston Iron Works, may still be tre'ated 
by the Government as obligatory upon the former company, notwith-
standing such transfer. 
Under the provisions of section 3737, Revised Statutes, such transfer 
operated to annul the contract so far as the United States are con-
cerned; but these provisions were not made to enable . a contractor to 
avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve himself from 
his obligations by a mere transfer. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Decembe1· 20, 1884. 
SrR: I return herewith the papers which accompanied 
your letter to me of the 27th of June last, relative to a cer-
tain contract with the South Boston Iron Company for the 
construction of a shop building and machinery for making 
cannon, etc., and have the honor to state my views upon the 
questions proposed. 
From these papers it appears that in October~ 1880, the 
said company entered into a contract with the Chief of Ord-
nance, by which it agreed to construct for the United States, 
upon the company's grounds at the South Boston Foundry, a 
shop building, with foundations for lathes, etc .. , and also to 
make and alter certain lathes, together with a traveling 
crane, etc., for all of which, upon completion thereof, the 
United States were to pay the company a stipulated amount; 
the payment, however, being subject to the folJowing condi-
tion, namely, that the amount so paid ''shall be reimbursed 
to the said United States by the said South Boston Iron Com-
pany when a reserve of 5 per centum from the price of all 
work for the United States subsequent to, and not including, 
the four 1~-inch breech-loading rifles contracted for under 
the date aforesaid, which may be executed by the machines 
herein contracted for, should amount to a sum sufficient for 
that purpose, the said shop building, etc., lathes, traveling 
cranes, etc., to remain the property of the United States until 
the sums above specified shall be paid to the United States 
by the said company." 
After the shop building, lathes, etc .• had been constructed 
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'by the said company and paid for by the United States the 
-company leased its works to another company, called the 
.South Boston Iron Works, and subsequently sold the latter 
·company its property and rights under these existing con-
tracts, including that entered into with the Chief of Ord-
pance above referred to. And this lease and sale have given 
rise to the following questions, on which my opinion is re-
·quested: 
"Whether the contract entered into with the South Bos-
ton Iron Company, as stated above, is in force anrl can be 
.enforced against the South Boston Iron Works, or whether 
a similar contract is to be entered into with the South Bos-
ton Iron W.orks covering the same thing, or what other 
action should best be taken to secure the interest of the 
United States." 
Under the provisions of section ;{737, Revised Statutes, 
which are expressly incorporated in the contract itself, the 
transfer of the latter by the South Boston Iron Company to 
the South Boston Iron Works was forbidden, such transfer 
by the terms of the same provisions operating to annul the 
contract so far as the United States are concerned. But 
(hose provisions were not meant to enable a contractor to 
avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve him-
.self from his obligations thereunder by a mere transfer. (See 
16 Opin., 278.) Hence, as against the South Boston Iron 
Company, the contract in question may still be treated by 
the Government as obligatory upon that company, notwith-
standing the transfer. As against the South Boston Iron 
Works, the transferee, the case is different. Between this 
company and the United States no privity exists by reason 
.of the transfer, and in the absence of any agreement between 
the company and the United States, ill{ porting an under-
taking by the former to perform the contract referred to, 
such con tract cannot be enforced against it by the latter. 
Thus far I have considered and answered only such of 
the questions presented as relate to the contract with the 
South Boston Iron Company. The remaining questions ap-
pear to me to be administrative, rather than law questions. 
Whether it is expedient under the present circumstances to 
renter into a similar contract with the South Boston Iron 
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Works, or what other action the interest of the United States 
requires in the premises, are, I submit, subjects that do not 
properly come within the province of this Department to 
examine. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Bon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN, 
Secretary of War. 
CHINESE EXCLUSION. 
Where a · sheriff in Washington Territory apprehended certain Chinamen 
and brought them before a Uniterl States commissioner, who, having 
found them to be in the country unlawfully, remanded them to the 
custody of the t~heri:ff, to be sent out of the country: Held that the 
expenses incurred by the sheriff in the performance of such service art'\' 
payable from the appropriation made by the act of July 7, 1884, chap-
ter 332, to meet expenses incurred in executing the act relating to the 
Chinese, approved May 6, 188~. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 22, 1884. 
SIR: Your communication of the 28th October ultimo 
and the inclosures therewith sent present the following state 
of facts: 
Certain Chinamen were apprehended in Washington Ter-
ritory by the sheriff of Skagit County and taken before a 
United States commissioner, who, having found them to be 
in the country unlawfully, remanded them to the custody (,f 
the sheriff, to be deliYered to the collector of customs, to be 
returned to British Columbia. 
The sheriff who made the arrests and took the Chinamen 
before the commissioner and executed the latter's order has 
applied to the collector of customs of Port Townsend, Wash-
ington Territory, to be paid the costs and charges for said 
services which are authorized by the twelfth section of the 
act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884, 
entitled, "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to execute 
certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, approved May 
sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two,"' and the question 
submitted for opinion is, whether expenses of this kind are to 
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be paid out of the appropriation made by the act of July 7, 
1884, ''to meet such expenses as may be necessary to be in .. 
curred in Cflrrying out the provision of the act to execute cer-
tain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, approved May 6, 
1882," or out of some one of the appropriations to defray the 
expenses of the United States courts. 
Upon· an examination of the appropriations to meet the ex-
penses of the United States courts made by the act of July 
7, 1884, I see no bead under which an expenditure tor the 
purpose in question could be made, and I am of opinion that 
the sheriff should be paid out of the appropriation made by 
the act of July 7, 1884, first abo\e indicated. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DRIVING STOCK ON INDIAN LANDS. 
Sheep-are" cattle" within the meaning of section 2117, Revised Stat-
utes, which imposes a penalty for driving any stock, etc., to range and 
feed on Indian lands without the consent of the tribe. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTH1E, 
December 22, 1884. 
SIR: In reply to your communication asking an opinion as 
to whether :sheep are embraced by section 2117, Revised Stat-
utes, I beg to say that I am of the opinion they are. 
Section 2117 reads thus: "Every person who drives or 
otherwise conveys any stock of horses, mules, or cattle, to 
range and feed on any land belonging to any Indian or In-
dian tribe, without the consent of such tribe, is lial,>le to a 
penalty of one dollar for each animal of such stock." 
The standard lexicographers place sheep under the head of 
cattle, and it would seem to be in derogation of the manifest 
intention of Congress to take the word in a more confined 
sense. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJ A'MIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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DISTILLERY WAREHOUSE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has power to make a regulation under 
which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in warehouse after 
the expiration of three years, upon the distiller or owner of the spirits 
filing a declaration of his purpose to export the same in good faith, 
and giving a bond to do so within a given period. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 23, 1884. 
SIR: Yours of the 15th instant asks the following question: 
Whether the Treasury Department has the power to make 
a regulation by which distilled spirits can be permitted to 
remain in a distillery warehouse after the expiration of three 
years from the date of entry therein, upon the filing by the dis-
tiller or owner of the spirits of a declaration of his purpose to 
export the same in good · faith, and the giving of a bond to 
do so within a given period. 
Upon consideration, I submit that it has such power. 
The exportation or transportation bond frees the spirits 
for the time being from any obligation for a domestic tax, 
and of course from the operation of the distillery warehouse 
bond. The giving of such first-named bond is one of the 
acts by the owner which go to constitute the complex trans-
action of exportation. Until exportation is perfected the 
spirits also remain subject to a tax lien on behalf of the Gov-
ernment. Therefore, whilst by the inception of the transac-
tion of exportation the spirits are transformed into a differ-
ent suQject-matter from that upon which the distillery ware-
house bond had operated, they nevertheless remain one upon 
which the United States have a specific contingent charge, 
in all reRpects perhaps, except that of contmgency, the same 
as what it previously had. There Is, therefore, no statutory 
reason why it may not for a period reasonably required in 
the process of exportation remain in the same custody as be-
fore, even after the three years. Manifestly upon the face I 
of it a wide difference exists in this respect betwixt the 
condition towards the Government of such spirits and that 
of tax-paid spirits. This difference is recognized in the pro-
vision of section 3288, Revised Statutes. 
I have spoken of statutory reasons, because it is this class 
only that affects the power of the Secretary of the Treasury 
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hereupon. The regulatory reasons, so to say, for this or that 
custody are for him to adjust. These latter reasons control 
the subject-matter of which you speak. 
Very respectfully, 
I concur in the above opinion. · 
S. F. PHIL LIPS, 
Solicitor- General. 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
,lJNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION CONGRESS. 
The fund appropriated by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 234, to defray 
the expenses of delegates to the Universal Postal Union Congress at 
Lisbon, Portugal, is subject to the restrictions, as to advances, con-
tained in section 3648, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 31, 1884. 
SIR: I have considered your inquiry of yesterday, · viz, 
whether, under the provisions made by the act of July 5, 
1884, chapter 234, to pay the expenses of delegates to the 
Universal Postal Union Congress to be held at Lisbon, Por-
tugal, you are authorized to make advances for that purpose, 
and submit the following in reply: 
The money appropriated by that act to defray such ex-
penses is to be " expended under the direction of the Post-
master-General." But the control of the fund thus given the 
Postmaster-General would seem to be subject to the restric-
tion as to advances contained in section 3648, Revised Stat-
utes. Adopting this view of the effect of that section, I am 
of the opinion that, to authorize advances out of the appro-
priation referred to for the purpose of meeting th\e expenses 
of the delegates, the previous direction of the President is 
necessary. By his direction the money may be ]awfully ad-
vanced for that purpose to the Postmaster-General, under 
whose control its expenditure is placed, or to any agent 
designated or appointed by the latter to disburse it. 
lam, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon. :FRANK HATTON, 
Postmaster General. 
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SCHOOL MEETINGS IN UTAH. 
The Utah Commission, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882, chap-
ter 47, have no duties or powers as regards the school meetings in 
Utah Territory. 
Voting at meetings of tax-payers called to fix the rate of taxation for 
school purposes is not voting at an "election" within the meaning of 
that act. Hence, polygamists may vote at such meetings, provideu 
they are property-tax payers and residents of the school district in 
which the meeting is held. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 5, 1885. 
SIR: In compliance with a request made the 20th ultimo 
by the Ron. M. L. Joslyn, then Acting Secretary of the In-
terior, I have considered the following questions, proposed 
by the Bon. Alex. Ramsey, chairman of the Utah Commis-
sion, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882, chapter 47, 
in a communication addressed to you dated the 18th ultimo, 
namely: 
"(1) Have we (i.e., said Commission) any jurisdiction in 
regard to the school meetings of Utah~ 
" (2) If yea, by what modus operandi are we to proceed t 
"(3) Can polygamists vote at the school meetings of tax-
payers~" 
'rhe powers of the Commission or Board established by said 
act are defined in the ninth section thereof. · That section, 
after declaring vacant "all the registration and election 
offices of every description 1n the Territory of Utah,'' pro-
vides that all duties ''relating to the registration of voters, 
the conduct of elections, the receiving or rejecUon of votes, 
and the canvassing and returning of the same and the issu-
ing of certificates or other evidence of election in said Terri-
tory, shall, until other provision be made, etc., be performed 
under the existing laws of the United States and of said Ter-
ritory by proper persons, who shall be appointed to execute 
such offices and perform such duties by a board of :fi. ve per-
sons," etc. By this provision t~e Board or Commission is 
invested with power to appoint persons to execute such offices 
and perform such duties as are above described, and no other~ . 
On examining the school laws of Utah Territory, to which 
attention is called in the communication referred to (viz, 
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<lhapter 19 of the Laws of 1880, chapter 47 of the Laws of 
1882, and chapter 30 of the Laws of 1884 ), I find no regis-
tration or election offices created thereby, nor tlo I discover 
:any duties there prescribed relat1ng to the conduct of elec-
tions, etc., as above. Those laws provide for the establish· 
ment of school districts, and for the holdmg of school 
meetings annually in each district, at which school trustees 
1 
are to be chosen by the registered voters of the district by 
ballot. Yet the orgamzatwn of the meetings and the con-
duct of elections thereat are not made the subject of statu-
tory regulation, but are left to be effectuated by such 
methods as the persons assembled on the spot may adopt. 
And in the absence of any statutory provision requiring the 
performance of ·specified duties at the school meetmgs rel-
ative to the conduct of elections, 'etc., or creating electiOn 
offices therefor, it seems to me that, as regards such meet-
ings, there is no room for the exercise of the aforesaid power 
conferred upon the Board or Commission by the act of March 
22, 1882. That power, I think, can only be exerted where 
offices or duties of the character ,mentioned exist, and are 
to be executed or performed under the statutes In force within 
the Territory. 
I am accordingly of the opinion that the first question 
should be answered in the negative, and so answer it. This 
disposes of the second question also. 
The remaining question is whether polygamists can vote 
at school meetings called for the purpose of fixing the rate of 
taxation for school purposes. At these meetings, under the 
laws of the Territory, the property tax-payers residing in 
the district, and they alone, are entitled to vote. By the 
eighth section of the act of March 22, 1882, polygamists 
are disqualified from voting at any ''election'' held in the 
Territory. But to vote at the meetings of tax-payers called 
as above, on propositions to fix the rate of a school tax, is 
not voting at an election within the meaning of that act; · 
the term "election," as there used, manifestly signifying 
only a proceeding to fill a public office or employment. 
Though not qualified to vote at any proceeding of this kind, 
or.1 :n the language of the statute, "at any eiection" in the 
Territory, a polygamist may nevertheless, in my opinion, 
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vote at such meeting of tax-payers on propositions of the 
character above described, provided be is a property-tax 
payer and resident of the school district in which the 
meeting is held. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER~ 
Bon. H. M. TELLER, 
Secretary of the interior. 
RETIRED LIST OF THE NAVY. 
An officer retired on furlough pay under section 1454, Revised Statutes, 
cannot be transferred on the retired pay list under section 1594, Re-
vised Statutes, with increase of pay; such increase is forbidden by the 
act of August 5, 18tl2, chapter 391. 
Nor can an officer be s1.multaneously retired on furlough pay, and trans-
ferred to the retired pay list, so as to give him the pay of the latter. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 5, 1885. 
SIR : Yours of the 17th ultimo, after calling attention to 
the provisions upon the matter of pay, etc., for officers retired 
from the Navy by sections 1588, 1593, 1594, and the act of 
1882, chapter 391 (22 Stat., 286), asks the following questionR: 
First. Can an officer who, not being amenable to the pro-
vision in the act of 1882 relating to discharges for miscon-
duct, has been found incapacitated for active service, and 
under section 1454 retired on furlough pay, be transferred 
under sections 1594 to the retired pay list with the pay inci-
dent thereto ~ 
If this question shall be answered in the · negative, it be-
comes necessary to inquire : 
Secondly. In the case of an officer found by the retiring 
board to be incapacitated for active service, such incapacity 
not being the result of misconduct on his part nor of any jn-
cident of the service, and in view of the considerations which 
lead to the President's determination to retire instead of dis-
charging the officer, and the same considerations being re-
garded as sufficient to warrant the transfer of such officer 
from the furlough to the retired pay list, can the President, 
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by and with the consent of the Senate, make the retirement 
and transfer simultaneous by placing such officer at once on 
the retired pay list ' 
The provision in the act of 18S2, which is important here, is 
as follows: "Hereafter there shall be no l)fOmotion or in-
crease of pay in the retired list of the Navy, but the rank 
and pay of officers on the retired list shall be the same that 
they are when such officers shall b~retired." 
In my opinion that provision prevents either rank or pay 
of officers on the retired list from being increased in an'!} way 
q,fter such officers shall have been placed thereupon; and 
therefore that a transfer from the furlough pay list to the re-
tired pay list under section 1594 can have no such effect. I 
am also of opinion that transfer immediately after retirement 
does not differ in this respect from transfer at the end of (say) 
a month or a year. The power of the PreRident to make such 
transfer depends by the section upon the fact that the officer 
is already upon the retired list, whether he has been so for 
a minute or longer. Whatever time therefore may have 
elapsed since the officer has been put upon that list, has 
elapsed of course after that point of time which fixes the pay 
of all retired officers. 
There can be here no contempo'raneous occurrence of the act. 
by which an officer is retired upon the furlough pay list, and 
of that by which he is transferred therefrom. The former 
precedes the latter necessarily; and so its effect in fixing 
pay precedes the existence of any question as to the effect of 
transfer thereupon. In other words, tbe transfer finds the 
pay already fixed by the act of 1882. 
I therefore answer both of the above questions in the nega-
tive . . 
Very respectfully, 
I concur in the above. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Solicitor General. 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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ASSISTANT COLLECTOR AT NEW YORK. 
The appointment of the assistant collector at the port of New York (who 
was formerly employed by the collector with the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury) should now be made by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 6, 1885. 
SIR: I have considered the question which was referred 
to me by your direction on the 2d instant, namely, whether 
an appointment to the office of assistant collector at the 
port of New York should be made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury or by the President with the concurrence of the 
Senate, and I now have the honor to submit to you my views 
thereon. 
The office of the assistant collector at New Y:ork was orig. 
in ally created by section 16 of the act of March 3, 1863, chap-
ter 79, which provided that it should be filled ''in the mode 
prescribed by law for t,be appointment of deputy collectors." 
These officers were then, as now (see sec. 7 of the act of 
March 3, 1817, chap. 109; sec. 2630, Rev. Stat.), employed 
by the colleetor with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. This moue of appointment is, in contemplation of 
law, an appointment by the Secretary (United States v. Hart-
well, 6 Wall., 385). But in the Revision of the Statutes the 
provision above adverted to, directing in what mode the office 
of assistant collector should be :filled, was omitted, and thus 
became repealed by the effect of section 5596, Revised Stat-
utes. So that, as the law now stands (see sec. 2536, Rev. Stat.), 
that office remains established, but without any statutory 
provision on the subject of appointment thereto. 
Such being the existing state of the law, the general rule 
which is deducible from Article II, section 2, of the Constitu-
tion becon,es applicable to and controls the q ue~tion under 
consideration, namely, that the appointment of all officers of 
the United States belongs to the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, where the appointment 
thereof is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution itself 
or by legislative enactment. This rule has been laid down 
by several of my learned predecessors (see 6 Opin., 1; 15 
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Opin., 3, 449), and acted upon in the practice of the Govern-
ment in cases like the present. 
I am therefore of the opinion that, although previous to 
the Revision of the Statutes an appointment to the office of 
assistant collector at the port of New York was required to 
be made by the Secretary of the Treasury in the mode above 
indicated, yet that, in consequence of the modification of the 
law effected by the ReviRion, such appointment is now de-
volved upon the President by and with the advice and con-
.sent of the Senate. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
AMERICAN VESSELS UNDER ACT OF 1884. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J anuat·y 6, 1885. 
SIR : In reply to yours of the 30th ultimo, inclosing a dis-
patch of November 3 from the consul at Shanghai to your-
self, I submit the opinion t.hat the act of June 26, 1884, sec-
tion 12, by the expression H American vessels,'' does not in-
tend only ''vessels of the United States" as defined by sec-
tion 4131, Revised Statutes, but includes as well "foreign-
built registered American vessels." 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF S'l'A'l'E. 
AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
Question considered as to whom payment should be made, under the cir-
cumstances stated, of an award of the American and Mexican Claims 
Commission in favor of a claimant, a resident of Mexico, who has 
deceased. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 16, 1R85. 
SIR: By a letter of the 18th of November last, received 
from the Ron. John Davis, then Acting Secretary of State, 
which inclosed an authenticated copy of the proceedings in 
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the matter of the probate of the will of Jorge Hammeken y 
:Mexia, deceased, before the judge of the first civil court 
of the City of Mexico, in Mexico, it is inquired "who the 
proper person is to whom payment should be made, under 
this will, of moneys coming into the hands of this [the State1 
Department on account of an award made by the late 
American and Mexican Claims Commission in favor of 
George L. Hammeken." To this inquiry I have now the 
honor to reply : · 
The papers which accompanied that letter, and which I 
return herewith, afford satisfactory evidence that the above-
mentioned proceedin~s were bad in the proper forum at the 
place of the domicile of the deceased, Jorge Hammeken y 
Mexia, and his will may be regarded as duly probated there- · 
under. 
The testator, in his will, declares himself to be the legiti-
mate son of George Lewis Hammeken and Adela Mexia,. 
both deceased, and claims as his property, by inheritance,. 
the right to the indemnity awarded in favor of his father 
by the Claims Commission. He leaves all his estate, in the 
proportions assigned by the la'f (excepting part of certain 
property in Texas and of certain concessions elsewhere, as 
to which other disposition is made), to his wife, Dolores 
Lebrisa de Hammeken, and their only son, Jorge Juan 
Harumeken y Lebrisa, and names. the son (a minor) his 
executor, who, in the discharge of the executor~hip during 
minority, is to be represented according to provisions of the 
ci vii code of Mexico. 
The testator's widow, Dolores Lebrisa de Hammeken, was 
in ~aid proceedings appointed by the court to represent 
the executor, her son, during his minority, and letters testa-
mentary have been issued to her. The appointment and 
issue of letters, which are properly authenticated, must be 
presumed to be regular and in conformity with the local 
.law. 
It thus appears that the testator's widow, by virtue of her 
appointment and letters testamentary as aforesaid, is clothed 
with ample authority to receh·e moneys due the testator's 
estate. And such authority being conferred by the forum 
domicilii of the testator, a. voluntary payment made to her in 
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this country of a debt due his estate will be good and dis-
-charge the indebtedness, in the absence of any adverse claim 
based on a conflicting grant of administration here in the 
interest of domestic creditors. (See Wilkins v . Ellett, 9 Wall., 
740.) 
If, then, the award referreu to in the present inquiry, 
though made in favor of the testator's father, now constitutes 
part of the assets belonging to the testator's estate and is 
to be dealt with as such, and if there be no ad verse claim 
as above, I am of the opinion that payment of the award 
.should be made to Mrs. Dolores Lebrisa de Hammeken, to 
whom the letters testamentary have been issued. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon. FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN, 
Secretary of State. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW CRUISERS. 
The Secretary of the Navy may assent to a modification of the contract 
for building the new cruisers where the interests of the Government 
will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby . 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Janunry 20, 1885. 
SIR: Referring to your letter of the 19th instant, relative 
to the subject of payment for the construction or the new 
.cruisers, I have now the honor briefly to state my views upon 
the case and question there presented. 
It is clearly competent to the Secretary of the Navy to 
.assent to a modification of the contract for building thes~ 
vessels, where the interests of the Government will not be 
,predjudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby. In 
United States v. Corli8s Steam-Engine Company (91 U. S., 321 ), 
the Supreme Court remark: "With the improvements con-
stantly made in ship-building and steam machinery and in 
arms, some parts originally contracted for may have to be 
.abandoned and other parts substituted, and it would be of 
serious detriment to the public service if the power of the head 
.of the Navy Department did not extend to providing for all 
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such possible conti11gencies. by modification or suspension 
of the contracts and settleJDent with the contractors." 
Undoubtedly the Secretary has power in the present case 
to modify the contract in regard to the construction of the 
shafts, and since this will involve delay and bear heavily 
upon the contractor, be may, I think, in consideration of these 
circumstances, also modify the contract to such extent as to· 
make the 10 per centum reserved upon each installment 
available to the contractor uefore the time originally stipu-
lated. But payment in full for the vessel, in advance of its 
completion and acceptance, is forbidden by section 3648, Re-
vised Statutes, and hence a modification of the contract to-
this extent would be beyond the power of the Secretary. 
I may here add that the assent of the contractor's sureties 
should be obtained to any change in the contract which af-
fects them before the same i8 consummated. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon. WiLLIAM E. CHANDLER, 
Secretary of the Navy. 
CLAIMS OF SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS. 
Statutory provisions relating to the appointment and duties of supervis-· 
ors of elections considered; and held that when they have served any 
giveu number of days not exceeding ten, and. it is so duly made to 
appear, they are entitled to be paid a per diem therefor, and that it is 
not for the Attorney-General to determine whether their period of serv-
ice is reasonable or unreasonable. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 21, 1885. 
' SIR: Having had my attention directed by you to the sub-
ject of the payment of supervisors of elections, under the· 
act of February 28, 1871, and the action of the Department 
of Justice upon the number of days of their employment 
and their payment, I have examined the su~ject, and I have 
learned that, soon after the enactment of the law, the .At-
torney-General was requested by the 'rreasury Department . 
to take charge of the accounts that were rendered by the 
marshals, in w bich were included the sums that were to be-
paid for supervisors. The Attorney-General declined at one, 
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time to entertain jurisdiction over the payment of the supet· 
visors, or to have anything to do with auditing the claims 
for their payment, because, as was said, the law nowhere 
directly puts that duty upon him or gives him any authority 
to act in the premises. 
After this, at the urgent instance of the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Department of Justice did take charge of the 
claims of supervisors, presented by marshals, in connection 
with their accounts; and this was done, no doubt, because 
it was considered inexpedient to separate the accounts, to 
wit, the accounts for supervisors and those rendered by the 
marshals for special deputies, who were created by the same 
statute, and because the Treasury Department stated that 
it had no special diRbursing offier for such a fund, and that 
the marshal, who is a disbursing officer of the Department 
of Justice and gives bonds for moneys that are committed 
to him for disbursement, would be a suitable and responsible 
person to pay this money to. In this way the Department 
of Justice assumed jurisdiction; and these two claims for 
allowance_;_those rendered by the marshals for special depu-
ties and the claims for these supervisors-became blended; 
and the rule adopted by the Department of Justice tore-
strain and control the expenditures for special deputy mar-
shals came to be considered as the proper t:ule to apply to 
supervisors. 
To avoid an abuse of the law such as was charged would 
and did take place, "it seems that a firm hand was from the 
first held upon both of these allowances, and this policy 
was not improper, as it was for the protection of the public 
Treasury. However, in doing this the Department has ap-
parently exceeded its jurisdiction, and has given an interpre-
tation of the law as it relates to these supervisors which, if 
persisted in, might result in frustrating the very purposes of 
the statute. The object of the law was to prevent the per-
petration of frauds at the elections; and to that end it was 
intended, as it appears, to give the supervisors the fullest 
opportunity for investigation and oversight of the elections 
in all that related to them, and not to limit them for any 
length of time less than ten days in the discharge of their 
duties. 
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The circuit court of each judicial district is required to 
choose from the commissioners of that district an officer 
known as the chief supervisor, whose duties are prescribed, 
requiring him to prepare and furnish books, etc., and in~truc­
tions for the supervisors, and to receive applications from all 
parties for appointments to such positions. He shall present 
such applications to the judge, ami furnish information to 
him in respect to the appointment by the court of such su-
pervisors; and he shall require of the supervisors, when nec-
essary, lists of the persons who may register and vote, etc., 
and cause the names of those upon any such lists, whose right 
to register or vote is honestly doubted, to be verified by proper 
inquiry and examination at the respective places by them as-
signed as their residences. When the appointment of such 
supervisors is solicited as provided for in sections 2011, 2012, 
two citizens of different political parties are appointed and 
commissioned .by the court for each election district or voting 
precinct; and these supervisors, so appointed, are required 
to perform various duties in connection with the registration 
of voterR, and the casting, counting, and certifying of their 
ballots, which are of vital importance to the preservation of 
the elective franchise of the citizen in Congressional elec-
tions. For their services they are to be paid $5 per diem, 
not exceeding ten days; and such appointments with such 
pay are restricted to cities and towns not under 20,000 
i nha bi tan ts. 
Thus it appears that the purpose of the law is to secure the 
appointment, at least ten days before the registration, if nec-
essary, of supervisors, who, being thus appointed, are author-
ized and required to scrutinize that registration and to verify 
it, for the purposes of registration and election, so that no 
fraud can be committed, and their authority continues and 
their duties are continued down to th~ very last moment of 
counting the votes, provided the time fQr which they are to 
be paid shall not exceed ten days. To undertake, therefore, 
by an arbitrary rule, to restrict or limit their payment within 
any period less than the ten days allowed by the law would 
be to cripple or perP.aps to utterly destroy the purpose of 
their cre~tion and the object of the law. 
The court creates them upon the call of citizens; they 
• 
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.are selected from both parties; they are subject to the con-
trol of a chief supervisor; they are all under the eye and con-
trol of the court from the nioment of their appointment to 
the last minute of their employment; and when a call was 
made upon this Department for the allowance of a sum to 
provide for their payment, the Department can not say how 
many days these supervisors shall be limited to for pay-
ment within the ten days allowed by law. In fact it has 
been denied that the Department has }urisdiction over the 
subject, and in my judg·ment it is to be doubted, except to 
exercise the duty, when called upon, of interpreting the law, 
so as to guide others as to the proper rule in paying them. 
And it is my opinion, after having thus examined the law, 
that when they have served any given number of days not 
exceeding ten, and it is so duly made to appear, they are 
entitled to payment therefor, and that the Attorney-General 
can not determine whether their time of service is reasonable 
or unreasonable. The only question for him is, Did they 
serve under the control of the supervisor, being duly ap-
pointed by the court¥ and if they did, the~r ought to be paid 
according to the number of days claimed, provided they do 
not exceed ten days. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
CONTRACTS l!"'OR THE NEW CRUISERS. 
Section 3648, Revised Statutes, does not preclude a payment in any case 
where the money has been actually earned and the Government has 
received an equivalent therefor; its object is to prevent payment 
being made to con tractors in ad vance of the performance of their con-
tracts, whether for services or supplies. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 22, 1885. 
SIR : Your letter of yesterday presents the following ad. 
ditional circumstances in connection with the subject upon 
which I had the honor to communicate to you my views on 
the 20th instant : 
''In the case now under consideration, the tenth payment 
(i. e.~ instalment) on the ship wholly finished has been earned, 
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but by reason of the fracture of the shaft the full trial trip-
and formal acceptance provided for by the contract cannot 
take place. The United States has, however, a lien upon 
the ship for all payments made; a named sum is to be re-
served for three months, and the contractor and his sureties. 
guaranty full completion and good workmanship." 
You inquire if, under these circumstances, should your 
Department deem it safe and advisable to pay the tenth 
instalment, less the.named sum referred to, such payment 
would fall within the prohibition of section 3648, Revised 
Statutes. 
To this inquiry I reply: The object of that section .is not. 
to preclude a payment in any case where the money has. 
been actually earned and the Government has received an 
equivalent therefor, but to prevent payments being made to 
contractors in advance of the performance of their contracts, 
whether for services or the supply of articles of any kind. 
Agreeably to this view of the statute, I observed in my 
opinion of the 20th instant that payment in full for the ves-
sel, in advance of its completion, is forbidden thereby. The 
circumstances of the case now under consideration, however, 
are essentially different from those there contemplated; and 
consistently with the same view' of the law, with which I 
remain satisfied, I am of the opinion that, the tenth install-
ment having been already earned, payment thereof, less the 
named sum reserved as above, would not be forbidden by 
section 3648. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Ron. WILLIAM E. CHANDLER, 
Secretary of the Navy. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. 
"Alizarine assistant," an article used in dyeing, Js dutiable, as a chem-
ical compound, at 25 per centum ad valorem. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 30, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 19th ultimo states that ''Alizarine 
assistant," an article used in dyeing, is a "chemical com-
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 10'7 
Duty of Attorney-General. 
pound," in which castor oil is a large element. A question 
thereupon has risen whether upon importation it is to be 
assessed for duty as a "chemical compound," at the duty 
expressly imposed upon articles so called (viz, 25 per cent. 
ad valorem), or under the similitude clause (sec. 2499, Rev. 
Stat.), by which, from its connection with castor oil, it would 
pay $1 per gallon. As I conceh·e it, that question is, in sub-
stance, whether" chemical compounds," the highest assessed 
material in which pays a rate other than 25 per cent., are for 
that reason (und0r section 2499) to be charged otherwise than 
at 25 per cent. 
I think it plain that the operation of the si'militude pro-
visiou upon this article can be ascertained only after that of 
the " chemical compound '' clause has been fixed. The mean-
ing of the latter get~ no light from that of the former, but 
vice versa. Sussjield's case (96 U. S., 128) is in point. 
I advise you that 25 per cent. is the true duty; and that 
any decision in your Department to the contrary should be 
changed. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
' 
DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Where a call for an opinion from the Attorney-General was made by the 
head of a Department, in compliance with a resolution of the House of 
Representatives, for the information of the latter, and without refer-
ence to any question of law arising in the administration of such De-
partment: Advised that the Attorney-General is without authority t() 
give an official opinion in such case. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 30, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 19th instant informs me of the 
receipt by you of a copy of a resolution recently passed by 
the House of Representatives of the following tenor: '~That 
the Postmaster-Geueral ask the Attorney-General for his 
opinion whether section 3738 of the Revised Statutes with 
reference to eig.ht hours' employment constituting a day's 
lahor for all laborers and so forth, employed on behalf of the 
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United States, applies to letter-carriers of the United States," 
and you request me to furnish you an opinion "in accord-
ance with the above resolution." 
In response to this request I now have the honor to reply: 
It is the duty of the Attorney-General to give an official 
opinion at the call of the bead of any Department only upon 
"questions of law arising in the administration of such De-
partment" (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.), and as the present call does 
not appear to be made with reference to any question of that 
.character, but solely in compliance with the resolution and 
for the information of the House, I am not satisfied that it 
is my duty or that I have the authority to furnish the opinion 
requested. I therefore feel constrained to decline giving an 
opinion. 
I may add t,hat a similar request for an opinion upon the 
same matter was made by a previous resolution of the House, 
and I felt compelled, from want of authority, to decline com-
pliance therewith, in a communication to the Speaker dated 
December 17, 1884. There the request came directly from 
the House. Here the request, though coming from the head 
of a Department, is to all intents and purposes an application 
by the House; and accordingly, wi~h respect to complying 
with it, the same want of authority ~xists. In this connec-
tion I beg to refer you to an opinion of one of my prede-
cessors in 14 Opin., 177. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Ron. FRANK HATTON, 
Postmaster- General. 
BOARDS OF IMMIGRATION. 
It is not the duty of aU 'ted States attorney to advise or defend boards 
<'f immigration; but the Secretary of the 'freasury is empowered by 
the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, to employ, and pay out of ihe 
immigrant fund, counsel for those purposes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l.'ICE, 
February 4, 1885. 
SIR: In reply to your communication asking my opinion • as to the employment of United States Attorneys by boards 
• 
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of immigration, a~ting :under the statute of .August 3, 
1882 (22 Stat., 214), I have the honor to submit that the 
duties of United States attorneys are prescribed by law 
(Rev. Stat., sec. 771), and that among those duties are not 
those of advising or defending such boards of immigration. 
By the first section of the said act 9f .August 3, 1882, the 
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to pay out of the 
immigrant fund "the expense of regulating immigration" 
under the act, of taking care of immigrants and relieving 
such as are in distress, and what may be required ''for the 
general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect." 
It is in tpis section that we find the power to. employ and 
pay counsel for the purposes above mentioned. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTY UPON SHELLAC VARNISH. 
Reconsideration of former opinion (see ante, p. 43) in regard to the duty 
upon certain shellac varnish imported from Canada; and advised that 
the warehouse value in Canada is to be taken as a basis for computing 
the duty thereon. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 4, 1885. 
SIR: Referring to your communication of 12th of .Aug-ust 
last about duty upon shellac varnish imported from Canada, 
the reply thereto of .August 18, and the subsequent communi-
cations upon tho same subject, including your note of October 
151ast, I have to say that at his convenience, as was agreed, 
Edwin B. Smith, as attorney for the importers, submitted a 
a brief upon the question upon the 20th of last month. 
I have considered this brief, and have reconsidered the 
general question presented by you, as above, last August. 
Whilst I am entirely satisfied with the general views 
expressed in the reply of August 18, above mentioned, the 
reargument has directetl my attention more particularly to 
the matter of the pertinency of those principles to the very 
question by youJirst as above put. 
It · is argued that the "construction" given in Birming-
• 
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ham's case in connection with the administrative "acquies-
cence" therein operates, under the statute of March 3, 1875, 
so as to prevent you from subsequently questioning that de-
cision in the course of another suit. I do not agree to this 
proposition. Whilst it would no doubt be inadmissible to 
.act capriciously in enforcing any statute, especially one 
which concerns the interests of many, I arn of opinion that 
if, upon consideration, a Secretary should conclude that a 
circuit court decision had been unadvisedly acquiesced in 
by himself and the Attorney General, it would be not so 
much merely competent as his duty to raise the question be-
fore the courts again. This certainly might become his duty 
even as to a decision of the Supreme Court itself, much 
more than in the case supposed. 
However, after reviewing your letter of August 12, I find 
that the reply was inadvertent in concluding you to be dis-
posed to raise again, whether directly or indirectly, the 
question underlying Birmingham's case. This may be due 
to the circumstance that that case was founded upon statu-
tory provisions since superseded, so that it might be better to 
forbear further litigation than to disturb the small remnant 
of transactions to which that decision applies. 
This being so, I advise that if the composition of the var-
nish can not be inquired · into (see Birmingham's case) at 
one stage of the question as to the rate of duty, neither 
can it be at another; if not directly, so neither indirectly. 
If the article was nothing but " varnish" at the point of 
importation, so also for tariff purposes it was nothing else in 
the Canadian warehouse. And, in conclusion, inasmuch as 
you state that there was no market for this" varnish" in 
Canada except so far as there was such inside of the ware-
house, I see no reason. why your former decisions upon 
"tea" and "malt" are not applicable~ viz: that the ware-
house value is to be taken as a basis for calculating duties. 
Very respectfully, 
I concur. 
S. F. PHILLIPS, 
Solicitor- General. 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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FOREIGN-BUILT VESSELS. 
Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not 
exempted by the act Of J nne 26, 1884, chapter 121, from the payment of 
fees for services of consuls. 
DEP A.RTMEHT OF JUSTICE, 
Febru.ary 5, 1885. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the 2d instant, let me say that by 
turning to the "dispatch" transmitted in yours of the 30th 
ultimo, to which I was then referred fvr the question upon 
which an opinion was asked, you will find that the question 
was by its words confined to'' foreign-built registered Ameri-
can vessels." It was upon that account that the reply was 
limited to that class. 
A like question is now asked as to foreign-built vessels 
purchased and owned by citizens of the United States, viz, 
whether the act of 1884, chapter 121 (June 26, 1884 ), ineludes 
· these amongst those vessels for services to which consuls are 
not to charge fees. 
Inasmuch as in the sa~e connection in which that statute 
provides for the fees in question it expressly refers to and 
operates upon the" consular regulations" issued by the Presi-
dent, and as th.e term "American vessels" is one employed 
passim in such regulations, I am of opinion that it has the 
same meaning in the statute (sec. 1~) as in the regulations. 
Upon a perusal of these regulations I do not find that the 
term in question is applied by them to designate foreign built 
vessels purchased and owned by citizens of the United 
States. It seems rather, so far as I can determine, to be 
employed synonymously with that other term so usual with 
us in both statutes and regulations, viz, "vessels of the 
United States ".(see ex. gr., Reg. 111, 128, and 219). I do not 
know whether there has been in your Department any long-
~ontinued practical administration of these regulations to 
the effect that the term ''American vessel" therein contained 
includes in any case as well foreign-built vessels owned by 
citizens of the United States. Such practice would of course 
be entitled to great respect. Otherwise, however, I conclude 
as above, and consequently that the act of 1884 does not. 
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exempt such foreign-built ships owned by citizens from the. 
fees in question. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
CONTRACTS FOR CARRYING THE MAIL. 
Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying the 
mail should be in the name of the United States as directed by statute. 
(See sec. 3949, Revised Stat.; also sec. 403, ibid.) 
The express condition mentioned in section 3741, Revised Statutes, need -
not be inserted in those contracts made with railroad corporations. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 10, 1885. 
SIR : In your letter of the 3d instant my attention is called 
to section 3942, Revised Statutes, and you inquire" whether 
a contract entered into under said section is legal, so far 
as the naming of the parties thereto is concerned, if made 
as follows: Between the Post-Office Department of the 
United States of .America {acting in this behalf by the Post-
master-General) and the Connecticut and East Valley Rail-
road Company," etc. You also inquire" whether, in con-
tracting with railroad companies for carrying the mails, it is · 
essential that such contracts contain a reference to the sub-
ject-matter of sections 3739, 3740, and 3741 of the Revised 
Statutes." 
In reply to your first inquiry I have the honor to state that 
by express provision of statute all contracts entered into 
by the Post-Office Department for carrying the mail are to 
be in the name of the United States (see sec. 3949, Rev. 
Stat.; also sec. 403, ibid.), and that the .contract men-
tioned, in "so far as the naming of the parties thereto is con-
cerned," does not appear to conform strictly to such provis-
ion. Yet the provision itself is, I think, to be regarded as 
directory only to the officer authorized to contract; it deals 
wit.h matter of form rather than of substance. Formerly _ 
mail contracts were made in the name of the Postmaster-Gen-
eral, and suits thereon brought in his name. But by the 
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thirteenth section of the act of July 3, 1836, chapter 276, 
bonds and contracts of mail contractors were directed there-
after to be made to and with the United States of America, 
and suits thereon instituted-in the name of the United States 
of America. This direction has been in force ever since, and 
its observance is obligatory upon the Post-Office Department 
as a duty. In the absence, however, of any declaration in 
_the statute to the contrary, the non-observance thereof 
would not, in my opinion. invalidate an agreement made for 
and in behalf of the United States which is otherwise unob-
jectionable. 
Assuming your second inquiry to refer to mail contracts 
made with incorporate companies for the general benefit 
thereof, and to have especial regard to the requirements of 
section 3741, I answer that the express condition mentioned 
in that section need not be inserted in these contracts. By 
section 37 40 such contracts are excepted from the operation 
of the law (sec. 3739) forbidding members of Congress to be 
admitted to any share in or benefit arising upon contracts 
vith the Government; and the insertion of the said condi-
tion in a contract thus excepted is obviously not contem-
plated by section 3741. 
I am, sir~ very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER .. 
Bon. FRANK HATTON, 
Postmaster- General. 
CASE OF GENERAL SWAIM. 
Review of the finding of the court-martial in the case of Judge-Advo-
cate-General David G. Swaim. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF ,JUSTICE, 
February 10, 1885. 
SIR : Section 923 of the Regulations of the Army of the 
United States, under the title '~Courts-Martial,'' provides 
that-
" When a court-martial appears to have erred in any re-
spect, the reviewing authority may reconvene the court fora 
reconsideration of its action, with suggestions for its guidance. 
The court may thereupon, shouhl it concur in the views sub-
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mitted, proceed to remedy the errors pointed out, and may 
modify or completely change its finclings. The object of 
reconvening the court in such a case is to afford it an oppor-
tunity to reconsider the record, for the purpose of correcting 
or modifying any conclusions thereupon, and also to make 
any amendments of the record necessary to perfect it." 
The record of the court-martial, including the finding and 
sentence of the court, in the case of Brig. Gen. David G. 
Swaim, Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. Army., has been 
transmitted to the President for his action thereon, as pro· 
vided by law. 
General Swaim was tried upon two charges: • 
(1) "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in 
violation of the sixty-first article of war." 
(2) "Neglect Qf duty, in viohttion of the sixty-second arti-
cle of war." 
Of the second charge the court has found the accused not 
guilty. 
The first charge is accompanied by four specifications. 
The second of these specifications was ruled out by demur-
rer, and of the offences set out in the fourth specification the 
court has found the accused not guilty. Of the offenses set 
out in the first and third specifications the court has (omit-
ting certain phrases in the third, which were ruled out on 
demurrer) found the accused guilty except as to certain words, 
phrases, and paragraphs, which are stricken out, and with 
the substitution of other words and phrases intended 
to restrict and qualify the finding; and, in lieu of the charge 
"'Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in viola-
tion of the sixty-first article of war," which these specifica-
tions were intended to support, the court has inserted the 
following : "Conduct to the pr~judice of good order and 
military discipline, in violation of the sixty-second article of 
war." 
That the court had the legal right to make such a finding 
is, I think, not open to doubt. (13 Opin., 460; Digest Opin-
ions Judge-Advocate-General, 264, 266; De Hart's Courts-
Martial, 180, 185; Ives' Military Law, 155; Benet's Military 
Law and Courts-Martial, 1~0, 132; Harwood's Naval Courts-
Martial, 123, 124.) 
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But whether, in view of the specific facts actually found by 
·the court, it acted advisedly in thus refusing to find the de-
fendant guilty of" conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tlemant and in substituting therefor the words ''conduct to 
the prejudice of good order and military discipline," seems 
to admit of very serious doubt. 
The first specification of charge 1 contains a substantial 
:allegation of an attempted fraud by the accused upon the 
banking firm of Bateman & Co., in the transfer by Swaim to 
a third party, for the purpose of a suit, of a certain memoran-
dum of deposit given by Bateman & Co. to Swaim on the 
15th of July, 1882, said transfer being made after Swaim had, 
in the course of his business, withdrawn nearly the entire 
sum covered by the memorandum of deposit from the said 
banking bouse, ''thus attempting to committ a fraud upon 
said Bateman & Co." The court has found all the material 
facts as alleged in this specification, but in the clause last 
quoted bas substituted the word "wrong" for ''fraud," so 
that in the findings of the court the clause reads: ''thus 
.attempting to commit a wrong upon said Bateman & Co."; 
and the finding further states in substance that -what the 
accused did in this respect he did" knowingly." 
If, as the court thus finds, the defendant did deliberately 
and with a knowledge of the facts seek in the manner de-
scribed to perpetrate a "wrong" upon Bateman & Co., the 
line of distinction between the "'wrong" which the court 
finds he sought to commit, and the "fraud" which he was 
charged with seeking to commit, is an exceedingly narrow 
one. Such a" wrong," deliberately planned and perpetrated, 
would involve the same moral turpitude wh-ether it were des-
ignated as a fraud or as a wrong, and in either event the 
offense would seem to fall much more naturally and appro-
priately under the classification of "conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman" than in the category of" conduct to 
the pr~judice of good order and military discipline." The 
·evidence adduced upon this point may or may not satisfy the 
court of the immorality or dishonest intent of the accused in 
the particular acts described in this specification. If the 
-court has reached the latter conclusion, then the accused is 
,entitled to such a finding or a verdict upon the specification 
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as will indicate the absence of immoral or dishonest pur-
poses, which the present finding does not. But, on the other 
hand, if the court is satisfied of such immoral or dishonest 
purpose, . then it is difficult to understand why the facts 
should be glossed over by the use of the ambiguous word 
''wrong," or why the original charge of ''conduct unbecom-
ing an officer and a gentleman" should not be sustained. 
The third specification charges the accused in substance 
with having prepared and forwarded to his official superior, 
the Secretary of War, a written statement relative to the 
transactions referred to in the first specification in regard t(} 
certain facts set out in two letters from A. E. Ba,teman to the 
Secretary of War, which statement by the sa~d Swaim is 
charged to have been "evasive, uncandid, and false, and 
calculated and intended to deceive the Secretary of War.'' 
Then follows an enumeration of seven particulars wherein the 
said statement was false, evasive, and intended to deceive. 
Of the substance of this specification the court has als(} 
found the accused guilty. After reciting at length the let-
ters of Bateman, their reference by the Secretary of War to 
Swaim, and the official indorsement thereon of the latter, the 
finding further proceeds: "Which said indorsement by the 
said Swaim was evasive, uncandid, and calculated and in-
tended to deceive the Secretary of War especially in the fol-
lowing particulars." 
In the succeeding enumeration of those particulars one 
has been found by the court exactly as charged, three having 
been found substantially as charged, and as to the remainder 
the accused has been found not guilty. 
In the first branch of the finding upon the third specifica-
tion above quoted, it will be observ:ed that the words "and 
false," as contained in the original specifications, are stricken 
out. In the enumeration of particulars, however, certain of 
the statements made by the accused in the indorsemen.t in 
controversy are expressly found to have been false, as he, 
Swaim, "well knew·;" so that there is apparently no ground 
to assume that in striking out the words "and false" the 
court intended to acquit the accused of having made a false 
indorsement. The only inference I can derive from this ac-
tion is that by striking out these words as applied to the in-
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dorsement as a whole, and yet finding in terms certain spe-
cific falsehoods contained in said indorsement, the court sim-
ply meant to negative the implication that the indorsement 
was false in every particular, while at the same time indicat-
ing that, being a mixture of truth and falsehood, it was as a 
whole ''calculated and intended to deceive the Secretary of 
War." 
However this may be, the court has in fact found the ac-
-cused guilty of having presented to the Secretary of War a 
written indorsement containing certain specific statements 
which the accused knew to be false, .and having made such 
statements for the purpose and with the· intention of deceiv-
ing the Secretary of War. 
The finding of the court upon the specifications plainly 
shows this. Yet, at the same time, taken as a whole, in con-
nection with the finding upon the charge, it would seem to 
indicate that in the opinion of the members of the court the 
·offense thus established is not one which can properly be 
classified as " unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." 
I find it difficult to reconcile this conclusion with any rec-
·ognized standard of either officerlike or gentlemanlike con-
duct, and it can only be so reconciled by annexing to the 
words " conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman " a 
narrow and very limited significance, in my judgment 
wholly incommensurate with the proper and reasonable im-
cport of those words. 
It is not improbable that the argument upon this point of 
the learned and able counsel for the accused may have pro-
·duced more than an ordinary impression upon the minds of 
the court. That argument was apparently intended to sup-
port the proposition that the charge of "conduct unbecom-
ing an officer and a gentleman," under the sixty-first article 
-of war, properly embraced only offenses of the grossest and 
basest character, of such a nature as to render the guilty 
party a moral and social outlaw. While it may be true that 
the position of the learned counsel has not been without some 
·countenance, I do not think it should receive the official sanc-
tion of the President of the United States. It should not be 
necessary to prove that an individual is a moral monstrosity 
in order to demonstrate his unfitness to be a trusted officer 
·Of the Army. 
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Undoubtedly charges of mere indecorum should not be 
(and I believe they never are) made the basis of prosecutions 
under the sixty-first article of war. The punishment an-
nexed to a conviction under that article clearly indicates 
that prosecutions under it should be limited to the more 
serious class of offenses. Bnt between the grossest offen-
ses of which an officer may be guilty and which are not 
specially enumerated in the Articles of vYar, and those of 
a character simply prejudicial to "good order and military 
discipline," such as are apparently contemplated by the 
sixty-second article of war, there are intervening grades of 
offenses, many of which are in every proper sense of the words 
"unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and the commis-
sion of which by any person is a sure indication that he is 
unfitted to hold an office of trust and honor in the military 
sen·ice. 
The objection to the finding of the court in General Swaim's 
case is therefore based upon the obvious inconsistency be-
tween the findings of fact as contained in the modifications 
and the gradation of the offense in the substituted charge. 
The action of the court as a whole seems to involve a serious 
lowering of -that high standard of honor which from the-
earliest days bas been the pride and the glory of mir mili-
tary service, and which was expressed on a memorable occa-
sion by the great Commander-in-chief of our Revolutionary 
armies, when reluctlantly compelled to reprimand a brother 
officer, in these words: ''Our profession is the chastest of all; 
even the shadow of a fault tarnishes the luster of our finest 
achievements." 
The court in the present case has found the accused guilty 
of making certain false statements to tbe Secretary of War 
for the purpose of deceiving that officer. The President, as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, should not concede that 
this ofl'ense is one either trivial in its nature or against good 
order and military discipline alone, nor as (in any sense of 
the words) other than an offense ''unbecoming an officer and 
a gentleman." If the evidence before the court-martial does. 
not establish the facts in question beyond a reasonable doubt 
(upon which no opinion is here intended to be expressed)~ 
then General Swaim is clearly entitled to be acquitted upon 
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this branch of the case. If, on the other hand, the evidence 
does establish these facts, then he is clearly shown to have 
committed an offense "unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man." 
In 1881 Bvt. Brig. Gen. George Talcott, at the head of 
the Ordnance Bureau in the War Department, was tried by 
a court-martial upon three charges, the third being a charge 
of" conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Under 
this charge the specifications set forth, inter alia, the fact that 
the accused had made a written report and also verbal state-
ments to the Secretary of War in regard to a certain trans-
action which "were false in fact and intent, and were made 
with design to deceiv.e the said Secretary of War." This was 
the burden of the charge. The accused was found guilty, 
sentenced to be dismissed the service, and was dismissed. I 
recall the case merely to indicate the fact that untruthful 
statements made by a high military officer to the official head 
of the War Department have not been regarded in the past-
as I think they should not be regarded in the future-as any 
less of an offense than one "unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman.'' 
I thin~ the record in the case of Bvt. Brig. Gen. David 
G. Swaim, U. S. Army, may with propriety be referred back 
to the court-martial, with suggestions in the line above indi-
cated, for further consideration and revision. 
I have not undertaken to criticise in detail the great mass 
of testimony presented by the record in this case, nor the 
propriety of the conclusions of the court as to the specifica-
tions established by it. Indeed it would be impracticable to 
do so intelligently without devoting many weeks' time to the 
examination of more than thirty volumes of the manuscript 
record. Moreover, the court which heard the witnesses was 
best qualified to scrutinize and balance their testimony, pos-
sessing, as it did, the advantage of personal contact and ob-
servation, so essential in reaching a just conclusion from 
lengt,hy and conflict,ing statements. After the deliberate 
consideration given to the case by the court it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that the specific facts found represent the 
truth of the case so far as it is ascertainable. 
If the President should decide to approve the findings and 
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sentence of the court as they now stand, I see no objection 
to the mere form of the sentence. Article 101 of section 
1;jl!l2 of the Revised Statutes refers in express terms to sus-
pension of pay, and it is apparently well settled that such 
suspension for a given period signifies its absolute forfeiture, 
and not simply the temporary withholding thereof. 
I am, sir, with great respect, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
IMMEDIATE 'rRANSPORTATION OF DUTIABLE GOODS. 
New legislation is not required by the proviso in section 7 of the act of 
June 10, 1880, chapter 190, in order to give the privilege of immediate 
transportation to any of the places named in that section which at the 
time of the passage of that act was without the "necessary officers" 
therein referred to, but which thereafter has such t>fficers ' assigned 
thereto. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 13, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 11th instant refers to the seventh section 
of the act of 1880, chapter 190 (Rev. Stat., Supp., p. 546), 
and asks in effect whether, in order to communicate the priv-
ilege thereby given, fresh legislation is required by the proviso 
whenever any one of the places mentioned in the body ofthe 
section, and which at the time of the passage of that act was 
without the " necessary officers" therein spoken of, thereafter 
bas such officers assigned to it. 
I think not. For, in the first place, such construction would 
render the body of the section so far superfluous, inasmuch 
as the secondary legislation supposed would be quite as com-
petent in its absence. Again, the careful na.ming of the places 
in the body of the section indicates that the general question 
of the policy of communicating the intended privilege to each 
had been decided by thB legislature. ':f.1he reference in the 
proviso to a consideration merely practical is one that should 
affect the operation of such policy. Such operation is to be de-
termined by the Executive Department, as I think, toties 
quoties such necessary officers are or are not at any of the 
places named. 
Very respectfully, 
BE:ijJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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MILEAGE. 
An officer of the Revenue Cutter Service is not entitled to rnileage for 
travel on duty, but may be allowed actual traveling expenses. 
DEPAR~MENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 19, 1885. 
SIR: I herewith submit a reply to the note of the Acting 
Secretary of February 17, in regard to a claim by Philip 
Littig, late second assistant engineer in the Revenue Cutter 
Service, for mileage upon travel done in Jnly, 1872, and May, 
187 4, betwixt Baltimore and San Francisco and Port Town-
send. Littig has received his actual expenses, but claims 
the balance betwixt that and the 10 cents a mile which for-
merly the Secretary assumed a right to allow by assimilation, 
as I suppose. The claimant refers to Graham's case (110 U. 
s., 219.) 
As Littig is not a naval officer, it does not appear that Gra-
ham's case, or the act therein contained, bas any application 
to his case. I am not referred to any statute, other than the 
ordinary appropriation acts p~oviding for "traveling ex-
penses" of officers of "the Revenue Cutter Service" (17 Stat., 
347 and 511), that concerns this claim; and as I know of none 
such, I advise that Littig has no right to the mileage for which 
he asks. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
FEES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. 
Certain fees claimed by a United States attorney for special services 
held to be" compensation allowed by law" within the meaning of the 
third section of the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 328, and therefore not 
precluded by that section from being paid. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 19, 1885. 
SIR : Yours of the 11th states a claim by the United States 
.attorney for southern New York for two fees, and asks 
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whether the act of 187 4, chapter 328, section 3, has any and 
what operation in preventing their payment. 
1. The first fee is for $2,500, allowed by court for defend-
ing .the Secretary of the Treasury in a suit brought in 1873 
by one Lamar because of cotton seized by order of the Sec-
retary, such Ruit being ended in November, 1884, by judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. 
This fee therefore comes within Revised Statutes, section 
827 (the Secretary being an " officer of the revenue" within 
that phrase there employed), and consequently it is excluded 
from the operation of Revised Statutes, sections 770, 833, 
(834) and 835. When duly allowed by the court it therefore 
became strictly compensation allowed by law within the 
meaning of those words in the body of section 3 first above 
mentioned. 
2. The second fee is one for defending Postmaster James 
(of New York) in the Yale Lock suits. 
I have considered this case with great care, having ap-
proached it with serious doubts as to the proper answer. 
After scrutinizing the statutory provisions, however, I see no 
reason to hold that compensation to district attorneys for 
special services duly allowed. to them under a statute which 
authorized their employment is not, as well as that in cases 
under Revised Statutes, section 827, "compensation allowed 
by law." 
The act of 187 4 therefore does not apply at all, and the pro-
viso herein was added ex abundanti cautela. I had at first 
thought this might sub modo be otherwise; it is not neces-
sary now to say why. 
Upon the whole I see no reason why the fees should not 
be paid. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER 
' The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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EMOLUMENT RETURNS OF MARSHALS. 
Allowances for travel by United States marshals, provided by section 829, 
Revised Statutes, are ''fees" within the meaning of section 833 Revised 
Statutes, and should be included in the emolument returns required by 
the latter section to be made by those officers. 
DEPAR'l'l\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 20, 1885. 
SIR: By letter of the 14th instant, the then Acting Sec-
retary of the Treasury, Mr. Coon, at the request of the Solic-
itor of the Treasury, submitted to me, for an opinion thereon, 
the following question, which has arisen in a matter now be-
fore the latter officer : '• Does the mileage received by 
United States marshals under section 829, Revised Statutes,. 
form a part of the emoluments and fees, returns of which are· 
required to be made to the Attorney-General by section 833, 
Revised Statutes¥" 
Having considered this question with much care, I am now 
prepared to state my opinion thereon. 
Tbe last-mentioned section requires the marshal to make,. 
semi-annually, a written return of "all the fees and emol-
uments of his office, of every name and character," etc. 
This language is very broad and comprehensive; it undoubt-
edly includes any and every allowance to which the marshal 
is entitled, and which may properly be denominated a fee or-
emolument of his office. 
Section 829 provides that the marshal shall re9eive certain 
·allowances and among others the following: "For traveling 
from his residence to the place of holding court, etc., 10 cents-
a mile for going only." ''For travel, in going only, to serve 
any process, warrant, etc., six cents a mile, to be computed 
from the place where the process is returned to the place of 
service," etc. Allowances of this description to the officers of 
courts are commonly called the traveling fees of such officers; , 
and they have received this designation in the legislation of 
Congress regulating the compensation of the marshal. Thus 
in section 3 of the act of 1\-Iay 8, 1792, chapter 36, which pre-
scribes the compensation of the marshal for the service of 
process, it is declared that " the fee for travel," where only 
one person is named in the writ, shall not exceed a certain 
sum, etc. That section was repealed by the act of February 
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29, 1799, chapter 19; yet it is in pari materia with all the 
subsequent legislation regulating the compensation of ·mar-
shals; and according to a familiar rule of interpretation, it 
may be referred to for the purpose of explaining the scope 
and import of terms employed in such subsequent legislation. 
Regarding the allowances for travel provided by section 
829, adverted to above, as fees within the meaning of section 
833, there is no escape from the conclusion that all such al-
lowances should be included in the written return which, by 
the latter section, the marshal is required to make semi-
annually ; and I am of the opinion that they must be so re-
garded. This view is fortified by the practice which I 
understand has hitherto uniformly prevailed from the pas-
sage of the fee-bill of 1853 (from which the above-mentioned 
provision in section 833 is taken) down to the present time, 
namely, to require marshals to include in their emolument 
returns the amounts received by them for mileage. Such 
practical construction of the statute for so long a period is 
itself entitled to very great weight. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Hon. HuGH McCuLLOCH, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
An attorney was employed by the War Department in 1868 to defend 
certain parties against whom suits were brought, in the result of 
which the Government was interested. The suits were not determined 
until some time after the passage of the act of June 22, 1870, chapter 
150, up to which time the attorney was continued therein: Advised 
that the authority under which the attorney was originally employed 
was sufficient, and that the Secretary of War is authorized to pay for 
his servibes out of any fund under his control which may be available 
for that purpose. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 24:, 1885. 
SIR: In your letter of the 12th instant, transmitting an ac-
eount of George P. Strong, esq., for professional services ren-
dered by him in the defense of certain suits brought by 
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William G. Clark v. Robert and William Mitchell, and Same v. 
Robert H. Franklin, you inquire "whether it is competent for 
the Secretary of War to pay ·for the services, in view of sec-
tion 365 of the Revised Statutes." 
It appears by the paper accompanying the account that 
both of these suits, and one other, were instituted in 1868 by 
the plaintiff, Clark, to recover from the defendants certain 
rents which they had paid over to the military authorities of 
the United States during the rebellion under the compulsion 
of an order issued by the latter; and that the War Depart-
ment, deeming the United States to be interested in the 
result of this legislation, Mr. Strong was then employed by 
that Department to appear in behalf of the defendants. 
Under the law in force at that time (act of February 26, 
1853, chap. 80) the head of any Department was authorized, 
in his discretion, to employ special counsel in behalf of the 
Government where its interests were concerned, the com-
pensation of counsel so employed being defrayed from funds 
under the control of such Department. This authority was 
taken away by section 17 of the act of June 22, 1870, chap-
ter 150, which is embodied in sections 189, 365, .and 366, Re-
vised Statutes; but the provisions of that act have been 
construed to not apply to a case in which the employment of 
counsel occurred prior to its passage, notwithstanding the 
services were in part rendered subsequent thereto. (13 
Opin., 580.) 
In the suits mentioned, Mr. Strong was employed by com-
petent authority before the said act of 1870, and, be having 
· become thoroughly prepared for them, considerations of 
economy, as well as of expediency, required his continuance 
therein after the passage of that act, as his previous prepa-
ration enabled him to conduct the defense at less expense, 
and perhaps with less hazard, than any one else. For the 
purpose of such continuance, as also for the purpose of allow-
ing compensation for his services, the authority under which 
he was originally employed was sufficient, the provisions of 
the act of 1870, according to the construction above adverted 
to, not applying to the case. 
The suits were ably and successfully defended ,by Mr. 
~trong; the controversy, after having been tried in the in-
• 
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ferior court and heard in the supreme court of the State, and 
thence brought before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, being finally determined by the latter in favor of the 
defendants. In my opinion you are authorized to pay for 
his services out of any fund under your control which is 
available for that purpose. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
COMPENSATION OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. 
Section 838 Revised Statutes does not authorize an allowance to be 
made by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for services 
in internal-revenue cases reported to the latter wherein no judicial 
proceedings have been instituted. 
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUS1'ICE, 
March 2, 1885. 
SIR : Your letter of the 28th ultimo, and accompanying 
papers, relative to an account submitted by the United States 
attorney for the eastern district of l\iissouri, under section 
838, Revised Statutes, presents this inquiry: Whether that 
section authorizes an allowance to be made to a district at-
torne~r for his services in _ internal-revenue cases reported to· 
him, wherein, upon inquiry and examination, he has decided 
that the ends of justice do not require that judicial proceed-
ings should be instituted and no such proceedings have 
been instituted. 
This, upon· inquiry, appears to be prompted by the cir-
cumstance that the district judge of the aforesaid district 
has, in a recent case, placed a construction upon that section 
which difl'ers from the one given it by your predecessors in 
office. As construed by the latter, the section does not au-
thorize compensation to be allowed in cases not "tried or dis-
posed of" before a judge; while by the former it is held that 
compensation may be allowed in such cases. 
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the construction 
hitherto adopted and acted upon by your Departi:Qent is cor-
rect. Thit; conchtsion is reached after having taken into 
view, in connection with section' 838, Revised Statutes, the 
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seventh section of the act of July 18, 1866, chapter 201, the 
act of March 3, 1873, chapter 244, and sections 3084, 3085, 
and 3164, Revised Statutes. 
By section 7 of the act of 1866 it was made the duty of 
the rlistrict attorney, upon the report of the collector of cus-
toms thereby required, to" cause suit and prosecution to be 
-commenced and prosecuted without delay for the fines and 
personal penalties by law in such cases provided, unless 
upon inquiry and examination he shall decide that a convic-
tion cannot probably be obtained, or that the ends of public 
justice do not require that a suit or prosecution should be 
instituted, in which case he shall report the facts to the Sec-
retary of the 'rreasury for hi~ direction; and for expenses 
incurred and services rendered in prosecutions for such fines 
.and personal penalties the Jistrict attorney shall receive 
such allowance as the Secretary shall deem just and reason-
able, upon the certificate of the judge before whom such 
prosecution was had," etc. Here it is very clear that no 
allowance is authorized for the services of the district attor-
ney. excepting in cases in which suits or prosecutions have 
been instituted. Nothing is allowed for the preliminary 
"inquiry and examinination" and report of facts to the Sec-
retary in cases not prosecuted. 
That section was wholly superseded by the amendatory 
act of 1873, which re-enacted the same provisions substan-
tially, and extended them to internal-revenue cases. This 
act made it the duty of the district attorney, on the report 
of the collector of customs or of the collector of internal rev-
~mue, as the case may be, to •' cause the proper proceedings 
to be commenced and prosecuted without delay for the fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures by law in such cases provided, un-
less upon inquiry and examination he shall decide that such 
proceedings cannot probably be sustained, or that the ends 
of justice do not require that proceedings should be insti-
tuted, in which case he shall report the facts in customs cases 
to the ~ecretary of the Treasury, and in internal-r~venue 
cases to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for their di-
rection; and for the expenses incurred and services rendered 
in all such cases the district attorn~y shall receive and be 
paid from the Treasury such sum as the Secretary of the 
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Treasury shall deem just and reasonable, u_pon the certificate-
of the judge before whom such cases are tried or disposed of."' 
The object of this enactment was to put internal-revenue 
cases upon the same footing with customs cases (respecting. 
fines, penalties, and forfeitures), both as regards the insti· 
tution of judicial proceedings therein and the allowance of 
compensation to district attorneys for their services, etc., 
therein. Under the act of 1866 such allowance was limited 
to '' expenses incurred and services rendered " in customs 
cases. The act of 1873 authorized a similar allowance to be 
made in internal-revenue cases as well as customs cases. 
The words " expenses incurred and services rendered in al~ 
s~wh cases," as used in the latter act, were meant to include 
both customs cases and internal-revenue cases; and that they 
were not meant to include cases (whether internal revenue or 
customs) in which no judicial proceedings have been in~ti­
tuted is shown by the context. Thus, the Secretary of the 
Treasury is authorized to make an allowance for such ex-
penses and services only "upon the certificate of the judge 
before whom such cases are tried or disposed of." This 
language shows that, in enlarging the provisions of the act 
of 1866 so as to cover internal-revenue cases, the act of 
1873 intended to retain the restrictions theretofore existing 
as to the cases in which allowances to the district attorney 
should he made. The former act required a "certificate of 
the judge before whom such prosecution was had;" the lat-
ter act calls for a ''certificate of the judge before whom such 
cases are tried or disposed of." The phraseology thus em-
ployed, which also occurs in sections 838 and 3085, Revised 
Statutes, is of the same import. 
The sections of the Revised Statutes hereinbefore men-
tioned have made no change in the law as it stood under th~ 
act of 1873, respecting allowances by the Secretary of the 
Treasury to district attorneys in customs and internal-rev-
enue eases. 
Accordingly, in answer to the inquiry presented, I have 
the honor to reply that in my opinion section 838, Revised 
Statutes, does not authorize an allowance to be made by the 
Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for expenses 
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incurred and services rendered in cases wherein no judicial 
proceedings have been instituted. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
Ron. HUGH McCuLLocH, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
CLAIM OF LAKE SUPERIOR AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COM-
PANY. 
Upon the facts presented in this case: Advised that it is not incumbent 
upou the Postmaster-General to have an account for mail transporta-
tion performed in July, 1876, audited in favor of the Lake Superior 
and Mississippi Railroad Company, until satisfactory evidence is pre-
sented that the company has maintained its existence and that there 
are proper officers to receive and receipt for the money. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 2, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of the 20th of February ultimo and to reply as followt-3: 
On the 12th of June, 1877, a decree of the circuit court of 
the United States for the district of Minnesota, foreclosing 
a mortgage dated January 1, 1869, transferred all the mort-
gaged premises to the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Com-
pauy. The mortgage had been given by the Lake Superior 
and Mississippi Railroad Oompany, and included, witll the 
real and personal property, all corporate franchises, includ-
ing the franchise to be a corporation. At the time of the sale 
and decree there was due from the United States to the LakfJ 
cuperior and Mississippi Railroad Uornpany $3,G8J. 7G for 
transportation of the mails from July, 1876. A suit instituted 
by the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Company to recover 
this sum has been decided in favor of the United States by 
the Supreme Court, it being held that no terms of description 
sufficient to pass the interest of the original company therein 
are to be found in the mortgage ur decree of sale, and, further, 
that the transfer of such a claim is forbidden by section 3477, 
Revised Statutes, which provides that every assignment of a • 
claim against the United States made before issue of a war-
rant is absolutely void. (112 U. S, 733.) 
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J. F. Farnsworth, claiming to be the attorney of the Lake 
Superior and Mississippi Ra,ilroad Company and of the St. 
Paul and Duluth Railroad Company, now asks that this claim 
be audited, promising that when that is done he will present 
satisfactory evidence of the rights of the party claiming the 
warrant. You ask my advice as to whether it is your duty 
to cause the claim in question to be audited by the proper 
officers of the Department. 
It does not seem to me incumbent upon you to have this 
account audited until e\-ridence has been prfsented sufficient 
to satisfy you that the Lake Superior and Mississippi Rail· 
road Company has maintained its existence, and that there 
are proper officers to receive and receipt for the money. The 
Supreme Court having decided that the St. Paul and Duluth 
Railroad Company is not entitled to the money, it follows that 
the officers of that corporation have no right, and that no 
assignee can make claim. You may, if you see fit, have the 
account stated in favor of the Lake Superior and Mississippi 
Hailroad Company, withholding the warrant until General 
}""'arnsworth produces the evidence promised; but in view of 
the mortgage and foreclosure of the franchise to be a corpora-
tion, and of the sale in 1877 of all and every right of the com-
pany,the presumption that the corporation still exists is over-
thrown, and 'the burden of proving its existence is upon the 
claimant. It is for you to determine whether you will audit 
without the promised evidence, or insist on the production of 
the evidence before taking any steps. Without more facts I 
cannot advise as to the preseut status of the Lake Superior 
and Mississippi Railroad Company. 
Very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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CANCELLATION OF POSTAGE-STAMPS. 
'The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, 1878, chap-
ter 359, to substitute. for the black printing inks and writing fluids used 
under section 721, Postal Regulations, any canceling ink which is uni-
form and which actual experiment and test have shown to his satis-
faction to be best calculated to guard again&t fraud, and to order its 
use in all post-offices where stamps are canceled. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 3, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 20th ultimo presents for my con-
sideration the following case and question : 
"Section 3921, Revised Statutes, 1878, requires that' post-
age-stamps affixed to all mail matter, or the stamped en-
velopes in which the same is inclosed, shall, when deposited 
for mailing or delivery, be defaced by the postmaster at the 
mailing office in such manner as the Postmaster-General shall 
direct.' 
"Under this statute the Postmaster-General, by regulation 
(sec. 721, P. L. and R.), requires that,' the cancellation must 
be effected by the use of black printing ink, whenever that 
material can be obtained; where it cannot, the operation 
shaH be performed by making several heavy crosses or par-
allel lines upon each stamp with a pen dipped in good black 
writing ink.' 
"In practice, however, it was found that the use of these 
.canceling materials invited frauds upon the revenues of the 
Department by the washing and reuse of stamps. 
"Accordingly, on . April 29, 1875, the then Postmaster-
General issued a circular invitation to the public to submit 
methods (inks and appliances for the more effectual cancella-
tion of stamps), under which many inks and appliances were 
examined by the Department. 
"In the sundry civil bill approved June ~o, 1878, appears 
the following enactment : 
" 'That the Postmaster-General be and he is hereby au-
thorized to adopt a uniform canceling ink or other appliance 
for canceling stamps which experiments and tests have 
proved to be the most practicable and the best calculated to 
protect the revenues of the Department from the frauds prac-
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ticed upon it, to be used in all the post-offices where stamps 
are canceled, and he is hereby authorized to distribute said 
canceling ink or other appliance in the same manner as other , 
supplies are now distributed in the different post-offices in the 
United States, and to this end the Postmaster-General is 
hereby authorized to use any funds of said Department· here· 
tofore applicable: Provided, The same shall not increase the 
expenditures of said Department for the purposes named in 
this section.' · 
"In view of the laws above quoted, I have the honor to 
request your opinion upon the question whether, assuming 
the Postmaster-General is able to find a practically indelible 
canceling ink, be will be authorized, under said laws, to sub-
stitute it for the black printing inks and writing fluids now 
used under Postal Regulations, section 721, and to order its 
use in all post-offices where stamps are canceled.'' 
Upon consideration, I am of the opinion that the question 
propounded by you should be answered in tlle affirmative .. 
Under the authority conferred by the act of June 20, 1878, 
cited above, the Postmaster-General has power to adopt, and 
to substitute for the inks now in use, any canceling ink which 
is uniform and which actual experiment and test have shown 
to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard against 
fraud npon the revenues of the post.:tl service, anu he has 
power to require such canceling ink to be used in all post-
offices where stamps are canceled; subject, however, to the 
restriction that the e-xpenses of the Department are not 
thereby increased. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER. 




HON. AUGUSTUS H. GARLAND, OF ARKANSAS. 
APPOINTED MARCH 6, 1885. 
BRIDGE ACROSS THE MISSISSIPPI AT ST. PAUL. 
'The provision in the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, fixing the width 
of the water-way between the spans of the proposed bridge across the 
Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., extends to the entire structure 
over so much of the river as is ordinarily navigable at some seasons of 
the year for either boats or rafts. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 20, 1885. 
SIR: I have considered the question presented in your let-
ter of the 17th instant, relative to the bridge which the City 
of St. Paul proposes to construct across the Mississippi River 
under the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, namely : "Whether 
the provision in that act as to the length of spans should be 
held to extend to the entire structure over the stream from 
bank to bank, or confined to such portion of the river as is 
navigable. " 
The provision here referred to is in the second section of 
tlrat act, and reads as follows : '' Provided, That if said 
bridge or bridges shall be made with unbroken and contin-
uous spans, it shall not be of less elevation in any case than 
fifty-five and one-half feet above extreme high-water mark 
.over the main channel of said river, as understood at the 
point of location, to the bottom chord of the bridge, nor shall 
the spans of said bridge or bridges give a clear width of 
water-way of l~ss than two hundred and fifty feet, and the 
piers of said bridge or bridges shall be parallel with the cur-
rent of said river, and the main span shall be over the main 
~hannel of the river, and give a clear width of water-way of 
not less than three hundred feet." 
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It appears by the drawings which accompanied your letter, 
exhibiting the plan and location of the proposed bridge, that 
the main span is to be over the main channel of the river and 
will give a clear width of water-way of 34:8 feet, but that each 
of the other spans (of which there are five) will give a width 
of less than 250 feet, two of them, nearest the main span,. 
giving but 200 feet, and the remainder still less. 
In regard to these spans (other than the main one), Major-
Mackenzie, of the United States Engineer Corps, reports that 
they are not over a navigable part of the river. The provision 
prescribing the width of the water-way to be given by the 
main and other spans is made in the interest of navigation,. 
and if the river at this point were not, at any and all times, 
navigable for" boats, vessels, rafts, and other water-craft," 
the requirements of such provision might well be deemed to 
be inapplicable thereto. But the drawings indicate that be-
tween low and high water mark a very considerable depth of 
water must exist there during certain seasons of the year, 
which, it may reasonably be assumed, is available for the 
navigation of rafts and like water-craft; and, in fixing the 
width of the water-way between piers to be erected in that 
part of the river which does not embrace the main channel, 
Congress probably had in view more especially the needs of 
such navigation. This is indicated by the second proviso in 
said section, where it is provided that the spans there re-
quired to give a water-way of not less than 250 feet may be-
not less than 10 feet above extreme high-water mark. 
Accordingly, in answer to your inquiry, I have the honor to 
state that in my opinion the provision in question sxtends to-
the entire structure over so much of the river as is ordinarily 
navigable at some seasons of the year for either boats or-
rafts. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND .. 
Ron. WILLIAM C. ENDICOTT, 
Secretary of War. 
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Head Tax.-Naval Court-Martial. 
HEAD TAX. 
The duty imposed by the ~ct of 1882, chapter 376, upon passengers, other 
than citizens, coming to any port within the United States, is to be ex-
acted· of convicts, lunatics, etc., ~!!though by the terms of the statute 
they are not to be permitted to land and are required to be returned to 
whence they c~me. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 20, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 18th instant refers to the duty of 50 cents 
imposed bytheactof1882,chapter376, upon passengers, other 
than citizens, who shall come, etc., to any port within the 
U_nited States; and asks whether such duty is to be exacted 
of convicts, lunatics, etc., amongst such passengers that; by 
the terms of the statute are not to be permitted to land, but 
are to be returned to whence they came. 
I advise you that it is to be so exacted. Amongst other 
reasons for this opinion I observe that the statute is impera-
tive as to the time within which (twenty-four hours after the 
entry of the vessel) such duty is to be paid; whilst nothing is 
said as to that within which the existence of convicts, luna-
tics, etc., is to be ascertained. This is a technical reason, it 
is true, but it seems supported also by the policy of this 
act-a matter which need not be developed here. 
Very respectfully, ' 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL. 
Special counsel may be employed by the Attorney-General, at the request 
of the Secretary of the Navy, to assist th~ judge-advocate in a trial by 
court-martial; the compensation of such counsel (in the absence of 
other provision) to be paid from the appropriation for the contingent 
expenses of the Navy. 
Such counsel should be commissioned by the Attorney-General under sec-
tion 366, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 21, 1885. 
SJR: Yours of the 18th instant calls my attention to cor-
respondence betwixt the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Attorney-General in January and February last which re-
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suited in an appointment of Mr. Cragin to assist a naval 
judge-advocate in the court-martial called to try the_ late 
Surgeon-General. Mr. Cragin was sel@cted, and his fee was 
arranged by the Secretary with the assent of the Attorney-
General. He has taken an oath which has been forwarded 
to this Department, but he has not been commissioned. The 
trial will begin upon the 14th proximo. 
After making a statement substantially as above, you ask: 
(1) Whether special counsel can be employed to assist a 
judge-advocate, i. e., "counsel" other than some officer of 
the Department of Justice~ 
(2) If he can, should he not be commissioned under section 
366, Revised Statutes; and also, can his compensation be 
paid out of the appropriation for the contingent expenses of 
the Nav.Y, which includes "expenses of courts-martial;" 
such appropriation being (sec. 3676, Rev. Stat.) under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Navy~ 
(3) Referring to sections 3676 and 3681, Revised Statutes, 
can the Secretary of the Navy, in his discretion and without 
applying to the Attorney-General, employ special counsel in 
connection with cases before naval courts martial~ 
1. The only difficulty in the way of the employment by 
the Attorney-General of special attorneys on behalf of the 
United States seems to be involved iu the question of the ex-
istence of an appropriation for their payment. 
The act of 1870, chapter 150, which created the Department 
of Justice, seems to have intended that all lawyers who should 
be employed, whether statedly or casually, upon behalf of the 
United States should have connection with that Department. 
They were not all to be '~officers" thereof, but there was to 
be subordination betwixt them and the Attorney-General. 
In particular it was provided (sec. 17) that such special 
counsel as might be from time to time required by any De-
partment should be appointed by the Attorney-General only, 
and should formally and really be assimilated, in point of 
office, oath, and commission, to the ordinary legal officers 
of the G-overnment, the amount of their compensation to be 
stipulated for by him. These provisions are to be found in 
sections 189, 362, 365, and 366, Revised Statutes. 
If, therefore, there be an appropricttion for the Navy De-
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partment that may be applied to the compensation of Mr. 
Cragin upon his being duly qualified, I see no reason why he 
may not entitle himself to be paid. 
I do not know that you make objection to the manner in 
which the Attorney-General informally delegated, as it were, 
his functions as regards selection, etc., to the Secretary. In 
.a proper case this might deserve consideration. 
Upon the whole, as to your first question, I agree in the 
{)pinion given to the Secretary of the Navy by Attorney-
General Akerman, under date of August 25, 1871 (13 Opin., 
.515). The cireumstance that in the mean time (June 19, 
1878) the office of "naval solicitor" has heen abolished (20 
Stat., 105), does not affect that conclusion. 
2. I think that Mr. Cragin should be commissioned under 
section 366, as you suggest. 
When so commissioned, I see no reason why he may not 
be compensated out of the fund for '"expenses of courts-mar-
tial," to which you refer. 
3. A judge-ad vocate need not be a professional person. 
His qualifications must of course be of the sort required by 
members of the bar, but there is no law limiting choice of 
judge-advocates, or of their assistants when needed, to that 
.class. Although there is no statutory provision in regard to 
naval judge-advocates, like that for those of the Army, to the 
effect that they shall belong to the Navy, yet in fact I take it 
that this is generally the case. So assistants for judge-advo-
cates might be detailed ft·om the same branch of service, or 
indeed specially intelligent persons might be selected from 
.any line of civil life. ' 
However, after considering the provisions in the Revised 
Statutes taken from the act of 1870, I am of opinion that if 
it be thought best in any case to employ regular counsel to 
assist a naval judge-advocate, he should be selected and com-
missioned by the Attorney-General. Such service would sub-
stantially be professional "service," to which the Attorney-
General might under section 367 assign any lawyer in the 
Department of Justice; and therefore it is probable that Con-
gress intended the statutory provisions tor compensating 
persons employed in lieu of these "offi~ers" (sec. 365) to 
.cover like service ; and so such profe::;sional persons as are 
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required to perform it should be selected etc., by the Attor-
ney -General alone. If such service be professional in the one 
point of view, so also in the other. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL INDIANS. 
Where an Apache Indian, charged with murdering another Indian of 
the same tribe on an Indian reservation in Arizona, was in custody of 
the Territorial authorities: Advised that the accused should be delivered 
up for trial and punishment to the authorities of his tribe. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 24, 1885. 
SIR: I have considered the papers inclosed in yours of the 
.20th instant~ stating the case of Eschilla, an Apache-Yuma 
Indian, charged with murdering an .4-pache Indian scout 
In August last within the White Mountain Indian Reserva-
iiion in Arizona. 
The question~ ou ask is whether for trial and punishment 
t.his criminal is to be delivered up to the Territorial authori-
ties or to the authorities of his tribe. 
I gather from the papers in the case that Eschilla and his 
victim are tribal Indians, belonging to the same tribe. 
The case therefore comes within the rule of the Grow Dog 
case (109 U. S., 556), i. e., whilst as between the Territory 
and the United States the latter would have jurisdiction, 
they have relinquished such jurisdiction to the tribe. 
The case therefore is to be remitted to the authorities of 
the tribe. 
I herewith return the papers inclosed as above. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE lETERIOR. 
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ALASKA. 
The fourteenth section of the act ofMay 17, 1884, chapter 53, which pro-
hibits the importation of "intoxicating liquors" into the Territory of 
Alaska, does not apply to wines imported for sacramental use. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 24, 1885. 
SIR : Yours of the 21st instant refers to an application to 
ship to Alaska wines for sacramental use in the various 
Greeco-Russian churches there; and in effect asks whether 
the fourteenth section of the act of 1884, chapter 53, which 
prohibits the importation into that Territory of " intoxicat-
ing liquors," except for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific 
purposes," operates upon such application. 
Granting that, as appears probable from its context in Re-
vised Statutes, section 1955, the word "importation" in the 
above provision includes shipments from other portions of 
the United States, and that wine is an" intoxicating liquor'" 
within the words there employed, I am still of opinion that 
-such provision does not apply to exclude wines intended for 
sacramental uses. Such use of wines is a religious rite 
equally solemn and venerable. Its "free exercise" is there-
fore protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. 
In the light of that guaranty,...! am satisfied that, by the 
provision referred to, Congress had no more intention than it 
bad power to interfere with the shipment of the wines in 
question. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. 
Where meat of American production, cured with foreign salt, was ex-
ported to Europe (the duty upon the salt being refunded), and subse-
quently brought back to this country: Advised that, on the duties 
upon the salt being re-refunded, the meat may be admitted duty free. 
under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 24:, 1885. 
SIR : Yours of the 20th instant calls my attention to a. 
case under the customs laws in which certain meats of Ameri- I 
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can production, cured with foreign salt, were exported to 
Europe, the duty upon the salt being thereupon refunded 
(tariff act of March 3, 1883, Treasury ed., par. 483), and 
have since been reimported. Thereupon a question was 
raised before your predecessor, 25th ultimo, whether upon 
such reimportation the meats after re-refunding duties on 
the salt were not free; and he decided that under existing 
law the meats could not be distinguished from meats of for-
eigu production, and therefore should be subjected to duty 
accordingly. 
Replying to the questions thereupon asked byyou,I advise-
(1) That under section 2 of the act of 1875, chapter 136 
(March 3), you cannot of yourself alone reverse that de-
cision for the purpose of holding the meats upon such re-
refunding to be free; and, 
(2) .A. proper construction of the free list in the tari~ act of 
1883 (Treasury ed., par. 649) designates these meats as free, 
at least upon such re-refunding of the duty upon the salt. 
For customs purposes the salted meats at exportation were 
regarded as "salt" and "meat." Upon their importation 
it is consistent to keep up that treatment. The only serious 
question thereabouts seems to be that which you mention as 
having been raised by Judge Sawyer, viz: Whether the 
words of paragraph 649 may not' avail to pass the whole 
importation free, as being a "manufactured article of the 
United States" returned in the same condition as exported. 
I advise therefore that you accept the refunded duty upon 
the salt, and thereupon admit the meats free. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. G .A.RL.A.ND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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OLD WINNEBAGO AND CROW CREEK RESERVATION. 
The contiguous tracts of land lying on the east bank of the Missouri 
River in the Territory of Dakota, known as the Old Winnebago and Crow 
Creek Reservations, are protected by the provisions of the treaty of 
April 29, 1868, with the Sioux Indians; and the executive order of 
February 27, 1885, restoring portions of such tracts to the public do-
main, is in violation of that treaty, and consequently inoperative and 
void. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 29, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 17th March instant re-
quests my opinion as to whether those contiguous tracts of 
land lying on the east bank of the Missouri River, m the 
Territory of Dakota, and designated the Old Winnebago and 
Crow Creek Reservation-and sometimes going by the last 
name only-are embraced by "the treaty concluded with 
various" bands of the Sioux Indians on the 29th April, 1868 
(15 Stat., 635), and whether the executive order of the 27th 
February, 1885, restored the lands in question to the public 
domain. 
In replying to the first question, as to whether the lands 
referred to come within thP- treaty of 1868, it will be neces-
sary to give particular attention to their condition prior to 
and at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. 
By an act passed on the 21st February, 1863 (12 Stat., 
858), tbe President was authorized to remove the Winnebago 
Indians from the State of Minnesota and settle them upon 
such unoccupied lands, beyond the limit of any State, as he 
might assign and set apart for them in conformity to the law. 
On the 3d March 1863 (12 Stat., 819), a similar law was 
passed, authorizing and directing the President to assign 
and set apart for the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Medawakanton, 
and Walpakoota bands of Sioux Indians a tract of unoccu-
pied land outside the limits of any State, in tbe manner re-
quired by the law. 
In furtherance of these acts Clark W. Thompson, a super-
intt...;.dant of the Indian service, proceeded, by direction of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to lay oft' two adjoining 
tracts or reservations of the public domain on the east bank 
of tbe Missouri River, in the Territory of Dakota, and on the 
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1st July, 1863, be reported to the Commissioner that he had 
completed the surveys, and tr~nsmitted the plats and field 
notes with his report. 
The Winnebagoes were settled on the upper tract or reser-
vation and the Sioux on the lower, but no executive order 
was made setting the lands apart for the use and occupation 
of these Indians. 
The Winnebagoes remained on their reservation until1865, 
when by a treaty dated the 8th March of that year (14 Stat., 
671) they ceded, sold, and conveyed to the United States" all 
their right, title, and interest in and to their present reser-
vation in the Territory of Dakota, at Usher's Landing, on the 
Missouri River, the metes and bounds thereof being on file 
in the Indian Department." After this treaty the Winne-
bagoes removed to their new reservation in Nebraska. 
In 1866 the Sioux were also removed to their new reserva-
tion in Nebraska set apart for them by an executive order 
dated the 27th February, 1866, and founded on the act of 3d 
March, 1863 (supra), but without any cession or formal relin-
quishment. 
After the removal of the Winnebagoes and Sioux, wander-
ing bands of Sioux belonging to the Yanctonias, Two Kettle, 
and Brule tribes entered and took. possession of the aban-
doned reservations and have remained on them up to the 
present time, although their original entry was without the 
sanction of Government. N evertbeless, the two reservations 
have not to this day, as matter of fact, become merged in 
the public domain, but have been continuously known, since 
the removal of the Indians for whom they were set apart, as 
the Old \Vinnebago and Crow Creek Reservations, or simply 
as the Crow Creek Reservation. This will be at once appar-
ent by reference to the maps prepared from time to time un-
der the direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and 
by the reports of that officer. They are so laid down on the 
map accompanying the Commissioner's report for the year 
1884, entitled" Map showing the location of the Indian reser-
vations within the limits of the United States and Territories, 
compiled from official and other authentic sources under the 
direction of the Hon. Hiram Price, Commissioner of Indian 
, 
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Affairs." Indee(i this is conceded in all the discussions of 
the subject that have been brought to my attention. 
In this condition of things the United States and various 
tribes of the Sioux Nation came together and concluded a 
treaty on the 29th April, 1868. By the second article of this 
treaty "the United States agrees that the following district 
of country, to wit, viz, commencing on the east bank of the 
Missouri River where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude 
crosses the same, thence along low-water mark down said 
east bank to a point opposite where the northern line of the 
State of Nebraska strikes the river, thence west across said 
river and along the northern line of Nebraska to the one 
hundred and fourth degree of longitude west from Green-
wich, thence north on said meridian to a point where the 
forty-sixth parallel of north latitude intercepts the same, 
thence due east along said parallel to the place of beginning; 
and, in addition thereto, all existing reservations on ·the east 
bank of said river shall be, and the same is (sic) hereby, set apart 
for the absol~tte and undisturbed use and occupation of the In-
dia.ns herein named and for .~uch other friendly tribes or indi-
·vidual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with 
the consent of the United States, to admit amongst them." 
-* * * (15 Stat., 635.) 
A reference to the treaty will show that the tribes or bands 
to which the Indians belonged or bad belonged who entered 
and occupied the abandoned reservations were parties to the 
treaty, and it may have been, and v~ry probably was, the 
case that the occupants of these reservations were repre~ 
sented in the negotiations, if they were not parties to th& 
treaty, otherwise than by the chiefs of the tribes from which 
they bad wandered. But whether that be the case or not, 
they have certainly remained where they are with the con-
sent of the United States and the tribes of the Sioux with 
whom the treaty was made. 
The questions submitted for opinion turn upon the inter-
pretation of these words of the second article of treaty, that 
is to say, "and in addition thereto all exisflng reservations . 
on the east ba:nk of the river shall be, and the same is [sic], 
set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use of the In-
dians herein named. " • • • 
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If the lands known as the Old Winnebago and Crow Creek 
Rese~vations answered to the de8cription of "existing reser-
vations on the east bank of the river" at the time the treaty 
was entered into, they are protected by it, and the executive 
order of the 27th February, 1885, restoring certain portions 
thereof to the public domain, is wholly inoperative and void~ 
being in violation of the treaty. 
But it is urged in support of the order restoring the lands 
in question to the public domain, that they were not origi-
nally set apart and dedicated as reservations by an execu-
tive order in the customary way, and, therefore, that at the 
time the treaty of 1868 was made they did not answer to the 
description of reservations in the legal technical sense, and 
consequently did not come under the protection of the treaty. 
I shall not stop to consider whether the laying off of these 
two bodies of land by direction of the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs and the removal of the Indians to them were 
equivalent to a formal executive order, because I find that by 
the third and fourth articles of the treaty between the United 
States ~nd the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Sioux 
Indians of the 19th February·, 1867 (15 Stat., 505), reser.va-
tions are set apart for certain members of the said bands "who-
were not sent to the Grow Greek Reservation." In proclaiming 
this treaty, thus excepting from its operation members of 
the tribes who were parties to it, on the ground that they had 
been already provided with a settlement on the Grow Greek Res-
ervation, the Executive necessarily recognized and adopted 
all that has been done towards establishing the reservations 
now in question, which it may be proper to say are, since the 
removal from them of the Indians for whom they were origi-
nally laid off, sometimes regarded as one reservation, and 
called simply the Crow Creek Reservation, there being no 
longer any reason for keeping up the old division. What-
ever, therefore, was needed to complete the dedication at-· 
tempted under the acts of 1863 would seem to have been sup-
plied by the Executive in concluding and proclaiming this 
treaty. 
It will be observed that this action of the .Executive was 
subsequent to the removal of the Winnebagoes and Sioux, 
and the ce·ssion of the former, by treaty, of their interest in 
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the lands, which, it is argued, had the effect of restoring them 
to the national domain. 
At the time of the treaty, then, the lands in question had 
been validly appropriated as Indian reservations, and being 
on the east bank of the Missouri River fell within the treaty 
and were protected by it from the power of the Executive to 
throw open lands to entry. 
But supposing I am wrong in this view, and that the lands 
had never been legally appropriated as reservations at the 
time of the treaty of 1868, I am still of opinion that they are 
cover~d by the treaty. It must be regarded as a well-settled 
principle in interpreting statutes that, if possible, ''no clause, 
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant,'' 
and I see no reason why this principle is not as applicable to 
treaties as statutes. 
Now, ~fthe argument in support of the executive order of 
February, 1885, is sound, the treaty of 1868, in so far as it 
professes to secure lands to. the Sioux on the east bank of 
the Missouri, is made to have no eflect or operation whatevt>r, 
because there is no land so situated which answers to the de-
scription used in t,he treaty, and the eminent and intelligent. 
gentlemen who represented the Government in concluding 
the treaty are placed in the somewhat embarrassing position 
of having offered to the Indians reservations on tpe east bank 
of the river when there were none there; for it is a fact that 
if the lands in question were not reservations, there was no 
reservation on the east bank of the river except the Yankton 
Reservation, which, however, c6uld not possibly have been in 
contemplation, because it was established by a previous treaty 
made in 1859 with the Yanktons, who were not parties to 
the treaty of 1868, and could not therefore be affected by it. 
lf, then, it be true that these lands were not teclmical res-
ervations at the time of the treaty of 1868, it is obvious the 
contracting parties must have used the term reservation in 
some secondary sense, and when we see that there has been 
an uninterrupted practical appropriation of the lands as 
Indian reservations from 1863 down to the promulgation of 
the executive order of February, 1885, and that, as already 
said, they are so described in the map of Indian reservations 
accompanying the Indian Commissioner's Report submitted 
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to the last Congress by the Secretary of the Interior, we can-
not for a moment be at a loss as to what that sense was. 
Nothing would seem to be better established in reason or 
authority than that when the expounder of a statute or other 
instrument is satisfied that a term occurring in it is not to be 
taken in its normal or technical acceptation, but in some 
other, it becomes his duty to give it the sense in which it ap-
pears to have been used. So, here, if the lands in question 
are found not to be reservations in a strict •legal sense, but 
to have been understood to be such generally, and even by 
the Government itself, surely the grant, which would other-
wise fail in this particular, must be held to refer to such lands 
as were reputed to be reservations. 
'rhe words of description used in the treaty are, when so 
interpreted, amply sufficient to point out the portion of the 
public domain intended to be ceded, and the competency of 
the treaty making power to make the cession is not open to 
discussion; so that we have all the conditions necessary to 
a public grant. 
To these considerations may be added that Indian treaties 
are not construed strictly, but liberally in favor of the In-
dians. (2 Opin., 465; The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., 737.) 
In conclusion, I am of opinion that the lands in question 
are covered by the treaty of the 29th April, 1868, and, con-
sequently, that the executive order of the 27th February, 
1885, is inoperative. 
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION. 
The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, in aid 
of the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, held in 
New Orleans, La., is not applicable to any objects other than those 
specifically enumerated in the act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 2, 1885. 
SIR : Your communication of the 30th of March, 1885, re-
quests my opinion as to whether the appropriation in the 
. ' 
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smH.lry civil appropriation act of 3d March, 1885, for ''final 
aid to the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Expo-
sition, now being held in New Orleans," will be available for 
the payment of debts due by the Exposition to persons, firms, 
or corporations residing or having their places of business 
in Louisiana, as to any surplus which may exist after all the 
disbursements specifically provided for in the act have been 
made. 
I do not think such residuum would be available for the 
purpose mentioned. 
The enumeration of the objects to which the appropriation 
is to be applied must, I think, be regarded as manifesting 
a purpose to exclude all other objects, according to a well-
known canon of interpretation. 
That such was the intention of Congress would seem to 
follow, also, from the requirement of the act that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury shall prescribe the modA of proving 
"'such indebtedness," that is to say, the previously mentioned 
indebtedness'' to persons, firms, or corporations living and 
d.oing business outside of the State of Louisiana." The use 
of the adjective '' such," in restriction of the meaning of the 
\YOrd "indebtedness," would hardly have occurred if the 
legislature had had in view the possibility of a use of the 
appropriation to pay debts not specified. Again, the law 
provides that no part of the ''foregoing sums" shall be paid 
until the Secretary of the Treasury shall be satisfied as to 
.all expenditures under the act of 21st May, 1884, and it cannot 
ue doubted that Congress intended to embrace every dis-
bnrsement under the act by the words ''foregoing sums," 
which, however, could refer only to the sums previously men-
tiO'J~ed. 
This view would seem to be strengthened by the consider-
ation that Congress in appropriating a sum H not to exceed the 
sum of three hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars," 
which is the language of the provision, appears to evince a 
purpose to appropriate only so much of the sum named as 
may be required for the demands specified, after the pay-
ment of which, if this reading is correct, there can be no sur-
plus, for the appropriation will then have been exhausted, 
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although the amount disbursed fall short of the sum named 
in the law. 
Furthermore, the particularity of Congress in this pro-
vision is hardly consistent with the probability that it has 
left to implication the application of any part of this appro-
priation. 
· I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTY ON SILVER ORE. 
Silver ore, ground, is not dutiable under the tariff act of March 3, 1883. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 11, 1885. 
SIR: Replying to yours of the 9th instant, which presents 
a question as to the duty upon silver ore somewhat advanced 
from a state of nature, as regards extraction of the bullion, 
by grinding, etc., you state that on the 30th of September 
last the Treasury Department decided that this article is 
subject to a duty of 10 per cent., as being a non-dutiable crude 
mineral refined, etc., in value by grinding, etc. (See tariff act. 
of 1883, par. 95, Treasury edition.) 
The soundness of this decision is questioned by the col-
lector at San Francisco in a letter addressed to the Secretary, 
dated February 12, mainly for the reason that paragraph 95 
cannot mean to include gold and silver ores so refined, etc., 
inasmuch as " bullion," which is a product from such ores, 
still further refined, etc., is free. (Par. 666.) 
For that and other reasons I entirely agree in the conclu-
sion which the collector suggests, viz, that the silver ore in 
question is free. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
~he SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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PARDON-LAWTON'S CASE. 
L., having been commissioned a lieutenant in the United States Army, 
and taken an oath as such officer to support the Constitution of the 
United States, afterwards bore arms against the United States in the 
war of the rebellion, but on the 6th of February, 1867, received a full 
pardon from the President for the part he had taken therein: Held, 
that the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution (section 3), which 
did not take effect until more than a year after such pardon was 
granted, does not operate to exclude L. from holding office under the 
United States. 
DEPARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE, 
April14-, 1885. 
SIR : My opinion is requested on the following case : Alex-
ander R. Lawton, who had been a cadet at West Point and 
held a commission as lieutenant in the United States Army, 
and, in one or both of those characters, had taken an oath 
which, it is contended, and which I am to assume, as a part 
of the case submitted, bound him to support the Constitution, 
afterwards bore arms against the United States in the war of 
the rebellion. 
On the 6th of February, 1867, he received a full pardon 
and amnesty for the part he had taken in the rebellion, and 
the question is whether he can hold a civil office under the 
ur:ited States notwithstru ding the third section of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution, which took effect on 
the 20th of July, 1868, and is in the following words: 
"HEc. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold 
any office, civil or military, under the United States or under 
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a mem-
ber of Congress, or as any officer of the United States, or as 
a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or 
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or re-
bellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. · But Oongress may, by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability." 
The question presented will be disposed of upon the legal 
intent and meaning of this amendment. 
Prior to the adoption of the amendment, the Executive, in 
I 
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the exercise of an unquestionable power, had granted par-
dons to tlle person whose case is now under consideration 
and others standing in the same predicament of guilt. 
The power to pardon vested in the Executive by the Con-
stitution was not given to be exercised capriciously, but 
when resorted to in cases like the present it should be in 
furtherance of the peace of society and in the interest of the 
Government. 
Such being the theory, it must be presumed that every 
exertion of that power in such cases by the Executive De-
partment of the Government was in furtherance of the objects 
for which the power was granted; for nothing is better estab-
lished than that a want of fidelity to its constitutional duties 
is never to be imputed to any one of the three great co-
ordinate Departments of the Government if it be possible to 
avoid it. 
At the time the fourteenth amendment went into opera-
tion, Mr. Lawton and the other persons referred to had been 
restored, by the pardons previously granted, to all thdr 
rights as citizens, and had become, by virtue of those par-
dons, as innocent as if they had never committed the offenses 
forgiven. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 380; United States v. 
Padelford, 9 Wall., 531 ; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128; 
Armstrong v. United States, ib., 154;-Pargoud v. United States, 
156; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 148.) 
The question, then, for my opinion is whether it was the 
intention of the fourteenth amendment to take away rights 
which previous pardons had restored; or, in other words,. 
whether it was the purpose of that amendment to cast a 
reproach upon the Executive Department of the Government 
by repudiating, as unworthy of credit, its acts of unques-
tionable validity, by destroying rights which had undoubtedly 
vested under those acts, and by violating the national faith, 
solemnly pledged. 
It can not be denied that the amendment is as comprehen-
sive as language could make it, but, at the same time, it 
must be rememhered that the words of every law are to be 
taken in subordination to its intent, and that where they are 
general their sense will be restricted if necessary to prevent. 
an unjust and absurd consequence, which it must be pre-
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sumed the legislature could not have contemplated. It was 
upon this principle that the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that an individual pardoned for taking part in 
the rebellion was not debarred from suing in the Court of 
Claims by a law providing that in order to recover the pro-
ceeds of captured or abandoned property the claimant must 
prove "that he has never given any aid or comfort to the 
present rebellion." The court say: ''It is not to be supposed 
that Congress intended by the general language of the act 
to encroach upon. any of the prerogatives of the President, 
and especially that benign prerogative of mercy which lies 
in the pardoning power. It is more reasonable to conclude 
that claimants restored to their rights of property, by the 
power of the President, were not in contemplation of Con-
gress in passing the act and were not intended to be em-
braced by the requirement in question. All general terms 
in statutes should be limited in their application, so as not 
to lead to injustice, oppression, or any uncons~itutional 
operation, if that b~ possible. It will be presumed that 
ex~eptions were intended which would avoid results of that 
nature." (Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 153.) In a very 
important case recently decided the same court restricted 
the general language of a statute in order to avoid giving it 
a sense that would have involved Congress in a violation of 
a treaty obligation. (Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S., 
555.) The same doctrine is forcibly presented in United 
States v. Kirby (7 Wall., 483). 
That this principle is appli~able to the interpretation of 
constitutions as to statute~ was conclusively established 
by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter House Oases (16 
Wall., 77), where the court refused to adopt the full meaning 
of certain general words in the first section of the fourteenth 
amendment in order to avoid an interpretation that would 
have involved "so great a departure from the structure and 
spirit of our institutions" as, in the absence of explicit lan-
guage, could not be presumed to have been intended. 
Applying, then, this sound rule of interpretation to the 
third section of the fourteenth amendment, I am of opinion 
that the consequences of allowing its general words of exclu-
sion to operate without a limitation in favor of persons in 
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the situation of Mr. Lawton would be productive of an in-
justice and a disregard of the public faith whlch nothing 
short of the most explicit and controlling language should 
authorize. 
If the conclusion I have reached is not well founded, then 
it follows that if the people of the United States should 
amend the third section of the fourteenth amendment in the 
single particular of requiring a unanimous instead of a two-
thirds vote of both Houses 'to remove the disability imposed, 
all persons whose disabilities had been th~retofore removed 
by a two-thirds vote would find themselves again under the 
necessity of applying to Congress, a result which would not 
be a whit less at war with justice than what would occur if Mr. 
Lawton and others in his situation were held to have been 
degraded by the amendment to the condition of disability 
from which their pardons bad raised them. ' 
I am also of opinion that Mr. Lawton is not affected by the 
amendment, because at the time it was ordained the offenses 
on which the disability imposed is based could not have been 
imputed to him, for the reason that he had by virtue of his 
pardon become " a new man," endowed with "a new credit 
and capacity," his guilt had been "blotted out," and he had 
become "as innocent as if he bad never committed the 
offense." Whatever was his connection with the rebellion 
the effect of the pardon was to close the eyes of th~ law to a 
perception of it. 
These positions have been laid down upon the greatest 
~onsiderations by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in cases already cited, which make it entirely clear that to 
have accused Mr. Lawton of any of the above named offenses 
at the time the amendment was adopted would have been a 
defamation for which an action might have lain. 
Two years before the amendment became law the Supreme 
Court laid down, in a case already cited, that a pardon had 
the cleansing, renovating effect I have described, and it 
almost seems like imputing to the framers of the third sec-
tion of the amendment either ignorance of the law or the 
purpose to set a snare to say that they intended to include 
persons already pardoned without specially referring to them. 
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I am of opinion, therefore, that Mr. ·Lawton is qualified to 
hold a civil office under the Government of the United States. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfulJy, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION. 
Opinion of April21 1885 (ante, p. 146), relative to the appropriation for the 
World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition at New Orleans, 
La., reaffirmed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 16, 1885. 
SIR: On the 13th instant I addressed you a letter, stat-
ing that I had examined the matter of the appropriation for 
the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition 
agafn, upon brief and docum~nts furnished by Mr. Merrick, 
" -counsel for the Exposition," and that I saw no cause to 
change the opinion that I had rendered you in the same mat-
ter on the 2d of this month. .After my letter of the 13th had 
been sent, Mr. Merrick appeared in person, and requested 
the privilege of being heard on the matter orally, in addition 
to the brief that he had filed before you. I acceded to his 
request~ and at the same time asked for a return of the 
papers by you, which you accordingly sent me. 
On last Tuesday Mr. Merrick appeared as H counsel for 
the Exposition," and argued the matter before me, with the 
brief already alluded to. I have given the matter close and 
careful c,onsideration, and I am still of the opinion that I 
expressed in my communication to you of the 2d instant, and 
see no reason to change the same. 
I herewith return the brief, with the documents, and also 
my letter of .A.pril13. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD, 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury. 
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EXTIRPATION OF PLEURO-PNEUMONIA. 
The provision in the act of May 29, 1884, chapter 60, giving the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture power to expend money in such disinfection and 
quarantine measures as may be necessary to prevent the spread of 
pleuro-pneumonia from one State or Territory into another, does not 
authorize him to purchase animals infected with that disease for the 
purpose of slaughter. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 21, 1885. 
SIR : Yours of the 18th instant caUs attention to the act 
of 1884, chapter 60, entitled " to prot'ide means for the supp'(eS-
sion and extirpation of pleuro-pneumonia," and, referring par-
ticularly to words giving you power to expend money "in 
such disinfection and quarantine measures as may be neces-
sary to prevent the spread of disease from one State or Ter· 
ritory into another," asks whether by these words you are 
not " authorized to purchase diseased and infected animals 
for the purpose of slaughter, i. e., disi~fection." 
At the same time you state that the destruction of animals 
infected with pleuro-pneumonia is recognized by experts as 
the only way of putting a stop to the spread of that disease. 
Conceding that this opinion exists, and is well-founded, I 
nevertheless think that the statute in question does not con-
fer power to purchase and slaughter such animals. 
You will observe that the statute makes distinction be-
twixt the District of Columbia and other parts of the coun-
try, as regards the duties which it assigns to United States 
officials. In the former case only are such officials expressly 
directed "to require the destruction of infected animals.'~ 
The officials so empowered are not, even in that case, such 
as belong to the Department of Agriculture. They are Com-
missioners of the District, or in other words the local authori-
ties such as answer here to the executive authorities of the 
States. For the destruction of infected animals within this 
District therefore a co-operation is provided between its leg. 
islature (viz, Congress, the statute in question affording 
such co-operation) and the lvcal executive. My understand-
ing is, that the same co-operation is intended also where such 
animals are to be destroyed elsewhere. And I add that 
inasmuch as Congress has not provided for "purchase" of 
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these animals within the District, I presume the more that 
it does not intend the appropriation contained in the act so 
to be applied anywhere. The diseased animal, as in ordinary 
cases, perit suo domino; the hasten·ing of such event upon 
public grounds being, to all appearance, supposed by Con-
gress to afford no ground for setting up a market for such 
animal, wherein the public is to be purchaser. 
The act in question being, as probably was anticipated, 
the first of a series upon that subject, is consequently some-
what general and merely tentative in its provi~ions; as, for 
instance, was fhe case in analogous recent legislation estab-
lishing a National Board of Health. As the results of expe-
rience and observation are accumulated upon the topic of 
which you speak, no doubt more definite legisiation is in-
tended. 
Section 3, to which you refer, authorizes regulations by the 
Commissioner of Agriculture, and supposes that these may 
be adopted by State executive authorities, or, as an alterna-
tive, supposes regulations by State executive authorities 
which in turn it empowers the Commissioner to adopt. In 
either case, of course, such State executive action is to be 
authorized by competent State legisl2Jtion. The section 
then proceeds to suppose a time for action to arrive, and to 
he notified by some proper State authority to the Commis-
ioner. And thereupon the Commissioner is authorized, as 
you quot~?, to spend money for the quarantine action required 
by the particular exigency. 
There is, however, as I repeat, no provision for purchasing 
the diseased animals. The question, at whose loss any nec-
e~sary destruction of these may be, is not a question of quar-
antine, and the powers of the Commissioner are incident to 
quarantine only; it being important, of course, that for the 
purpose of executing these he shall have acquired informa-
tion and come to conclusions in the way indicated by sec-
tion 2. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE. 
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PAYMASTER OF THE FLEET. 
No designatiori. otherthan that made by the President entitles a naval 
paymaster to the place and perquisites of paymaster of the fleet. 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 21, 1885. 
S:m : I have considered yours of the 18th instant, relating 
to the case of Naval Paymaster Whitehouse, who, in October, 
1'883, being on duty upon the Asiatic Station, was designated 
"paymaster of the fleet" by Admiral Crosby, then in command 
there, such designation being made expressly ''subject to the 
approval of the President; " such approval (virtually, at 
least) having been given on the 14th of November, 1884. 
The question is whether he became entitled from the date of 
his designation to pay as " paymaster of the fleet, " or re-
mained entitled as" paymaster" only. 
In that connection I have considered sections 1378, 1381, 
1382, 1475, and 1556 (fifth and seventh paragraphs from top 
of page 266), Revised Statutes. 
I am of opinion that no designation other than that by the 
President entitles a paymaster to the place and perquisites 
in q uestwn. The powers conferred by sections 1381 and 1382, 
respectively, are quite distinct. I am not referred to any leg-
islation which changes the state of the case as constituted by 
these sections. 
Nor do I think that there is any relation by the subsequent 
approval to the time of the designation by the Admiral. The 
latter act has no significance in point of law, no more than 
has any other recommendation made to an appointing power. 
I notice that there is nothing in your communication to .ex-
plain to me the bearing upon this question of the date "June 
5, 1884, " therein mentioned. I· take for granted, however, 
that this reply, which ignores that date, will meet your pur-
poses. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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COMPENSATION OF CONSULAR OFFICERS. 
W. was appointed minister resident and consul-general to Hayti, and 
took the oath of office, but failing to execute a bond as required by 
section 1697, Revised Statutes, his commission was not delivered to 
him : Held that by the provisions of that section he never became 
qualified to receive the commission or to enter upon the duties of the 
office, and that he is not entitled to pay as an incumbent of such office. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 22, 1885. 
Sm: Your communication of the 20th April instant asks 
my opinion upon this case: Mr. George W. Williams was ap-
pointed by President Arthur minister resident and consul-
general to Hayti, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
On tlie 4th of March, US85, Mr. Williams took the oath of 
office at the Department of State, and was there furnished 
with a blank form of the official bond, which consuls-general 
are required by law to execute. .Mr. Williams has not exe-
cuted any bond, and the President has determined not to 
deliver his commission to him. 
The question submitted is whether Mr. Williams is entitled 
to any pay. 
I am of opinion that be is not entitled to pay as an incum-
bent of the office mentioned. 
The commission of Mr. Williams has been held by the Sec-
retary of State in escrow, and its delivery depended upon the 
condition prescribed by section 1697 of the Revised Statutes, 
which provides that'' every consul-general, consul, and com-
mercial agent before he receives his commission or enters upon 
the duties of his· office, shall give a bond to the United States 
with sureties." 
It will be observed that Congress manifests a plain inten-
tion that no right of any kind shall accrue from appointment 
to the offices named until the bond shall have been given; 
so that if ;Mr. Williams had been permitted to enter upon the 
duties of the office in question he could not have received 
compensation for his services. This exceptional stringency 
was no doubt employed for the better protection of the vub-
lic interests in foreign countries. 
As Mr. Williams had not given the required bond, it fol-
lows that he has never become entitled even to demand his 
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commission, let alone to enter upon the duties of the office, 
from which it follows, necessarily, that he cannot claim any of 
its emoluments. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
LIEUT.ENANT ROBERTSON'S CASE. 
Leave of absence was grantefl Lieutenant R., of the Army, for one yea1 
from August 1, 1881, during part of which period, namely, from August 
1 to November 1, 1881, he was entitled to cumylative leave with full 
pay. On March 16, 1882, the order granting said leave of absence was 
revoked, and a new order was issued by direction of the Secretary of 
War placing Lieutenant, R. "on a status of waiting orders for one year 
from August 1, 1881.'' He has drawn full pay (notonly from August 1 
to November 1, 1881, to wh1ch he was entitled, but) from November 1, 
1881, to March 16, 1882, when, for this period, he was only entitled to 
half pay: Held, that the difference between full pay and half pay for 
the last-mentioned period can'not be withheld in the adjustment of 
another and subsequent pay account presented by Lieutenant R. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 22, 1885. 
SIR: The letter of the Second Comptroller, accompanying 
your communication of the 14th instant, presents the follow-
ing case: 
Lieut. S. C. Robertson, of the Army, was granted leave of 
absence for one year from 1st August, 1881, with permission 
to go beyond sea. He proceeded at once to Saumur in 
France, tor the purpose of obtaining military instruction. 
On the 16th March~ 1882, the orders granting the leave of 
absence were revoked, and on the same day an order was 
issued by the Adjutant-General, by direction of the Secretary 
of War, placing Lieutenant Robertson '' on a status of wait-
ing orders for one year, from August 1, 1881," the date he 
left his post on leave. This order, which is in the form of a 
letter to Robertson, refers in complimentary terms to his 
"conduct and progress at the cavalry school at Saumur," 
and was no doubt induced by the Secretary's des-ire that this 
officer should be mad~ thereby better able to meet his ex-
penses while abroad. 
It seems that at the time the leave of absence was granted 
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Lieutenant Robertson was entitled to cumulative leave with 
full pay until the 1st of November, 1881, and the question as 
presented by the Comptroller is whether he "was entitled" to 
full pay from the 1st of November,1881, to the 16th of March, 
1882, or "is to be regarded as on leave and entitled to half 
pay during that period." 
I do not understand that Lieutenant Robertson has not 
drawn his pay for the period mentioned, for the question sub· 
mitted is whether he H was entitled" to full pay for that time. 
It is moreover stated by the Comptroller that the question 
•~ is now pending in this office in an acco:1nt presented by 
Lieutenant Robertson." It being hardly supposable that this 
officer failed to draw his pay between November 1, 1881, and 
March 16, 1882, it would have been better, perhaps, if there 
l1ad been a full statement as to how the case arises upon the 
account. Still, I am inclined to think there is enough stated 
to justify me in giving an opinion. 
Besides, as the pay of officers of the Army is fixed by law 
for every status (Rev. Stat., sec. 1265), it was doubtless not 
the intention of the Comptroller to ask my opinion upon the 
point whether the Secretary of War could by any retroactive 
order make what bad been the status of leave of absence one 
()f waiting orders, that is to say, whether the Secretary could 
by an order dated the 16th of March, 1882, completely change 
the status of Lieutenant Robertson from that time back to 
the 1st of November, 1881. I have no hesitation in saying 
that the Secretary had no such power. 
But this officer bas evidently received waiting orders pay 
for the period named when he was only entitled to half pay, 
and consequently the question arising upon the presentation 
of his account against the Government must be whether the 
latter is entitled to withhold from the amount due on the ac-
count the difference between waiting orders and leave of ab-
sence pay for the period mentioned; in other words, whether 
the Government can in that way compel this officer to refund 
the excess. 
In my opinion this cannot be done. The case in hand falls 
directly within the principle laid down in the case of Col. Wa-
ger Swayne by Attorney-General Brewster: Colonel Swayne 
-was entitled to a certain percentage increase on his retired 
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pay. It happened that on the 28th July, 1866, he, being a 
major-general of volunteers, was appointed colonel of the 
Forty-fifth United States Infantry, and on the lOth of Sep-
tember, 1866, accepted the appointment and took the oath of 
office. From the time of his appointment as colonel until he 
was mustered out of the service as major-general of volun-
teers, he continued to draw the pay of a major-general, and 
it was contended at the Treasury that the Government was 
entitled for percentage increase an amount representing the 
difference between the pay of major-general and colonel 
from · the time be was appointed colonel until he was mus-
tered out of the service as major-general. It is not neces-
sary to do more than quote what is laid down in the opinion 
referred to. 
''I am of opinion that upon principles of administrative 
policy which ought to be considered firmly established, the 
settlements between Colonel Swayne and the accounting offi-
cers in the matter of his pay as a major-general of volunteers 
are conclusive upon the executive department of the Gov-
ernment, and cannot be re-opened in the way indicated. 
"In Hedrick's case (16 C. Cis. R., 88), it was held that set-
tlements with a supervisor of internal revenue, crediting him 
with clerk hire paid to a person who was at the same time a 
gauger, and who therefore could not legally receive compen-
sation as ~lerk, were conclusive on the judicial department 
of the Government, and that the Government could no more 
recover back money paid under a mistake of law than an in-
dividual. That case and Colonel Swayne's seem to be iden-
tical in principle, assuming, argumenti gratia, that the allow-
ance of a major-general's pay to Colonel Swayne after his 
appointment as colonel was mistaken. But in disposing of 
this case it is not necessary that I should go farther than to 
bold that the settlements with Colonel Swayne are conclusive 
upon the executive department of the Government." (August 
29, 1882.) 
As the Supreme Court say, in McKnight v. United States (98 
ti. S., 186), there is not in such cases one law for the Govern-
ment and another for the citizen. 
I have the honor to be, sir, sour obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. 
Sentble that an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia is not 
within the prohibitions of sections 1782 and 5498, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 24:, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 16th (received on the 22d) asks whether 
an assistant attorney for the District of Columbia is within the 
prohibitions of sections 1782 and 54:98, Revised Statutes, or 
ei1;her of them. 
Section 1782 prohibits and renders highly penal the recep-
tion, or agreeing to receive, by officers or clerks in the em-
ploy of the Government, compensation for services to any 
person in relation to any matter or thing before any Depart-
ment, court-martial, bureau officer, or any civil, military, or 
naval commission whatever. 
Section 5498 prohibits under like penalty "every officer of 
the United States or person holding any place of trust or 
profit or discharging any official function under or in connec-
tion with any Executive Department of the Government of the 
United States or under the Senate or House of Representa-
tives" from acting as an agent or attorney for prosecuting 
any claim against the United States, etc. 
In these statements I have used only so much of the lan-
guage of the sections as is pertinent to the question now pre-
sented. 
The District of Columbia is a corporate agent, through 
which the United States administer certain executive func-
tions over the locality which includes the national capital. 
The chief executive authority is vested in three commissioners, 
and the assistant attorney in question is an officer under and 
appointed by them. 
It is plain, then, that under Germaine's case (99 U. S., 508) 
such attorney is excluded from the description '~officer of the 
United States" in section 54:98; and inasmuch as the other 
words of that section which describe parties prohibited refers 
to places and offices under Executive Departments or the two 
Houses of Congress, it follows that this section in no part 
affects an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia. 
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The same is true of section 1782, unless a substantial dis-
tinction can be drawn betwixt the expressions ''officer of the 
United States" and" officer in the employment of the Gov-
ernment," which is at least doubtful, especially in a highly 
penal statute. 
Whilst I am much inclined to advise that the present case 
is not in terms provided for by statute, I concur in the view 
which I find intimated here and there in the papers which 
you have transmitted, viz, that the principle which underlies 
such legislation makes employments like that here under 
consideration, viz, by Indians [or of course others] to prose-
cute a claim against the United States before their courts 
or Departments at this place inconsistent with those rela-
tions of ready confidence, entire unreserve, and liberty in 
coming and going, which ought to exist betwixt officials of 
the United States in every Department and attorneys whose 
engagements with the Government at this locality are marked 
by "tenure, duration, emoluments, and duties," no matter 
what technical name may designate that engagement. I 
need not enlarge upon this suggestion. It is one pertinent 
apparently to the "approvals" required by the Revised Stat-
ute's, section 2103, paragraph "Second." 
I may add that the gentleman whose interests are here in-
volved seems to have acted with candor, and, as I have said, 
probably also in accordance with law. Pursuing a sugges-
tion offered by him (amongst the papers sent by you), I add 
that no doubt his resignation as assistant attorney for the 
District of Columbia will place his right, in every sense, to 
. be employed by the Six Nations, beyond" all question. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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CUSTOMS DUTIES-WORKS OJ<' ART. 
An artist of foreign birth, but who has resided in the United States for 
fourteen years and has declared his intention to become a citizen 
thereof, may properly be treated as an American artist within the 
meaning of the provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, de-
claring free of duty "works of art, painting, etc., the production of 
American artists." 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 25, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 23d instant asks whether certain water-
color sketches by an artist who is by birth a British subject, 
but who bas resided in the United States for the last fourteen 
:years (making occasional visits abroad), and who has de-
clared (June 13, 1883) an intention to become a citizen, 
are free from duty under paragraph 819 (Treasury edition) 
of the tariff act of 1883, which declares free "Works of 
arts, painting, statuary, fountains, and other ·works of art, 
the production of American artists." 
Such a person is of course not a citizen, but he is never-
theless recognized as having inchoate qualities as such which 
entitle him when abroad to protection by the United States. 
American art, as I apprehend, is not confined to such art 
only as is produced by native or naturalized artists. The 
clause quoted above might easily have ended with the word 
"citizen," if the notion of citizenship had been as prominent 
before Congress there as it is for instance in sections 2505 
and 2506 of the same statute. I suppose that the language 
of paragraph 819, like that of sections 2508 and 2509, was 
dictated by interest in the progress of art in this country. 
It is more easy than satisfactory to define the term " an 
American artist" by limiting it to citizens, and upon the whole, 
without attempting a definition, lad vise that it will be proper 
to treat artists of the class now in question as being Ameri-
can artists within the scope of the above tariff provision. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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RAILROAD BRIDGE AT ST. PAUL, MINN. 
The power of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters is par-
amount, and where it comes in conflict with that of a State the latter 
necessarily becomes ine:ffecti ve. 
Yet, until Congress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes control 
of the subject, the power of a State over bridges across navigable 
streams within its limits is plenary. • 
Accordingly, wb.ere a railroad company was authorized by the laws of 
Minnesota to construct a bridge across the Mississippi River within the 
limits of that State: Held that, if such authority is unatl'ected by any 
law of Congress, the company may act thereunder, though in so doing 
it will subject itself to the risk of future Congressional interference. 
DEPARTMENT OF . JUSTICE, 
May I, 1885. 
SIR : Your communication of April 15, 1885, with accom-
panying papers, relative to the matter of the railroad bridge 
across the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., bas been re-
ceived, and I beg leave to reply as follows: 
It seems a railroad bridge is being constructed by the Min-
nesota and Northwestern Railroad Company across the Mis-
sissippi River at St. ·Paul, with a pivot draw over the main 
channel, under the authority of an act of the Territory of Min-
nesota, entitled" An act to incorporate the Minnesota and 
Northwestern Railroad Company," and acts amendatory 
thereof, and also under the alleged authority of the general 
laws of the State of Minnesota. 
By the act of Congress of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, power 
is given to the common council of St. Paul to erect or to au-
thorize the erection of'' one or more foot and carriage or rail-
road bridge or bridges across the Mississippi River, extend-
ing from such point or points to be selected as lie between 
the easterly and westerly boundaries of said city to a point 
or points on the opposite side of said river, now known as the 
Sixth ward of said city," etc. The act further provides that 
any bridge or bridges built thereunder may, by direction of 
said common council, be built as a draw-bridge, with a pivot 
or other form of draw, and, if built as a draw-bridge, that the 
draw shall be over the main channel of the river at an acces-
sible a_nd the best navigable point, with spans giving a clear 
width of water-way of not less than 160 feet on each side of 
the central or pivot pier of the draw, etc. 
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The bridge in course of construction by said company is 
located within the limits described in the last-mentioned act, 
and while the spans of its draw give a narrower water-way 
than is required by that act (it being but 150 feet on each 
side of the pivot pier) tllis bridge in otller respects fails to 
meet the requirements of the same act. 
Such is substantially the case presented by the papers, 
and you snbmit for my determination the question" as to what 
.action shall be taken to enforce the rights of the Government 
and give efl'ect to the duty resting upon it to protect the 
navigation of the Mississippi River." 
As the Mississippi River above, at, and for some distance 
below the city of St. Paul, is wholly within the State of Min-
nesota, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of tile 
United States in Wilson v. Tke Blackbird Greek JJiarsh Com-
pany (2 Pet., 250), Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713),Pound 
v. Turck (95 U. S., 459), and Escanaba Company v. Chicago 
(107 U. S., 678) applies to this case, namely, that until Con-
gress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes control 
of the subject, the power of a State over bridges actos~navigable 
streams within its limits is plenary; lmt that when this power 
is exercised so M to unnecessarily obstruct navigation, Con-
gress may interfere and remove the obstruction. The power 
of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters is par-
amount, and where it comes in conflict with that of the State 
the latter necessarily becomes ineffective. Yet in the case 
last above cited, the court obser,es that a to render the 
action of the State invalid in constructing or authorizing the 
construction of bridges over one of its navigable streams, the 
General Government must directly interfere so as to super-
sede its authority and annul what it has done in the matter;" 
and this doctrine is announced and. recognized in Bridge 
Company v. United States (105 U. S., 470) and JJiiller v. The 
:Mayor, etc. (109 U. S., 385), and especially by a decision 
rendered at the present term of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in Gloucest~r Fer1·y Company v. Pennsylvania 
(114 u. s., 196). 
Assuming, then, that the construction of the railroad bridge 
referred to is authorized by the laws of the State of Minnesota, 
this would seem to be sufficient for the purpose, unless the 
/ 
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authority imparted by those laws is in conflict with, or has 
been superseded or invalidated by, Congressional legislation. 
If such authority is unaffected by any existing l_aw of Con-
gress, the railroad company above named may undoubtedly 
act thereunder; and, in so doing, it will only subject itself to 
the risk of future Congressional interference. 
Congress has passed no general law regulating the erection 
of bridges across the Mississippi. Numerous acts have been 
passed by it authorizing the erection of such bridges at par-
ticular localities, the provisions whereof are similar to tho~e 
contained in the aforesaid act of July 5, 1884:. That act does 
not expressly prohibit the building of any bridge at the local-
ity therein describetl, other than such as is authorized thereby, 
and whether it does so by implication is a question of con-
struction. It declares that" any bridge or bridges constructed 
under this act, and according to its provisions and conditions,. 
shall be a lawful structure or structures." If this affirmative 
declaration may be construed to include the negative one, viz,. 
that " any bridge not constructed under this act, etc., shall 
be an unl~wful structure," which is, at least, doubtful, it would 
in efl'ect annul any authority derived under the State to erect 
a bridge of any sort in that locality. 
But suppose the act bas that effect, and the bridge now 
being erected by the railroad company is not a lawful struct-
ure, what action, if any, are the officers of the General Govern-
ment authorized to take in the premises~ There is no law of 
Congress under which criminal proceedings can be instituted 
by them; and without the authority of Congress it is ques-
tionable whether of their own motion, and simply in vindica-
tion of the general public right of navigation, they can insti-
tute any civil proceedings on behalf of the U_nited States-
such as an information to enjoin the erection of the bridge, 
or to abate it as a nuisance. (See 15 Opin., 526.) Where, 
however, the interests of the United States are directly con-
cerned-as, for example, if the structure should threaten 
injury to or interfere with any work of the General Govern-
ment for the improvement of the river~a civil proceeding to 
protect such work may be instituted in its behalf in the 
proper circuit court. (United States v. Duluth, 1 Dill., 469.) 
But as regards the right of nadgation, the public law of the 
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United States appears to leave the vindication of this right 
wholly to those who sustain injury thereto from unlawful 
obstructions or otherwise, through the institution by them of 
appropriate civil proceedings for relief. 
I am accordingly inclined to the conclusion that in the ex-
isting state of the law, the facts of the present case (as they 
appear in the accompanying papers) aft'ord no ground for a 
judicial proceeding on behalf of the rJnited States against the 
railroad company ; and that until Congress makes some ade-
quate provision upon the subject the officers of the United 
States can in this case take no action '' to enforce the rights 
of the Government and give effect to the duty resting upon 
it to protect the navigation of the Mississippi River." 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
SALE OF INDIAN TRUST LANDS. 
The claims of Ely Moore, J. W. Whitfield, and Daniel Woodson, as special 
agents and receivers, for additional compensation for the sale of the 
trust lauds ~f the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw, Peoria, and Wea 
Indians, considered. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 5,1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 
communication of the 2d instant, inclosing papers in the 
matter of the claims of Ely Moore and others, late special 
agents and receivers, for amounts claimed for compensation 
for sale of the trust lands of the Delaware, Wea, etc., Indian 
tribes. 
The general nature of your communication compels me 
to resort to the inclosures, and as I may not form correct 
conclusions as to the weight and effect of those papers, I beg 
you to regard this opinion as based upon the case stated by 
me and not upon the actual facts. 
The claims presented to you are those of the administrator 
of Ely Moore deceased, of J. W. Whitfield, and of Daniel 
Woodson; and consist of a demand for 1 per cent. commis-
sion, together with a per diem compensation. On both of 
these items interest is claimed at 6 per cent. per annum. 
Ely Moore was not duly appointed special receiver· and 
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superintendrmt to assist the special commissioner to dispose 
of the trust lands of the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw, 
Peoria, and Wea Indians, but as special register and superin-
tendent aided William Brindle, who was so appointed. 
Daniel Woodson as such special receiver and superintendent 
sold some Delaware lands which were not sold by Brindle, 
and was aided by J. W. Whitfield, special register and super-
intendent. 
I am not clear as to the precise relation of Moore to Brindle 
and of Whitfield to Woodson, but I shall assume tbat all 
rendered valuable services in the sale at public auction of 
the lands ceded in the treaties of May 6, 1854 (10 Stat., 1048), 
and May 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1082). 
These treaties simply provided (art. 3, p. 1049; art. 4, p. 
1083) that the United States shall pay to the Indians all the 
moneys arising from the sale of such lands as were offered 
for sale after deducting therefroll) the actual cost of survey-
ing, managing, and selling the same. The Supreme Court 
(110 U. S., 693) says: "This clearly implied the payment of 
a reasonable compensation for the services of those employed 
in carrying the trust into effect." 
I fail to find anything in the treaties fixing or suggesting 
what shall be a reasonable compensation for either survey-
ing, managing, or selling; and between private parties, in the 
absence of an agreement as to what that compensation should 
be, or an acceptance without protest of a sum fixed, it would 
become a question of quantum meruit for the courts. 
Your letter of the 2d instant says: 
"At the time the sales of these lands were made the claims 
for services, etc., of the parties were allowed by this Depart-
ment at rates considered fair and reasonable." 
Whether the rates thus considered by the Departq~.ent fair 
and reasonable were paid, and, if so, were accepted ·without 
objection, I am not informed, except as the expression in your 
letter, '• that the other claimants whose accounts had been 
closed at the Treasury should seek their remedy in the 
proper courts or before Congress," leads me to infer that they 
received without protest the amounts so fixed. If this be so, 
I am of opinion that the powers of your Department in the 
premises have been fully exercised aud are exhausted. 
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It is urged by the agent fOrtbeclaimantstbattbeSupreme 
'Court bas decide(l what is a fair and reasonable compensa· 
tion for the services of Mr. Brindle in the sale of these lands, 
and that the rate fixed by the court must be adopted as to 
similar officers engaged in said sale. 
I do not so read the opinion. I find in it nothing on the 
subject except that fair and reasonable compensation should 
be paid. It appears, however, that the jury sitting 1n Phila-
delphia did find that a fair and reasonable compensation 
to Brindle for his labor and risk in making sales of Indian 
trust lands was 1 per cent. commission, together with some 
per diem compensation. There is a vast difference between 
the annunciation by the court of last resort of legal princi-
ples of general application or applicable to a class of cases 
and a verdict rendered by a jury on a question of fact at issue 
lJetween the United States and an individual. The former, 
if not absolutely binding upon an officer of the executive de-
partment, is of such authority that nothing short of con-
scientious objections would warrant such officer in disre-
garding it. From the latter the officer may differ at his 
pleasure; indeed, to make it of any weight the person in-
voking it should show that the circumstances of the two 
-eases were identical, that the witnesses were credible, and 
that the verdict was not unreasonable; in short, he should 
substantially prove his case de novo. The officer must exer-
cise his own discretion on such a subject and he is at liberty 
to attach as much or as little importance to the verdict as 
seems to him proper. 
In conclusion, I will confine my opinion to four propositions. 
(1) The claims now presented apparently differ from that 
of Brindle in that the claimants receiveu their pay at the 
time and acquiesced in the allowance of what was fair and 
reasonable. 
(2) Such acquiescence as much precludes them as the 
United States from requesting a re-opening of the matter. 
(3) The case is not affected in principle by the decision of 
the Supreme Court in the Brindle case. 
( 4) That the conclusion of the jury in Philadelphia as to 
what was fair and reasonable compensation for Brindle dif-
fers from that previously fixed by the Interior Department 
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as fair and reasonable for Moore and others is not a matter 
requiring special consideration at your hands. 
Should you decide to re-open the cases and desire my 
opinion on the question of interest and other questions sug-
gested, I will be glad to comply with a request to that effect. 
As the case is now presented to me, they do not seem to me 
matters of importance. 
I return all inclosures. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE IN1'ERIOR. 
CASH INDEMNITY FOR SWAMP LANDS SOLD. 
The Secretary of tht- Interior is warranted in approving certain state~ 
ments of account between the United States and the State of Ohio. 
made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for cash indem-
nity for swamp lands sold during the period intervening between the 
passage of the swamp-land act of September 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 6, 1885. 
SIR: I retur-n herewith the two statembnts of account be-
tween the United States and the State of Ohio, which accom-
panied your letter of the 21st ultimo, showing amounts found 
due that State by the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office as cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the 
period intervening between the passage of the swamp-land 
act of September 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857; and in reply 
to your iuquiry whether the case presented in these state-
ments authorizes your approval of the accounts, I have the 
honor to state that in my opinion such approval is fully war-
ranted thereby. 
Two points only seem to call for consideration in connec-
tion with these accounts, one of which relates to the period 
of the sales, the other to the proof relied upon to determine 
the character of the lands sold. 
In regard to the latter point, it appears that the field notes 
of the public surveys on file in the General Land Office were 
resorted to and deemed sufficient. The evidence afforded by 
such notes, in this class of cases, was early regarded and 
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accepted by the Land Department as satisfactory, and it is, 
perhaps, the most satisfactory of any now obtainable for the 
purpose of determining whether lands were swampy at the 
passage of the swamp-land act of 1850 and covered by the 
grant thereby made. 
The former point involves the question whether, in view 
of section 2482, Revised Statutes, sales of swamp lands made 
subsequent to March 2, 1856, and prior to March 3,1857, are 
{as they were under the law in force previous to the revision) 
authorized to be included in the account. Respecting this 
question, I beg to refer to an opinion of om~ of my prede-
cessors, dated July 25, 1~77 (15 Opin., 34:0), which covers the 
same subject, and in the conclusions of which I concur. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
Hon. L. Q. C. LAMAR, 
Secretary of the Interior. 
INVENTIONS INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION. 
The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the "Inven-
tions InternatJOnal Exposition" at London, such office not existing by 
virtue of any law of the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 6, 1885. 
SIR: Your commun~cation asking my opinion as to the 
the power of the President to appoint honorary commission-
ers to the "Inventions International Exposition" at London 
has received my consideration. 
By the Constitution the President is empowered to" com-
mission all the officers of tbe United States." An officer of 
the United States presupposes an office duly created by law; 
and the offices to which the President is authorized under the 
Constitution to appoint are onJy those established or recog-
nized by the Constitution or by act of Congress (United 
States v. Maurice,2Brock., 104; 5 Opin., 88, 754; 7 ib., 249), 
but there is no office of the description referred to existing 
by virtue of any law. As the President cannot create an 
office, I am of opinion he cannot appoint honorary commission-
ers to the'~ Inventions International Exposition" at London. 
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As the matter of sending commissioners to this exposition 
was somewhat urgently brought to the notice of the last 
Congress by the Executive witho11t effect, it may almost be 
inferred that it was the sense of Congress that there was no 
sufficient reason for this Government's being represented 
there. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
SPECIAL EXAMINERS OF THE PENSION BUREAU. 
Special examiners of the Pension Bureau authorized to be appointed by 
the act of July 7, 11•84, chapter 331, and by the act of MaFch 3, 1885, 
chapter 343, come within the purview of the civil service act of Janu-
ary 16, 1883, chapter 27; and in appointing such officers the latt·er act 
and rules thereunder should be observed. 
The office of special examiner is newly created by the said act of 1885, as 
it was by the said act of 1884 ; the term under each act being for one 
year only. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
May 7,1885. 
SIR: The communication of the Commissioner of Pensions 
to you and by you referred to me for an opinion has received 
my careful consideration. 
The twelfth section of the act of July 14, 1862, creating 
the office .of special agent for the detection and prosecution 
of frauds against the pension laws(12 Stat., 569) was repealed 
by the act of July 4, 1864 (13 Stat., 387), which authorized 
the Secretary of the Interior to detail clerks in his office from 
time to time for the discharge of the same duty, and this 
.statute has been followed by several others, the effect of 
which has heen to continue the act of July, 1864, until the 
present time, with various modifications touching allowances 
to clerks detailed in addition to their regular salaries. 
In this state of legislation Congress, by the act of July 7, 
1884, making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 
.SO, 1885, enacted, inter alia, 
"For an additi.onal force of one hundred and fifty special 
examiners,for one year, at a salary of one thousand six hun-
dred dollars each, two hundred and forty thousand dollars; 
and no person so appointed shall be employed in the State 
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from which he is appointed : Provided, That all of said ap-
pointments shall be temporary and on probation. 
"For per diem in lieu of subsistence for one hundred and 
fifty additional special examiners above provided for, while 
traveling on duty, at a rate to be fixed by the Secretary of 
the Interior, not exceeding three dollars per day, and for act-
ual necessary expenses for transportation and assistance, 
two hundred and twenty thousand dollars." 
And by the act of March 3, 1885, making appropriations for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1886, it was enacted inter alia. 
''},or an additional force of one hundred and fifty special 
examiners, for one year, at a salary of one thousand four 
hundred dollars each, two hundred and ten thousand dollars; 
and no person so appointed shall be employed in the State 
from which he is appointed; and any of those now employed 
in the Pension Office or as special examiners may be reap-
pointed if they are found to be qualified. 
" For per diem in lieu of subsistence for one hundred and 
fifty additional special examiners above provided for, while 
traveling on duty, at a rate to be fixed by the Secretary of 
the Interior, not exceeding three dollars per day, and for 
actual necessary expenses for transportation and subsist-
ance, two hundred and twenty thousand dollars." 
The first question submitted, as arising upon this legisla-
tion, is whether special examiners of the Pension Bureau 
must be appointed ''from the working force and the Civil 
Service Commission eligibles, or whether they may be ap-
pointed from outsiders, at the risk of the Secretary." 
The second question submitted is, whether special exam-
iners must be reappointed after 30th June, 1885. 
It seems clear that no detail from the clerical force of the 
bureau can be made to fill the place of special examiner, 
which is a new office, with a fixed salary attached. 
It seems equally clear that the office of special examiner 
comes within the purview of the act of 16th January, 1883, 
entitled '' An act to regulate and improve the civil service 
of the United States" (22 Stat., 403}, and is not within any 
of the exceptions in Rule XIX of the amended Civil Service 
Rules. It might indeed be thought that the office of special 
examiner came within the exception in favor of persons em· 
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ployed exclusively in the secret service of the Government; 
but it must be remembered that to constitute secret service 
the employment as 1.1.-'ell as the service must be concealed. 
(Totten v. United States, 92 U.S., 106.) 
'nhe third clause of the sixth section of the act in question 
made it the dut.v of the Secretary of the Interior to throw 
into classification the officers designated special examiners, 
and Special Civil Service Rule No.3, approved 22d July, 
1884, shows that the President thought the officers in ques-
tion would fall within the civil service legislation. 
I am of opinion, therefore, that in appointing special ex-
aminers the civil service law and rules must be observed. 
In answer to the second question, I am of opinion that the 
term of service to which a special examiner is appointed is 
one year. The office is as new a creation by the act of 3d 
March, 1885, as it was by the act of 7th July, 1884. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SITE FOR PUBLIC BUILDING .AT L.A. CROSSE, WIS. 
The provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 14::S, authorizing the 
Secretary of the Treasury "to acquire by private purchase or condem-
nation the necessary lands for public buildings and light-houses to be 
constructed, and for which money is appropriated, including all public 
building sites authorized to be acquired under any of the acts of the 
first session of the Forty-seventh Congress," does not empower him to 
acquire by condemnation the site for the proposed public building 
authorized to be erected at La Crosse, Wis., by the act of February 
28, 1885, chapter 260. 
That provision is limited to lands for public buildings for which money 
is then (i. e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated, including 
building sites authorized to be acquired under acts of th.e previous 
session, and does not extend to other cases. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 9,1885. 
SIR: By your letter of the -29th ultimo, respecting the site 
selected for a public building authorized to be erected at La 
Crosse, Wis., by the act of February 28, 1885, it appears 
that a proposal for the sale of part of the premises, made by 
Gertrude A. and E. W. Hayden, was accepted by your De· 
partment on the 25th of same month, and that on the 27th 
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a letter was received at the Department from their attorneys 
inclosing a notice of the withdrawal of the proposal. 
In connection with these facts you call attention to a pro-
vision in the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 143, and inquire whether, "if the Department can-
not enforce the performance of the contract of sale," title to 
the premises may be acquired, under that provision, by con-
demnation. 
This inquiry presents two questions. One is as to enforc-
ing a specific performance of the " contract of sale," and 
hereupon I remark that, without fuller and more definite 
information, I am unable to form a satisfactory opinion upon 
the subject. To enable me to do this it would require, among 
other things proper to be taken into view, an examination of 
the terms of the contract as expressed in the proposal and 
acceptance, neither of which is before me. The other ques-
tion is whether the provision in the act · of 1883, above 
referred to, extends to building sites for which money is at 
.any time thereafter appropriated. 
By that provision the Secretary of the Treasury ''is au-
thorized to acquire by private purchase or condemnation 
the necessary lands for public buildings and light-houses to 
be constructed, and for which money is appropriated, in-
cluding all public building sites authorized to be acquired 
under any of the acts of the first session of the Forty-seventh 
Congress," etc. To make it applicable to sites for which 
appropriations are thereafter made, the words "for which 
money is appropriated," as employed therein, must be taken 
to import the same as if they read" whensoever an appro-
priation exists therefor ;" and, if they are to be understood 
in this sense, the provision would, simply by force of those 
terms, embrace not only sites for which appropriatiOns are 
thereafter made, but those for which appropriations were 
made theretofore and still remain ~.vailable. But the express 
i uclusion, by a separate clause, of sites authorized to be ac-
quired under the legislation of the preceding session, shows 
pretty clearly that tbe words adverted to are not used in so 
broad ·a sense as that above indicated; otherwiRe such clause 
would be needless. I think the discretionary authority 
either to purchase or condemn, with which the provision in-
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vests the Secretary, must be deemed to be limited to ''lands 
for public buildings and light-houses'' for which money is 
then (i. e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated, includ-
ing building sites authorized to be acquired under the acts 
of the previous session, and not to extend to other cases. 
The fact that a similar provision is found in the sundry civil 
appropriation act of March 3, 1885, though applicable to a 
particular site, is a circumstance which strongly favors this 
construction. 
Besides this, it i~ a well-settled rule-in view of the consti-
tutional provision, ''No money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law'' 
(art. I, sec. 9, par. 7)-that a statute should not be construed as 
making an appropriation, or authorizing the expenditure of 
money, unless the language is sufficiently explicit to clearly 
justify it; authority for the use of the public money cannot 
arise by inference without very clear terms requiring it. 
I am accordingly of opinion that the above-mentioned pro-
vision in the act of 1883 confers upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury no authority to acquire, by condemnation, the build-
ing site in question. 
I may add that, upon receipt of your letter aforesaid, the 
United States attorney for the western district of Wisconsin 
was requested to take no steps in the matter of the examina-
tion of the title to the premises until further instructed. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
Hon. D. MANNING, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL. 
The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy Depart-
ment is amenable to the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial upon 
charges and specifications preferred against him for acts done as such 
chief. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 13, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 11th May instant, and 
the inclosures therein referred to, have received my careful 
~onsideration. 
The question presented for opinion is whetller the court-
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martial, now assembled for the trial of Medical Director 
Philip S. Wales, bas jurisdiction to entertain the charges and 
specifications upon which that officer has been brought 
before them, he having formally objected to the jurisdiction, 
and the court, after hearing argument, having referred the 
question of jurisdiction to you for your opinion. 
The charges are brought under the articles for the better 
government of the Navy, and the various offenses specified 
are laid as having been committed by the accused as Chief 
of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. 
The objection to the court's jurisdiction is founded on the 
contention that the office of Chief of the Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery belongs to the civil branch of the executive 
department of the Government, and that the incumbent of 
it is for that reason not amenable to the articles for the gov-
ernment of the Navy touching an ofl:'ense which affects him 
only as an officer belonging to the civil administration of the 
Government, anu, as seems to be conceded, and therefore 
may be assumed, cannot be said to reflect on him generally 
as an officer of the Navy. 
This brings me to the consideration of the law creating the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, upon the meaning of which 
the question submitted necessarily turns. 
By Title X of the Revised Statutes (p. 70) it is provided 
that there shall be "an Executive Department, to be known. 
as the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy, 
who shall be the head thereof." 
It is furthermore provided (sec. 419) that the business of 
this Department shall be distributed in such wise as the 
Secretary may deem proper, amongst eight bureaus, one of 
which is the" Bureau of Medicine and Surgery," and that 
the chiefs of all of these bureaus shall be appointed for the 
term of four years by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, from certain classes of officers of 
the Navy specially named, and, as to the Bureau of Medi-
cine and Surgery, ''from the list of the surgeons of the Navy." 
By section 1471, Revised Statutes, it is declared that the 
chief of this bureau ''shall have the relative rank of commo-
dore whilst holding said position, and shall have • * *' 
the title of Surgeon-General." 
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It is also provided (sec. 418) that the Secretary of 
the Navy shall have the custody and charge of all the 
books, records, and other property now remaining in and 
appertaining to the Department of the Navy, or hereafter 
acquired by it; and (sec. 420) that "the several bureaus 
shaH retain the charge and custody of the books of records 
and accounts pertaming to their respective duties; and all 
of the duties of the bureaus shall be performed under the 
authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall 
be considered as emanating from him, and shall have full 
force and effect as such." 
It is contended, as already mentioned, that the efl"ect of 
this legislation is to make these chiefs of bureaux civil offi-
cers for the term of their appointment, without, however, im-
pairing their rights, in any way, as officers of the Navy. 
It is very cle~r that the office of Secretary of the Navy is 
a civil office. Congress has not attempted to confine the 
appointing power to any class or profession in choosing the 
incumbent for that position. But this cannot be said of the 
several bureaus of tLe Navy Department, the chiefs of which, 
we have seen, must be appointed from certain classes of 
officers of the Navy. When, therefore, it is said that these 
officers are civil, it must be shown satisfactorily why it was 
that Congress denied the appointing power the same range 
of selection in filling them as in filling the office of Secre-
tary of the Navy and civil offices generally. If it was the 
purpose of Congress to make these offices purely civil, it was 
not to be expected that the same restriction would be put on 
the Executive in filling them as is usual in appointments 
purely military and naval; a restriction w~ich, although in 
derogation of the appointing power, is imposed b,y virtue of 
the constitutional authority "to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces." (14 Opin., 
172.) 
To me it is far from clear that Congress could, in creating 
a purely civil office, constitutionally require that it should 
l>e filled from a certain class of persons, when it is apparent, 
as in the case now before me. that the restriction imposed 
has much less relation to qualification than to military 
economy; for it seems hardly to admit of question that it 
would be easy to find in civil life any number of medical 
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men entirely competent to take charge of the Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery. 
It is quite clear to me that if Congress had intended to 
make the several bureaus of the Navy Department civil of. 
fices it would have provided for the appointment of civilians 
to fill them, and not frustrated its purpose to secure the bene-
fits of a civil administration by declaring that these offices 
should be filled by naval officers exclusively. It is difficult 
to see what advantage it could be to the service to impress 
its officers with a civil status when called to the performance 
of duties purely naval and professional, as chiefs of bureaus, 
.and before such an intention can be attributed to Congress 
it must be shown that some practical end was to be answered 
by the introduction of so eccentric and anomalous an innova-
tion as a naval officer performing naval duties, a~d yet not 
amenable to the articles for the government of the Navy. 
The view I have taken is much strengthened in the case 
in band by the consideration that the Chief of the Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery, by the very fact of being so, enjoys 
"the relative rank of commodore while holding that position," 
together with an increase of pay corresponding to that rank, 
and the right to be retired as of that same rank if it should 
fall to him to be transferred from the active list of the Navy 
while chief of bureau. If, now, his office is civil, why this 
accession of rank, with its attendant privileges and emolu-
ments, which it would hardly strengthen the argument to 
enumerate~ 
Would it not be deemed incongruous to give the Secretary 
·ofthe Navy or the Secretary of War "relative rank" of any 
kind, as incidental to a purely civil status? 
So far, indeed, from there being any reason why the chief 
of this bureau should have this additional rank if Congress 
had intended him to be a civil officer, I should have supposed 
that it would be more suitable to a civil status to deny him 
all rank whatever in virtue of his position. 
I am, therefore, of opinion that the court-martial has juris-
diction. 
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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CASE OF JAMES S. MORGAN. 
Effect of the President's proclamations of amnesty of September 7, 1867, 
and December 25, 1868, considered in connection with the case of 
James S. Morgan as submitted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 19, 1885. 
SIR: In reply to your communication asking an opinion 
as to the capacity of Mr. James S. Morgan to hold a civil 
office under the Government of the United States, I have to 
say that while Mr. Morgan represents (and his st;atement 
alone is the evidence on which I am requested to act) that, 
he took no oath to support the Constitution of the United 
States on entering the Nava1 Academy, it may nevertheless . 
be that he did then take an oath of some kind, and, there-
fore, that his statement is mere inference as to the legal 
effect of such oath. 
If he took no oath at all, or none binding him to support 
'the Constitution, the President's proclamation of the 25th 
December, 1868, which was unconditional and em braced all 
cases not within the third section of the fourteenth amend-
ment, necessarily restored him to his lost civil rights, it being-
well settled that a general pardon or amnesty is as effica-
cious for that purpose as one by deed (Armstrong v. United 
States, 13 Wall., 155, and Knote v. United States, 95 U.S., 150) ; 
and as to the effect of a pardon of the latter kind I need do 
no more than refer to my opinion in the case of General 
Lawton. 
If, on the other hand, he did take an oath, in effect, al-
though not in terms, to support the Constitution, he may 
have been entirely rehabilitated by the President's procla-
mation of the 7th September, 1867; in which case the rights 
thus restored would continue in full force noth withstanding 
the fourteenth amendment, subsequently adopted, according 
to my opinion in · General Lawton's case. · 
It is true it does not appear in the somewhat imperfect 
statement furnished you that Mr. Morgan was not within 
the exceptions of this proclamation, or that he took the oath 
prescribed therein, but the probabilities that he was not 
within the excepted classes and that he took the required 
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oath are so great that I hardly deem it necessary to go into the 
question whether the oath and a year's services in the Naval 
Academy, without being graduated, made Mr. Morgan an 
officer of the United States, unless it should appear that he 
did not embrace the offer of the proclamation in question, 
and, as a conseq ueuce, comes under the ban of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
A fuller presentation of the facts of Mr. Morgan's case 
than has been furnished you will · show whether any other 
questions require discussion. 
I am, with the highest respect, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
APPOINTMENT OF AN INDIAN AS POSTMASTER. 
An Indian residing in the Indian Territory, who is a member of one of 
the tribes there, and subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not eligible to 
appointment as a postmaster; he being incompetent, in contempla-
tion of law, to take the required oath of office. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 21, 1885. 
SIR : Your letter of the 29th ultimo presents for my con-
·sideration the following question : 
"Whether an Indian in the Indian Territory, possessing 
otherwise the requisite attainments, but a member of one 
·of the tribes there, and not a citizen of the United States, 
can be lawfully appointed and qualify as postmaster of any 
of t.he several classes.'' 
This question involves the inquiry whether an Indian, un-
·der the circumstances therein stated, is eligible to the office 
mentioned. 
Excepting as regards the offices of President and Vice-
President, and membership of either House of Congress-
for which certain qualifications (embracing citizenship, 
age, etc.) are required-the Constitution is silent on the 
subject of eligibility to office under the General Govern-
ment. Disqualification to hold office is declared in special 
·cases (Art. I, sec. 6) and under particular circumstances 
(14th amend., sec. 3); but, excepting as above, it contains 
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no requirement in order to be eligible to office, other than 
such as is implied in the provision for an oath to support 
the Constitution (Art. VI), namely, that the individual pos-
sesses the legal capacity to take that oath. Beyond this 
the Constitution appears t<> leave the whole subject to the 
regulation of CongreRs ; and tlle only legislation of Congress, 
applicable to the office of postmaster, which contains any-
thing in the n-ature of a qualification for such office, is that 
prescribing an oath of office and requiring an official bond. 
Hence, whether an Indian is eligible to the said office de-
pends upon whether his status, civil and political, is at the 
time such that be can give the required bond and take the 
prescribed O'i1th. 
By the act of May 13, 1884, chapter 46, it is declared that 
thereafter the oath to be taken by any person elected or ap· 
pointed to any office of honor or profit. either in the civil, 
military, or naval service, except the President of the United 
States, shall l?e as prescribed in section 1757, Revised Stat-
utes; and it is further declared that this "'shall not affect the 
oaths prescribed by existing statutes in relation to the per-
formance of duties in special or particular subordinate offices 
and employments." Thus, while postmasters, in common 
with all other officers of the United States except the Presi-
dent, are now required to take the oath of office prescribed 
in section 1757, Revised Statutes, they are not exempted from 
taking the oath prescribed by the act of March 5, 187 4, chap-
ter 46, relative to the performance of duties in the postal 
service, but must take this also. It is unnecessary, however, 
to consider here any other oath than the one in section 1757, 
which is as follows: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mentall'eservation or purpose 
of evasion ; and tha·t I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter: so help me 
God." 
There is nothing in this oath which precludes a foreign-born 
resident of the United States, who has not yet been natural· 
ized, from taking it. Want of citizenship is not of itself an 
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obstacle. But the condition of an Indian who is a member 
of a tribe, and especially one who dwells within the territory 
and jurisdiction of his tribe, is peculiar. He is regarded and 
treated by our Government asbeJonging toaseparate though 
dependent political com]Ilunity, the members of which owe 
immediate allegiance thereto, and are not ordinarily dealt 
with by the Government individually, so long as their tribal 
relation is preserved. The obligation imposed by the oath 
does not seem to be consistent with the duty of obedience to 
tribal authority which springs from such relation, and the 
existence of which is distinctly recognized by our Govern-
ment, and its effect would obviously be to greatly weaken if 
not destroy that relation. Unless clearly warranted by the 
provisions of some treaty or statute, an act whic.h thus i~ter­
feres with the tribal relation, and is productive of conse-
duences so discordant and in such direct conflict with the 
authority of the tribe over its members and their alJegiance 
thereto, must be deemed to have no sanction in our laws. I 
therefore think that an Indian, while a member of a tribe and 
subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not in legal contemplation 
competent to take the oath referred to. 
As to the competency of an Indian in the Indian Territory, 
under those circumstances, to give the required official bond 
I entertain strong doubt. In general, contracts with Indians, 
not citizens of the United States, can only be made under 
certain ~:;tatutory restrictions and regulations (see sees. 2103 
to 2106, Rev. Stat.), which, however, are designed for the 
protection of such Indians in their dealings with other 
persons, and appear to have no application to transactions 
with the Government. Yet one against whom the bond can 
not be enforced in the ordinary way (i.e., by snit in a United 
States court), may well be considered as being, in contem-
plation of the statute requiring it to be given, incapable of 
becoming a party thereto ; and such seems to be the condi-
tion of an Indian in the Indian Territory belonging to a tribe 
there. Whilst in that Territory certainly he would not be 
liable to suit on his bond in any court of the United States, 
as the jurisdiction necessary to entertain the suit is not con-
ferred by existing laws. 
In an opinion of one of my predecessors, dated April12, 1869 
184 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Appointment ofan Indian as Postmaster. 
(13 Opin., ~7), it was held that General E. E. Parker, an In-
dian, was not disqualified from holding the office of chief of 
a bureau in the Interior Department, and he was subse-
quently appointed to and filled the office of Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs. The opinion is very brief and does not state 
the facts in the case. But on examining the files of this De-
partment I find that the faets presented were these: General 
Parker was a Seneca Indian, born in the United States, and 
had been separated from his tribe twenty-four years, living 
<luring that time among the whites. He had been an engineer 
upon the New York State canals; was subsequently chief 
assistant engineer of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Ship 
Canal in Virginia, and also constructing engineer of light-
·houses under General W. F. Smith, on the upper lakes. He 
had · been appoint~d superintendent of con:struction, under 
the Treasury DP.partment, of the custom-house and marine 
llospital at Galena, Ill., and. afterwards of the custom-house 
at Dubuque, Iowa. In 1863 he was appointed by President 
Lincoln a captain and assistant adjutant-general, and served 
on General Grant's staff, and at the date of the opinion was 
still holding a commission in the Army. He had paid taxes 
on real estate for over twelve years and been a voter in New 
York. 
It may be added that General -Parker was, perhaps, re-
garded as having already become clothed with citizenship by 
force of the first section of the act of .April 9, 1866, chapter 
31. But aside from that, the circumstances of his ca8e differ 
very materially from the one under consideration, in this: 
t.hat in the latter case the Indian (being a resident of and 
member of a tribe in the Indian Territory) still sustains the 
tribal relation and is 8till subject to tribal jurisdiction, while 
in the other such relation and jurisdictiOn had long before 
. ceased to exist. The circumstances of the present case to 
which I have just adverted are those which, in my view, 
render the Indian incompetent to take the prescribed official 
oath and give the required official bond, and therefore ineli-
gible to the office. 
It is true the statutes touching the diplomatic and consular 
officers in several instances provide for certain officers althmtgh 
not citizens. Thus, in section 1678, Revised Statutes, the Ian-
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guage employed is, ''notwithstanding he may not be a citi-
zen." But there is no statute regulating in any respect 
this matter as far as Indians are concerned, and the very 
mentioning of these cases in this particular service would, 
by implication, exclude the idea as appllcable to Indians. 
(Sedgwick Con st., 2d ed., p. 31, note.) 
Therefore, in answer to the question proposed by you, I 
have the honor to reply that, in my opinion, an Indian, under 
the circumstances stated, cannot lawfally be appointed and 
qualify as postmaster of any of the several classes. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
Hon. W. F. VILAS, 
Postmaster- General. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
HEAD-MONEY TAX. 
'The tax of 50 cents imposed by the act of Angnst 3, 1882, chapter 376, is 
applicable to all passengers, not citizens of the United States, who shall 
come by steamer or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within 
the United States, whether as immigrants or merely as tonriste. 
DEPARTMENT OF .JUSTICE, 
May 22, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 18th of 1\fay, instant, 
with the inclosures therein referred to, has received my care-
ful consideration. 
The question presented•for opinion is, whether the head 
money tax of 50 cents, levied by the act of the 3d August, 
1882 (22 Stat. 214), entitled'' An act to regulate immigration," 
is demandable for passengers coming int.o our ports not as 
immigrants but transiently as toru.rists. 
The first section provides "that there shall be levied~ col-
lected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and every pas-
senger not a citizen of the United States who shall come by 
.steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within 
the United States." 
Was it the intention of Congress that the term "passen-
gers," as thus used, should be taken in its most extended 
acceptation, or in the restricted sense of immigrants, or per-
.sons coming into the country for the purpose of permanent 
abode' 
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This is a question that must be resolved by a careful ex-
amination of the act itself. 
The object of the duty imposed is, as the act declares 
(sec. I), to raise a. fund to be called the immigrant fund, which 
it enacts shall be paid into the United States Treasury and 
be used under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury 
" to defray the ~xpenses of regulating immigratton under 
this act, and for the care ofimmig'i'ants Brriving in the United 
States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the 
general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect.'' 
That Congress had power to lay an impost of this kind for 
the purposes mentioned has been recently decided by the Su-
preme Court in a case that arose under this very act (Beau 
Money cases, 112 U; S., 580). But this case in_volved only the 
constitutionality and not the interpretation of the act. 
As we have seen, the statute sets out with imposing a duty 
of "fifty cents for each and every passenger." The samt~ 
section contains the provision already quoted, that the money 
thus collected shall be used for the care and relief of" immi-
grants," · and to meet the expenses of enforcing the law. It 
then goes on to declare that the duty shall be a lien on the 
vessels bringing" such passengers" into the country. 
The second section directs what measures the Secretary of 
the Treasury shall take ''to provide for the support and re-
lief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into dis-
tress or need public aid." It theft goes on to make provision 
for examination "into the condition of passengers arriving," 
etc., and if there shall be found ''among such passengers any 
convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of 
himself," such person shall not be permitted to land. 
The third section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, 
inter alia, to make rules and regulations "to protect the 
United States and immigrants into the United States from 
fraud." 
It will be observed, on this survey of the statute, that 
whenever Congress refers to the persons entitled to its ben-
efit, whether as partakers of its bounty or objects of its pro-
tection, it invariably describes them as "immigrants" and 
not as "passengm·s." On the other band, when the statute 
would provide a protection against the introduction of con-
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victs, lunatics, idiots, and paupers, it declares that there 
shall be an examination into the condition of "passengers" 
arriving at the ports, etc., thus plainly manifesting a pur-
pose to use a term em bracing immigrants and all other itin-
eran.t persons. So when the act declares (sec. 1) that the 
duty laid shall be a lien on the vesBels bringing ''such pas-
sengers," it can hardly mean immigrants, for in that case the 
most natural expression would have been "such immi-
grants," as the term immigrants occurs in the sentence next 
preceding, and would, in all probability, have been present 
to the draughtsman's mind as the antecedent to which he 
wa~ referring. 
The first duty of the expounder of a writing is to give each 
word its ordinary sense unless there be some satisfactory in-
dication that it was employed in some other sense; but as I 
am far from seeing anything in this statute that leads me to 
suppose that the word "passengers" was intended to be 
taken in the restricted sense of" immigrants," I am of opin-
ion it should have its ordinary sense of comprehending all 
itinerent persons, not citizens of the United States, coming to 
our ports in steam or sail vessels. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CIVIL SERVICE. 
The officers in the Pension Bureau described as medical referee, assistant 
medical referee, medical examiners, and law clerk, being "exclusively 
professional," do not fall within the operation of the civil service la"·; 
they are excepted therefrom by Rule XIX. 
Those described as principal examiners for review board are not excepted 
and in appointing them the civil service law and regulations should 
be observed. 
DEPARTMENT OF . JUSTICE, 
]J1ay 28, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication asking my opinion upon the 
question submitted to you in the letter of the Commissioner 
of Pensions, which you inclose to me, has received my con-
sideration. 
The ques_tion is whether officers in the Pension Office, 
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answering the description of medical referee, assistant medical 
referee, medical examiners, qualified surgeons, law clerk, and 
principal examiners for review board, fall within the civil 
service law and the rules made pursuant thereto. 
It seems to me that as the duties of the medical officers and 
the law clerk 'are "exclusively professional," those officers 
are expressly excepted from the law by Rule XIX. There is 
hardly room for question, therefore, that these o;fficers do not 
fall within the operation of the civil service law as restricted 
by the rule just mentioned. 
As to the" principal e:xaminers for review board," I do not 
understand that they come within any of the exceptions of 
Rule XIX, and therefore I am of opinion that ih appointing 
them the civil service law and regulations must be observed. 
It is proper to add that I have carefully reconsidered my 
opinion of the 7th of May, 1885, in the light of some addi-
tional views submitted for the purpose of influencing my 
judgment, but I see no reason for receding from any position 
taken in that opinion, which is herewith returned. 
I have the honor to be, sir, ~'our obedient servant, 
. A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
WORKS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGATION. 
The indefinite appropriation made by the fourth section of the act of 
July 5, 1884, chapter 229, is not applicable to river and harbor improve-
ments generally, but only to a particular class of public works, such 
as canals, locks, etc., in the use of which both operating expenses and 
expenses for repairs are necessarily incurred. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
May 28, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant, inclosing a communi-
cation from the Chief of Engineers of the 8th, and other 
papers, relative to the indefinite appropriation provided in 
section 4 of the river and harbor act of July 5, 1884, chap-
ter 229, calls attention to the points presented in these papers 
and requests my opinion as to the construction which should 
be placed on the provision referred to. 
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The section above-mentioned reads as follows: H That no 
tolls or operating charges whatsoever shall be levied or col-
lected upon any vessel or vessels, dredges, or other passing 
water craft through any canal or other work for the improve-
ment of navigation bP-longing to the United States; and for 
the purpose of preserving and continuing the use and navi-
gation of said canals, rivers, and other public works without 
interruption, the Secretary of War, upon application of the 
chief engineer in charge of said works, is hereby authorized 
to draw his warrant or requisition from time to time upon the 
Secretary of the Treasury to pay the actual expenses of op-
erating and keeping said works in repair, which warrants or 
requisitions shall be paid .by the Secretary of the Treasury 
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated: 
Provided, however, That an itemized statement of said ex-
penses shall accompany the annual report of the Chief of 
Engineers." 
Soon after the enactment of this provision it appears to 
have become a questi_on whether the indefinite appropriation 
thereby made, besides being (as it was deemed by the War 
Departm~nt to be) applicable to defray the expenses of oper-
ating and keeping in repair the locks, dams, canals, etc., of 
certain public works, is available for "restoring any improved 
harbor channel to its previous condition when such channel 
has been obstructed by the action of storms, freshets, or other 
causes, repairing or rebuilding harbor piers or revetments 
which have been injured by ice, storms, freshets, or natural 
decay, refilling piers with stone or other material when such 
material has settled or has been displaced by the action of 
the elements," and, more recently, whether it is also available 
for removing snags and scraping bars in certain rivers, etc. 
By the terms ot the section the appropriation is to meet 
" the actual expenses of operating and keeping said works in 
repair," and the difficulty seems to be in determining whether 
"said u:orks," as used therein, refers to the v-arious public 
works for the improvement of navigation mentioned in the 
preceding parts of the act, including harbors and rivers 
generally, or only to a particular class of works, such as 
canals, locks, etc., the operation and use of which ordinarily 
involve the incurring of certain expenses by the Govern-
190 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Works for Improvement of Navigation. 
ment. An examination of previous legislation may throw 
some light on this point. 
The act of May 18, 1880, chapter 96, which abolished all 
tolls on the Louisville and Portland Canal after July 1, 1880, 
authorized the Seeretary of War "to draw his warrant from 
time to time upon the Sec,retary of the Treasur;y to pay the 
actual expenses of operating and keeping said canal in re-
pair." Before the passage of that act this canai was, by sec-
tion 3 of the act of May 11, 1874, chapter 165, made ''free 
of all tolls and charges except such as are necessary to pay 
the current expenses of said canal and to keep the same in 
repair." 
The ri\er and harbor act of June 14, 1880, chap. 211, 
in providing for an acceptance of a transfer of the St. Mary's 
Falls Canal from the State of Michigan, declared that after 
such transfer said canal should be free for public use, and 
authorized the Secretary of War "to draw from time to time 
his wa'rrant on the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the 
actual expenses of operating and keeping said canal in 
repair." 
By a clause in the river and harbor act of March 3, 1881, 
chapter 136, it was provided that thereafter, "for the purpose 
of operating and keeping in repair the Des Moines Rapi-ds 
Canal, and St. Mary's Falls Canal, and St. Clair Flats Canal, 
and the J..~ouisville and Portland Canal, the Secretary of War 
is authorized to draw his requisition on the Secretary of the 
Treasury from time to time, which requisition shall be paid 
out of any rnoneJ: in the Treasury not otherwise appropri-
ated." The expense of operating and repairing the Des 
Moines Rapids Canal and the St. Clair Flats Canal h:1d 
theretofore been met by definite appropriations for those 
objects (see as to the former work 20 Stat., 159, 367; 21 
Stat .• 188; and as to the latter 20 Stat., 269; 21 Stat., 189), 
and on neither of these canals had tolls been collected by 
the Government. 
Lastly, by a provision in the river and harbor act of Au-
gust 2, 1882, chapter 375, it was declared "that no tolls or 
operating charges whatsoever shall be levied or collected 
upon any vessels, boats, dredges; craft, or other water craft 
passing through any canal or other work for the improve-
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ment of navigation belonging to the United States." The 
effect ofthis enactment was to abolish the tolls theretofore 
levied by the Government upon vessels passing through the 
works of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers improvement from 
which the current expenses of operating and keeping these 
works in repair were paid (see sec. 4, act of July 7, 1870, 
chap. 210; section 5249, Rev. Stat.) No other proYision was 
then made for defraying those expenses; they were left to 
be provided for by future legislation. 
Recurring now to section 4 of the act of July 5, 1884, 
quoted above, it will be observed that the first clause of this 
-section re-enacts the provision in the act of August 2, 1882, 
just adverted to, and that in immediate juxtaposition there-
with follows the clause containing the indefinite appropria-
tion under consideration. The latter clause is" and for the 
purpose of preserving and continuing the use and na·vigation 
of said canals, rivers, and other public works without interrup-
tion, the Secretary of War * :t * is hereby authorized 
to draw his warrant or requisition from time to time upon the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to pay the actual expenses of op-
erating and keeping said works in repair," etc. This lan-
guage is broad, but I do not think the words '' said canals, 
rivers, and other public works," and" said works" were meant 
to include all those public works which are described in the 
preceding parts of the same act. The language employed in 
that clause must be viewed in connection, not only with the 
first clause in the same section, but with the previous legis-
lation to which reference is above made, and which contains 
provisions of the same character. Regarded from this point 
of view, the more reasonable construction is that it embraces 
only public works of the kind described in that legislation, 
and obviously referred to in said first clause. 
Such, indeed, seems to be the meaning given it by the 
Committee on Rivers and Harbors of the House, in their re-
port which accompanied the bill. Referring to the provision 
.vherein it occurs, the committee say, "Anothe provision 
prohibits tolls or operating charges from being levied or col-
lected upon vessels passing through any canal or other work 
for the improvement of navigation belonging to the United 
States. Operating charges, under proper restrictions, are to 
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be paid by reqlJisition upon the Secretary of the Treasury. 
This is the existing law as to Des Moines, Portland, and St. 
Mary's Canals, and there seems to be no good reason for not 
putting all similar Government works upon the same footing." 
A necessity existed for making Rome provision to meet the 
current expenses of operating and keeping in repah· the 
works of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers improvemeni, since 
the abolishment of tolls thereon; and while there can be no 
doubt that the inrlefinite appropriation provided by section 4 
of the act of 1884 was meant to apply to those works, there 
is also strong ground for the inference that it was intended 
to be limited to works of that class, in whose use both operat-
ing expenses and expenses for repairs are necessarily incurred 
(the object being, as the statute itself declares, to prevent 
interruption to their use and to the navigation thereof for 
want of funds to pay such expenses), and not to extend to 
river and harbor improvements generally. 
In my opinion the provision in question should be con-
strued to cover only works of the class above referred to. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
Hon. WILLIAM C. ENDICOTT, 
Secretary of War. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY AT NEW YORK. 
Compensation of the United States attorney for the southern distnct 
of New York, under sections 770, 836, and 827, Revised Statutes, 
considered. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
tlune 5, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 2d instant contains two inquiries~ 
bearing upon the corrtpensation of Elihu Root, United States 
attorney for the southern district of New York, under sec-
tions 770, 836, and 827, Revised Statutes. 
(a) Section 770, fixing the salary of the attorney, and sec-
tion 836, providing for the expenses of his office, do not conflict 
with each other. Section 770, which provides a '' salary for 
\ll his services," has been practically interpreted to mean all 
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official services required directly by statute, and his accounts 
have been adjusted under this view. 
The statutes which fix the salary and fees for official serv-
ices required by law do not regulate in any way the pay-
ment for unofficial services rendered. Of this character are 
the se.rvices rendered by virtue of section 827, which allows 
to the attorney a sum in addition to his salary. 
(b) The employment of clerks in the district attorney's 
office for services not directed by the judiciary act, as far as 
the amount of payment is concerned, is a matter within the 
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. Whether, in 
addition to the salary mentioned, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury approves an account taxed in favor of the attorney by 
the court in the sum of $4 or $6, is not a question of legality. 
Under section 824 he bas a legal right to increase the pay by 
$4,000, and again by $2,000, and the extent to which he shall 
exercise that right is a matter of discretion alone. 
Very respectfully, 
Ron. DANIEL MANNING, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
TERRITORIAL OFFICERS IN UTAH. 
The superintendent of dist,rict schools, auditor of public accounts, 
and treasurer of Utah Territory should, in conformity to the organic 
law of the Territory, be appointed by the governor, with the advice 
and consent of the legislative council. The Territorial statutes, in so 
far as they require such officers to be elected, are in conflict with the 
organic law and void. 
The commissioners to locate university lands, created by the Territorial 
legislature under the powers given by the act of Congress of February 
21, 1855, chap. 117, should be elected in the manner prescribed by the 
Territorial statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF. tTUSTICE, 
June 5, 1885. 
SIR: At the instance of the U tab · Commission, the Hon. 
H. L. Muldrow, Acting Secretary of the Interior, in a letter 
dated the 22d ultimo, requested my opinion upon the follow-
ing question: "Whether certain Territorial officers in Utah~ 
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namely, superintendent of district schools, auditor of public 
accounts, treasurer, and commissioners to locate university 
lands, should be appointed by the governor, with the assent 
of the legislative council, or chosen by the people at their 
general elections." 
For convenience, so much of the question 'as relates to the 
commissioners will be considered separately, as the appoint-
ment or election of those officers appears to be controlled by 
a provision not applicable to the others. 
Upon examination of the statutes enacted by the Territo-
rial legislature, it appears that the superintendent, auditor, 
and treasurer are thereby required to be elected biennially1 
at the general election, by the qualified voters of the Terri-
tory (see Comp. Laws of Utah, 1876, p. 247; act of Feb. 22, 
1878, chap. 11, Laws of twenty-third session, p. 27). 
The organic law, however (see sec. 7 of the act of Congress 
of Sept. 9, 1850, chap. 51), declares that "the governor shall 
nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the 
legislative council, appoint all officers not herein otherwise 
provided for." And as the three Territorial officers last 
mentioned are not therein '' otherwi~e provided for," a direct 
conflict manifestly exists between the statute-s of the Terri-
torial legislature above referred to and the organic law. 
The organic law of a Territory takes the place of a constitu-
tion as the fundamental law of the local government. It is 
obligatory on and binds the Territorial authorities (National 
Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S., 129.) Any act of the 
Territorial legislature inconsistent therewith must be held 
void (Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall., 375.) Congress may un-
doubtedly make a void act of the Territorial legislature valid 
and a valid act void (101 U. S., supra.) But for the exercise 
of this power some legislative act on its part, having that effect, 
would be necessary. Certainly nothing can be implied in 
favor of the validity of a Territorial statute which conflicts 
with an express provision of the organic law of the Terri-
tory, from the mere fact that Congress has not disapproved 
it. It follows that the statutes of Utah, in so far as they 
require the ~uperintendent of district schools, auditor of pub-
lic accounts, and treasurer of the Territory to be elected, be-
ing contrary to the provision of the organic law hereinbefore 
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mentioned, are a nullity, and that those officers should be 
appointed in conformity to that provision. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the supreme court of 
that Territory in regard to the Territorial marshal, who by 
an act of the legislature of the Territory was required to be 
elected by a joint vote of both houses thereof. The court 
held the act to be inconsistent with the provision of the or-
ganic law above adverted to, and therefore void. (See Ex 
parte Duncan, etc., 1 Utah Rep., 81.) 
In regard to the commissioners, these officers are by the 
Territorial statute required to be elected annually by the 
qualified voters at the general election. (Comp. Laws of Utah, 
1876, p. 241.) By the third section of the act of Congress of 
February 21, 1855, chapter 117, a certain quantity of land 
was reserved for the establishment of a unive~sity, ''to be 
selected under the direction of the legislature," etc. The leg-
is] ature of the Territory provided for the selection of this 
land by creating a board of commissioners, to consist of three 
men, elected as above, and devolving upon such board the 
duty of selecting the land. I am of the opinion that the 
Territorial legislature, by virtue of said act, was invested 
with full power over the selection of the land, including the 
establishment of the agency by which such selection was to be 
accomplished. It was at liberty to devolve the duty of 
electing on officers alreac.ly created, or authorize the appoint-
ment of persons for that purpose by such officers or by the 
governor, or otherwise provide the instrumentality for car-
rying its will upon the subject into effect. The commission-
ers in question are not, therefore, to be regarded as within 
the operation of the above-mentioned provision of the 
organic law; and their election in the manner prescribed by 
the Territorial statute is proper. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
Ron. L. Q. C. LAMAR, 
Secretary of the Interior. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
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HEAD-MONEY TAX. 
The duty of 50 cents a passenger, imposed by the act of August 3, 1882, 
chapter 376, should be exacted from itinerant persons, not citizens of 
the United States, toties quoties any such person enters one of our ports 
from a foreign port. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 9, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 6th J nne instant, refer-
ring to my opinion of the 21st May, holding that the duty of 
50 cents a passenger imposed by the act of August 3, 1882, is 
collectible on account of all itinerant persons, not citizens of 
the United States, coming to our ports in steam or sail ves-
sels from ·foreign ports, asks whether such duty ''should be 
collected on each successive return of any such person to the 
United States." 
In my opinion the duty is demandable as often as any such 
person enters one of our ports. The statute makes no ex-
press provision for exemption from the duty, and I see no 
ground for implying one. 
It is hardly to be supposed that Congress could have in· 
tRnded such' au exemption and yet have failed to provide for it. 
When Congress, by the act of J nne 26, 1884 ( Sess. Acts 1883-'8~, 
p. 57), was imposing a tonnage tax on foreign vessels enter-
ing our ports, it remembered that the tax would fall heavily 
on such of them as were constantly plying between the United 
States and the ports of other nations, and therefore especially 
provided that vessels hailing from some ports should not be 
required to pay over 15 cents a ton in any one year, and that 
vessels from other ports should not pay more than 30 cents a 
ton per annum. The total omission of Congress to make any 
such provisian in the head-money law to meet the case of a. 
passenger, not a citizen of the United States, repeatedly 
entering our ports from foreign ports, is, I think, conclusive 
that no such indulgence was in the mind of the legislature. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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TONNAGE DUTY. 
The right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the first proviso of section 
14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, takes effect from the procla-
mation of the President, and not before. 
By virtue of the third section of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 221, the 
decision of the Commissioner of Navigation on questions involving a 
refund of the tonnage tax is final. That section supersedes or repeals 
the previous law vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with appellate 
power in such cases. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 12, 1885. 
SIR: I have duly considered the questions submitted for 
<>pinion in your communication of May 23, 1885, and will now 
proceed to answer them in their order. 
(1) The first question is in these words: "In the event of a 
right to an exemption from the tax of 3 cents per ton, or to a 
reduction thereof, attaching under the conditions specified 
in the first proviso of said section 14, when did such right 
inure to the owner of a vessel~ Did it inure to him on the 
first tender of payment of tax after the passage of the act 
and prior to the proclamation of the President suspending 
its collection~ Or did it inure on the first tender of payment 
·Of tax after the date of suspension of collection as fixed by 
the proclamation ~" 
I think the right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the 
first proviso of the fourteenth section of the act of June 26, 
1884, takes effect from the proclamation of the President, and 
not before. Until the President has by proclamation sus-
pended the operation of the statute, the rate of duty thereby 
prescribed must be demanded. The action of foreign gov- . 
·ernments in respect of diminishing or abolishing tonnage, or 
light-house, or other equivalent tax or taxes, can have no 
effect in this country except by the dispensing power of the 
Executive, as grallted by the statute; and until that power 
is. exerted the statute, or the last proclamation under the 
statute, as the case may be, must be the law as to whether 
any tonnage duty is demandable in certain cases, and, if any, 
how much. 
If the right to exemption from or diminution of tonnage duty 
resulted directly from the act of the foreign government in 
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a given case, it is quite remarkable that Congress did not 
require that the proclamation of the President should state 
the time when the foreign law or regulation took effect. It 
is not reasonable to suppose that Congress would have left 
a matter so largely affecting the revenue to be determined 
by the collector at each port of entry, according to the light 
before him, with no small probability of occasional violations 
of the constitutional injunction of uniformity in duties, 
through conflicting decisions of the various collectors. 
As, then, the ship Antillas was entered and the tonnage duty 
demanded as to her paid before the proclamation under which 
the refund is claimed went into operation, it follows that the 
duty collected wal:) due and demandable. 
(2) The second question is in these words: "Does the 
right to an exemption or a reduction of the tax entail a right 
to a refund thereof from the date when a partial or entire 
exemption accrued~" 
This question I have answered already, if I apprehend it 
correctly. 
(3) Tb,e third question is as follows: ''In view of the lan-
guage of the last clause of section 3 of the act of July 5r 
1884, constituting a Bureau of Navigation in the Treasury De-
partment, and of section 26 of the shipping act, when rights 
to exemption from tonnage tax accrue under treaty stipula-
tions with foreign governments, or accrue under provisions 
of foreign law operating jointly with the provisions of section 
14 to carry such exemption, are interpretations and decisions 
of the Commissioner of Navigation relating to the legal col-
lection of tonnage tax in such sense final and conclusive as 
to preclude an authoritative appeal to the Department of 
State upon the interpretation of treaties or foreign law affect-
ing the collection of said tax; or to preclude an appeal to the 
Secretary of the Treasury for a refund of tonnage tax by 
virtue of the provisions of section 26 of the act of June 26, 
1884, when exemption from paying such tax may, in t"!le 
Secretary's judgment, have accrued under the provisions of 
foreign law or treaty stipulation~" 
I am of opinion that the decision of the Commissioner of 
Navigation is final by virtue of the third section of the act 
of July 5, 1884, entitled "An act to constitute a Burearr of 
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Navigation in the Treasury Department," as to all claims for 
refunds of the tonnage tax. This section provides ''that the 
Commissioner of Navigation shall be charged with the su-
pervision of the laws relating to the admeasurement of ves-
sels, and the assignment of signal letters thereto~ and of 
designating their official number, and on all questions of in-
terpretation growing out of the execution of the laws relat-
ing to these subjects and relating to the collection of tonnage 
tax, and to the refund of such tax when collected erroneously 
or illegally, his decision shall be final;" and being as to 
questions involving the refund of the tonnage tax irrecon-
cilable with section 2931 of the Revised Statutes authorizing 
appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury in cases of contro-
versies about tonnage and other duties, it has, in my opinion, 
repealed that section in so far as appeals from the collector's 
decisions as to tonnage duties are concerned. In like man-
ner the provisions of any treaty inconsistent with the law· in 
question mnst be held to be annulled in so far forth as a rule 
of civil conduct in this country. (Head Money Oases, 112 
U.S., 597, 598.) Indeed, I am persuaded that, in the ab-
sence of the explicit language of the statute, the mere fact of 
confiding questions about tonnage duties to the judgment 
and discretion of the Commissioner would, upon a settled 
principle, have made his decisions final. (Freeman on Judg. 
ments, 531; Allen v. Blunt, 3 Story C. C., 742; Steel v. Smelt-
ing Co., 106. U. S., 447.) 
In my opinion section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, 
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to refund, in cer-
tain cases, "any fine, penalty, forfeiture, exaction, or charge 
arising under the laws relating to vessels or seamen," has 
no application to tonnage duties. The words " exaction and 
charge'' in this section, which might in some circumstances 
be held to comprehend tonnage duties, must, from their 
association with the terms "fine, penalty, forfeiture," be 
taken in an acceptation akin to that of these latter words, 
upon the well known principle of interpretation that words 
associated together and admitting of a like sense take their 
color from each other, the more general being restricted to a 
sen~e analogous to the less general. (Maxwell Stat., p. 379, 
2d ed., London, 1883.) 
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Besides, there was no necessity to include tonnage duties 
in this section, inasmuch as the Secretary of the Treasury 
already had the powPr under section 2931 of the Revised 
Statutes to refund such duties when illegally or improperly 
exacted. 
If, however. section 26 does include tonnage duties, the 
power of the Secretary of the Treasur;y to refund such duties 
has been abrogated by the third section of the subsequent 
act of July 5, 1884, making final the decision of the Com-
missioner of Navigatiou as to "aU questions" relating to the 
refund of the tonnage tax when erroneously or illegally col-
lected. This provision seems repugnant to and to have sup-
planted the previous law investing the Secretary of the Treas-
ury with appellate power in such cases. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE 'TREASURY. 
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
In the case of the bridges of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company 
across the Southern and Easteru Branches of Elizabeth River, the facts 
set forth are insufficient to authorize judicial proceedings against said 
company in behalf of the United States on the ground that such bridges 
are an obstruction to navigation 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 16, 1885. 
SrR : I return herewith the papers which accompanied your 
letter of the 11th ultimo in relation to the bridges of the N"or-
folk and Western Railroad Company across the Southern and 
Eastern Branches of Elizabeth River, at·Norfolk, Va. 
It appears by these papers that, in view of officers of the 
Engineer Department, those bridge~ are already an obstruc-
tion to navigation, and that the work of strengthening them 
as proposed by said company will add to the obstruction. 
This matter is thought to be of sufficient importance to war-
rant action by the United States authorities, if such action 
can be legally taken. 
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the facts set forth 
in the papers are not in themselves sufficient to authorize a 
judicial proceeuing against said company in bPhalf of the 
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United States, and that for this purpose authority from Con-
gress is needed. In connection with this point, I beg tore-
fer to my opinion of May 1, 1885, in the matter of the construc-
tion of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi at St. Paul, 
wherein the subject of authority of officers of the Government 
to institute proceedings in its behalf in cases like the present 
is fully examined. 
I suggest that the proper course to take in the present case 
is indicated by the following provision in section 2 of the 
act of July 5, 1884, chapter 229. "He l the Secretary of War] 
shall also report [to Congress] whether any bridges, cause-
ways, or structures, now erected or in process of erection, do 
Dr will interfere with free anu safe navigation, and if they 
do or will ~o interfere, to report the best mode of altering or 
~onstructing such bridges or causewayR so as to prevent any 
.such obstruction." 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
EXTRA-DUTY PAY. 
In the matter of the claims of Sergeant Robinson and Corporal Speddin, 
of the Signal Corps, for extra-duty pay for services performed by them 
from July 1, 1883, toDecember20, 1884, it appearing that Congress has 
made no provision for extra-duty pay to signal service men in either of 
the a11propriation acts of March 3~ Hl83, chapter 143, aud July 7, 1884, 
chapter 332, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1884, and June 30, 1885, 
respectively, or in any other appropriation act for the same fiscal 
years: Held that the claimants have no right to such pay for the pe-
riod covered by their claims, unless the right is elsewhere conferred 
by statute, which does not appear. 
The claimants being non-commissioned officers, and not employed on 
extra duty as overseers, their claims are not within section 1287, Re-
vised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J 1tne 26, 1885. 
SIR: By letter of April 8, 1885~ the Ron. A. S. Fairchild 
{then Acting Secretary of the Treasury), at the instance of 
the Second Comptroller, submitteu to me for an opinion 
thereon the following question, which · relates to certain 
daims before the Comptroller made by Sergeant Jesse H. 
Robmson and Corporal William C. Speddin, of the Signal 
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Corps, for extra-duty pay for services performed by them 
from July 1,1883, to December 20, 1884, viz," whether either 
or both of these claimants have a legal claim against the 
Government for extra-duty pay for services rendered within 
the period. mentioned, notwithstanding no appropriation has 
been made by Congress." 
These claims appear to be based upon the following facts:. 
The act of June 20, 1878, chapter 359, having proviueu · 
that "Signal Service men shall not receive extra-duty pay 
unless specially directed by the Secretary of War," an order . 
was subsequently issued from the War Department (Gen~ 
Order No. 54, dated July 23, 1878) in terms as follows: 
"By direction of the Secretary of War extra-duty pay at-
the rate of thirty-five cents a day will be allowed the follow-
iug class of enlisted men in the Signal Service of the Army. 
"(1) Corporals and privates in charge of stations or serv-
ing as operators and repair men in the United States tele-
graph lines carrying, or which may carry, commercial busi-
ness. 
"(2) Non-commissioned officers in charge of sections. 
"(3) In such instances as they may be mustered by the 
Chief Signal Officer for extra-duty pay in pursuance of the 
special direction of the Secretary of W ~r." 
(See also Army Regulations of 1881, par. 406, 407.) 
Sergeant Robinson was mustered for extra-duty pay by spe-
cial direction of the Secretary of War, dated June 20, 1881, 
and served as a telegraph operator during the period above 
specified, aud Corporal- Spedden was duly assigned to duty, 
in pursuance of the first paragraph of said order, on Sep-
tember 1, 1881, as a telegraph operator on the United States 
telegraph lines, and served as such during the same period. 
The said order received no modification during that period 
and was not revoked until February 5, 1885. 
The question proposed calls for an examination .ofthe stat-
utory provisions which relate to the ~ubject of extra-duty pay. 
The earliest legislation upon the subject is the act of March 
2, 1819, chapter 45, which provided ''that whenever it shall 
be found expedient to employ the Army at work on fortifica-
tions, in surveys, in cut.ting roads, and other constant labor, 
of not less than ten days, the non-commissioned officers, 
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musicians, and privates so emploseu shan be allowed fifteen 
cents and an extra gill of whisky or spirits each per day while 
so employed." 
Attorney-General Butler held that under this statute a 
sergeant of the Army employed as an assistant clerk in one 
of the bureaus of the War Department was entitled to the 
additional compensation thereby allowed. He was of opin-
ion that it included not only the particular kinds of duty 
mentioned therein, but all "other constant labor," and that 
in legal contemplation the service of a clerk in a bureau is 
''labor," and, if it be continuously and regularly performed, 
"constant labor." (2 Opin., 706.) 
By the sixth section of the act of August 4, 1854, chapter 
~47, "the allowance to soldiers employed at work on fortifi-
cations," etc., authorized by the said act of 1819, was ''in-
creased to twenty-five cents per day for men employed as 
laborers and teamsters, and forty cents per day when em-
ployed as mechanics, at all stations east of the Rocky Mount-
ains, and to thirty-five cents and fifty cents per day when 
the men are employed at stations west of those mountains. 
Section 35 of the act of March 3, 1863, chapter 75, provided 
that" enlisted men, now or hereafter detailed to special serv-
ice, shall not receive any extra pay for such services beyond 
that allowed to other enlisted men." But by section 2 of the 
act of April1, 1864, chapter 45, it was declared that that sec-
tion "shall not be deemed hereafter to prohibit the payment 
to enlisted men employed at the Military Academy of the 
extra-duty pay heretofore allowed by law to enlisted men 
when employed at constant labor for not less than ten days 
continuously." 
The said section 35 was construed differently by Attorney-
General Bates and Attorney-General Devens. (See 10 Opin., 
472; 15 Opin., 362.) Its construction, however, is unimpor-
tant in connection with the present inquiry, as all legislation 
of a permanent character on the subject of extra-duty pay in 
the Army remaining in force was superseded by section 7 of 
the act of July 13, 1866, chapter 176, which provided as fol-
lows: 
"That when it is necessary to employ soldiers in the con-
struction of permanent military works, public roads, or other 
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constant labor of not less than ten days' duration in any case, 
they shall receive, in addition to their regular pay, the fol-
lowing additional compensation therefor: enlisted men work-
ing as artificers and non-commissioned officers employed as 
overseers of such work, not exceeding one overseer for every 
twenty men, thirty-five cents per day, and enlisted men em-
ployed as laborers, twenty cents per day; but such working 
parties shall only be authorized on the written order of a com-
manding officer. This allowance of extra pay is not to appiy 
to the troops of the Engineer and Ordnance Departments." 
Subsequently, by the act of February 1, 1873, chapter 88, 
the enlisted men of the Engineer Department were "placed on 
the same footing with respect to compensation for extra-duty 
service as the other enlisted men of the Army," and all laws 
in conflict therewith were repealed. 
The above-mentioned provisions of the act of July 13, 1866, 
as modified by the act of February 1, 1873, are em bodied (with 
some further modification, w.hich will be hereinafter noticed) 
in sections 1235 and 1287 of the Revised Statutes, of which 
sections the latter only need be considered here. 
Section 1287 reads : "When soldiers are detailed for em-
ployment as artificers or laborers in the construction of per-
manent military works, public roads, or other constant labor 
of not less than ten days' duration, they shall receive in 
addition to their regular pay the following compensation: 
Privates working as artificers, and non-commissioned officers 
employed as overseers of such work, not exceeding one over-
seer for twenty men, thirty-five cents per day, and privatelil 
employed as laborers, twenty cents per day. This allowance 
of extra pay shall not apply to the troops of the Ordnance 
Department." 
Where the word "privates" occurs in this section, the words 
''enlisted men" were used in the corresponding provision of 
the act of 1866. The former term, in our military service, 
applies only to those soldiers who are below the grade of 
non-commissioned officers, while the latter term comprehends 
all soldiers who enter the service by enlistment, ~<,nd conse· 
quently includes both non-commissioned officers and privates. 
The provision of the act of 1866 is therefore modified by sec-
tion 1287 to the extent thus indicated. 
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The act of June 20, 1878, to which reference has already 
been made, declares that "Signal Service men shall notre-
ceive extra-duty pay unless specially directed by the Secre-
tary of War." 
i' may here add that the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 217, 
provides that such extra-duty pay thereafter" shall be at the 
rate of :fifty cents per day for mechanics, artil-mns, school-
teachers, and clerks at Army, division, and department head-
quarters, and thirty-five cents per day for other clerks, team-
sters, laborers, and others." 
It appears that prior to the :fiscal year beginning July 1, 
1883, the claimants, along with other extra duty men in the 
Signal Service, were allowed extra-duty pay out of the funds 
provided by the Army appropriation acts for extra pay to 
"soldiers employed on extra duty." But by a clause in the 
act of August 7, 1882, chapter 433, the Secretary of War was 
directed to submit to Congress for that fiscal year separate 
and distinct estimates for the Signal Service, which esti-
mates were accordingly submitted; and Congress, in the act 
of March~, 1883, chapter 143, made a separate appropria-
tion for the Signal Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1884, and declared that "there shall not be expended from 
any moneys appropriated by the act entitled' An act making 
appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year 
ending J nne 30, 1884, and for other purposes,' approved 
March 3, 1883, any money for the support of the Signal Serv- -
ice Corps, except the pay of such commissioned officers as 
the Secretary of War may detail for service in that corps." 
A separate appropriation for the Signal Service was also 
made for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1885, with a similar 
prohibition against expending any moneys for that service 
out of the Army appropriations for the same fiscal year. (See 
act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332.) And, as Congress has 
made no provision for extra-duty pay to Signal Service men 
in either of the separate appropriations above mentioned, or 
in any ot.ber appropriation for the same fiscal years, it is very 
clE'ar that the claimants have no right to such pay for the 
period covered by their claims (from July 1, 1883, to Decem-
ber 20, 1884), unless the right thereto is elsewhere conferred 
by statutes, which is the point now to be examined. 
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As already intimated, the only legislation in force at that 
period which relates to extra duty pay (exclusive of appro-
priations) is contained in section 1287, Revised Statutes, and 
in the acts of June 20, 1878, and July 5, 1884, the provisions 
whereof on that subject are hereinbefore se't forth. It is un-
necessary, for present purposes, to consider any of this legis-
lation, excepting that which is found in section 1287. By 
that section it is declared that soldiers "shall receive, in ad-
dition to their regular pay," certain compensation when 
detailed for employment as there provided; and where a 
soldier is detailed for and performs extra-duty service in 
conformity thereto, the question whether he thereby acquires 
a legal right to such additional compensation, and the Gov-
ernment incurs a corresponding obligation to pay the same to 
him, in the absence of any appropriation therefor, might well 
arise. But in the view I take of the case under considera-
tion it does not present that question. 
Assuming that the provision of the act of July 20, ;1.878, 
which requires the special direction of the Secretary of War, 
has been complied with in respect to extra duty performed 
by claimants, their claims, in order to come under section 
1287, must be within its terms. The language thereby em-
ployed tn fixing the extra CQmpensation is "privates working 
as artificers, and non-commissioned officers employed as over-
seers of such work, not exceeding one overseer for twenty 
men, thirty-five cents per day, and privates· employed as 
laborers, twenty cents per day." Both of the claimants 
were non-commissioned officers, and neither of them was 
employed as an overseer. In view of these facts, the section 
must be deemed to be inapplicable to their claims. 
However meritorious these claims may be in themselves 
by reason of the nature of the service and the circumstances 
under which the same was rendered, yet it is essential to 
their legality that they be warranted by some statute. (See 
sec. 1765, Rev. Stat.) Therefore, as they are without statu-
tory authorization, in my opinion they are not legal claims 
against the Government. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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DISPATCH BOAT DOLPHIN. 
:Examination of the contract entered into between Mr. John Roach and 
the Secretary of the Navy for the construction of the dispatch boat 
Dolhpin, and consideration of the rights and duties of the United 
States arising thereunder. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 30, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 17th June instant re-
quests my opinion as to the rights and duties of the United 
States touching the dispatch boat Dolphin, recently con-
structed by Mr. John Roach under a written contract entered 
into between him and your predecessor, the Bon. William .E. 
Chandler. 
This ve&sel, you inform me, has been found to be defective 
in three particulars, two of which are fundamental, that is 
to say: (1) she does not develop the power and speed which 
the contract calls for; (2) she is not staunch and stiff enough 
for the service expected of her; and (3) the general character 
of her workmanship does not come up to the requirements of 
t he contract. . 
As to the defect in the article of speed: The act of Con-
gress under which the vessel was built (22 Stat., 477) makes 
an appropriation for the construction of ''one dispatch boat, 
as recommended by the Naval Advisory Board in its report 
of December twentieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two." 
Upon reference to tha.t report it will be found, as I am in-
formed by you, that the board recommended the construc-
tion of "one dispatch vessel or clipper, to have a sea speed 
of :fifteen knots," and I take it as very clear that the recom-
mendation became, by force of this reference to it, as much a 
part of the statute as though it had been recited therein 
word for word. 
The contract contains no express covenant as to the speed 
of the vessel-unless one is necessarily involved in the stipu-
lation for a "collective indicated horse-power" of two thou-
sand three hundred--but its very first covenant is to con-
struct a dispatch boat" in conformity with the aforesaid plans 
and specifications hereto annexed, and in accordance with the 
provisions of the a,cts of Congress approved August 5 and March 
3,1883, respectively, before mentioned, and relating thereto," 
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and I am of opinion that this covenant bound the contractor 
as effectively to make a ship "of the Eea-speed of fifteen 
knots" as though he had agreed to do so in express words. 
It may be said possibly that the covenant as to power and 
speed is not absolute, but qualified by the provision that, if 
upon the trial trip the engines should not develop the full 
power called for by the contract and the failure should not 
be due to "defective workmanship or materials," the ship 
should be accepted by the Government nevertheless. 
This attempt to bind the Government to take from the 
contractor's hands a ship of less power and speed than what 
the act of Congress peremptorily requires is, in my opinion,. 
utterly null and without effect. It was to the quality of speed 
more than any other that Congress w~s looking, a~ the terms 
"dispatch ve~ sel or clipper," used in the report of the Advis-
ory Board referred to in t.he law, plainly Rhow. Congress 
deemed that the service required a swift vessel of a sea-speed 
of 15 knots, and it directed such a vessel to be contracted 
for and built. 
The contractor cannot be · heard to allege ignorance of the 
very law under which the contract was made. He was bound 
to know the source and extent of the authority of the official 
with whom he contracted. "Individuals as well as courtst 
say the Supreme Court, "must take notice of the extent of 
authority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official 
capacity, and the rule applies in such a case that ignorance of 
the Jaw furnishes no excuse for any mistake or wrongful act." 
(Whiteside et al. v. The United States, 93 U.S., 257; Hawkins 
v. United States, 96 U.S., 691; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 
666.) 
With a full knowledge of the statute authorizing the con-
struction of a dispatch boat of a designated speed and no 
other, and with the plans and specifications under which the 
work was to be done laid before him that he might bid with 
intelligence and safety, the contractor, if he had misgivings 
whether a vessel planned like the Dolphin would make the 
required speed, should have abstained from sending in pro-
posals, knowing as he did, or ought to have done, that a ship 
defective in point of speed could not be accepted under the 
statute, whatever her merits might be in other respects. 
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Under any other view the most imperative requirements 
of Congress would be liable at all times to be evaded upon 
one pretext or another. I can not conceive how it could be 
seriously urged that the United States is bound under the 
law in question to accept from the contractor any other sort 
of vessel than the one ordered by Congress to be built, 
namely, a dispatch boat or clipper of a sea speed of 15 knots; 
and the Dolphin having been found not to be a vessel of that 
description, as I must assume, it wonld seem to follow that 
nothing short of an act of Congress could authorize her ac-
ceptance. 
I come now to consider the next objection : that the vessel 
is wanting in the necessary strength and stiffness. If this 
defect exists, as I must assume, it is fatal, whether due to 
the plans upon which the vessel was built or not, because, 
by the ninth clause of the contract, the contractor and his 
sureties stipulate "that the vessel constructed under tllis 
contract shall be sufficiently strong to carry the armament, 
equiprf!;ent, coal, stores, and machinery prescribed by the Naval 
Advisory Board, and indicated in the annexed drawings and 
specifications. * * * 
Now, it is too plain for serious discussion that the con- J 
tractor has, by this covenant, undertaken to make a ship for 
a specific purpose in accordance with given drawings andl 
specifications, and·has, to all intents and purposes, warranted 
that the ship so agreed to be built shall be H sufficiently 
strong" for that purpose. In a word, the contractor by this 
covenant makes the plans of the Advisory Board his own, 
and agrees to construct a vessel of sufficient strength accord-
ing to those plans. 
Manifestly, then, the Dolphin, which I am bound to assume, 
in view of the report accompanying your communication, is 
anything but ''sufficiently strong," can not for this reason 
alone be accepted by you under the contract, the defect men-
tioned being fundamental in character. 
The third objection, as to the general character of the 
workmanship of the vessel, I need not stop to consider, in 
view of your representation that, if the vessel is otherwise 
in accordance with the contract, this objection can be readily 
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dealt with by you, the oontractor being ready and willing to 
make the vessel satisfactory in this respect also. 
As to whether the Government has been in any wise es-
topped or compromitted by acts of acquiescence, approval, or 
acceptance by the Advisory Board or others, I am of opinion 
that the G~vernment stands unaffected by any such acts. 
This must be the case necessarily if the law authorizing the 
building of a dispatch boat is to have effect. Its language is 
that ''no such vessel shall be accepted unless completed in 
strict conformity with the contract, with the advice and assis-
tance of the Naval Advisory Board • * * ,"and conse-
quently no acceptance of a vessel not built "in strict conform-
ity u:ith the contract" could bind the Government. Neither 
the Secretary of the Navy nor any officer under him had any 
dispensing power over this statute, the words of which, 
appearing as they do in a context displaying great solicitude 
for the protection of the public interests, can not be taken 
in any other sense than as mandatory, without a plain disre-
gard of the legislative intention. 
The power to accept a ship built under this law cannot be 
exercised unless the fact be that the ship was constructed in 
strict conformity with the contract, and the mere enunciation 
from any official quarter that the ship was so constructed, 
when in truth it was not, lends no validity whatever to a 
pretended act of acceptance. It was not the intention of 
Congress that the United States should be foreclosed or con-
cluded in any such way, or that any departure from the con-
tract, except as expressly provided for, should be condoned 
by the act or judgment of any official, and that it should be 
open at all times to show that a vessel alleged to have been 
built and accepted under the law was not so built and ac-
cepted. It was competent for Congress to create an extraor-
dinary barrier of this kind against fraud and inefficiency, 
and it is the duty of those called upon to apply their language 
to do so in such a way as to make it effective. 
The case of the Floyd acceptances, already referred to, 
shows how difficult it is to bind the Government by the acts 
·of its officers in the matter of contracting for and disbursing 
its moneys, and before that case was decided an opinion by 
one of my predecessors was given sustaining the view that 
I' 
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was afterward adopted in that case (10 Opin., 288). After 
.all, this is but an application of the general doctrine, that 
the Government of the United States, in transactions of this 
character, is not ordinarily bound by an estoppel. (Fenemore 
'T· United States, 3 Dallas, 363; Johnson v. United States, 5 
1\Iason, C. C., 425; United States v. Oollier, 3 Blatch., C. C., 
-325; Cook v. United States, 12 lb. 43, 61; Herman on Estoppel, 
sec. 219; 10 Opin. 231; 12 ib., 43.) These references show 
the application of this doctrine in almost every conceiv-
able shape; and also that in dealings with the Government, 
upon contracts, there is always a safeguard until the final 
acceptance by the proper ·officer and a disbursement of the 
money. 
But, aside from this consideration, suppose it was a case 
:ts between individuals or private parties, I (lo not think that 
the party occupying the place of the Government would be 
·estopped by the action of the Advisory Board, or any inter-
mediate agent, by whatever name such agent might be known. 
In Glacius v. Black (50 N. Y., 145) the court of appeals of 
:i'TewYork considered this question very elaborately, after very 
exhaustive argument, analyzing and applying many cases 
that were cited in argument, and by a unanimous opinion 
Uburch, chief-justice, speaking for the court, ruled as fol-
lows: 
"Where by the terms of a contract for the :repair of a 
building it is stipulated that the material shall be of the best 
quality and the work performed in the best manner, subject 
to the acceptance or rejection of an architect, all to be done 
iu strict accordance with the plans and specifications, and to 
be paid for when done cqmpletely and accepted, the accept-
ance by the architect of a different class of work or of infe-
rior materials will not binq the owner, and does not relieve 
the contractor from the agreement to perform according to 
the plans and specifications. The provision for acceptance 
is an additional safeguard against defects not discernible by 
.an unskil1ful person." 
This case, it is conceived, goes the full length to relieve 
the Government in this instance as against anything in the 
nature of an estoppel; and ;n this opinion (50 N. Y.) the 
.court says: ''Fraud or mistake vitia.tes the certificate in tho-se 
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cases where a certificate is otherwise conclusive." So that, as 
upon a final inspection and trial of this vessel, it has been 
found that a certificate has been given, or an acceptance 
made, of work that did not comply with the requirements, 
and whether this was through fraud or mistake matters not, 
that action is not conclusive, and the Government is not 
bound thereby, as an individual would not be in a similar 
case. 
In Bird v. Smith (64 E. C. L. R., 7S5) the contract was fpr 
the sale and delivery to the plaintiff of a quantity of iron 
rails, of certain weights, shapes, and dimensions. and -to be 
inspected and certified as then agreed upon, and in quality 
equal to any rails made in Staffordshire. A plea that the 
rails were inspected, certified, and approved by an agent of 
the plaintiff, as provided in the contract, was held bad on de 
murrer, on the ground, among others, that each stipulation 
is in its terms distinct, and in its nature, as an absolute war-
ranty for quality, may well be required in addition to a pro-
vision for inspection aud approval, to guard against defects 
which inspection cannot discover. 
It is not deemed necessary to say more upon this feature 
of the case. 
All that has been said thus far is based upon the idea that 
there is a valid, subsisting contract; but it is proper at this 
point to say that the provisions of the contract binding the 
United States to accept the vessel on the approval of the 
Naval Advisory Board are in my opinion void and inopera-
tive, as shifting a high trust and duty from the Secretary of 
the Nav~ to the board, in violation of tlie act under which 
the contrac~ was made, which directs the Secretary of the 
Navy to invite proposals, which authorizes the Secretary of 
the Navy "to construct said vessels and procure their ar-
mament," which requires proposals for the work to be "sub-
ject to an such rules, regulations, superintendence, and pro-
visions as to bonds and security for the due completion of the 
work as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe," and which 
authorizes the SecrMary of the Navy to use for the purposes 
of the act the bJ,lance of an appropriation made for another 
object. In the face of these explicit provisions it seems to 
me impossible to reach any other conclusion than that Con-
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gress, after providing the Secretary of the Navy with abun-
dant facilities for forming an intelligent judgment, intended 
that the full and ultimate responsibility of carrying out the 
law should be on him. 
This, however, while proper 1:o be mentioned, is perhaps 
not of much practical consequence, in view of the contractor's 
express covenant, already referred to, to do the work in ac-
cor·dance with the law authorizing it. 
But beyond these questions there lies another of very great 
importance not referred to in your communication or the re-
port accompanying it, and that is, whether there was any 
val·id contract at all between Mr. Roach and the United 
States. 
As we have seen, the Secretary of the Navy had no power 
to contract for a dispatch boat that would not make 15 knots 
at sea, or to accept any boat not built " in strict conformity 
with the contract" he was authorized to enter into. 
But the ninth clause of the contract provides that, should 
the engines of the vessel contracted for fail to maintain suc-
cessfully on the trial trip for six consecutive hours a power of 
two thqusand three hundred horses, the v~ssel shall be ac-
cepted nevertheless, if it appear satisfactorily that the short-
·coming was not owing either to defective workmanship or 
materials. In other words, it was to make no difference how 
much the engines should be wanting in power, and conse-
quently how far short they should fall of propelling the ship 
at the speed required by the law-it being impossible to dis-
sociate power from speed-if there was no defect in the work-
manship or materials. The obvious 'intention of this was to 
relieve the contractor of all duty and responsibility as to the 
.speed and power of the ship, and make it possible to force 
upon the United States a ship wanting in the prime quality 
of speed and fundamentally different from what Congress 
authorized and was desirous to secure. It needs no further 
discussioh to show tllat what was thus attempted was 
wholly out of the question. 
But the contract, is an entirety and does not admit of being 
broken up into fragments, so as that what is good may be en-
forced and what is bad rejected. The stipulation which was 
intended to relieve the contractor of responsibility for the 
f 
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power of the engines, and as a necessary conRequence for the 
speed of the ship, forms a large and most important part of 
the consideration moving to him from the Government. It 
is impossible to say what was its bearing on the whole con-
tract, nor is it material to do so, inasmuch as it and the other 
covenants of the Government constitute one entire and indi-
visible consiueration, the invalidity or illegality of any ele-
ment of which must necessarily vitiate the whole and abro-
gate the contract. 
This is very well illustrated by the case of Ohater v. Becket 
(7 T. R.,. 201), which is often referred to in illustration of 
the principle on which I rely. In that case a parol, and 
therefore invalid promise to 'answer for the debt of an-
other, and a promise entirely valid and meritorious formed 
the consideration of the contract sued on, and in view of the· 
defendant's contention that the consideration was void in toto, 
it ~as insisted on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant 
should be held an"werable for so much of his contract as was 
valid; but it was said by the court in reply that the agree-
ment was entire, and that there could be no recovery on one 
part the other part being illegal. As was said by Chief-Justice· 
Gibson, "if any part of an indivisible promise or any part of an 
indivisible consideration for a promise is illegal, the whole is 
void." (Filson v. Himes, 5 Pa. St., 456.) In the latter case 
the consideration was, like that in the case before me, made 
up of several particulars, one of which was illegal, and the 
learned judge, referring to the illegal part, says " Who can 
say from this how far the office entered into the defendant's. 
computation of what he was to get for his $500." I would 
refer also to the cases of De Beerski v. Paiue (36 N. Y., 537); 
Pettit v. Pettit (32 Ala., 289); and Doty v. Knox County Bank 
(16 Ohio St., 134), as directly in point: 
It follows then that no contract exists between Mr. Roach 
and the United States, and that the large sums of money 
which have been paid Mr. Roach have passed into his hands 
without authority of law, and are held by him as so much 
money had and received to the use of the United States, and 
may be recovered from him. And not only so, but the 
money thus paid him by officials holding a fiduciary relation 
to the Government having gone into the ship Dolphin, a 
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court of equity will follow it there, and for that purpose en-
tertain a proceeding against the ship itself. In support of 
this position I need do no more than cite the .recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the 
Nat-ional Bank v. Insurance Co., (104 U. S., 55). 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, · 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
POST-OFFICE LEASES. 
Certain leases of post-offices, made by the Postmaster-General prior to 
the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342, for terms of twenty years, held 
not to be obligatory upon the Government. 
Where the tenancy of the Government is from year to year, it may be ter-
minated by giving such notice as is required by the law of the State 
in which the property is situated. 
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July l, 1885. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of 29th of 
June, inclosing leases of three post-offices, viz, at La Fayette, 
Ind., at Augusta, Me., and at Quincy, 111., and requesting an 
opinion upon the question "whether a lease of a post-office 
by the Postmaster-General on behalf of the United States 
executed prior to the act of the Forty-eighth Congress, ap-
proved March 3, 1885, specially authorizing leases of post-
office~ for a term not ·exceeding five yP,ars, is of any binding 
obligat.ion upon the Government; and whether, if of binding 
obligation only from year to year, it may be terminated upon 
notice by the Postmaster-General to the lessor, and .if so, 
upon what notice." 
The lease for post-office premises at La Fayette, Ind., was 
executed February 4, 1870, for a term of twenty years, com-
mencing May 1, 1870. 
The lease at Augusta, Me., was for a term of twenty years, 
commencing July 1, 1870, executed July 1, 1870. 
The lease at Quincy, Ill., was for a term of twenty years, 
commencing April!, 1873, executed May 2, 1873. 
These leases were executed on the part of the Government 
by the Postmaster-General. 
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At the time of the execution of these leases the following 
provision of the act of Congress, approved March 2, 1861 
(Rev. Stat., sec. 3732), was in force: "No contract or purchase 
on behalf of the United States shall be made unless the same 
is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate 
to its fulfillment, exeept in the War and Navy Departments, 
for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transpor-
tation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of 
the current year.'' 
And at the time of the execution of the lease for premises 
at Quincy, Ill., this further provision (see act of Congress, 
approved July 12,1872; sec. 3679, Rev. Stat.) was in force: 
"No Department of the Government shall expend in any one 
·fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Con-
gress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any 
contract for the future payment of money in excess of such 
appropriations." 
Independent of these inhibitory provisions, the authority 
of the Postmaster-General to make these leases must be de-
rived from an act of Congress. ( 'l'he Floyd Acceptances, 7 
Wall, 666; .United States v. Alexander, 110U. S., 325; Moffatt 
v. United States, 112 ib., 24.) 
There was no such express authorization at the time of 
their execution, and they are therefore valid only so far as 
they are under appropriations adequate to their fulfillment 
and not in excess of such appropriations. (McCollum v. 
United States, 17 C. Cls. R., 92.) 
The act of Congress approved March 3, 1868, appropriated 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1869, miscellaneous pay-
ments, including allowances to postmasters for rent, light, 
and fuel, etc., $37•3,000. (15 Stat., 55.) 
Tbe act of Congress approved March 3, 1869, making appro-
priations for 'miscellaneous payments for the year ending June 
30, 1870, made no reference to rent, etc. (15 Stat., 323.) 
The act of Congress approved July 11, 1870, for appropria-
tions for the year ending June 30, 1871, provided for pay-
ments for rent, etc. (16 Stat., 228.) 
The act of Congress approved June 1, 1872, for appropria-
tions for year ending June 30, 1873, provided for payments 
fo:r; rent. (17 Stat., 200.) 
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The act of Congress making appropriations for the year 
ending June 30, 187 4, made provision for payments for rent. 
(17 Stat., 556.) 
In none of these acts, nor in any acts, was authority given 
to the Postmaster-General to make leases for a term of years 
for premises to be occupied as post-offices until the act ap-
proved March 3, 1885, which authorized the Postmaster-Gen-
·eral to make leases for a term not exceeding five years. This 
.act also made appropriation for rent. 
In the absence of express authority,_ the leases under con-
sideration, as leases for terms of years, are invalid. 
But it would appedr from your communication that these 
several premises have been occupied by the Government for 
the purposes and under the tm·ms expressed in the leases, 
and, presumably, that the rents have been paid therefor 
under appropriations available for t.bat purpose, and that 
for the current year there is a proper appropriation. The 
Court of Claims, under a similar state of circumstances, 
decided that the effect of such a contract was ''to give the 
Postmaster-General each fiscal year thereafter, when a new 
appropriation should be made, the option to adopt and ratify 
the contract for another year. This he might do by express 
notice to that effect, or by entry and occupation of the prem-
ises after the commencement of the year. If he should occupy 
the premises after the beginning of the new year, be might 
be held to have renewed the obligation on the part of the 
defendants for that one year. In other words, a lease for a 
term of years founded on an annual appropriation is binding 
on the Government only until the end of that year, with a 
future option from year to year till the end of the lease. Such 
is the effect of the contract and statutes taken together, to 
which the contracting parties must be held to have agreed." 
{McCollum vs. U.S., ut supra.) 
It appears that there is for the ensuing year an appropria-
tion available for the payment of these rents. 
The statutes and decisions of the courts in each of the 
States where these leases were to take efl'ect determine the 
-character of the tenancies. 
In Indiana a holding over beyond the term creates a ten-
ancy from year to year. (Stat. Ind., 1881, sec. 5508.) .A ten-
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ant by holding over after expiration of lease for one year 
without any new contract or agreement becomes tenant for 
another year upon same terms. (Burbank v. Dyer, 54 Ind.t 
392.) 
In Illinois the tenant holding over may, at the election of 
the landlord, be treated as a trespasser or as a tenant for 
another year upon the same terms as in the original leaset 
and this tpough the tenant has no intention of holding over 
for a year or of paying the same rent. (Clinton Wire Olotk 
Go. v. Gardner, 99 Ill., 151.) 
In Maine the rule appears to be somewhat different. By 
statute (Maine Rev. Stat.~ 1883, sec. 10, p. 604), it is pro-
vided: "No estate in lands greater than tenancy at will can 
be created without writing signed by grantor, maker, or his. 
attorney." 
The statutory provisions as to the notice requisite to ter-
minate these tenancies are as follows : 
In Illinois sixty days' notice in writing within the last four 
months of the year terminates a tenancy from year to year. 
(Dig. Stat. Ill., sec. 5, p. 1492.) 
In Indiana a tenancy from year to year created by holding 
over is terminated by landlord by three months' notice before 
termination of the year. (Rev. Stat. Ind., 1881, sec. 5209.) 
In Maine thirty days' notice in writing by either party ter-
minates a tenancy at will. (Maine Rev. Stat., 1883, sec. 2, p. 
286.) But the expiration of the thirty days' notice to terminate 
the lease at will must be coincident in point of time with a 
pay day. ( Wilson v. Prescott, 62 Me., 115.) 
All questions of the · regulation of the tenure of real 
property within the limits of a State are to be determined by 
the laws of that State. The title and modes of disposition of 
real property within the State~ whether inter vivos or testa- . 
mentary, are not matters placed under the control of Federal 
authority." (United States v. Fox, 94 U. S., 315.) 
By the laws of Indiana and Illinois the tenancies of the 
United States of the post·office premises at La Fayette and 
Quincy are from year to year. By the laws of Maine the 
tenancy at Augusta is at will. 
At Quincy, sixty days' notice in writing within the last four 
months of the year will terminate the tenancy. 
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At La Fayette, by the Indiana statute, the landlord can 
determine the tenancy by giving notice three months before 
the termination of the year. The obligation to give this 
notice should be reciprocal by a holding-over tenant . 
.At Augusta, thirty days' notice in writing before a usual 
pay day by the tenant will terminate the lease. 
The original leases for a, term of years being· invalid, and 
no special agreement having been entered into between the 
lessors and the lessees relating to the tenancies for the en-
suing year, the notice to terminate the leases will be such 
as the law of the State in which the property leased is situated 
requires. 
Very truly, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
CONSULAR JURISDICTION. 
Where a citizen of the United States, trading in the island of Gnap, a 
barbarous or semi-civilized country, was charged with cruelly and in-
humanly punishing .a boy ou said island: A.dt1ised that the case is cog-
nizable by a consul cr commercial agent under the provisions of section 
4088, Revised Statutes, and that a special commercial agent might be 
sent to the island for the trial of the accused. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 6, 1885. 
SIR: The communication of Dr. Wharton (the examiner of 
claims in the Department of State), addres8ed to me, at your 
request, on the 3d instant, is received and has been carefnlly 
read. It contains a statement as to the conduct of C. P. Hol-
comb, a citizen of the United States, trading in the islanrl of 
Gnap, a barbarous or semi-civilized country, in arresting a boy 
for stealing some of his goods, and 'punising him arbitrarily 
by the most cruel . and inhuman tortures without any legal 
proceedings whatever; and I am asked. what remedy there is 
for this; or, in other words, how can Holcomb be reached for 
his illegal and unjust acts in this regard ~ 1 
Section 4088, Revised Statutes, gives jurisdiction to the 
· ~onsuls and commercial agents of the United States at islands 
220 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Consular Jurisdiction. 
or iu countries not inhabited by any civilized people, or rec-
ognized by any treaty with the United States, to hear and 
determine certain matters of civil rights and contentions, and 
then gives them jurisdiction over offenses or misdemeanors, 
as is conferred by sections 4086 and 4087. These two sections 
simply give consuls jurisdiction, civil and criminal, to be 
exercised in conformity with the laws of the United States, 
which are extended over all citizens of the United States in 
those countries (certain countries with which there are 
treaties), * * * and provided the way and manner of pro-
ceeding by these consuls; and in the two sections immediately 
following punishment for offenses is provided. The iRland of 
Gnap, from the statement before me, comes within the class 
of countries referred to in section 4088; and it would seem, 
under the several sections already named, considered to-
gether, that full power exists to arrest, try, and punish Hol-
comb. · 
The jurisdiction thus conferred is based upon the well-
received doctrine of international law, that consuls in 
barbarous or semi-barbarous states are to be regarded as 
investing with extraterritoriality the place where their flag 
is planted, and if justice is to be administered at all, so far 
as concerns civilized foreigners visiting such states, it must 
be by tribunals such as are named in section 4088, Revised 
Statutes. Civilized powers will not surrender the control of 
the business relations or of the persons of their subjects to the 
sovereigns of uncivilized or semi-civilized states (Lawrence's 
Wheaton, 215, et seq.; The lVilliarn Harris, 1 Ware's Reports, 
367; 7 Opin., 342; 8 ib., 380); and such doctrine is clearly in-
ferable in Oonsequa v. Fanning, ~Johns. Chancery, Rep. 587; 
Daineses v. Hale, 91 U. S., 13; and JJ[ahoney v. United States, 
10 Wallace, 62. 
This being the case, there is no reason why a special com-
mercial agent may not be sent to the island of Gnap, for the 
trial of Holcomb, and I see no other remedy, under the law, 
than this, which I think will be quite adequate. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
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NEW ORLEANS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY. 
Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated: AdviBed that the 
suspension of the issue of land patents to the New Orleans and Pacific 
Railway Company, heretofore made, be continued until the proper 
tribunals, courts or Congress, definitely settle the rights of the parties 
in the premises. 
. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 6, 1885. 
SIR: I am in receipt of a statement of facts submitted to 
you by E. B. Wheelock, esq., president of the New Orleans 
and Pacific Rail way Company (which you have designated as 
a memorial), touching the claim of such company to certain 
lands therein referred to. There is no prayer or request in 
this statement for any definite action by you; indeed, no 
action is asked for, except that serious consideration be given 
to the matters therein contained; but I presume the ultimate 
object of the statement ''(memorial)" was to have recalled 
your order of the 1Oth of March last, suspending the issuing 
of patents for such lands. 
This statement, or memorial, is referred by you to me for 
my opinion. The matter as now presented I do not consider 
raises the question of strict right of the company to these 
lands, for I have nothing before me to enlighten me upon that 
subject, except this statement and some briefs and documents 
submitted by Mr. Wheelock and his counsel. I take it, that 
instead of a legal question upon the force and effect of the 
grant, as well as upon the claim set up by the railway com-
pany as having complied with the terms of the grant, and 
therefore being entitled to all of these lands-that, instead 
of this, a mere question of administrative practice, or of ad· 
ministrative policy, is submitted to me, and that more for an 
advisory opinion than for a judicial one, properly speaking. 
It seems that this matter has been before Congress, and 
there have been various reports by .majorities of committees 
and by minorities of committees upon the legal questions and 
the rights arising upon this grant, and it seems that the sub-
ject is one which is in great doubt in the Congressional mind. 
From the papers before me it would appear that the question 
is susceptible of much debate, and in view of this fact :t 
I 
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might not be proper for me to give an opinion affecting the 
rights of the parties interested before some final and definite 
action is taken by Congress or by the courts, as the case may 
be. I therefore refrain from expressing any view in the 
premises, except that in reference to the duties of your De-
partment, as a branch of the executive power of the Govern-
ment. 
Courts, upon questions properly before them, and Congress, 
in the exercise of its legitimate power, may do certain things, 
for reasons which would not or could not influence the exec-
utive branch of the Government, and reasons might prompt 
the executive branch of the Government to a certain course, 
which might not operate, on the other hand, upon Congress 
or the courts. But in disposing of the public domain of the 
Government, and especially under a grant, or a ~upposed 
grant, by Congress, in case of doubt the Department should 
not part with the fee of the Government, but should with-
hold its action until the proper tribunal, whether courts or 
Congress, has disposed of the matter. (3 Opin., 102; 13 ib., 
430.) 
So great is the doubt in this case that your Department, 
on the lOth of March last, arrested the proceedings under 
which patents were being issued and suspended all further 
action in that direction. No new light or information has 
been had upon this subject, so far as I am advised, since that 
time. The same doubt that existed then still exists, as I am 
assured by the very fact, if by nothing else, that, p~nding the 
suspension of proceedings, you ask my ad vice upon this prop-
osition. That advice is, as I have already indicated, that you 
continue that suspension and do not isssue any more patents 
until the proper tribunals, courts or Congress, shall definitely 
settle the rights of parties in the premises. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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CLAIMS OF ELY MOORE AND OTHERS. 
Where an account has once been duly adjusted, settled, and closed by 
the proper officers, upon a full knowledge of all the facts, anct no errors 
of calculation have been made, it cannot be re-opened in the absence 
of statutory authority. 
1.'he prov~sions of the act of August 7,1882, entitled "An act to author-
ize the auditing of certain unpaid claims against the Indian Bureau 
by the accoun~ing officers of the Treasury," do not extend to the 
opening of settled account.s. 
Upon the facts stated: Advised that no action whatever should be 
taken by the Executive Departments on the claim of Ely Moore and 
others for additional compensatiou for selling certain Indian trust 
lands, without legislation by Congress providing therefor. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 7, 1885. 
SIR: In a letter received from the Ron. H. L. Muldrow, 
Acting Secretary of the Interior, dated the 20th ultimo, rela-
tive to the matter of the claims of Ely Moore and others, as 
special registers and receivers, for additional compensation 
lor selling certain Indian trust lands, my opinion is asked 
upon the following questions: "Whether these claims ought 
to be allowed by the Indian Office and passed to the account-
ing officers of the Treasury under the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States on March 3, 1884, together with 
interest on the amounts in dispute; whether they should be 
referred to the Court of Claims for decision; or whether any 
action whatever should be taken by the Executive Depart-
ments on these claims without further legislation by CoMgress 
providing therefor." 
The Acting Secretary's letter was accompanied by a com-
munication from the Commissioner of Indian .A:fl'airs (at 
whoso request the above questions were submitted to me), 
dated the 19th ultimo, giving the history and facts of the 
~ases as they are understood by his office, and also a num-
ber of other papers relating to the claims, all of which are 
returned herewith. 
From these papers I gather the following facts in regard 
to the origin of the claims, the action hitherto had thereon, 
and their present condition. 
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By the treaty with the Delaware Indians of May 6, 1854t 
and also by the treaty with the Kaskaskia and Peoria, Pian-
keshaw and Wea Indians of May 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1048t 
1082), certain lands were ceded to the United States in trust, 
to survey, manage, and sell the same for the benefit of the 
Indians. The sale of these trust lands was to be conducted 
in the same manner as the sale of public lands, and the pro-
ceeds were to be paid to or invested for the Indians, after 
deducting therefrom the " cost of surveying, managing, and 
selling the same." 
It appears that in October, 1856, Ely Moore was appointed 
by the Secretary of the Interior a special register and super-
intendent, and William Brindle a special receiver and super-
intendent, to assist in the sale of the eastern portion of the 
trust lands of the Delaware Indians under their said treaty; 
and that in May, 1857, the Secretary of the Interior appointed 
John W. Whitefield a special register and superintendent, and 
Daniel Woodson a special receiver and superintendent, to 
assist in the disposal of the western portion of the same trust 
lands under the same treaty. In May, 1857, the said Moore 
was also appointed by the Secretary of the Interior a special 
register and the said Brindle a special receiver and superin-
tendent, to assist in the sale of the trust lands of the Kaskas-
kia and Peoria, Piankeshaw and Wea Indians under their 
treaty aforesaid. 
Each of these special registers, at the time of his appoint-
ment, already held the office of register, and each of the 
special receivers, the office of receiver, in different land dis-
tricts. 
Whit,field, Woodson, and Brindle having claimed compen-
sation for their services (the first as special register and the 
others as special receivers) in selling the trust lands aforesaid, 
the question arose, whether they were entitled to compensa-
tion for selling those lands in addition to the compensation 
received by them for the sale of public lands. This question. 
along with the accounts of 'VLHfield and Woodson, was sub-
mitted by the Commjssioner of Indian Affairs to the Secre-
tary of the Interior for his determination, and in a letter to 
the Commissioner dated May 8, 18G1, the Secretary (citing 
Converse v. United States, 21 How., 464) decided that they 
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were entitled to additional compensation for the services 
mentioned; that, as no specific compensation was provided 
in the treaty, they were entitled to a reasonable one; and that 
the rate of compensation adopted by the Government for 
similar services furnished a fair rule to determine the amount 
which should be paid. He concluded by saying: 
"I think the claimants should be allowed 1 per cent. 
commission upon the sales of the lands of each tribe, the 
maximum in any one year not to exceed $2,500, being the 
amount allowed by the United States. Their accounts will 
be adjusted accordingly, and the amount found to be due 
will be paid out of the respective Indian funds in proportion 
to the amount of the sales of each." 
Subsequently the Commissioner of Indian .Affairs submit-
ted to the Secretary of the Interior the account of Ely 
Moore, then deceased, for compensation for his services as 
special regi~ter in selling the said trust lands. In a letter to 
the Commissioner dated June 6, 1862, the Secretary referred 
to his decision of May 8, 1861, in the cases of Whitfield and 
Woodson, and remarked that" if the account of Mr. Moore, 
now presented, involv('s the same principles as were settled 
by that decision, I see no objection to its allowance, and it 
is herewith returned to be paid accordingly." 
The accounts of Moore, Whitfield, Woodson, and Brindle 
were adjusted and settled by the proper officers in con-
formity to the decision of the Secretary of the Interior 
above mentioned. In adjusting those of Moore, Whitfield, 
and Woodson, balances were found in favor of each of these 
persons, which were paid. In adjusting Brindle's account a 
balance was found to be due from him to the United States. 
In each account, it seems, a commission was claimed of 1 per 
centum upon the entire proceeds .of the sale, and in the ad~ 
justment thereof the same commission was allowed, but not 
to exceed the sum of $2,500 in any one year, the excess being 
disallowed. 
I understand that it is the excess thus disallowed, with in-
terest thereon, which constitutes the subject-matter of the 
claims of Ely Moore and others, referred to in the questions 
proposed. And as the allowance of these claims would in-
volve the reopening of accounts long since settled and closed, 
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the ~nswer to those questions must necessarily depend upon 
whether sufficient ground exists to warrant such action. 
The only ground relied upon is the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the case of United States v. Brindle (110 U. S. Rep., 
688), the defendant in that case being one of the special 
receivers above named. 
In May, 1877, suit was brought by the United States 
against Brindle in the United States district court for the 
eastern district of Pennsylvania, to recover certain balances 
(amounting in the aggregate to $9,251.68) claimed to be due 
from him as receiver of public moneys. Whilst this suit was 
pending in that court, Congress passed an act (dated June 
10, 1878, chapter 179) providing that "in the trial of said 
cause the said court shall hear and determine all disputes 
and differences between the United States and the said 
· William Brindle in reference to his various accounts as re-
ceiver and acting disbursing agent of public money in the 
Pawnee land district in Kansas, and also . in relation to his 
accounts as special receiver of Indian trust moneys received 
and expended under the Indian treaties of May 6 and May 
30, 1854, as well under said Indian treaties as under the laws 
of the United States; and the said William Brindle, in the 
trial of said cause, shall be permitted and be entitied to make 
.defense and· claim setoff in his favor in said court, if said 
·court shall determine him to be entitled thereto, with the 
same effect as if said suit were commenced by an individual 
against the said William Brindle, and said set-off shall not 
be barred by any statute of limitations. And should the 
said court, in the said trial, determine that there is a balance 
due to the said William Brindle upon said accounts, the court 
shall certify the amount so found to be due to him to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury of the United States, for payment, out 
()f any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, 
reserving, nevertehless, the right of appeal to either party 
from the judgment of the said court." 
The defendant, among other defenses, pleaded set-off, under 
which plea he claimed that a large sum was due to him from 
the United States as receiver of public moneys, and also that 
a further sum was due to him as special receiver of Indian 
trust moneys as aforesaid. At .the trial the jury found a 
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special verdict, upon which the court entered judgment pro 
forma in favor of the defendant. The cause was then brought 
by writ of error before the United States circuit court for the 
district aforesaid, which affirmed the said judgment; where-
upon it was carried by writ of error before the Supreme 
Court. 
The judgment of the court below was for the largest sum 
awarded by the jury in their alternative findings, and em-
braced an allowance of" military land-warrant fees exceeding 
$2,500 per year, including commissions on cash sales of pub-
lic lands," and also an allowaQce of ''commissions on sales of 
Indian trust lands exceeding the sum of $2,500, for each sale 
·of said lands." 
The Supreme Court held tha,t the defendant, as receiver of 
public moneys, was not entitled to the military bounty land 
fees received by him during his term of office, over and above 
the amount required, with his commissions on cash sales of 
public lands, to make up his annual salary of $2,500 per 
year; but that he was entitled to commissions on sales of 
Indian trust lands in addition to his compensation as such 
receiver of public moneys, that by express provisions in the 
treaties the expenses incurred by the United States in mak-
ing the sales were to be paid from the proceeds, which clearly 
· implied the payment of a reasonable compensation for the 
services of those employed to carry the trust into effect. 
Among other facts found in the special verdict was the fol-
lowing : "That for the labor and risk of making sales of 
Indian trust lands 1 per cent. commissions on the amount 
of such sales is a fair compensation." Adopting this as the 
sole basis for computing defendant's compensation, the jury 
(in an alternative finding different from the one on which the 
judgment below was rendered) found a certain balance due 
him for that service. 
The judgment of the court below was reversed, and the 
cause remanded with directions to enter another judgment in 
favor of the defendant for the balance so found. 
In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case 
of United States v. Brindle relates to the matter of compen-
sation for making sales of Indian trust lands, thePe is no con-
llict whatever between it and the decision of the Secretary 
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of the Interior hereinbefore mentioned on any question of 
law. On a question of fact which was directly involved, 
namely, what is a fair compensation for such service, there 
is a di:ffe!'ence between the determination of the Secretary 
and the finding of the jury. Yet, as it was not for the court 
to find the facts (nor did it assume to do so), but only to de-
clare the law on the facts found by the jury, so its decision, 
being of necessity confined to the facts thus found, cannot 
properly be regarded as in itself conflicting with the deter-
mination of the Secretary just referred to. Therefore, if any 
ground exists in that case for re·opening the accounts of 
claimants, it is to be found in the special verdict of the jury, 
not in the decision of the court. 
It h~s been held that when an account has once been duly 
adjusted, settled, and closed by the proper officers, upon a 
:flull knowledge of all the facts, and no errors of calculation 
have been made, such account can not be reopened in the ab· 
sence of statutory authority (12 Opin., 386; see also 3 Opin., 
148, 461), and administrative practice has accorded with that 
view. On this subject Attorney-General Grundy observed: 
"It is undoubtedly a good general principle of law, as well as 
of expediency, not to say absolute necessity, that the account-
ing officers, as well as all other responsible executive officers, 
shoultl, as far as possible, refrain from disturbing, unsettling, · 
or reversing any of the official determinations of their prede-
cessors; and if in the observance and preservation of this 
wholesome general rule, injustice shall be done to any person, 
it will be far better for the aggrieved individual to seek re-
dress at the hands of Congress, than to place the whole past 
transactions of the accounting ·officers in an unsettled condi-
tion. By which means, not only would great, and perhaps 
inextricable, confusion be introduced into the transactions of 
these officers, but in the resettlement of accounts might 
great injustice be done in many cases, to individuals as wen 
as to the Government." (3 Opin., 462.) Indeed there is no 
rule more firmly and thoroughly settled in the administration 
of the Government than this. (Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock., 
473; United State8 v. Bank, etc., 15 Peters, 401; 9 Opin., 412; 
Swift Company v. United States, 105 U. S. 694, 6H5.) 
From these considerations, it must follow that the mere 
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circum~tance that the finding of the jury difl'ers from the 
previous determination of the Secretary of the Interior, upon 
the question of what was a fair compensation for the service 
of selling the Indian trust lands, is not sufficient ground to 
authorize the reopening of an account settled in accordance 
with such determination, with a view to a readjustment of it 
in accordance with such finding; and no other ground is 
presented by the special verdict. 
In this connection, I remark that there is no statute from 
which such authority can be derived. The provisions of the 
act of August 7, 1882, entitled "an act to authorize the au-
diting of certain unpaid claims against the Indian Bureau 
by the accounting officers of the '.rreasury ," do not extend to 
the opening of settled accounts. 
The result at which I arrive is that no valid ground exists 
for reopening the accounts of the claimants; in view of which 
I am of the opinion that no action whatever should be taken 
on their claims by the Executive Departments without legis-
lation by Congress providing therefor. Agreeably to this 
opinion, the first and second of the questions submitted must 
be answered in the negative. 
And I beg leave to say, that although there are additional 
papers before me touching this case, since I considered it on 
5th May last, yet they do not in the least change the legal 
.aspect of the matter, but they do rivet the conclusion I then 
reached, somewhat doubtingly, on the imperfect record 
presented. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CASE OF LIEUT. S. C. ROBERTSON. 
This case reconsidered in the light of new and material facts; and it 
appearing that there has been no such settlement of his account as 
was heretofore supposed: Held, that Lieutenant R. is bound to refund 
the sum which has been paid him without authority of law. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 7, 1885. 
SIR: I have reconsidered the case of Lieut. S.C. Robertson 
in the light of the new facts appearing in the letter to you 
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from the Second Comptroller of the 27th April, ultimo, and 
by your reference now before me. 
My opinion of the 22d April, ultimo, proceeded on what 
turns out to have been a mistaken inference from the· 
Second Comptroller's letter of the lOth .April, ultimo, then 
before me, by your reference, that there had been a settle-
ment between Lieutenant Robertson and the accounting 
officers of the Government, touching the alleged unauthorized 
payment to him of waiting-orders pay for a period when he 
was only entitled to leave-of-absence pay. It appearing that 
there has been no such settlement, the whole matter is at 
large, and Lieutenant Robertson is bound to refund the sum 
of $281.25, which has been paid him without authority of 
law. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE TREASURY. 
SHEYENNE ISLAND, MISSOURI RIVER. 
I 
At the date of the Sioux treaty of April 29, 1868, Sheyenne ll'lland was. 
within the reservation thereby established, the east line of which was 
the east bank of the Missouri River at low-water mark. The island 
having since gradually become attached to the mainland on the east 
bank of the river, so that it is wholly surrounded by water only in 
seasons when the water is high, t.he low-water mark is now on the 
west side of the island instead of the east side as formerly: Held that 
the island is still a part of the reservation, notwithstanding the aban-
donment of its former channel on the east side of the same; whether 
the island now belongs to the reservation being determinable by the line 
of low-water mark on the east bank of the Missouri, not according to 
the present course of that river, but according to its course at the date 
of the treaty. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 14, 1885. 
SIR: I have considered the question proposed by the Hon. 
H. L. Muldrow, Acting Secretary of the Interior, in a letter-
to me dated the 27th ultimo, which bas arisen upon the fol-
lowing case stated by the Commissioner of ~ndian Affairs in 
a communication dated tbe 25th ultimo: 
''It appears that at the date of the Sioux treaty of April29, 
TO THE SECRETARY ~F THE INTERIOR. 231 
Sheyenne Island, Missouri River. 
1868 (15 Stat. 635), a certain island in the Missouri River, 
situate about 3 miles south of the mouth of Sheyenne River, 
and known as Sheyenne Island, was within the boundary 
lines of the reservation thereby set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians, parties to 
said treaty, and for such other Indians as they might be 
willing to admit amongst them. The east bank of the Mis-
souri River at low-water mark, from the forty-sixth parallel 
of north latitude to~ point opposite where the north line of 
Nebraska strikes the river, was, by the terms of the treaty, 
to constitute the east line of the reservation. At the date of 
the treaty, Sheyenne Island was, at all stages of the river, 
entirely surrounded by water, the low-water mark of the 
river being east of the island, and until quite recently it has 
never been disputed that the island belonged to the reserva-
tion. But it appears that the island has gradually become 
attached to the mainland on the east bank of the river, so 
that it is wholly surrounded by water only in seasons when the 
river is high. The low-water mark is now found to be on the 
west side of the island instead of the east side, as formerly." 
The question proposed is, "whether the island is still a 
part of the reservation or whether it has become a part of 
the public domain." · · 
In reply thereto I now have the honor to submit, that, as 
the island formed a part of the reservation at the time the 
boundaries of the latter were established, it must still be 
deemed to be a part thereof, notwithstanding the· fact that 
subsequently the river has so far abandoned the channel on 
the east side of the island that its waters flow there " only 
in seasons when the river is high." In other words, whether 
the island now belongs to the reservation is determinable by 
the line of low-water mark on the east bank of the Missouri, 
not according to the present course of that river, but accord-
ing to its course at the date of the treaty. The principle ap-
plicable here is the same that applies where a river, which 
has been made the boundary between two nations, afterwards 
abandons its bed and forms a new one in a different direc-
tion ; in such case the old bed continues to serve as the 
boundary . . (Bluntschli, Droit International, sec. ~99; Heft: 
ter, sec. 66.) This principle was adopted and applied by the 
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Suvreme Court in the case of Missouri v. Kentucky(ll Wall., 
395, 401), in deciding as to which of those States Wolf lsland 
belonged. 
If, instead of being included in the reservation, the island 
had been embraced by a grant to an individual, the bounda· 
ries whereof extended to low-water mark on the east bank 
of the Missouri, it would hardly be contended that his own-
ership of the island became extinguished, and that it became 
reunited to the public domain on the s bsequent abandon-
ment by the river of the channel between the island and said 
. bank. Such a proposition is countenanced by no rule of law. 
Obviously the hypothetical case of the grant, as above, does 
not differ essentially from the actual case of the reservation. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the island in question is still a 
part ofthe Sioux Reservation. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SPECIAL AGENTS-INDEPENDENT TREASURY. 
The appropriation for "contingent expenses, independent treasury," is 
not applicable to the payment of expenses of special agents of the 
Treasury employed to investigate the affairs of sub-treasurers. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 14, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the lOth instant, with a state-
ment~ has been received, and the matter has been duly con-
sidered. The question that you desire my opinion upon arises 
upon the following state of facts: 
The Secretary of the Treasury found it necessary, in May 
and June, 1885, to send a party of experts to New Orleans to 
make an examination or investigation of the affairs of the 
sub treasury in that city. The. examination was made nec-
essary on account of the absconding of the redemption clerk 
of that office, and the default of a considerable amount. On 
their way back from New Orleans the experts stopped at St. 
Louis, Chicago, and Cincinnati and examined the sub-treas-
uries in those cities. 
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The expenses incurred in making these examinations 
amounted to several hundred dollars more than the balance 
remaining to the credit of the appropriation, "Salaries of 
special agents, independent treasury, 188.5," from which such 
expenses are properly and usually paid. The only other 
available appropriation at all applicable, it would seem, is 
"Contingent expenses, independent treasury, 1885." 
Question: Can the expenses be paid from the latter-named 
appropriation~ The First Comptrol~er holds that they can-
not. 
The first appropriation is: "Salaries of special agents, inde-
pendent treasury. Compensation of special agents to exam-
ine the books, accounts, and money on hand at the several 
sub-treasuries anu depositaries, including national banks 
acting as depositaries, under the act of August 6, 1846." 
The second appropriation is: "Contingent Expenses Inde-
pendent Treasury. Contingent expenses under the act of 
August 6, 1846, for the collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and 
disbursement of the public money, and for transportation 
of notes, bonds, and other securities of the United States." 
The expenses incurred about which inquiry is made were 
for examining books, accountA, etc., of "several sub-treas-
uries;" and not for "collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and 
disbursement of the public money," nor for transportation of 
national securities. 
The " salary" appropri.ation is for the examination of sub-
treasuries, and the sum appropriated is all that Congress 
.saw fit to give for that specific purpose, and this expression 
of their will excludes the inclusion of all other expenses. 
It is not seen how the contingent appl'opriation is at all 
applicable or available. 
The conclusion is that if services have been rendered under 
the salary appropriation beyond the amount appropriated 
for, unintent.ionally, it is a deficiency for which Congress 
may be asked to appropriate, and I do not see how other-
wise, under the law, its payment can be provided for. 
Very respectfully, 
.A.. H. G ARL.A.ND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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AMERICAN SHIPPING. 
Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not 
within the provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, forbid-
ding the collection of fees by consular officers from American ves-
sels. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 20, 1885. 
SIR : In answer to your letter of July 16, 1885, asking my 
attention to letters from the Department of State dated De-
cember 30, 1884, February 2 and 28, 1885, relative to the 
question of the collection of consular fees from foreign-built 
vessels owned by citizens of the United States, I beg leave 
to refer to the opinion of my predecessor, dated February 5, 
1885. 
Vessels not built in the United States owned by citizens 
of the United States are recognized by the statutes of the 
United States as a class of sea going vessels. They are the 
property of American citizens, entitled to bear the flag and 
receive the protection of the Government. (6 Opin., 638; 16 
ib., 533; Consular Reg. (1881), sec. 344.) But with the excep-
tions made in the statute they are not "vessels of the United 
States." (Rev. Stat., sees. 4132-4133.) Are they "American 
vessels" within the meaning of the twelfth section of the act1 
chapter 121, approved June 26, 1884 ¥ 
A careful examination of the statutes convinces me that 
the expressions" vessel or ship of the United States,"" Ameri-
can vessel of the United States," and "American vessels" are 
used synonymously and apply only to regularly documented 
vessels. And in the Revised Consula.r Regulations (1881), 
section 200, for the purpose of those regulations the terms 
"American vessel" and "vessel of the United States" are 
declared synonymous. In both statutes and regulations are 
many provisions relative to foreign-built ships owned by 
American citizens and the designation is in that distinctive 
language. In the statute, the twelfth section of which is 
under consideration, both terms," vessel of the United States" 
and ''American vessel" are used, and in view of the previous 
statutes and regulations must be considered, I think, as used 
interchangeably. 
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I conclude, therefore, that foreign- built vessels owned by 
citizens of the United States are not embraced in the provis-
ions of the act of 1884, forbidding the collection of fees by 
consular officers from American vessels. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
LEASE OF INDIAN LANDS FOR GRAZING PURPOSES. 
There is no law empowering the Interior Department to authorize In-
dians to lease their lands for grazing purposes. 
Neither the President nor the Secretary of the Iut,erior has authority to 
make a lease, for such purposes, of any part of an Indian reservation ; 
nor would their approval of any such lease made by Indians render it 
lawful and valid. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 21, 1885. 
SIR: By your letter of the 8th instant, inclosing a commu-
nication fr~m the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 7th, 
the following questions are at his suggestion submitted to me 
with request for an opinion thereon: 
"Whether there is any law empowering the Interior De-
partment to authorize Indians to enter into contract with 
any parties for the lease of Indian lands for grazing purposes; 
and also whet,her the President or the Interior Department 
has any authority to mal\e a lease for grazing purposes of 
any part of any Indian reservation, or whether the approval 
by the President or the Secretary of the Interior would ren-
der any such lease made by Indians with other parties law-
ful and valid." 
These questions are propounded with reference to certain 
Indian reservations, namely : 
(1) The Cherokee lands in the Indian Territory west of the 
ninety-sixth degree of longitude, except such parts thereof 
as have heretofore been appropriated for and conveyed to 
friendly tribes of Indians. 
(2) The Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation in the Indian 
Territory. 
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(3) The Kiowa and Comanche reservation in the Indian 
Territory. 
Our Government has ever claimed the right, and from a 
very early period its settled policy has been, to regulate and 
control the alienation or other disposition by Indians, and 
especially by Indiau nations or tribes, of their lands. This 
policy was originally adopted in view of their peculiar char-
acter and habits, which rendered them incapable of sustain-
ing any other relation with the whites than that of depend-
ence and pupilage. There was no other way of dealing with 
them than that of keeping them separate, subordinate, and 
dependent, with a guanlian care thrown around them for 
their protection. · (3Kent Com., 381; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 
U.S., 517, where most of the cases on this subject are cited 
and discussed.) 
Thus in 1783 the Congress of the Confederation, by a proc-
lamation, prohib~ted '' all persons from making settlements 
on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, without the limits 
or jurisdiction of any particular State, and from purchasing 
or receiving any gift or cession of such lands or claims with-
out the express authority and directions of the United States 
in Congress assembled," and declared "that every such pur-
chase or settlement, gift, or cession, not having the authority 
aforesaid, is null and void, and that no right or title will ac-
crue in consequence of any such purchase, gift, cession, or 
settlement." By section 4 of the act of July 22, 1790, chap-
ter 33, the Congress of the United States enacted "that no 
sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of 
Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any per-
son or persons, or to any State, whether having the right of 
pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be 
made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under 
the authority of the United States." A similar provision was 
again enacted in section 8 of the act of March 1, 1793, chap-
ter 19, which by its tc:Lms included "any purchase or grant 
of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indians, or 
nation or tribe of Indians within the bounds of the United 
States." The pro·dsion was farther extended by section 12 
of the act of May 19, 1796, chapter 30, so as to embrace any 
"purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of 
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any title or claim thereto." As thus extended, it was re-
enacted by the act of March 3, 1799, chapter 46, section 12, 
and also by the act of March 30~ :1802, chapter 30, section 12. 
In the above legislation, the provision in terms appliC3d to 
purchases, grants, leases, etc., from individual Indians as well 
as from Indian tribes or nations; but by the twelfth section 
of the act of June 30, 1834, chapter 161, it was limited to such 
as emanate ''from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians." 
And the provision of the. act of 1834, just referred to, has 
been reproduced in section 2116, l~evised Statutes, w_hich is 
now in force. 
The last· named section declares : "No purchase, grant, 
lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim 
thereto, from any Inqian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be 
of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by 
treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitu-
tion." 
This statutory provision is very general and comprehen-
sive. Its operation does not depend upon the nature or 
extent of the title to the land which the tribe or nation may 
hold. Whether such title be a fee simple, or a right of oc-
cupancy merely, is not material ; in either case the statute 
applies. It is not therefore deemed necessary or important, 
in connection with the subject under consideration, to inquire 
into the particular right or title to the above-mentioned 
reservations held by the Indian tribes or nations respectively 
which claim them. Whatever the right or title may be, each 
of these tribes or nations is precluded~ by the force and 
effect of the statute, from either alienating or leasing any 
part of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim in 
or to the same, without the consent of the Government of the 
United States. A lease of the land for grazing purposes is 
as clearly within the statute as a lease for any other or for 
general purposes, and the duration of the term is immaterial. 
One who enters with cattle or other live stock upon an Indian 
reservation under a lease of that description, made in viola-
tion of the statute, is an intn1der, and may be removed there-
from as such, notwithstanding his entry is with consent of 
the tribe. Such consent may t~xempt him from the penalty 
imposed by section 2117, Revised Statutes, for taking his stock 
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there, but it can not. validate the lease, or confer upon him 
any legal right whatsoever to remain upon the land; and 
to this extent and no further was the decision of Judge 
Brewer in United States v. Hunter, 21 Fed. Rep., 615. 
But the present inquiry in substance is, (1) whether the De-
partment of the Inter~or can authorize these Indians to make 
leases of their lands for grazing purposes, or whether the ap-
proval of such leases by the President or the Secretary of the 
Interior would make them lawful and valid; (2) whether the 
President or the Department of the Interior has auth<?rity to 
lease for such purposes any part of an Indian reservation. 
I submit that the power of the Department to authorize 
such leases to be made, or that of the President or Secretary 
to approve or to make the same, if it exists at all, must rest 
upon some law, and therefore be derived from either a treaty 
or a statutory provision. I am not aware of any treaty pro-
vision applicable to the particular reservations in question 
that confers such powers. The Revised Statutes contain 
provisions regulating contracts or agreements with Indians 
and prescribing how they shall be executed and approved 
(see sec. 2103) ; bu.t those provisions do not include contracts 
of the character described in section 2116, hereinbefore men-
tioned. No general power appears to be conferred by statute 
upon either the President or Secretary, or any other officer 
of the Government, to make, authorize, or approve leases of 
lands held by Indian tribes; and the absence of such power 
was doubtless one of the main considerations which led to 
tbe adoption of the act of February 19, 1875, chapter 90," to 
authorize the Seneca Nation of New York Indians to lease 
lands within the Cattaraugus and Allegany Reservations 
and to confirm existing leases." The act just cited is more-
over significant as showing that in the view of Congress 
Indian tribes cannot lease their reservations without the 
authority of some law of the United States. 
In my opinion, therefore, each of the questions proposed in 
your letter should be answered in the negative, and I so an-
swer them. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE1'ARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
,. 
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IMMIGRANT ACT. 
Where it appeared. th:1t an immigrant from a foreign State was convicted 
of an offense there, sentenced to imprisonment, and after having served 
a portion of his sentence was given an unconditional pardon: Held 
that section 4'of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, and section 5 
of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 141, do not forbid his landing in 
the United States. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 23, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 20th instant bas been received, in 
which you inquire whether section 4 of the act approved Au~ 
gust 3, 1882, and section5 of the act approved March 3, 1875, 
relating to foreign immigration, forbids the landing in the · 
United States of the immigrant .F. A. H. Behncke, the cir-
cumstances attending whose arrival at New York City are 
detailed in the papers forwarded by you and which are here-
with returned. 
The facts disclose that he was guilty of embezzlement, 
sentenced to imprisonment, served a portion of the sentence, 
.and was pardoned. 
The turning point in the case is whether or not Behncke 
was pardoned upon condition of emigration. A doubt may 
arrise from his own statement. The officials at New York 
apparently do not ~ntertain this doubt, but agree in the 
statement that his case does not fall within the clauses pro-
hibiting immigration. 
If his papers were examined and passed upon officially by 
the United States consul at Bremen, it is presumptive evi-
dence that his pardon was unconditional, as he asserts, as 
the fact would be notorious. Such presumption is borne 
out by the additional supposition that the Government would 
not pardon a man whose offense was simply embezzlement in 
order to get him out of the country, such conditional par-
dons being usually granted in cases of a higher grade of 
crimmals, whose presence in the country would be a menace 
to the constituted authorities. 
The pardon for an offense committed here would relieve 
him of the act and its consequences-in fact, would, in legal 
contemplation, blot out the ofi'ense (Knote v. United States, 
95 U.S., 153; United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 542; Ex-
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parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333); and like effect must be gi\en 
to the pardon by a foreign State of an qffense within its ju-
risdiction. (Wharton Conti. Laws, sec. 831; Bar Interna-
tional Law, 684, 692-693.) 
The recognition of a pardon pronounced abroad is founded 
upon consideration of the general security of intercourset 
and would lead to a liberal application of the statute in this 
case. This view, if not in conflict with other evidence not 
yet presented, indicates that Mr. Behncke should be per-
mitted to land. 
The desirA expressed by you to have a rule stated in 
this case which shall be a standard for application to sim-
ilar cases is, perhaps, onA that can not be met by general 
statement. Similar cases must be governed to a large ex-
tent by the circumstances attending them, and are matters 
for your official discretion. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE rREASURY. 
CONTRACT WITH JOHN ROACH. 
Opinion of June 30, 1885, touching the contract with Mr. John Roach for 
building the Dolphin (ante, p. 207), reaffirmed. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July ~8, 1885. 
SIR: I have c<1nsidered with much care the law and the 
contracts in reference to the building of certain vessels un-
dertaken by Mr. John Roach, which you were kind enough 
to send me on last Saturday for my examination. Consider-
ing these matters in connection with the conversation we had 
respecting some settlement with Mr. Roach, I have this to 
say: that in the opinion I have already gi\en you touching 
the Dolphin the principle is laid down that the law providing 
for the building of that and the other vessels is the basis, and 
the only basis, upon which the contract to build them could 
be rested. That is the chart by which these matters are to 
be examined and finally determined, both as to the Govern-
ment and as to the contractor. If the contract is a bad one, 
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or an improvident one, or amounts to no contract in law, it 
is to be regretted, of course; but the consequences are not 
for this Department nor for the Navy Department to consider, 
unless, possibly, in interpreting a doubtful statute. 
There was no doubt in my mind, nor is there now, as to the 
exposition I gave you in that opinion of the law and the sup-
posed contract under it. With the consequences of that de-
cision, of course, I was not concerned, and could not be, as a 
public official. There is nothing left, in my judgment, but a 
following of that law and a strict enforcement of it. Gener-
-ally there is no power in a Department to compromise differ-
ences arising in the execution of contracts, and in the absence 
of a clear conferring of such power the Department could not 
exercise it. The law in this case leaves no margin, as I view 
it, for the exercise of any such power, or for the adjustment 
of these matters upon "business principles" as between in-
dividuals. Individuals, dealing with their own afl'airs, of 
course, can change their contrac~s and make them more or 
less elastic, to suit their convenience. In these particular 
matters Mr. Roach might yield certain advantages, but I do 
not see how the Navy Department, acting under a law for a 
spedfic purpose, can do anything of the sort to bind the Gov-
ernment. It would be a responsibility that your Department 
would assume which Congress might approve, but Congress. 
failing to approve it would leave the Department in a very 
awkward attitude regarding these subjects. 
Therefore I do not see that there is any room for a confer-
ence between yourself and :Mr. Roach (or his assignees) look-
ing to any adjustment of these matters, only as indicated by 
the opinion I have already given in the case of the Dolphin. 
The only remedy is the enforcement of .the law as therein 
indicated. You might yourself see every propriety and 
every advantage to the Government, in recognizing any and 
all of these contracts, and in yielding certain things in them, 
if you had the power; but not having the power, whatever 
the advantage might be to the Government, you cannot well 
enter into an adjustment with Mr. Roach, or his assignees, 
outside of the course indicated by the opinion referred to. 
Of course that opinion is broad and far-reaching; but not 
more so than the inquiry and the subject matters of it justi-
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242 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Indian Contract. 
fied; and if that be the state of tile law, as I am persuaded 
it is, it is not your fault nor mine that Mr. Roach is injured, 
or that the Government is injured or embarrassed. 
In this view of the subject, a conference between yourself, 
as Secretary of the Navy, and myself, as Attorney-General, 
and the assignees of Mr. Roach, would be unnecessary, as I 
could not give any opinion looking in the least to any devia-
tion or relaxation of the law upon which these contracts are 
supposed to be based. Of course, if upon any point or points 
arising upon this law, or the supposed contracts under it, 
the Navy Department should desire an opinion from me, it 
would be most cheerfully and readily given; but it occurs 
to me that in the opinion I have heretofore rendered to you 
the question is pretty well settled, so far as the Dolphin is 
concerned, and also in regard to the other vessels, as far as 
the facts respecting them are the same with those in the 
Dolphin case. 
I retutn with this the two books that you sent me. 
Very respectfully, · 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
INDIAN CONTRACT. 
Upon the facts of the case as presented: Advised, that the contract re-
lating to certain coal mines at Savanna, Choctaw Nation, between 
Mrs. A. G. Ream and her husband and the Atoka Coal Mining Company, 
dated N ovem her 3, lti~3, be considered as in full force for the period 
for which it was executed and approved by the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and Secretary of the Interior. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 29, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication to me of the 9th instant, through 
the Acting Secretary of the Interior, Hon. H. L. Muldrow, 
touching the matter of certain coal mines at Savanna, Choc-
taw Nation, Indian Territory, has been received and duly 
considered. The question propounded to me by such com-
munication is: Ought the contract, execntPd Novemher 8, 
1883, between Mrs. A. G. Ream and Robert L. Ream, jr., 
/ 
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her husband, and the Atoka Coal and :Mining Company, to 
be considered as in full force for the period for which it was 
executed, and approved by the office of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, notwithstanding the decision of the 
supreme court of the Choctaw Nation~ 
From the record before me it appears that a suit was pend-
ing between certain parties in reference to these coal mines, 
in the courts of the Choctaw Nation, through the years of 
1881-'84, inclusive. During this time the contract referred 
to, in fa\or of Mrs. Ream (that is, the one dated November 
8, 1883), was executed, and it was approved by the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior 
in due form of law. It does not appear that this agreement 
was before the court of the Choctaw Nation in any manner; 
in fact, the papers which I have are silent as to this fact. 
It is a presumption universally indulged til at the Executive 
Departments, in the transaction of business, act according to 
law; and this presumption is particularly strong when one 
Department is passing upon and considering the action of 
another Department. It is therefore to be concluded that 
the Department of the Interior, in ratifying and approving 
this contract of November 8, 1883, did what the law author-
ized to be done ; and I have nothing before me to rebut that 
conclusion. 
This contract was either before the court of the Choctaw 
Nation or it was not. If it was before that court, very strong 
and cogent reasons should be furnished why that court ig-
nored or set it aside; and no reasons of any kind appear in 
the papers submitted to me. If it was not before that court, 
any action by that court, nullifying or avoiding it, would 
amount to nothing. So, in either view of the case, I find 
nothing to justify the Department in rejecting or canceling 
that agreement; and therefore the question propounded to 
me is answered in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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CONSTRUCTION OF VESSELS FOR THE NAVY. 
Whue a statute authorizes the building of vessels by the Navy Depart-
ment, but makes no provision for procuring the necessary plans and 
specifications therefor, it is to be construed as impliedly authorizing 
the head of the Department to procure such plans and specifications 
in the mode and manner which he shall deem best. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 30, 1885. 
SIR: Touching the question which you submitted to the 
Cabinet the other day, aml more particularly to myself, as to 
your power or authority to provide for and procure plan~ 
and specifications, in your own way, for the building of cer-
tain vessels by the Navy Department, I wish to say, that 
after full examination of it I am not able to find, in any of 
the laws as to these vessels, any provision for procuring 
plans and specifications, nor do I find in any of the laws pre-
scribing the duties of different officers of your Department 
anything providing for the procuring of these plans and 
specifications. 
Usually, as a general rule, such provision is made in the 
laws providing for the building of cruisers or vessels. In the 
absence of any provisions of this sort, the power delegated 
to you to build vessels would take with it the right to exe-
cute that power in the mode and manner you should deem 
best. Judge Curtis states the general proposition in these 
words: "When it comes to a.question whether a power exists, 
the parti<mlar mode in which it may be exercised must be left 
to the will of the body (or person) that possesses it;" and he 
quotes from Chief-Justice Marshall to sustain this position. 
(2 Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, 374.) Similar views, 
conveying the same idea, are to be found in 1 Story on the 
Constitution, by Cooley, pp. 430, 431; 2 ib., 1211. 
As plans and specifications are necessary to insure the 
building of vessels, to accomplish the purpose for which they 
are to be used, it would follow as a matter of course that the 
power to build these vessels, given you by the law, would 
carry, without any expressions to that effect, the authority 
to procure the plans and specifications, as you see proper. 
The proposition could be stated in different ways, and 
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could be illustrated by many citations, but I deem it unneces-




... £\.. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
CIVIL SERVICE. 
The act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, to regulate and improve the 
civil service of the United States, repeals by implication section 164, 
Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 1 , 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of yesterday submits to me this 
question : Is section 164 of the Revised Statutes repealed or 
abrogated by the provisions of the act to regulate and im-
prove the civil service of the United States, approved Janu-
ary 16, 1883 (chap. 27, Stat. L., vol. 22, p. 403.). 
Section-164 of the Revised Statutes provides a certain man-
ner for the examination and the appointment of clerks speci-
fied in section 163, which says that clerks in the Departments 
shall be arranged in four classes, distinguished as the first, 
.second, third, and fourth classes. Hence it seems that sec-
tion 164 has reference entirely to the clerks named in section 
163. The act to regulate and improve the ci vii s·ervice of the 
United States, famiiiarly called "the civil service act," seems 
to deal w!th the entire subject that section 164 referred to. It 
is true there is no repeal, in so many words, of section 164, by 
the" civil service act;" but under that rule which recognizes 
that a statute that undertakes to provide for an entire sub-
ject-matter repeals all former laws or statutes upon that sub-
ject, it would seem that section 164 is repealed by the "civil 
service act." It was certainly the intention of Congress to 
make a new law upon this subject to embrace all that was in-
-tended under section 164, and to repeal all other laws on the 
subject. (Murdock v. Oity of Memphis, 20 Wallace, 617.) 
Then another rule somewhat similar, but of a little wider 
.scope, is this: When there are two acts of Congress on the 
• 
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same subject, and the later embraces what is contained in 
the first, and also new provisions, the later act operates, with-
out any repealing clause, as a repeal of the first. ( Un-itt1d 
States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 88, et seq.) 
It can not be supposed that Congress intended these two 
different modes of procedure to be pursued, when it under-
took, in the later act, to regulate this very subject as a part 
of the civil service. The two are entirely inconsistent, and 
both can not stand; and the later must prevail. 
I must conclude, therefore, that section 164 is as completely 
repealed as if repealing words had been incorporated in the-
act of January 16, 1883. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
INTERNAl~ REVENUE. 
Where the holders of distilled spirits, bonded for exportation, shall have, 
failed within the seven months specified in the bond (given under the 
regulations of internal revenue circular No. 282) to withdraw such 
spirits in fact from the distillery warehouse, a forfeiture of the bond 
follows, and the spirits are not protected from the domestic tax, 
Upon application of the principal and sureties on such bond, and for-
good cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, under 
existing regulations, extend the time named in the bond beyond seven. 
months. · 
The spirits covered by an exportation bond, after the failure to with-
draw them and after the forfeiture of the bond, are liable to distraint. 
under the act of May 28, 1880, chapter 108. 
The condition of the bond having been broken by the failure to with-
draw the spirits, the Government may also proceed upon the bond. 
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 5, 1885 • 
Sm : I make the following extract from your letter of the 
28th ultimo : 
"Under the provisions of section 3330, Revised Statutes, 
the act of June 9,1874, amendatory thereof (l8 Stat., 64), the· 
holders of distilled spirits on which the tax has not been 
paid are allowed to export them in bond or transport them 
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in hond to a port of export for exportation;" and then you 
ask for an opinion on three questions. 
Answer to the first quebtion: In the event that holders or 
owners of such spirits shall have failed within the seven 
months specified in the bond (given under the regulations of 
the internal revenue cJrcular No. 282) to withdraw them in 
fact from the distillery warehouse, a forfeiture of the bond 
follows, 'and the spirits are not protected thereafter from an 
obligation for a domestic tax. The effect of the bond while 
in force and before forfeiture is to free the spirits from such 
obligation, but this effect ceases upon the forfeiture of the 
bond. Any other construction, it is respectfully submitted, 
would be an evasion of the statute. (Meredith v. United 
States, 13 Peters, 486.) 
The Commissioner Qf Internal Revenue, with the assent of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, by circular No. 282, above re-
ferred to, has already provided for the assessment of spirits, 
covered by transportation or exportation bond, when they 
have not been withdrawn from the warehouse within the 
time named in the bond for the delivery at the port from 
which they are to be exported, and I see no sufficient reason 
for disturbing this regulation. 
Upon the application of the principal and sureties on such 
bond and for good cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue may, under existing regulations, extend the time 
named in the bond beyond seven months. If the bond should 
become forfeited, and the time should not be extended as 
above indicated, the presumption would arise that the inten-
tion to export had been abandoned, and the Government 
should assess the taxes due upon the spirits and take 1:?teps 
to eollect the same with interest as provided by circular 282. 
Second. I am of opinion that the spirits covered by expor-
tation bond after the failure to withdraw them, and after the 
forfeiture of the bond, are liable to distraint, up.der provisions 
of section 4 of the act of May 28, 1880. (21 Stat., 145, 146.) 
Third. I answer that the condition of the bond having 
been broken by the failure to withdraw the spirits from the 
warehouse, the right of the Government to proceed upon the 
bond is unquestioned. At the same time, of course, the tax 
can be collected by distraint, and as the latter mode is most 
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expeditious, it would be advisable to resort to it first. (16 
Opin., 634, 635.) 
It is to be said, as a general rule in matters of this kind, 
that the construction of these statutes must be such as is 
most favorable to their enforcement. There is no liberal 
interpretation in favor of the individual to be indulged in; 
but, as statutes for the accomplishment of great public pur-
poses, they must be construed in a manner to reach those 
purposes, and to carry out the intention of the legislature in 
passing them. (Taylor v. United States, 3 Howard, 210; Oli· 
quot's Champagne, 3 Wall., 114; United States v. Hodson, 
10 Wall., 406; Smythe v. Fiske, 21 Wall., 380.) As a rule de-
ducible from these decisions, the Government loses none of 
its remedies to collect its revenue or debt unless there is 
an express repeal or abrogation of some existing remedy. 
This is discussed in the opinion of my predecessor already re-
ferred to. (16 Opin., supra. See also United States v. Her-
ron, 20 Wall., 251; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 
ib., 227 ; 13 Peters, supra.) 
In view of these authorities, I feel that there is no doubt 
as to the correctness of the answers given above to your let-
ter of the 28th ultimo. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GAHLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
MAIL TRANSPORTATION. 
The authority to make contracts for carryi~g the mail between ports of 
the United States and foreign ports, given by section 4007, Revised 
Statutes, is limited by section 4009, Revised Statutes, with respect to 
the amount of compensation; so that in such contracts under the 
former section no greater compensation can be allowed to American 
steam-ship lines than the sea and inland postage npon the mail trans-
ported. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
A ug·ust 7, 1885. 
SIR : By your letter of the 1st instant my attention is 
called to sections 4007 and 4009, Revised Statutes, with a 
request for an opinion upon the question whether the author-
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 249 
Mail Transportation. 
ity to make contracts under the former section is limited by 
the latter upon the point of compensation; in other words, 
whether in making contracts, after advertisement, under sec-
tion 4007, you are at liberty to award to American steam ship 
lines a greater compensation than the sea and inland postage 
upon the mail transported. 
In response to this request, I have the honor to state that, 
upon examination of those sections, I reach the conclusion 
that section 4009 was intended to limit, "upon the point of 
.compensation," the authority conferred by section 4007. This 
view appears to me to be not only in harmony with the lan-
guage employed in those sections, but to be greatly strength-
~ned by a reference to the statutes on the subject of foreign 
mail transportation which were the subjects of revision. 
Those sections embody provisions which originated with 
the acts of March 3, 1845, chapter 69, and June 14, 1858, 
chapter 164. The act of 1845 gave the Postmaster-General 
.authority " to contract for the transportation of the United 
States mail between any of the ports of the United States 
and a port or ports of any foreign power whenever, in his 
opinion, the public interest will thereby be promoted." It 
prescribed no limitation in regard to the amount of com-
pensation to be allowed for such transportation. The act of 
1858, however, restricted the authority of the Postmaster-
General in that regard (see sections 4 and 5). The fifth sec-
tion of the last-mentioned act authorized him to allow for 
~uch transportation, if by an American vessel, the sea and 
United States inland postage? and if by a foreign vessel, the 
sea postage only on the mails conveyed. The provisions of 
this section were re-enacted by section 4 of the act of June 15, 
1860, chapter 131, and extended so as to include transporta-
tion between ports of the 0 nited States, touching at a foreigu 
port. By section 9 of the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 89, 
the fourth section of the act of 1860, just mentioned, was so 
modified that the compensation for transporting the mails 
between the United States and any foreign port, or between 
ports of the United States, touching at a foreign port, was 
limited to " any sum not exceeding the sea and United States 
inland postage," or" any sum not exceeding the sea postage," 
250 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Mail Transportation. 
on the mails conveyed, according as the serfice should be 
performed by an American or by a foreign vessel. 
This legislation, including the provision in the act of 1845t 
above referred to, was subsequently embodied without ma-
terial alteration in sections 267 and 269 of the act of June 8t 
1872, entitled "An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the 
statutes relating to the Post-Office Department;" and as the 
law now stood it is very clear that the Postmaster-General,. 
in contracting with American steam-ship lines for the trans-
portation of the mail between the United States and foreign 
ports, could not allow a greater compensation for such serv-
ice than the sea and inland postage upon the mail trans-
ported. 
Sections 267 and 269 of the act of 1872 were adopted with-
out change in the Revised Statutes, becoming sections 4007 
and 4009 thereof; so that no modification of the law was 
effected by the· revision touching the subject of compensation 
for foreign mail transportation. On examining section 5 of 
the act of May 17, 1878, chapter 107, to which my attention 
is also called in connection with that subject, I ~erceive noth-
ing therein which alters the law as contained in the sections 
of the Revised Statutes above mentioned upon that point" 
I am therefore of the opinion that the authority to contract 
for such transportation, given the Postmaster-General by 
section 4007, is limited by section 4009 with respect to the 
matter of compensation, just as if section 4009 were a part 
of section 4007, and followed as such in immediate connection 
after the word promoted, as it might very well have done. 
I add that, as the s~ope of your inquiry seems to be limited 
to the construction of those sections, I have in the foregoing 
confined myself to them, and not considered the effect of 
recent legislation upon the authority of the Postmaster-Gen-
eral to contract for the transportation of foreign mails. I 
refer here to a clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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' l<'EES OF PENSION AGENTS. 
The provision of section 4769 Revised Statutes authorizing pension agents 
to deduct from the fees of attorneys in each pension case 30 cents, in 
payment of the services of the former for forwarding the same, is re-
pealed by the act of June 14, 1878, chapter 188. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
A 1tgust 10, 1885. 
SIR : In compliance with your request of August 4, 1885, 
for an opinion in reference to the deduction of 30 cents by 
pension agents from the fees of attorneys in pension cases, I 
have the honor to submit the following: 
By section 4769, Revised Statutes, the sum of 30 cents wat\ 
deducted from the fees of the attorneys or agents prosecut-
ing each pension case, by the pension agent, in payment of 
his services in forwarding the same. 
By the . act approved June 14, 1878, it is provided that 
from and after July 1, 1878, agents for the payment of pen-
sions shall, in lieu of the pereentage, fees, pay, and allowances 
now allowed by law, be allowed compensation for their serv-
ices, postage, vouchers and checks sent the pensioners, and 
aU the expense of their offices: first, a salary at the rate of 
$4,000 per annum; second, $15 for each hundred vouchers, 
or at that rate for a fraction of one hundred, prepared and 
paid by the agent in excess of 4,000 vouchers per annum; 
third, actual and necessary expenses for rent, fuel, and lights, 
and for postage on official matter directed to the Depart-
ments and Bureaus at Washington, to be approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior; and it is further provided that all 
acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are here by 
repealed. 
It will be remarked that in the latter quoted statute no ref-
erence is made to the fees allowed to attorneys or agents of 
pension claimants. The question presented to me is simpli-
fied by remembering that the portions of the Revised Stat-
utes providing for the deduction of the 30 cents from the 
fees of the attorney is repealed as an allowance to the pen-
sion agent, the amount and the manner of the payment of the 
fees of the attorney or agent remaining the same. The whole 
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subject matter of the compensation of the pension agents 
was determined by this statute. 
It is claimed, however, that by an act approved June 20, 
1878, section 4769, Revised Statutes, is recognized as being 
in full force. It is only necessary to observe that this act of 
June 20, 1878, has no reference to the allowances to claim 
agents, which were fixed lJy the statute approved only six 
days previously, and which expressly repeals all provisiQns 
relating to that matter. 
It is further claimed that section 4769, Revised Statutes, 
is recognized as being in force by the act approved July 4, 
1884. 
The provisions of the Revised Statutes giving the 30 cents 
in payment for services named were expressly repealed by 
the act of 1878. They could not be revived by the implied 
repeal of this latter act (Rev. Stat., sec. 12), nor can it be 
reasonably said that there was intended to be a,p. express 
recognition of the right to this allowance or payment, because, 
as claimed in the two acts subsequent to the repealing act, 
section 4769 is referred to in express words; else there is no 
force in the words "in lieu of the percentage, fees, pay, and 
allowances now allowed by law." 
There is no repugnancy in the provisions of these three 
statutes which would operate as a repeal or preveut them 
from being construed together. Effect can be given to all 
of them. (United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92; Henderson 
Tobacco, 11 Wall., 65~; Wood v. United States, 16 Peters, 
342; Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 Howard, 636.) 
I am of the opinion that the conclusions arrived at by the 
Secretary of the Interior are correct, and that the pension 
agents can not deduct 30 cents from the attorneys' fees for 
the services named in the act, section 4 769. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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ADVANCE WAGES TO SEAMEN. 
The provisions of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, pro-
hibiting the payment of advance wages to seamen hired in our ports, 
in so far as those provisions apply to foreign shipping, are not in con-
flict with the stipulations of article 8 of the consular convention with 
France of February 23, lt353. 
Nor do such provisions come in conflict with any rights which, upon 
principles of international law, other natiDns are entitled to exercise 
within our ports as regards their merchant vessels. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 19, 1885. 
SIR: Agreeably to the request contained in your letter of 
the 6th instant, inclosing a copy of a note from the French 
minister in relation to a supposed conflict between certain 
provisions of the shipping act of June 26, 1884, and certain 
stipulations of the American-French consular convention of 
February 23, 1853, I have with much care and reflection 
considered the points suggested in that note touching those 
provisions and stipulations, and now have the honor to pre-
sent to you my opinion thereon. 
The provisions of said act and the stipulations of said con-
vention specially in.....-olved are those contained in section 10 
of the former and in article 8 of the latter, each of which, 
for convenience of reference, I here quote in full: 
By section 10 it is provided : "That it shall be, and is 
hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages 
before leaving the port at which such seaman may b.e en-
gaged in advance of the time when he had actually earned 
the same, or to pay such ad vance wages to any other person, 
or to pay any person, other than an officer authorized by act 
of Congress to collect fees for such service, any remunera-
tion for such shipment of seamen. Any person paying such 
advance wages or such remuneration shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and,.upon conviction, shall be punished 
by a fine not less than four times the amount of the wages 
so advanced or remuneration so paid, and may be also im-
prisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discre-
tion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or 
remuneration shall in no case, except as herein provided, ab-
solve the vessel, or the master or owner thereof, from full 
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payment of wages afler the same shall have been actu-
ally earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action 
for the recovery of such wages : Provided, That this section 
shall not apply to whaling vesseLs : And provided further, 
That it shall be lawful for any seaman to stipulate iu his 
shipping agreement for an allotment of any portion of the 
wages which he may earn to his wife, mother, or other rela-
th .. e, but to no other person or corporation. And any person 
who shall falsely claim such relationship to any seaman in 
order to obtain wages so allotted, shall~ for every such of-
fense, be punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred 
· dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, at the 
discretion of the court. This section shall apply as well to 
foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States; and any 
foreign vessel, the master, owner, consignee, or agent of 
which bas violated this section, or induced or connived at 
its violation, shall be refused a clearance from any port of 
the United States." 
By article 8 it is stipulated: ''The respective consuls-gen-
eral, consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents, shall have ex-
clusive charge of the internal order of the merchant vessels 
of their nation, and shall alone take cognizance of differences 
which may arise, either at sea or in port, between the captain, 
officers, and crew, without exception, particularly in refer-
ence to the adjustment of wages and the execution of con-
tracts. The local authorities shall not, on any pretext, inter-
fere in these differences, but shall lend forcible aid to the 
consuls, when they may ask it, to arrest and imprison all 
persons composing the crew whom they may deem it neces-
sary to confine. Those persons shlitll be arrested at the sole 
request of the consuls, addressed in writing to the local au· 
thority, and supported by an official extract from the register 
of the ship or the list of the crew, and shaH be held, during 
the whole time of their stay in the port, at the disposal of 
the consuls. Their release shall be granted at the mere re-
quest of the consuls made in writing. The expenses of the 
arrest and detention of those persons shall be paid by the 
consuls." 
In his note, the French minister, after referring to the pro-
vision in said section prohibiting the payment of advance 
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wages to seamen, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, 
suggests that this provision cannot be reconciled with the 
stipulations in said article. He further suggests that such 
provision "infringes upon the rights of the different nations to 
determine, according to their own legislation, the duties and 
<>bligations of their merchant captains towards their crews 
on the merchant vessels of their own nation." And while 
~onceding the right of this Government to forbid American 
-captains in home or foreign ports to make payment of ad-
vance wages to their crews, be asks whether such right can 
he "legally extended to French captains, who enlist French 
.sailors in the ports of the United States." He views the sub-
ject as presenting a "question of the rights of French cap-
tains over French sailors, rights concerning which the very 
general terms of the final provision of section 10 might raise 
difficulties between the Federal authorities and the consuls." 
Not only does the French minister apparently entertain too 
narrow a conception of the power of this Government to affect 
by its legislation foreign merchant ships when within its ter· 
ritorial jurisdiction, but I apprehend he has misconceived 
th6 scope and operation of the statutory provision prohibit-
ing the payment of ad vance wages to seamen to which he 
.refers. 
That provision is, from its subject-matter, of the nature of 
a commercial regulation. Commerce in its simplest significa-
tion means an exchange of goods, but in the advancement of 
society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care, and various 
mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into 
-commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the a.gent, and their 
various operations, become the objects of commercial regula-
tion. (9 Wheat., 229.) The officers and crew of a merchant 
vessel are as much the instruments of commerce. as the ship. 
{7 How., 408.) 
The immediate purpose of. tke provision is to protect the 
interests and promote the welfare of merchant seamen while 
sojotuning at our ports, persons whose occupation is indis-
pensable to maritime commerce, and who are objects of great 
.solicitude and care in the codes of all commercial nations. 
They are characterized as usually a heedless and ignorant, 
but most useful claAs of men, exposed to constant hardships, 
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perils, and oppression, and in port the ready victims of temp-
tation and fraud (3 Kent Com., 176)-as notoriously and 
proverbially reckless and improvident, and on all accounts 
requiring protection, even against themselves (The Minerva, 1 
Hagg., 355)-as credulous, complying, and easily overreached, 
and requiring to be treated, in reference to their bargains, as 
courts of equity treat young heirs in dealing with their ex-
pectancies, wards with their guardians, cestuis que trusts with 
their trustees (Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 556). Legislation 
for their security and protection, when employed in our mer-
chant service, was early adopted by Congress (act of July 20,. 
1790, chap. 29), and has been enacted from time to time down 
to the present, containing many wise and wholesome provis-
ions directed to that end. (See Rev. Stat., Title LIII.) 
The provision now under consideration deals with the sub-
ject of wages of those seamen who are hired in our ports, and 
those only. It is thereby made unlawful to pay" advance 
wages" to the seaman himself before he leaves the port at 
which he is engaged, or to pay the same (i.e., advance wages of 
such seaman) to any other person; and this, by the express 
terms of the statute, applies to foreign as well as to American 
vessels. The power of Congress to regulate the employment 
or hire of merchant seamen within the ports of the United 
States cannot be questioned. There is no principle of inter-
national law which forbids the application of such legislation 
to foreign ships. 
''The jurisdiction of the nation" (obser 8S :Marshall, C. J., 
in The Exchange, 7 Cr., 136) "within its own territory is nec-
essarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no lim-
itation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriv-
ing validity from an external source, would imply a diminution 
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an 
investment of that sovereignty tp the same extent in that 
power which could impose .such restriction. All exceptions, 
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within· 
its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the 
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source." 
Hence a foreign merchant vessel going into the port of a 
foreign state subjects herself to the laws of that state, and is 
~onnd to conform to its commercial as well as its police and 
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other regulations during the period of her stay there. " She 
is as much a subditus temporaneus" (remarks Sir R. Philli-
more with reference to such a case in The Queen v. Keyn, 2 
Ex. D., 82) "as th~ individual who visits the interior of the 
country for the purposes of pleasure or business." 
From this doctrine it follows that in extending the provis-
ion adv~rted to, so as to make it applicable as well to foreign 
merchant ships within our ports as to American vessels, Con-
~ess has not assumed to deal with any rights of such ships 
with which, on principles of international law, it is not enti-
tled to interfere, nor has it exceeded the proper limits of its 
jurisdiction, having regard to the rights of other nations. 
Therefore, unless exempted from the operation of the pro-
vision by virtue of some treaty or statute having that effect, 
no nation has any valid ground to claim for its merchant 
shipping, in any case or under any circumstances, immunity 
from the observance thereof. Whether the seaman hired or 
engaged in one of our ports by a foreign ship is or is not of 
the same nationality as the vessel is wholly immaterial, the 
language of the provision being general and including (as it 
may properly do) all merchant seamen who are there hired 
or engaged by such ship, irrespective of their nationality. 
In regard to the supposed conflict between the statutory 
provision and article 8, quoted above, I submit that the sub-
ject-matter of the one is entirely distinct from that of the 
other, and that no collision necessarily arises. 
By tlre said article the respective consuls, etc., ''shall 
have exclusive charge of the internal order of the merchant 
vessels of their nation, and shall alone take cognizance of 
differences which may arise, either at sea or in port, between 
the captain, officers, and crew, without exception, particularly 
in reference to the adjustment of wages and the execution of 
co ;ttracts.'' The word ''execution" is obviously used here in 
the sense of performance. 
This provision accords to the consular officer: (1) A lim-
ited police jurisdiction over the merchant ves~els of his na-
tion, embracing only those acts which relate to the interior 
discipline of the vessel, and which do not disturb the peace 
and good order of the port. With respect to that jurisdiction, 
the scope of the provision is precisely determined by the' 
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word "internal." (2) A limited cognizance of civil contro-
versies between the officers and crews of such vessels, par-
ticularly those relating to the performance of contracts of 
service and the adjustment of wages thereunder. 
It is very plain that a public law of the port, which pro-
hibits thf' payment of advance wages to seamen hired 
thereat before the vessel sails, does not concern the "inter-
nal or(~er" of such vessels, in contemplation of the above 
provision; and it is difficult to see wherein the law coul 
become a subject of "difference" between the officers and 
crew of the vessel. In hiring a seaman at one of our ports, 
the master of a ship can make no valid agreement to pay 
advance wages before leaving the port, for the reason that 
such payment is prohibited by the public law of the place. 
Should he do so, and fail to pay the advances~ this might 
give rise to a ''difference" between him and the seaman, 
but it would be a difference manifestly involving no con-
flict between the law and the treaty. On the other hand, 
should the master pay the advance wages to the Ewaman, 
the enforcement of the law against the former could not in 
any point of view be deemed an interference in a ''differ-
ence" between the two individuals. 
As already intimated, the provisions of section 10 of the 
act of 1884 are designed to regulate dealings with seamen who 
are -commorant itt" the ports of the United States, and with 
whom shipping agreements are there entered into. They do 
not apply to dealiugs with the seamen of a vessel under such 
agreements made elsewhere. Obligations arising out of the 
latter agreem~nts are unaffected by the statute; the former 
can give rise to no obligation the performance of which in-
volves an infraction of its provisions. 
On the whole, I reach the following conclusions upon the 
points suggested as above: 
(1) That the provisions of the said act respecting the pay-
ment of advance wages, in so far as they apply to foreign 
shipping, are not in conflict with the stipulations of article 
8 of the said convention with France. 
(2) That they infringe upon no rights which, upon principles 
of international law, other nations are entitled to exercise 
within our ports, as regards their merchant vessels. 
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(3) That therefore they can ' 1 legally extend t.o French 
captains who hire French sailors in the ports of the United 
States," and that, in extending (as they do) to them, they 
violate or prejudice no right of such captains in the premises. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE'rARY oF STATE. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Qpinion of Attorney-General Devens, of October 4, 1878 (16 Opin., 158), 
that imported merchandise entered upon pro jotma invoices. in the 
absence of regular invoices authenticated by United States consular 
officers, when advanced in value on appraisement more than 10 per 
cent., is not liable to the 20 per cent. ad valorem additional duty 
under section 2900, Revised Statutes, concurred in. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 27, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
·communication of the 25th instant, in reference to the opin-
ion of Attorney-General Devens, forwarded to your Depart-
ment on the 4th day of October, 1878, in which he took the 
ground that imported merchandise entered at the .custom-
house upon p"ro forma invoices, in t,he absence of regular 
invoices authenticated by United States consular officers, 
when advanced in value on appraisement more than 10 per 
cent., was not liable to the additional duty of 20 per cent. 
ad valorem prescribed by section 2900 of the Revised Stat-
utes.· 
It is very much to be regretted that the abuses referred to 
bave arisen, and that certain shippers and importers have 
used the opinion of a former Attorney-General as a loop-hole 
for the purpose of entering their goods at prices much below 
the proper dutiable values. This Department would cheer-
fully co-operate in applying the needed remedy, but after a 
careful examination of the opinion in question I am not pre-
pared to say that it is erroneous. On the contrary, I think 
that section 2900 has been correctly interpreted. It is the 
well-settled practice of this Department not to disturb former 
rulings upon legal questions submitted to it unless they 
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appear to be plainly erroneous, and if the question were ·an 
original one I would feel constrained to hold that section 
.:.moo, Revised Statutes, does not apply to an entry made in 
the absence of a certified invoice! upon affidavit, under the 
provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the act of June 22, 1874, 
) 
chapter 391. 
In my opinion the words " original invoice" found in sec-
tion 2900 were intended to refer only to the consular invoice. 
Under existing legislation, it seems to me that the only 
remedy for the abuses complained of is to be found in a more 
rigid enforcement of the provisions of the twelfth section of 
the act of 1874 and section 2864 of the Revised Statutes. 




Acting Attorney- General. 
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD, 
Acting l'Jecretary of the Treasury. 
TONNAGE DUTY. 
The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels sailing from the 
regions mentioned in the act of J nne 26, 1884, chapter 121, and entered in 
our ports, is purely geographical in character, inuring to the advantage 
of any vessel of any power that may choose to transport between this 
country and any port embraced by the fourteenth section of that act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 19, 1885. 
SIR: Your _communication of the 8th September, instant,. 
with the inclosures therein referred to, has received my de-
liberate consideration, and I have the honor to submit, in 
reply, that I agree with you entirely in the interpretation you 
place on the fourteenth section of the act of Congress of the 
26th June, 1884, entitled "An act to .remove certain burdens 
on the American merchant mnrine and encourage the Amer-
ican foreign carrying trade, and for other purposes," and in 
your conclusion that the claims set up by the several powers 
mentioned by you are not founded. 
The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels 
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sailing from the regions mentioned in the act 'and entered in 
our ports is, I think, purely geographical in character, inur-
ing to the advantage of any vessel of any power that may 
choose to fetch and carry between this country and any port 
embraced by the fourteenth section of the act. 
I see no warrant, therefore, to claim that there is anything 
in "the most favored nation" clause of the treaty between 
this country and the powers mentioned that entitles them to 
have the privileges of the fourteenth section extended to 
their vessels sailing to this country from ports outside the 
limitation of the act. 
Your able and comprehensive discussion of the subject 
renders it quite unnecessary for me to treat it at large. 
I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant, 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
W. A. MAURY, 
Act,ing Attorney-General. 
CUSTOMS LAWS-COLLECTOR'S CERTIFICATE. 
In the case of merchandise of domestic production shipped at ports on 
the Great Lakes to other ports in the United States, by routes through 
Canadian terrritory, the issue of a certificate by the collector of customs 
showing that the merchandise so shipped is of domestic production is 
not authorized by law. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 3, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
-communication bearing date September 30, 1885,requesting 
an opinion from this Department upon the question therein 
submitted. 
The joint resolution of Congress approved March 3, 1883, 
providing for the termination of articles numbered 18 to 25, 
inclusive, and article numbered 30, of the treaty between the 
United States of America and her Britannic Majesty, con-
duded at Washington May 8, 1871, directs the President to 
give notfce to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that 
the provisions of each and every of the articles aforesaid will 
terminate and be of no force on the expiration of two years 
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next after the time of giving such notice. .Article 30 of said 
treaty is as follows : 
"It is agreed that, for the term of years mentioned in arti-
cle 33 of this treaty, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty may 
carry in British vessels, without payment of duty, goods, 
wares, or merchandise from one port or place within the terri-
tory of the United States upon the St. Lawrence, the Great 
I 
Lakes, and the rh·ers connecting the same, to another port or 
place within the territory of the United States, as aforesaid: 
PYovideil, That a portion of such transportation is made 
through the Dominion of Canada by land carriage, and in 
bond, under such rules or regulations as may be agreed upon 
between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the 
Government of the United States. Citizens of the United 
States may, for a like period, carry in United States vessels, 
without payment of duty, goods, wares, or merchandise from 
one port or place within the possessipn of Her Britannic Maj-
esty in North America to another port or place within the 
said possessions: Provided, That a portion of such transpor-
tation is made through the territory of the United States by 
land carriage, and in bond, under such rules and regulations 
as may be agreed upon between the Government of the United 
States and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty. The 
Government of the United States further engages not to im-
pose any export duties on goods, wares, or merchandise car. 
ried under this article through ·the territory of the United 
States, and Her Majesty's Government engages to urge the 
parliament of the Dominion of Canada and the legislatures of 
the other colonies not to impose any export duties on goodsr 
wares, or merchandise carried under this article; and the· 
Governrnt:,nt of the United States may, in case such export 
duties arA imposed by the Dominion of Canada, suspend 
during the period that such duties are imposed, the right of 
carrying granted under this article in favor of the subjects 
of Her Britanic 1\iajesty." 
It appears that notice was given, by proclamation of the 
President, of the abrogation of said article 30 of the treaty of 
Washington, and that it ceased to be in force from and after 
July 1, 1H85. 
Section3006 of Revised Statutes provides that" imported 
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merchandise in bond or duty paid, and products or manufact-
ures of the United States may, with the consent of the 
proper authorities of the British provinces, or Republic of 
)Iexico, be transported from one port in the United States to 
any other port therein over the territory of such provinces 
or republic, by such routes, and under such rules, regula-
tions, and conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury may 
prescribe; and the merchandise so transported shall, upon 
arrival in the United States from such provinces or repub-
lic, be treated in regard to the liability to or exemption 
from duty, or tax, as if the transportation had taken place 
entirely within the limits of the United States." 
It appears from your communication that a practice ob-
tains at certain ports on the great lakes of shipping mer-
chandise of domestic production to other ports in the United 
States by routes, partly by water ahd partly by rail, through 
Canadian territory, and that foreign vessels are used in such 
transportation. It appears also that the goods are regularly 
exported to Canada from American ports, and at the time of 
shipment a certificate is obtained from the collector of cus-
toms showing that the merchandise so shipped is of domestic 
production, and upon this certificate free entry is made at 
the port in the United States when the goods arrive after 
transit. 
Under section 2503 of the tariff act approved March 3, 
1883, articles "the growth, produce, and manufacture of the 
United States, when returned in the same condition as ex-
ported," shall be exempt from duty. The object of that par-
agraph, as I understand it, is to enable the exporter of do-
mestic products and manufactures to bring back the same to 
the United States free of cost, if from any cause he may de-
sire to do so; but in order to entitle him to the benefit of that 
provision, the articles must be the growth, produce, or man-
ufacture of the United States, and must be returned in the 
same condition as exported. It appears, however, in the 
cases referred to by you, that merchandise of domestic pro-
duction is shipped from certain ports on the great lakes to 
other ports in the United States. The transportation is partly 
through Canadian territory, but the port of destination is in 
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the United States. In other words, it is not a bona fide ex-
portation. 
In view ofthe provisions of the joint resolution referred to, 
I am of opinion that the practice of issuing the certificates 
mentioned at the time of shipping the articles described in 
your letter is illegal. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
GRANT TO GARLAND COUNTY, ARKANSAS. 
Under the circumstances existing in this case, and for reasons stated, the • 
institution of proceedings on behalf of the United States to recover 
the title and possession of certain land (part of the Hot Springs 'Res-
ervation) granted to the county of Garland, Arkansas, for the site of a 
public building, would not be warranted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 7, 1885. 
SIR: By your letter of the 26th of August last my atten-
tion is called to the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 108, grant-
ing a piece of land (part of the Hot Springs Reservation) 
"to the county of Garland in the State of Arkansas as a 
site for the public building of said county," and also to the 
report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Interior 
Department, first session, Forty-eight Congress, and other 
documents, from which it appears that, after the location of 
the grant, the county authorities leased the land so granted 
for a period of ninety-nine years to private parties, by whom 
the same has been subdivided into lots and sublet to numer-
ous persons, and that the land has never been devoted to 
the purpose for which it was donated by Congress. 
In directin~· my attention to this subject, you request that 
"legal proceedings be instituted, with a view to recover to 
the Government the title and possession of the land," should 
the failure of the county authorities to carry out the purpose 
of Congress be regarded as operating to nullify the grant. 
While it is very plain, from the language of the gr~nt, 
that Congress intended to donate the land for the specific 
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purpose designated therein, namely, to be used'' as a site for 
the public building of said county," yet, whether this annexes 
acondition to the grant, or creates a mere trust, is not so clear. 
If a condition, upon breach thereof the grant would be liable 
to forfeiture; if a trust, the same result would not follow 
upon a breach, but the aid of a court of equity might be in-
voked by proper parties to effectuate the trust. (See Stanley 
v. Colt, 5 Wall., 119.) 
In the former case, I submit that, in the absence of any 
law of Congress declaring the forfeiture or directing the in-
stitution of proceedings to that end, no authority exists to 
bring a suit in behalf of the United States to recover the land 
on the ground of failur~ to perform the condition. In the 
latter case, it would seem to be unnecessary to consider the 
subject of proceedings to enforce the trust, as it appears by the 
accompanying letter of the superintendent of the Hot Springs 
Reservation, addressed to you, dated the 14th of August 
last, that a suit bas recently been brought by the proper 
county authorities to annul the aforesaid lease and recover 
~ontrol of the property, that it may be devoted to the pur-
pose for which it was donated. 
These considerations lead me to think that, under the ex-
isting circumstances, I would not be warranted in instituting 
proceedings of any kind in behalf of the United States touch-
ing the premises. 
I return herewith the documents which accompanied your 
letter. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SE.CRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
. ... 
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HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARKANSAS. 
The Secretary of the Interior bas power, under the act of December 16~ 
1878, chapter 5, to lease sites upou the Hot Springs Reservation in 
Arkansas for the term of five years, and to relet the premises for the 
same term, from time to time, as the leases expire. 
Upon the facts stated: Advised that the Secretary may accept a surrender 
of a lease of a bath-bouse site heretofore made to S., and cancel the 
same, and then enter into a new lease of the premises with the same 
party for the term of five years. 
During the term of the lease, and while the tenant is in possession under 
the same, be may remove from the premises whatever improvements. 
be bas erected thereon for the purposes of trade, whether machinery or 
buildings; but if be leaves the premises without removing such im-
provements, and the Govern1:nent should take possession, they would 
become the property of the latter. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 12, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 5th instant, forwarding the letter dated 
the 29th ultimo (with inclosures) from Ron. D. W. Voorhees~ 
John Paul Jones, and J. L. Smithmeyer, requesting your De-
partment ''to surrender a lease of a bath-house site upon the 
Hot Springs Reservation, Arkansas, granted to Mr. Smith-
meyer by the Secretary oftbe Interior January 15,1884, and 
that a new lease may be entered into to run for five years 
from September 1, 1885." 
Reference is made in your letter to the original lease, which 
is also forwarded, and the act of December 16, 1878 (20 Stat. 
258). 
You state that ''the facts in relation to the granting of the 
lease and the extension of the time of the commencement of 
payment of water rent thereunder are set forth" in said let-
ter of Hon. D. W. Voorhees and others, and that "there is no 
reason to doubt the statement that d nring a great portion of 
the time since the lease was made it has been entirely im· 
practicable for the lessee to carry out the purposes for which 
the site was leased." 
You further sta.te that "the five years' term of lease to Mr. 
Smithmeyer commenced from the date of the lease, January 
15, 1884, and consequently a renewal of the lease, as he de-
sires, would extend the period beyond the whole term speci-
fied in the statute." 
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.An opinion is requested, as follows, viz : 
First. ".As to whether there is any authority of law for 
complying with the request of Mr. Smithmeyer, as above set 
forth." 
Second. "Generally, whether there is authority for renew-
ing any of the leases which have expired." 
Third. "And also, whether at the expiration of a lease the 
permanent improvements upon the site belong to the lessee 
or to the Government." 
The clause of the act of December 16, 1878, authorizing the 
Secretary of the Interior to lease sites for the building of 
bath-houses at the Hot Springs Reservation, .Arkansas, is a~ 
follows, viz : 
''And he is further directed to lease the bath-houses of a 
permanent nature, now upon the Hot Springs Reservation, to 
the owners of the same, and lease to any person or persons,. 
upon such terms as may be agreed on, sites for the building 
of other bath-houses for the term of five years, unless other-
wise provided by law, under such rules and regulations as 
he may prescribe; and the tax imposed shall not exceed fif. 
teen dollars per tub per annum, including 'ground rent.'" 
The main question presented by the inquiries is, as to 
whether the authority of the Secretary of the Interior is lim-
ited to the granting of leases for only one term of five years, 
or as to whether he is directed to make leases of a term 
neither greater nor less than five years V In other ""ords, 
does the limitation of five years apply to the period in which 
leasing is authorized, or as a limit to the length of the leases or 
If it is the true intent and meaning of the law that all lease-
hold estates, acquired under and by virtue of the said act, 
shall expire at the end of their respective terms of five years 
without any autlwrity being vested in the Secretary of the 
Interior to renew the leases or relet the said sites for bath-
houses, the obvious duty rests upon the Secretary at the end 
of such terms to repossess himself for the Government of the 
leasehold premises, and to hold them unused and unoccupied 
against all intruders. He has no authority, under such inter-
pretation of the act, either to create vr permit a tenancy at 
will or by sufferance. 
Snch an interpretation of the Jaw would have the effect of 
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depriving the public of the use of such bath-houses where the 
leases have expired; to foster a monopoly such as it is the 
declared purpose of the said act of December 16, 1878, to 
avoid; to depreciate the value of the lots sold or leased by 
the Government on the '' rese!'vation" for hotel and building 
purposes; to interfere with the price and sale of other lots 
for such purposes by the Government, and, awaiting the ac· 
tion of Congress, defeat the purposes for which the" reser-
vation " was established. 
As such interpretation would be against public policy and 
should not be adopted unless it is required by either the 
words, the context, the effect, or the spirit and reason of the 
law, is such interpretation required~ The Secretary of the 
Interior is directed by the act to lease two kinds of property, 
viz, first, bath houses of a permanent nature, at the time of 
the passage of the act, to the owners of the same; second, 
"sites for the building of bath-houses" to any person or 
llersons. The maximum rental of $15 per tub is fixed; the 
l'Ules and regulations are to be prescribed by the Secretary; 
the t.erm of each lease is to be a period of five years "unless 
otherwise provided by law." There is no prohibition as to 
reletting. So long as the conditions precedent to leasing 
exist, the Secretary is directed to lease, and this without any 
limitation except in the words " unless otherwise provided 
by law." 
By act of March 3, 1877 (Stat. 19, 377), when Congress 
first undertook to dispose of the "reservation" after the 
decision of the Hot Springs cases (92 U. S. 698,) such portion 
of the "reservation" as includes the hot or warm springs is 
reserved from sale. By that act the Secretary of the Interior 
is permitted to fix a special tax on water taken from said 
springs (sec. 4 of said act), but no authority is given him 
therein to either lease bath-houses or sites for bath-houses. 
The words'' unless otherwise provided by law" in the stat-
ute of 1878 bad, therefore, no present meaning at the time of 
the passage of the act, and must either be regarded as sur-
plusage, or the obvious interpretation be given, that so long 
as the conditions precedent to leasing exist, the authority to 
let or relet, in accordance with the terms of the act, is vested 
in the Secretary of the Interior, unless at the time of such 
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leasing it is otherwise provided by law. This interpretation 
is not only in accord with public policy and the presumed 
object of the ''reservation," but a contrary interpretation, 
confining~' the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to 
the granting of such leases for one term only of .five years," 
is warranted neither by the said act of 1878, its words and 
context, nor by the general intent and meaning and declared 
object of the several acts of Congress relating to said ''res-
ervation." 
This view as to interpretation of the act is in accord with 
an opinion of the Supreme Court delivered in an al)alogous 
case (United States v. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 537). In that case, 
referring to a clause in act of March 3, 1807 (2 Stat., 449), viz: 
"The President of the United States shall be and is hereby 
authorized to lease any lead mine which has been or may 
hereafter be discovered in Indiana Territory for a term not 
exceeding :five years," Thompson, J., in delivering the opin-
ion of the court, says: "The authority given to the President 
to lease the lead mines is limited to a term not exceeding five 
years; this limitation, however, is not to be construed as a 
prohibition to renew the leases from time to time, if he shall 
think proper so to do. The authority is limited to a short 
period so as not to interfere with the power of Congress 
to make other disposition of the mines, should they think 
proper so to do." • 
The site for bath houses leased to Mr. Smithmeyer, jt is 
alleged, remains in the same condition as to imprlwements 
as it was at the time the original lease was made, in Decem-
ber, 1883. There bas been no possession taken by the lessee 
by virtue of the lease. If the lease is annulled by the 
joint consent of lessor and les8ee, the premises will still re-
main such a site for the building of a bath-hquse as the Sec-
retary of the Interior is authorized by the act of 1878 ,to 
lease for a period of five years. By the terms of the lease 
to Mr. Smitbmeyer be was entitled to the possession and 
enjoyment of the lea~ehold premises for the period of five 
years. 
He has been ready at all times, if permitted the free use 
and enjoyment of his grant, to fulfill his contract. The 
Government in the making of improvements on the "reser-
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vation" has interfered with him, for the time being, in the 
use and enjoyment of his grant. As up to this time he bas 
been practically dispossessed by the Government, if he de-
sires to surrender his lease the Secretary of the Interior bas 
the authority to cancel it. The Government is not injured 
thereby. If the lease is surrendered and canceled a new 
lease may be made to Mr. Smith meyer, or any person or per-
sons, in accordance with the provisions of the act. 
In reply to the inquiry as to the ownership of permanent 
improvements upon the bath-house site at the expiration of 
the lease, if the tenant should leave the premises without 
removing such permanent fixtures, and the Go ernment 
should take possession, such improvements would become 
the property of the Government. During the term of the 
leasP, however, or whilst the tenant is in the peaceable en-
joyment of the leasehold premises, he may take away what-
-ever he has erected for the purposes of trade, whether ma-
chinery or buildings. As to whether a building is erected 
for the purposes of trade does not depend upon the form or 
size of the building, or whether it is or is not attached to the 
realty by a permanent foundation. The sole question is 
whether the building was erected and was designed for the 
purposes of trade. The building may be used as a residence 
for a family, if such residence be ~rely an accessory for the 
more beneficial exercise of tire trade (Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 
Peters 137); bath-tubs, fixtures, and buildings should be re-
garded as improvements for the purposes of trade. 
" If the tenant does not exercise his privilege before his 
interest expires be can not do it afterwards; because the 
right to possess the land and fixtures as a part of the realty 
vests immediately in the landlord." (Taylor's Lanulord and 
Tenant, 433.) 
The letter of Hon. D. W. Voorhees, John Paul Jones, and 
J. L. Smith meyer to the Secretary of the Interior, dated Sep-
tember 29, 1885, with inclosures, and also the original lease to 
Mr. Smithmeyer, dated the 12th day of December, 1885, are 
herewith returned. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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APPOINTMENT OF POSTMASTERS. 
Where a post-office of either the first, second, or third class (all of which 
classes are filled by appointment by the President) is reduced to a post-
office of the fourth class (which is filled _by appointment by the Post-
master-General), the commission of the then incumbent, though he 
may not have served out the term for which he was appointed, expires, 
~nd a new appointment (by the Postmaster-General) becomes neces-
sary. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 14, 1885. 
SIR: Yours of the 1st instant submits for answer the fol-
lowing question: 
"When a post-office is reduced to a fourth-class office from 
one of the higher classes, is it necessary or proper that the 
Postmaster-General should make a new appointment, or does 
the postmaster appointed for a term hold for the residue of 
.the term for which he was appointed~" 
The fifth section of the act of July 12, 1876 (Stat. L., 19, 
80), provides "that the postmasters shall be divided into 
four classes, as follows: The first class shall embrace all those 
whose annual salaries are three thousand dollars, or more 
than ~hree thousand dollars; the second class shall embrace 
all those whose annual salaries are less than three thousand 
dollars,- but not less than two thousand dollars; the third 
class shall embrace all those whose annual salaries are less 
than two thousand dollars, but not less than one thousand 
dollars ; the fourth class shall em brace all postmasters whose 
annual compensation, exclusive of their commissions on the 
money-order business of their offices, amounts to less than 
one thousand dollars." 
The first section of the act of March 3, 1883 (Stat., 22, 600), 
lays down the rules by which the Postmaster-General shall 
" ascertain and fix" the salaries of postmasters of the first, 
second, and third class. 
The gross annual receipts of the office determine the com-
pensation of the postmaster, and in that way the class to 
which the office belongs. The first three classes include all 
offices whose gross annual income amounts to or exceeds 
$1,000. All offices with a less gross annual income belong to 
the fourth class. Section 2 lays down the rules by which the 
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compensation of the fourth-class postmasters are to be ascer-
tained. 
The act further provides : 
Section 3. "That the Postmaster-General shall make aU 
orders relative to the salaries of postmasters, and any change 
made in such salaries shall not take effect until the first day 
of the quarter next following the order." * * * 
Section 4. ''That the salaries of the first, second, and third 
classes shall be re-adjusted by the Postmaster-General; the' 
first adjustment (under this act) to take effect simultaneously 
with the reduction of the rates of postage, and thereafter at 
the beginning of each fiscal year." * * • 
These statutes are homogeneous parts of a system devised 
for regulating the salaries and keeping the accounts of post-
masters throughout the land. 
The sixth section of the act of July 12, 1876, is as follows: 
'' Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall 
be appointed and may be removed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold 
their offices for four years unless sooner removed or su&pend-
ed according to law ; and postmasters of the fourth class 
shall be appointed, and may be removed, by the Postmaster-
General, by whom all appointments shall be notified to the 
Auditor for the Post-Office Department." 
This section forms no part of the system for regulating the 
salaries and adjusting the accounts of our postmasters. The 
two classes into which it divides them are totally distinct. 
The difference between a presidential office and a depart-
mental office is the greatest that can exist between any offices 
known to the Constitution. 
For the purpose of distinguishing the postmasters who be-
long to either class this section adopts the classification of 
section 5. As we have seen, this classification is made an-
nually and based on the gross annual income of the respective 
post-offices. As the gross annual income of each post-office 
varies more or less, an office which one year is presidential 
may the next year be departmental, and vice versa. 
It was patent that each annual adjustment would result 
in transferring some officers from one class to the other. In 
full view of the fact that each annual adjustment would re-
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suit in such changes, the President is divested of and the 
Postmaster-General is invested with all authority to appoint 
and remove all fourth-class postmasters. There is no excep-
tion to this general and sweeping provision. At the begin-
ning of the first quarter after the adjustment is made, each 
post-office takes its place in the class to which by the adjust-
ment it was found to belong. It is then as fully and firmly 
established in the class to which it has been assigned as it 
ever can be. 
In making the assignment you are required to look alone 
to the gross annual income of the office for the preceding 
year. Whether or not the incumbent of the office at the 
date of the adjustment has served out the term for which he 
was appointed is of no moment, and is not a matter which 
you have· to consider in making the a:::;signment. The effect 
of the assignment of a first, second, or third class office to 
the fourth class is to abolish a presidential office and create 
a departmental office. The President and Senate can not 
appoint, remove, or suspend the incumbent of a fourth-class. 
post-office. An appointment by the President and Senate t() 
a presidential office can not confer any title to a depart-
mental office. 
It is true that Congress might have enacted that the incum-
bent of a presidential post-office should continue to be post· 
master until the expiration of his term, even though during 
the term the office was assigned to the fourth class. 
If such had been the intention of Congress, the presump-
tion under all the circumstances is of the very strongest 
character that an express provision to this effect would have 
been inserted in the lawo 
If, in a foreseen contingency, Congress intended that broad 
and general provisions should be disregarded, authority for 
such disregard would have been given in explicit terms and 
not left to inference or conjecture. 
This view is strengthened by the twelfth section of the act 
of 1876, which is as follows: "* • • and no salary of 
any postmaster where the appointment is now presidential 
shall be reduced by the compensation herein established un-
til the next re-adjustment below the sum of one thousand 
dollars." 
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Congress could have had but one purpose in thus enacting 
that a presidential office should not be reduced to a depart-
mental office until the then ''next re-adjustment." That pur-
pose was to protect the tenure of office of presidential appoint-
ees until that date. An express provision to effect this was a 
recognition by Congress that as the law stood such appointee 
might lose his office before the date therein indicated; and 
since the protection was temporary and bas never been ex-
tended, we must conclude that the legislative intent was, 
that a presidential appointee after the date fixed should lose 
his place if, under the law, his office should be assigned to 
the fourth class. 
The fact that a presidential postmaster is appointed for a 
fixed term is not evidence of a legislative intent that such 
officer shall hold a departmental office, should his office expire 
before his term. 
On the contrary, since the law provides that in a certain 
contingency the office to which be is appointed shall expire, 
without reference to the expiration of his term, such post-
master bas accepted the office with full notice that his term 
was liable to be defeated by the abolition of the office. 
From the foregoing Rtatement of the law it follows that the 
first branch of your question should be answered in the affirm-
ative and the last one in the negative. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PosTMASTER-GENERAL. 
BONDS OF ASSISTANT UNITED STATES TREASURERS. 
The form of the bond requil·ed to be given by assistant treasurers of the 
United States under section 3600~ Revised Statutes-whether the par-
ties thereto are to be jointly and severally, or may be only jointly 
bound, and whether each surety is to bind himself for the fullamount 
of the penalty, or may restrict his liability to a less amount-is not 
made the subject of statutory regulation, but is left to the determina-
tion of the officers by whom the bond is to be approved. 
But the form ordinarily made use of in practice is that wherein the prin-
cipal and sureties are jointly and severally bound for the full amouut 
of the penalty. 
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This form being preferable to any other, and its use sanctioned by long 
practice, the adoption of a different form (though it might not be in-
consistent with the terms of the statute so to do) would not be war-
ranted unless the circumstances of the particular case were such that 
the public interests could not otherwise be served. 
DEPARTMENT OF JU~TICE, 
October 17, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 6th instant inquires: "Whether 
the bonds required to be given by assistant treasurers of 
the United States, under section 3600 of the Revised Statutes, 
should in all cases be joint and several, so that each surety 
is iiable for the full amount of the bond; or whether a several 
bond can be lawfully given, in which each surety is made 
liable for a limited amount therein specified, and less than 
the amount of the penalty of the bond." To this inquiry I 
have now the honor to reply: 
The section above mentioned . provides that those officers 
"shall give bonds to the United States for the faithful dis-
charge of the duties of their respective. offices as assistant 
treasurers according to law, and for such amounts as shall 
be directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with sureties 
to the satisfaction of the Solicitor of the Treasury;" and it 
further provides that they "shall, from time to time, renew, 
strengthen, and increase their official bonds as the Secretary 
of the Treasury may direct." 
But the form of the bond to be given by them, whether 
the parties thereto are to be jointly and severally or may be 
only jointly bound, and whether each surety is to bind him-
self for the full amount of the penalty or may restrict his 
Uability to a less amount, is not made the subject of statu-
tory regulation. This appears to be left to the determina-
tion of the officers by whom the bond is to be approved. 
I observe that in the case of collectors, naval officers, and 
surveyors, the form of the bond to be given by these officers 
is prescribed by statute (see sec. 2619, Rev. Stat., as amended 
by the act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69); the form thus pre-
scribed being that of a joint and several bond in which the 
sureties bind themse1ves each for the full amount of the 
penalty. Also, by express statutory provision, the bond of 
a marshal is required to be given, "jointly and severally with 
two good and sufficient sureties," for a certain sum. 
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In the case of some other officers the form of the bond, by 
the express terms of the statute requiring it, is to be pre-
scribed by or to be subiect to the approval of the President, 
head of Department, or other officer named therein (see sees. 
1697, 3144, as amended by the act of March 1, 1879, chaps. 
125, 3153, 3tl14, 4459, and 4779, Rev. Stat). 
In most cases, however, where official bonds are required 
the form thereof is (as in section 3600, Revised Statutes) tac-
itly or impliedly left by Congress to be regulated or fixed by 
the officers by whom the bonds are to be approved (see sees. 
302, 479, 795, 1191, 1349, 1383, 1698, 2215, 3143, as amended 
by the act of March 1, 1879, chaps. 125, 3151, 3156, 3551, 3759, 
3834, 3870, 4113, and 4950, Rev. Stat.). 
So far as I am informed, the form of bond ordinarily made 
use of in practice, in all cases; corresponds with that pre-
scribed by statute as above, i. e., it is one wherein the prin-
cipal and sureties are jo-intly and severally bound for the full 
arnount of the penalty. This form is manifestly preferable to 
any other; and where its use is sanctioned by long practice, 
the adoption of a different form, though it might not, strictly 
speaking, be inconsistent with the terms of the statute, 
would not be warranted unless the circumstances of the par-
ticular case were such that the public interests could not 
otherwise be served. 
The same form is commonly used in the States, though in 
some cases sureties are allowed, under statutory regulation, 
to become severally liable for amounts less than the penalty 
of the bond. Thus in California, while all o:ffici~l bonds are 
there requited to be in form joint and several, when the penal 
sum of any bond exceeds $1,000 the sureties may become 
severally liable for port,ions of not less than $500 thereof, 
making in the aggregate at least two sureties for the whole 
penal sum (see Political Code, sees. 956, 958). Here the bond 
may contain a joint and several obligation, as regards the 
principal and each surety for that portion of the penalty to 
which the undertaking of the surety is limited; but as re-
gards the sureties inter sese the obligation of each would be 
several only. A bond in this form where several sureties 
bind themselves each jointly and severally with the princi-
pal for a part of the penalty, making in the aggregate (say) 
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double the amount thereof, may be equivalent in point of 
security to a bond wherein two sureties with the principal 
bind themselves jointly and severally for the whole penalty, 
but this depends upon circumstances extrinsic to the bond, 
namely, the sufficiency and responsibility ofindividual sure-
ties. 
While there is nothing in section 3600 that forbids the giv-
ing and accepting of an official bond thereunder in the form 
just adverted to (which I understand is the one referred to 
in the latter clause of your inquiry), and while the form of the 
bond is thereby left to the determination of the approving 
officer, yet I think the discretion of such officer, in that re-
gard, should be governed by the established practice, and 
that a departure from the latter would not be justified in any 
case unless required by public considerations. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS. 
Claims in favor of the Government, founded on judgments entered upon 
forfeited recognizances taken in the prosecution of offenses against the 
postal laws, may be compromiseu by the Secretary of the Treasury un-
der the provisions and upon the considerations imposed by section 3496, 
Revised Statu.tes. 
Such claims do not arise under the postal laws, within the meaning of 
the exception in that section. 1 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 22, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 15th instant, inclosing the petition of John Cob-
berg et al. for my consideration and such action as I may 
deem proper. 
It appears from the petition that each one of the petition-
ers forfeited a personal recognizance for his appearance as a 
witness on behalf of the Government, before the district 
court of the United States for the southern dist.rict of Illinois, 
in a criminal cause or proceeding pending therein. On these 
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forfeitures the court entered final judgments at the January 
term, 1885. 
The petitioners ask for the remission of these judgments. 
I have no authority to take any action in the premises. 
You ask that I will, in the event this conclusion is reached, 
give an opinion as to " whether in view of the exception as 
to cases (claims) arising under the postal laws, in section 
3496, Revised Statutes, these judgments can be settled by 
compromise thereunder." 
Though these judgments were entered upon recognizances 
taken in the prosecution of a " postal crime,'' they are not 
within the exception. They are not claims arising under the 
postal laws, but under the laws regulating procedure in crim-
inal cases; claims within this exception are those over which 
the Postmaster-General has jurisdiction by section 409, Re-
vised Statutes. 
I am therefore of opinion that balances due on these judg-
ments belong to the class of claims which you have authority 
to compromise under the provisions of and upon the con-
ditions imposed by section 3496, Revised Statutes. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
WITNESSES BEFORE A COURT-MARTIAL. 
Where a civilian witness is brought before a court-martial but refuses 
to testify, the court is not invested with any inherent power to pun-
ish the witness in such case, either summarily or otherwise, as for a. 
contempt. Such power can only be exercised by it when given by the 
positive terms of some statute. 
Section 1202 Revised Statutes arms the court with authority to compel 
the witness to appear and testify, so far as this can be done by process; 
but in securing his testimony the court is restricted to the means 
which it iA thus authorized to employ. It can not inflict any punish-
ment where the power t.o impose it is not clearly conferred by Con-
gress, 
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 23, 1885. 
SIR: By your letter of the 16th instant and the papers 
transmitted to me therewith, it appears that at a trial before 
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a general court-martial recently convened at Fort Clarke, 
Tex., two civilians, who were summoned and appeared as 
witnesses, refused to testify, and stood mute when their testi-
momy was sought to be elicited. The court adjuged one of 
them to be in contempt, and dismissed him from further at-
• ten dance. The other the court was directed, by orders from 
the commanding general of the military department of Texas, 
to commit for contempt in case he persisted in his refusal to 
testify. But the court upon consideration held that it had 
no legal authority to imprison or otherwise punish a civilian 
witness for obstinately standing mute when called upon to 
give testimony. 
Doubts being entertained by the judge-advocate of the 
court, and also by the commanding general, as to the cor-
rectness of this decision, the following question (suggested 
by the former) is proposed by you for my opinion thereon: 
"What remedy has a court-martial in case a civilian wit-
ness is brought before it, and refuses positively to answer 
questions which the court decides are proper for him to 
answer~" 
After careful examination of this question, I arrive at the 
conclusion that the court has no remedy-that it is not in-
\ested with power to punish the witness in such case, either 
summarily or otherwise, as for a contempt or other offense 
committed by him. 
The main purpose of the creation of courts-martial is the 
maintenance of military discipline. Their jurisdiction and 
powers are based wholly upon the Articles of War and other 
statutory provisions constituting our military code, and, in 
general, extend to those persons only who are subject to 
military law. Formerly, a citizen not in the military service, 
even when summoned only as a witness by such court, was 
not bound to obey the summons (9 Opin., 311); and it would 
seem that if he appeared, he was not bound to testify. In 
the absence of any statute making him amenable to the 
authority of the cpurt it was powerless to compel his appear-
• ance, and a fortiori to punish him for a refusal to testify. 
But by the twenty-fifth section of the act of March 3, 1863, 
chapter 79, the judge-advocate of a court-martial was 
authorized to issue process " to compel witnesses to appear 
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and testify." The same provision is reproduced in section 
1202 Revised Statutes. This is the only statutory provision 
now in force that imparts to a court-martial power to enforce 
obedience to its summons by civilians when called as wit-
nesses before it; and the inquiry here arises, whether a court-
martial derives any authority thereunder to punish a wit- • 
ness who, after having appeared, refuses to testify. 
In this connection I remark that such power has sometimes 
been expressly conferred upon courts-martial. Thus, by the 
Rules and Articles of War adopted by Congress September 20, 
1776, for the government of the American armies, an article 
contained therein provided that ''all persons called to give 
evidence in any cause before a court-martial, who shall refuse 
to give evidence, shall be punished for such refusal at the dis-
cretion of such court-martial." The terms of this article are 
broad enough to include civilian witnesses, and it was doubt-
less meant to apply to them. It -was, however, along with 
some other articles relating to courts-martial, repealed May 
31, 1786. 
Another ii_nstance of the express grant of such power to 
courts-martial, applicable to civilian witnesses, is found in 
section 4 of the act of April18, 1814, chaptPr 82, which act, 
by its terms, expired at the end of the then existing war. 
That section imposed a pecuniary forfeiture (to be recovered 
by bill, plaint, or information, in any civil court of competent 
jurisdiction) where the witne~s, after being duly summoned 
to attend the court-martial to testify before the same, failed 
to appear without reasonable excuse; and where he refused 
to testify before the court-martial, or behaved with contempt 
thereto, it empowered such court to punish him with impris-
onment. 
The inference to be drawn from these enactments is, that 
the power to punish a recusant civilian witness, a8 for a con-
tempt, is no~ inherent iB a court-martial, and that such power 
can only be exercised when authorized by the positive terms 
of some statute. 
The same view has been adopted and acted upon in the 
British service. Prior to 1800, it seems, no power existed 
there to secure the attendance before courts-mart-ial of civil-
ians summoned as witnesses. To supply such power a clause 
• 
TO THE SECRETARY OF W.A.R. 281 
W.itnesses Before a Court-Martial. 
------------ ------------~ 
was introduced into the mutiny act of that year, providing 
"that all witnesses so duly summoned as aforesaid (i. e. by 
the judge-advocate or person officiating as such), who shall 
not attend such courts, shall be liable to be attached in the 
court of king's bench, etc., in like manner as if such wit-
ness had neglected to attend on a trial in any criminal pro-
ceeding in that court." Notwithstanding this provision au-
thorized the issue of compulsory process by the courts therein 
designated to secure the attendance of witnesses before 
courts-martial, yet where the witness attended the court-
martial and refused to be sworn or to testify, such court 
could not commit. him for contempt or otherwise punish him 
for the refusal. (See Clode. Mil. Law, 1st ed., p. 126). 
This was remedied in 1830 by a further amendment of the 
mutiny act, making the witness liable to attachment as 
above, where, having attended, be refused to be sworn, or 
being sworn, refused to give·e"Vidence or to answer· all such 
questions as the court might legally demand of him. 
Recurring now to section 1202 Revised Statutes, I am un-
able to discover in this section any grant of power to punish 
a recusant witness. The judge-advocate is thereby given 
"power to issue the like process to compel witnesses to ap-
pear and testify which courts of criminal jurisdiction * * * 
may lawfully issue." This does not enlarge the power of the 
court-martial to punish, or create or give it cognizance of any 
new offense. It arms the court with authority to compel the 
witness to appear and testify~ so far as this can be done by 
process; but in securing his testimony the court is restricted 
to the means which it is thus authorized to employ. It can 
not, on grounds of supposed public expediency, or on the 
supposition that the interests of justice will thereby be pro-
moted, assume to exercise any jurisdiction beyond what is 
plainly granted, or inflict any punishment where the power 
to impose it is not clearly conferred by the laws of Congress. 
I may add that the general conclusion reached upon the 
question herein considered derives additional support from 
the provisions of the sixty-eighth article of war (Rev. Stat., 
sec. 1342). By this article Congress has given a court-
martial power to punish for contempts; but the power is in 
terms restricted to cases of acts of menace in its presence or 
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of disorder by which its proceedings are disturbed. In thus 
limiting the grant of power to certain cases designated in the 
statute, by a familiar rule of interpretation it is to be implied 
that all others were meant to be excluded therefrom. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. B. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
FINES, PENALTIES, FORFEITURES, ETC. 
The power conterred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section 26 
of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to refund" a fine, penalty, for-
feiture, exaction, or charge arising under the laws relating to vessels 
or seamen," which has been paid to any collector of customs or con-
sular officer, does not extend to the case of a fine, penalty, etc., exacted 
and paid prior to the date of that act, and of which an application for 
remission was made within a year from the date of payment. 
Nor does the power of remitting fines, penalties, etc., so arising, given by 
the same section to the Secretary of the Treasury, extend to cases 
where a competent judicial tribunal shall have decided that such fines 
penalties, etc., were legally imposed. 
DEPART:.JIENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 30, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 24th ultimo presents for my con· 
sideration the following case and questions : 
''In 1.\'Iay, 1882, the British steamer Glenelg arrived at 
Astoria, Oregon, from Hong Kong, China, having on board 
an excess of passengers in violation of section 4253, Revised 
Statutes. The master was tried in the United States district 
court for Oregon, and condemned to pay a fine of $5,200, 
which sum was paid into the registry of the court, and has 
been regularly accounted for by the collector of customs in 
that port. Hing Kee & Co., owners or agents of the vessel, 
by their attorney, applied for a remission of the fine within 
a year from the date of its collection j but the money having 
been already covered into the Treasury by warrant, this De-
partment took no action on the merits of the case, as it had 
no power to refund any part of the money, even should it 
decide that the penalty could be remitted. After the passage 
of the shipping act of June 26, 188J, chapter 121, the appli-
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cation was renewed under the twenty-sixth section of that 
act." 
Hereupon these questions are proposed: 
"(1) Does the power to refund moneys, conferred on the 
Secretary of the Treasury ·by section 26 of said act of June 
26, 1884, extend to moneys accruing from fines and penalties 
exacted and recovered prior to the passage of the act, when 
the application for a refund was made within a year from the 
date of payment thereof' 
" (2) Is a power to remit vested in the Secretary by the 
same section, in cases where a competent tribunal shall have 
decided that such fines and penalties were legally imposed ~" 
The answer to the first of these questions depends upon 
whether the provisions of section 26 of the act therein men-
tioned have or have not a retrospective operation. It is a 
well settled rule that statutes are to be construed as pros-
pective only, as intended to apply to those facts and cases 
only which come into existence after their enactment, un-
less the contrary very clearly appears either explicitly or 
by necessary implication from the language employed. In a 
recent case the Supreme Court of the United States quotes 
what was said })y the same court in the case of the United 
States v. Heth (3 Or., 413), namely, that ''words in a statute 
ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are 
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can 
be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature 
cannot be otherwise satisfied;" and it declares that such is 
the settled doctrine of that court (Chew Beong v. United 
States, 112 U. S., 559.) 
The doctrine in the case of Heth v. United States, supra, 
was applied in construing a clause in the act of May 10, 1800, 
chapter 54, which provided ''that in lieu of the commissions 
heretofore allowed by law, there shall, from and after the 30th 
of June next, be allowed to the collectors * * * two and 
a half per centum on all moneys which shall be collected and 
received by them * * * for and on account of the duties 
arising on goods impM·ted into the United States." The point 
was whether this provision included collections on account 
of goods imported before as well as after the 30th of June, 
or was restricted to collections on account of goods imported 
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after that date. It was construed to embrace the latter only. 
In commenting upon the terms of the provision, Patterson, 
J., observed: ''The word 'arising' refers to the present time, 
or time to come, but cannot, with any propriety, relate to 
time past and embrace former transactions. As to the word 
'imported,' it may comprehend the past, or future, or both, 
according to the subject-matter, and the words with which 
it is associated. Thus the word 'arising,' coupled with the 
words 'on goods imported,' shows that the whole clause has 
a future bearing and aspect, and will not justly admit of a 
retroactive construction." 
The terms of the section now under consideration are some-
what similar. They are: "That whenever a :fine, penalty, 
forfeiture, exaction, or charge arising under the laws relating 
to vessels or seamen has been paid to a:r1y collector of cus-
toms or consular officer, and application has been made 
within one year from such payment for the refunding or re-
mission of the same, " etc. Here the controlling words, de-
scriptive of the cases contemplated, appear to be "whenever 
a fine, etc., arising," etc., which seem to have a prospective 
meaning, and to be significant of an intent to include only 
such :fines, etc., as may thereafter arise. They cannot well be 
taken to comprehend such as had already arisen. The sub-
sequent words, "has been paid," are necessarily limited to 
the payment of a fine, etc., so arising; and hence to a pay-
ment made after the date of the act. Agreeably to this con-
struction, an application for refunding or remission, unless 
presented within one year from a payment so made, is not 
within the act. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be in-
ferred from the language emnloyed that Congress intended 
to go back an indefinite period of time, and provide for re-
funding payments made during such period, where the ap-
plication for remission happened to be filed within a year 
from the date of the payment, but not until after the money 
bad been covered into the Treasury. 
To the first question, I therefore reply, that in my opinion 
the power to refund, conferred upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury by section 26 of the act of J nne 26, 1884:, does not 
extend to payments of fines and penalties exacted and recov-
ered prior to the date of the act, and of which an application 
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for remission was made within a year from the date of pay-
ment. 
The second question involves an examination of section 26 
of the act of 1884 with reference to the circumstances under 
which, in the case of a fine or penalty arising as above, the 
power to refund may be exercised under its provisions. It 
declares that where the fine, etc., has been paid to any col-
lector of customs or consular officer, etc., "the Secretary of 
theTreasury7 if on investigation he finds that such fine, pen- . 
alty, forfeiture, exaction or charge was illegally, improperly, 
or excessively imposed, shall have the power, either before or 
after the same has been covered into the Treasury, to refund 
so much of such fine, penalty, forfeiture, exaction or charge 
as he may think proper, from any moneys in the Treasury 
nCft otherwise appropriated." 
This provision, in respect of the circumstances above re-
ferred to, differs very materially from the provisions for the 
remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures contained in sec-
tions5292 and 5293 Revised Statutes, and in the act of June 
22, 1884, chapter 391. Under the latter, the power of the 
Secretary to remit may be exercised, when, in his opinion, 
the fine or penalty was incurred" without willful negligence 
or any intention of fraud in the person incurring the same." 
Generally, in the cases of such fines and penalties as come 
within the scope of these statutes, it is not necessary toes-
tablish either negligence or fraud on the part of the defend-
ants, in onler to recover in prosecutions therefor; and 
hence, notwithstanding the liability to the fine or penalty is 
judicially established, the question of negligence or fraud in 
the party liable remains an open one, and (as the statute pro-
vides) may still be the subject of investigation with a view 
to the exercise of the power of remission. 
Where, however, a fine or penalty has been recovered by 
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, the ques-
tion whe.ther it was or was not "illegally, improperly or ex-
cessively imposed," is one tha!i goes to the very foundation 
of the judgment itself, and cannot well be determined ex-
cept upon a review of the proceedings wherein such judg-
ment was rendered. It may reasonably be assumed, in the 
absence of anything in the statute indicating the contrary, 
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that Congress did not intend to devolve upon the Secretary 
of the Treasury a duty of that character. The "in,Testiga-
tion" to be made by him, as contemplated by the statute, is, 
I think, limited to cases of fines, penalties, etc., exacted by 
and directly paid to the customs and consular officers them-
seh·es, without the intervention of a court. In such cases 
fines and penalties may be and often are "illegally, improp-
erly, or excessively imposed." But where the imposition of 
the fine or penalty is by the judgment of a competent court, 
the presumption is otherwise-one which, on general princi-
ples, must be regarded as conclusive of the question of the 
legality of the fine, etc., so long as the judgment stands 
unreversed. 
Accordingly, in direct answer to the second question, Ire-
ply, that in my opinion the section under consideration does 
not give the Secr.etary of the Treasury a power of remission 
"in cases where a competent tribunal shall have decided that 
such fines and penalties were legally imposed." 
I am, sir, very respectfully,. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
MEMBER OF CONGRESS. 
The provisions of sectiqns 3739, 3740, and 3741, ReYised Statutes, con-
sidered, and held that, upon a fair construction thereof, a member of 
Congress may be lawfully accepted as a surety on the bond of a con-
tractor with the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
November 2, 1885. 
SIR: In your communication of October 27, 1885, you sub-
mit for an opinion the following question: 
"Whether a member of Congress can lawfully be accepted 
as a bondsman on a contract with the Government~ " 
This question must be determined by a construction of 
sections 3739, 37 40, and 37 41 of the Revised Statutes. 
Section 3739 provides that ''no Member of or Delegate to 
Congress shall, directly or indirectly, himself, or by any other 
person in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or on his 
own account, undertake, execute, hold, or enjoy, in whole or 
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in part, any contract or agreement made or entered into in 
behalf of the United States?" 
The penalty for violation of this statute is $3,000, and the 
contract rendered void. 
Section 37 40 construes the statute as to agreements with 
incorporated companies. 
Section 3741 provides for an express condition in the con-
tract that" no Member of (or n·elegate to) Congress shall be 
admitted to any share or part of such contract or agreement, 
or to any benefit to arise thereupon." 
Section 37 42 makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of the 
United States to enter into any such contract or agreement 
with any Member of or Delegate to Congress, under penalty 
<>f $3,000. 
An opinion was rendered upon substantially the same sec-
tions (2 U.S. Stat. JJ., 484) by Attorney-General Legare. 
He says : " The act of 1808 is a singularly strict, searching, 
and comprehensive enactment, and one of my distinguished 
predecessors (Mr. Wirt) thought it ought to be so construed 
as to make it as remedial and efficacious as possible. Yet it 
is a highly penalla w ; and, besides, is in derogation of com-
mon right; on both accounts, therefore, if not to be inter-
preted strictly, at least not to be extended by any latitude 
of inference and construction. * * * The interest to dis-
qualify a member from taking, or an officer from offering a 
contract, must, in my opinion, be an immediate (however in-
direct) personal interest in its benefits. That he may ulti-
mately profit by the contract * * * is not enough." ( 4 
Opin., 48, 49.) 
The rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed is 
well established. How, then, can the above statute be so con-
strued as to extend its prohibitory provisions to bondsmen 
and sureties~ Signing a contractor's bond would not give 
the surety any immediate personal interest in its benefits. 
He is not a contractor with the Government nor does he, 
under any circumstances, become so under the statute. 
The bondsman does not become an original contractor, nor 
is there any statute which subrogates him to the right of 
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If the original contractor fails to perform his agreement, 
there is no statute that substitutes the bondsman or surety 
to the right to fulfill the same. If such right or privilege 
devolves on the bondsman, it is acquired by the terms of the 
contract, and not by the provisions of the statute. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that, upon a fair construction 
of the ~tatute7 a :Member of or Delegate to Congress may 
be lawfully accepted as a bondsman on a contract with the 
Government in the case mentioned. · 
The inclosures are returned herewith as requested. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant. 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CUST0:\18 DTJTIES. 
The expense of brokerage, auctioneer's commissions, and packing, in-
curred at the place of exportation, are, by the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121, not to be estimated in determining the dutiable value of 
imported merchandise. 
DEPART]f!ENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 3, 1885. 
SIR: I have considered your communication of the lOth 
ultimo, inclosing papers relating to the cases of Glanz v. Spald-
ing, recently decided in the United States circuit court for 
the northern district of Illinois. 
These cases, as I gather from the papers submitted, in-
volved the question whether, under the customs laws as mod-
ified by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, 
certain items of expense, hereinafter mentioned, formed part 
of the dutiable value of a lot of seal-skins which had been im-
ported into the United States. 
On the trial it appeared that, in the usual course of trade, 
the skins were bought undressed at auction in London by 
plaintiff's agent, who afterwards had them dyed and dressed 
there, and, when finished, packed and shipped to the place of 
importation. Besides the price paid for the undressed skins at 
auction, the cost of the goods to the plaintiff at the place of 
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exportation included the expense of dyeing, dressing, pack-
ing, etc., together with the auctioneer's commissions and the 
agent's brokerage, all of which items had been added by the 
customs officer in determining their dutiable value. 
The plaintiff sought to recover back so much of the duties 
paid by him on the goods as covered the items of brokerage, 
com1nissions, and packing. The court found in his favor for 
the amount of these items, and judgments were rendered ac-
cordingly. 
Upon examination of the statutes, I am unable to discover 
any ground for contesting the correctness of the judgments 
so rendered. Expenses such as those last above described 
are plainly forbidden by the act of 1883 to be estimated in 
determining the dutiable value of goods. Formerly, under 
sections 2907 and 2908, Revised Statutes, those and other 
like charges were rP-quired to be added to the actual whole-
sale price or general market value in the principal markets 
of the country of exportation in order to ascertain dutiable 
value. But that act expressly repealed these sections, and 
declared that thereafter "none of the charges imposed by 
said sections, or any other provisions of existing law, shall 
be estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to be im-
ported,'' etc. I think the judgments are in perfect harmony-
with the customs laws as thus modified. 
In my opinion, therefore, writs of error should not be prose~ 
cuted in the cases above referred to, and I hereby certify-
that no writs of error will be taken by the United State& 
therein. The papers which accompanied your communica ... 
tion are herewith returned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
273-VOL XIII--19 
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TRAVELING EXPENSES OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS. 
In the adjustment of a marshal's emolument account, he may be allowed 
credit for expenses of travel incurred by himself while serving process. 
So a deputy-marshal may be reimbursed for expenses incurred while 
serving process, and also be allowed three-fourths of the profits aris-
ing from his services. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 3, 1885. 
SIR : The communication to you from the First Comptroller, 
and by you submitted to me for opinion, presents the folio'\\-
ing questions : 
(1) Whether in the adjustment of a marshal's return of 
fees and emoluments he can be allowed credit for expenses of 
travel incurred by himself while serving process. 
(2) Whether a deputy-marshal can be reimbursed for ex-
penses incurred while serving process, and also be paid 
three-fourths of the profits accruing from his services. 
This subject is regulated by section 841, Revised Statutes, 
which provides that "no marshal shall be allowed by the At-
torney-General, except as provided in the next section, to 
retain of the fees and emoluments which he is required to 
include in his semi annual return, as aforesaid, for his pet-
.sonal compensation, over and above the necessary expenses 
<>f his office, including necessars clerk hire, to be audited and 
allowed by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury De-
partment, and a proper allowance to his deputies, any sum ex-
ceeding Hix thousaud dollars a year, or exceeding that rate for 
any time less than a year. The allowance to any deputy 
shall in no case exceed three-fourths of the fees and emolu-
ments received or payable for the services rendered by him, 
and may be reduced below that rate by the Attorney-General 
whenever the returns show such rate to be unreasonable.i' 
The general question that arises upon tllis section is 
whether it was the intention of congress that, in estimating 
the personal compensation of marshals and deputy-marshals, 
no credits representing traveling expenses necessarily in-
curred by them in the discharge of official duties should be 
allowed; in short, whether it was the intention of Congress 
that these officers should defray their own expenses of that 
kind. 
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If this question is answered in the affirmative, it must fol -
low that if the traveling expenses of a deputy marshal for ·a 
year should amount to the maximum sum he may receive for 
that period, as might well happen in some large judicial 
districts, he must be contented to have served the Govern-
ment for his actual expenses merely. And what bas been 
supposed of a deputy-marshal might be the case with a mar-
shal. .Manifestly such a reading of the law must be avoided 
if possible. 
In my opinion the statute does not call for any such con-
struction. It plainly requires that before the personal com-
pensation of the marshal shall be determined "the necessary 
expenses of his office" together with "a proper allowance to 
his deputies" shall be first deducted, and it would be a rig-
orous interpretation, indeed, which rejected the cost of travel-
ing in exe~uting process from the category of " necessary 
expenses" of the marshal's office, or which recognized such 
items as proper credits for the marshal, but not for his 
deputies. Both offices stand on the same footing in this re-
spect. The allowance of the marshal's "personal compensa-
tion" presupposes a reduction of all "necessary expenses of 
his office," as well those incurred by his deputies as by him-
self, and superadded to that the deduction of " a proper ai-
lowance to his deputies," thus showing that the compensation 
of both grades of officers was intended to come out of the 
emoluments or net earnings of the office. 
And such bas been the interpretation that the accounting 
officers of the Treasury have for many years given the law 
regulating not only tbe compensation of marshals and deputy-
marshals, but that governing the compensation of district 
attorneys and the clerks of United States circuit and district 
courts, all which are regulated in this particular in precisely 
the same langu-age, so that one principle must necessarily 
apply to al1. 
And the files of this Department show that this construc-
tion of the law was recognized by Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior Otto when the subject of marshals' compensation 
was under the control of that Department, and afterwards, 
more than once, by Mr. Attorney-General Devens. 
Such being the case, it would violate a wise principle of 
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administration to overturn a reading of the law so long 
established and appealing so powerfully to the sense of 
right, and which may well be presumed to have received 
the acquiescence of Congress. · 
In a case where two constructions of a statute are admis· 
sible tre Supreme Court has uniformly deferred to and gen-
erally treated as controlling that construction which has 
· been adopted by the proper Department of the Government 
in applying the statute, particularly where it has been longes· 
tablished. (Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wh., 206; Atkins v. Disin-
tegrating Company, 18 Wall., 301; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall., 
382; United States v-. Moore, 95 U. S., 763; United States v. 
Pugh, 99 U. S., 269 ; Swift v. United States, 105 U. S., 695; 
Hahn· v. United States, 107 U. S., 406; United States v. Gra-
ham, 110 U.S., 221; F·ive Per Cent. Cases, 110 U.S. 485.) 
It follows that the questions propounded must be answered 
in the affirmative. 
Very, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
N.A. VAL ACADEMY -HAZING. 
To constitute the offense of" hazing" at the Naval Academy, under the 
act of June 23, 1874, chapter 453, it is essential that the victim should 
be a new cadet of the fourth class. Hence, unless the charge against 
the accused alleges that the victim was a new cadet of the fourth class, 
a court-martial organized under the statute would have no jurisdic-
tion over it. An allegation that the victim was a candidate for ap-
pomtment or admission to the Academy is insufficient. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 12, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the lOth instant, inclosing'' a copy of all 
rules, regulations, and orders in force at the Naval Acad-
emy prior to and at the date of the act of June 23, 187 4, de-
fining prohibiting, or referring to the offense of hazing." 
This copy was requested in view of your communication of 
the 20th ultimo, in which you ask "my opinion as to the 
proper construction of the act of June ~3, 187 4, 'to prevent 
hazing,' with special reference to the question of jurisdiction 
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as affected by the fact that the person against whom the 
offense is committed, being a candidate for appointment, is 
not at the time a naval cadet." 
This act provides: ''That in all cases when it shall come 
to the knowledge of the Superintendent of the Naval Acad-
emy at Annapolis, that any cadet midshipman or cadet en-
gineer has been guilty of the offense commonly known as 
hazing, it shall be tile dut.y of said Superintendent to order 
a court-martial, * * * and any cadet midshipman or 
cadet engineer found guilty of said offense by said court 
sball upon recommendation of said court be dismissed, and 
such finding when approved by said Superintendent shall be 
final." * * * 
The act does not define the offense against which the pen-
alty is denounced. This is not unusual. Congress fre-
quently affixes a penalty to a common law offense by name, 
without defining it. In such cases we must look to the com-
mon law to ascertain the ingredients of the offense. The 
statute under consideration is local to the Naval Academy at 
Annapolis, and the offense named is unknown either to the 
common or statutory law of tile land. Again, the statute 
denounces an "offense," not a system or practice. Naval 
cadets could not be guilty of an "offense," unless there was 
some rule or regulation prescribed by competent authority 
to be offended. 
It is evident, therefore, that we must go to the rules and 
regulations in force at the Naval Academy of Annapolis at 
the date of the passage of this act for a definition of the 
"offense commonly known as hazing." An examination of 
the copy of them which you have furnished shows that for 
many years prior to the passage of this act there existed at the 
Naval Academy a practice among the older naval cadets of 
maltreating the new cadets of the fou~th class. This prac-
tice was forbidden by tbe orders of the Superintendent of 
the institution, and in those orders denominated as "haz-
ing." Many cadets were dropped from the roll for the offense 
of hazing, and much official correspondence about the offense 
and its punishment took place between the Superintendent 
of the Academy and the Secretary of the Navy during the 
period from October, 1865, to l\1ay, 1874. 
294 HO)I" . .A. H. GARLAND 
~aval Academy-H~zing. 
On O~tober 6, 1865, a board was appointed by order of 
the Superintendent of the Academy "to investigate the late 
disgraceful proceeding that took place on the dock near the 
Santee and Oonstit·ntion," in which it appear~ that Midship-
man Wheeler was molested for the purpose of " horsing" 
(as they express it here). T~w term ''horsing" was e,-j. 
dently used by mistake for '' hazing." This is the first time 
in which the existeuce of any system or practice kn.own as 
"horsing" or "hazing'' is recognized in any order or regu-
lation promulgated by those in authority at the Academy. 
Here the victim was a mid~hipman. 
Referring to this order the Superintendent of the Academy 
writes the Secretary of the Navy, October 18, 1865, No. 27, 
that" the practice of teasing and tormenting new midship-
men, often to the endangering of life and limb, has been 
practiced here rather too freely.'' The Secretary of the 
Navy, in reply, says: "Your No. 27, reporting midshipmen 
(naming them) of the third class for taking unwarrantable 
liberties with members of the fourth class, who have just 
entered the Academy, has been received," etc. 
The Secretary continuing, says that such conduct will not 
be tolerated. 
October 20, 1868, order No. 44 was issued by the Super-
intendent of the Academy and read at the evening parade. 
This order was directed at the practice of hazing, and was 
evoked by some cruelties practiced by inembers of the senior 
classes upon new members of the fourth class. It recites 
that'' orders have been issued in regard to the disreputable 
practice of hazing," and dismissed those midshipmen who 
were leaders in the hazing or maltreatment of the fourth-class 
midshipmen. ' 
On September 28, 1871, order No. 105 was issued by the 
Superintendent. It is as fqllows: 
"Order No. 105.] NAVAL ACADEMY, 
"Annapolis, JJfd., September 28, 1871. 
''The cruel and senseless practice which has prevailed to 
a greater or less degree amongst the senior classes of the 
cadet midshipmen in the Academy, of 'hazing' the mem-
bers of the junior or fourth clas~, is hereby positively pro-
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hibiteu. The cadet midshipmen are warned that those who 
persist in the violation of regulations, and of this orcler, and 
who are detec~ed in this practice will be reported to the Navy 
Department and their dismissal from the Academy earnestly 
recommended by the Superintendent. 
"JOHN L. WORDEN, 
'" Commodore and Superintendent of Naval Academy. 
On October 6, 1871, Order No.117 was issued. This order 
recites that " in open defiance of the regulations of the 
Academy and of the stringent order of the Superintendent of 
28th September, some evil-disposed members of the second 
and third classes have carried the senseless practice of 'haz-
ing' many of the fourth class to such an extent as to require 
the most stringent measures for its immediate suppression." 
On September 28, 1872, Order No. 109, was issued, \which is 
as follows: 
"Order No. 109.) UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY, 
"Annapol,is, Md., September 28, 1872. 
''While the Superintendent does not believe that any of 
the cadet midshipmen wi11 be so blind to their own interests, 
or so regardless of the reputation of the Academy, as to at-
tempt to re·establish the exploded and senseless practice of 
'hazing' junior classmen, he yet deems it advisable, in the 
event of his being miRtakeu in the gentlemanly instincts of 
the young gentleme-::1. to warn them, at the outset of the new 
academic year, that any violation of the regulations in that 
regard will meet with speedy punishment. For the informa-
tion of all concerned, the following extracts from letters of 
the honorable Secretary of the Navy, dated October 14 and 
November 16, 1871, are publisl;led: 
* * * * * * 
"Extract 1. 'The traditions and instincts of a naval o:ffi~ 
cer call upon him . to protect the weak, to be kind and courte-
ous to strangers, to render the service of the country as ac-
ceptable to its members as its hardships and privations will 
permit. 
" 'The Department is determined to root out the recently 
exhibited tendency to treat the incoming cadets with violence 
and inhumanity, and will punish to the extent of its power 
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------------------ ------------------
condu~t so unworthy of officers and gentlemen as that just 
shown at Annapolis.' 
• * * . * * * 
"Extract 2. 'The Secretary of the Navy learns with regret 
that the order from the Department of the 14th of October, 
visiting upon certain cadet midshipmen at the Academy the 
proper punishment for their offenses against good order and 
discipline, has failed to entirely remoYe the evil against 
which the order was directed. The Superintendent of the 
Academy reports that the barbarous and ungentlemanly-like 
practice of 'hazing' bas been renewed by certain members 
of the class which has just entered upon its second year at 
the Academy, and that not only the constant annoyance, 
but in some instances brutal treatment, to which certain of 
the newly-entered cadets had been subjected, still continues. 
* * * * * 
"Extract 3. 'Youug gentlemen selected to be educated for 
the public service at the public expense ·must realize that 
the continuance of· the national favor depends upon the 
spirit with which it is received, and that misGonduct in their 
position, like misconduct in any other office, deser"Ves and 
will inevitably be followed by· removal.' 
• * * * * *' 
''Extract 4. 'In conclusion, let it be distinctly understoo<l 
that the Academy will be purified of this disgraceful practice, 
and the defiant spirit which now invokes its action, by the 
dismissal, if necessary, of every cadet-to the "Very last-who 
refuses the fullest obedience to the regulations on this sub-
ject.' 
* * * * * * * 
"The prompt action taken ~y the Navy Department last 
year, in dismissing parties who were found guilty of" hazing," 
should be sufficient proof to others who may be tempted to 
commit like offenses, of the certain conRequenee which must 
result therefrom. !Jet this warning given in the interests of 
yourselves and of the Academy be sufficient to sa,Te you and 
your friends from the disgrace and mortification which a 
disregard to it will surely bring. 
''JOHN J.J. WORDEN, 
"Commodore and Superintendent of Naval Academy." 
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No order, rule, or regulation has been found in which the 
maltreatment by a cadet of any one other than a new cadet 
of the fourth class is denominated as hazing or made a spe· 
cific offense. 
The statute under consideration is highly penal and must 
be strictly construed. The definition of the offense commonly 
known as "hazing'' cannot be enlarged or its ingredients 
varied for the purpose of carrying out any line of policy, 
however wise, or effecting any purpose, however laudable. 
The offense commonly known as hazing, at the date of the 
passage of the act, was committed where an older cadet mal-
treated a new cadet of the iourth class. 
I am confirmed in this opinion by the interpretation put 
upon this statute by the authorities of the Naval Academy. 
In an official copy of the regulations of the United States 
Naval Academy, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 
of date January 1, 1876, I find the following: 
Section 170 (page 32), under general heaci " Internal disci-
pline,'' provides: "The practice of molesting, annoying, ridi-
culing, maltreating, or assuming unauthorized authority over 
the new cadets of the fourth class, known under the term 
. hazing, running, etc., shall subject the older cadets to 
prompt dismissal from the Naval Academy, as prescribed 
by the act of Congress and the orders of the Secretary of 
the Navy." 
I am of opinion, therefore, that to constitute the offense of 
hazing under the statute it is essential that the victim of the 
maltreatment should be a new cadet of the fourth class. 
Unless the charge on which the cadet is arraigned alleges 
that the victim of the maltreatment or hazing was a new 
cadet of the fourth class, a court-martial organized under the 
statute would not have jurisdiction to try it. If the charge 
makes the allegation and the proof fails to maintain it the 
court-martial should acquit the accused. As a candidate for 
admission to the Academy is in no sense proper or popular" a 
new cadet midshipman or cadet engineer of the fourth 
class," a charge alleging that the victim of a cadet's mal-
treatment was a candidate for admission would not come 
within the jurisdiction of a court-martial organized under the 
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statute. nor would proof that the victim wag a candidate au-
thorize conviction on a charge properly drawn. 
AU papers and documents sent me in connection with this 
matter are herewith returned. 
Very respectful1y, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
ThA SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
COMMISSIONERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS. 
The officers composing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, 
re-established by the act of June 5, 188~, chapter 195, were appointed 
in conformity to the provisions of that act, but were not commissioned 
for any stated period. · That act limited the duration of the court to 
two years ft·om the time of its organization thereunder; but, by the 
act of June 3, 1884, chapter 62, its existence was extended to December 
31, 188fi; and under the latter act tile officers of the court con tinned 
to perform their duties aft,er the expiration of the two years referred 
to, without any other appointment than that originally received: Held 
that the limitation upon the duration of the court prescribed by the 
act of 1882 was not a limitation upon the terms of the officers thereof, 
and that the court remained after the expiration of the two years lim-
ited by that act, by virtue of the act of1884, a legally constituted body, 
notwithstanding the officers composing it received no other commis-
sions than those originally given. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 14, 1885. 
SIR: Your letter of the 13th ultimo informs me that a ques-
tion has arisen in the Treasury Department " as to the legal-
ity of the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims," upon 
which you desire my opinion. Iu compliance with your re· 
quest I have now the honor to state my views upon this sub-
ject. 
The officers composing that court were appointed under 
the act of June 5, 1882, chapter 195, re-establishing it. This 
act limited the existence of the court to two years from the 
time of its organization thereunder. By the act of June 3, 
1884, chapter 62, its existence was continued and extended 
to December 31, 1885. Under the latter act eaGh of the offi-
cers of the court has, from the expiration of the two years re· 
ferred to down to the present time, continued to exercise the 
duties of the office to whieh he was appointed as above, 
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without any other commission than the one originally re-
ceived. This has given rise to the question alluded to by 
you, which I understand to be: Whether the court has been 
since the expiration of the two years mentioned, and is now, 
a legally constituted body. 
It is assumed that the doubt as to the legality of the court, 
which the suggestion of this question implies, proceeds from 
the view that the term of the incumbents, appointed as above, 
was apparently for a definite period (namely two years), and, 
if for a definite period, that Congress could not, by subse-
quently prolonging it, continue them in office after the ex-
piration of the term fixed by the law in force when their ap-
pointments were made. Here, then, it becomes important in 
the first place to inquire whether the aet of June 5, 1882, 
under which the appointments were made, prescribed a defi-
nite term for the appointees. 
By the first section of the act of 1882 the Court of Commis-
sioners of Alabama Claims, created by the act of June 23, 
187 4-, chapter 459, was re-established in the manner and with 
the obligations, duties, and powers imposed and conferred by 
said chapter, except as changed and modifi~d by this act." 
The second section of the same act provided "that the num-
ber of judges for said court, to be nominated and appointed 
in the mode directed by section 2 of said chapter, shall be 
three," etc. Section 3 provided "that the judges of the court 
hereby re-established shall convene and organize in the city 
of Washington as soon as practicable after their appointment, 
and the court so organized shall exist two years," etc. 
It w~ll be observed that the second section of the act of 
1882 declares that the judges sliall be nominated and ap-
pointed in the mode directed by section 2 of the act of 1874. 
The latter section contains nothing in regard to the appoint-
ment of the judges. Their appointment, unrler the last-men-
tioned act, is regurated by the first section thereof, and it is 
probable that Congress had in mind the provisions of this 
section when passing the act of 1882. The mode prescribed 
by the first section of the act of 187 4 is, nomination by the 
President to the Senate and appointment by him with the 
advice and consent of that body, which is the mode whereby 
the judges were actually appointed under the act of 1882. 
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Had the latter act been silent or made no valid and effective 
provision on the subject, their appointment would have con-
stitutionally devolved upon the President and Senate (6 
Opin., 1; 11 Opin., 209; 15 Opin,. 3, 449); so that it is un-
important whether the clause in the second section thereof, 
quoted above, be taken to refer to the first section of the act 
of 187 4, or be regarded as wholly inoperative, the appoint-
ments of the judges under the act of 1882 as actually made 
being in either case proper. 
Neither the act of 1874, which originally created the court, 
nor the act of 1882, by which it was re-established, expressly 
limited or defined the terms of the officers thereby authorized 
to be appointed. 
The act of 187 4, in Recti on 8, provided that " the said court 
shall exist for one year from the date of its first convening and 
organizing, and should it be found impracticable to complete 
the work of the said court before the expiration of the said 
one year, the President may, by proclamation, extend the 
time of the duration thereof to a period not more than six 
months beyond the expiration of the said one year; and in 
such case all the provisions of this act shall be taken and 
held to be the same as though the continuance of the said 
court had been originally fixed by this act at the limit to 
which it may be thus extended." The duration of the court 
was subsequently extended by proclamation of the President 
for a period of six months from July 22, 1875 (19 Stat., 661.) 
Afterwards, by act of December 24, 1875, chapter 1, its ex-
istence was continued and extended to July 22, 1876, when, 
by an act of the latter date (chapter 225), it was again con-
tinued and extended to January 1, 1877. 
In similar terms the act of 1882, in the third section thereof, 
provided that " the cottrf, * * * shall exist two years." 
This legislation limits the du~ation of t}J.e court, and, inci-
dentally, the term of each officer constituting it; as, when 
an office ceases to exist, the in cum bent is ipso facto out of 
office. But it does not restrict such term otherwise than in 
this incidental way. The judges, etc., are not thereby re-
quired to be appointed for any definite period, but only to 
the office; and, in point of fact, they were not commissioned 
for any stated time. It is manifestly intended by the statute 
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that the term of the officer so appointed shall not be for a 
fixed period, but be co-extensive with the existence of the 
office itself, which depends solely on the will of Congress, 
and may be prolonged or shortened at the pleasure of that 
body. The effect of the limitation adverted to was nothing 
more than that the court should exist for two years only, 
unles~ Congress, in the meantime, should extend its duration 
for a longer time. And when the appointments were made 
to the office without any definite term being expressed therein 
(which, as already intimated, was in conformity with tile 
statute authorizing them) it must be presumed that they were 
so made with the knowledge of the power of Congress to pro-
long the existence of the conrt, and also in contemplation of 
the possibility of Congress exercising this power and thereby 
continuing the appointees in office correspondingly. 
Instances of this sort are found in earlier acts of Congress 
and in the practice of the appointing power thereunder. 
Thus, by the act of July 13, 1832, chapter 199, to carry into 
effect the convention betwRen the United States and France 
of July 4, 1831, the President, with the concurrence of the 
Senate, was authorized to "appoint three commissioners, 
who shall form a board," whose duty it was to receive and 
examine all claims presented to them under that convention. 
The act further provided ~'that the board * * * within 
two years from the time of its meeting shall terminate its 
duties." Subsequently, by act of June 19,1834, chapter 57, 
the duration of the commission was extended to three years 
from August 1, 1832, and again by act of March 3, 1835, 
chapter 43, it was extended to January 1, 1836. The com-
missioners appointed under the act of 1832 were not (nor 
did it require them to be) commissioned for a definite term, 
and they continued in office under their original appointment 
after the expiration of the two years limited by that act, and 
during the whole period for which the existence of the com-
mission was extended by the subsequent acts mentioned. 
So, in the case of the commission created by the act of 
March 2, 1833, chapter 96, to carry into effect the convention 
between the United States and the Two Sicilies of October 
14, 1833. That act limited the duration of the commission 
to one year from the time of its first meeting. The act of 
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J nne 19, 183-t-, chapter 58, extended the time six months. 
The commissioners were not appointed for a definite term, 
and they remained in office under their original commissions 
during the extended period. 
Very different, however, is the case where Congress pre-
scribes a definite term for the appointment, and afterwards 
extends the duration of the office. Thus the act of March 3, 
1871, chapter 116, which created the Southern Claims Com-
mission, provided that the commissioners should be ''com-
missioned for two years," and they were commissioned for 
two years from March 10, 1871. The provjsions of that act, 
establishing the commission, were subsequently by the act 
of March 3, 1873, chapter 236, extended and continued in 
force for four ~·ears from March 10, 1873 .. But the commis-
sioners, on the expiration of the term for which they were 
commissioned under the act of 1871, were re-appointed and 
thereafter served under new commissions. This case well 
illustrates the difference between a law which limits the dur-
ation of an office and one which limits the term of an incum-
bent thereof. 
In addition to the instances above mentioned, showing the 
practice of the Government where offices, limited in duration, 
have been created by statute, and afterwards continued in 
existence by Congress, I may mention another, showing a 
similar practice where the office was established by treaty 
for a limited period and subsequently extended by treaty for 
a further period. The Mexican Claims Commission, created 
by the convention between the United States and Mexico, 
of July 4, 1868 (one of the commissioners being appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate), 
was originally limited in d ura.tion to two years and six months, 
but was subsequently extenJe<l from time to time by the con-
ventions of Avril 19, 1871, .November 27, 1872, and Novem-
ber 20, 1874. The comillissioner who was appointed by the 
_President under the convention of 1868 (and here the ap-
pointment was not for a definite term) continued to serve 
under his original appointment during the period for which 
the commission was subsequently extended as above. 
The result arrived at is that the limitation upon the dura-
tion of the court prescribed by the law of 1882 is not to be 
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understood as a limitation upon the term of the officers 
thereof in such sense as to restrict the latter to a definite 
period of time beyond which it can not extend, or the incum-
bents continue in office without new appointments. 
In response, then, to the general question submitted, I 
reply that in my opinion the Uourt of Commissioners of Ala-
bama Claims, re-established by the act of J nne 5, 1882, has 
been since the expiration of the two years limited by that 
act, and is now, by virtue of the act of June 3, 1884, a legally 
constituted body, notwithstanding the judges, etc., compos-
ing it were appointed under the former and before the pas-
sage of the latter act, and have received no other commis-
sions than those originally given. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE'f.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CASE OF DANIEL DONOVAN. 
D., while a clerk in the office of the Auditor of the District of Columbia, 
was appointed a referee by the Court of Claims under the provisions 
of the act of June 16, 1880, chapt,er 243, and performed services as such; 
and in consideration of such services the court issued certificates to him 
fixing the amount ot compensation allowed therefor: Held that D. is 
entitled to receive the amount thus allowed. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF .JUSTICE, 
November 18, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of five 
certificates of the Court of Claims allowing Daniel Donovan, 
a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District of Colum-
bia, ~930 for services as referee in certain suits against said 
District with a request for my opinion upon the question pre-
sented. 
Inclosed therewith is a communication addressed to "The 
. President," dated November 2, 1885, from J. B. Edmonds, 
president ofOommissioners of the District, referring to said 
certificates of Court of Claims to said Donovan for services 
as referee under appointment of said court in accordance 
304 RON • .A.. H. GARLAND 
Case of Daniel Donovan. 
with the act of June 16,1880, and stating: "Inasmuch as 
his right to receive these awards has been challenged on ac-
count of his employment as clerk in t,he auditor's office, we 
have the honor to request that this question be referred to 
the honorable Attorney-General for his opinion." 
By said act of June 1G, 1880, it is provided (inter alia) to 
wit: "When the trial of any claim against the District of 
Columbia, prosecuted under the provisions of this act, in-
volves the taking and stating of a long account, or the making 
of measurements or computations involving the services of 
engineers, said court shall have the power to award a refer-
ence to a competent referee to take and state such account, 
or .to the engineer commissioner of the District to make and 
report such measurements and computations; and said 
referee or engineer shall report to the court the evidence 
taken by him for the information of said court, and any such 
referee shall be allowed such compensation for his services 
as the court may determine, not to exceed ten dollars per 
day for time actually employed, to be paid on the order of 
the court by the Secretary of the Treasury and charged to 
tbe account of the District of Columbia." 
If Daniel Donovan is otherwise competent there is noth-
ing in said act to prevent his acting as referee in accordance 
with its provisions and receiving proper compensation there-
for whilst a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District. 
Revised Statutes~ section 17G3, provides, viz: "No person 
who holds an office the salary or annual compensation at-
tached to which amounts to the sum of two thousand :five 
hundred dollars, shall receive compensation for discharging 
the duties of any other office unless expressly authorized by 
law." · 
It does not appear from the papers presented whether or 
no the salary of Donovan amounts to the sum of $2,500. The 
offices referred to in said act are offices under the Govern-
ment of the United States. It is questionable as to whether 
a clerk in the auditor's office of the District is embraced in 
its provisions. It is not necessary to consider that question, 
however, as a referee appointed by the Court of Claims under 
the provisions of said act of June 16, 1880, does not hold an 
office under the Government embraced in the provisions of 
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said section 1763 of the Revised Statutes. ''An office is a 
public station or employment, conferred by the appointment 
of Government. The term embraces the idea of tenure, dura· 
tion, emolument, and duties." (United States v. Hctrtwell, 6 
Wall., 393.) A referee is appointed to perform a specific 
duty and as soon as that duty is performed the service ceases. 
It is a duty attached to the person selected under the said 
act of J nne 16, 1880. Should the referee die a new reference 
would have to be awarded. The referee is paid by the Gov-
ernment, but the'District is charged with the amount. It is 
his duty to be disinterested in his action and to represent 
both ·claimant and defendant. 
If the office of Douavan as clerk in the auditor's office of 
the District be assumed as embraced in section 1763 of Re-
vised Statutes, then the payment of the certificates to Don-
ovan as referee could only be disputed on the ground of 
their being for extra services. For such services, however, 
a compensation is fixed by law, and they have no connection 
with the duties of the office he holds, and should therefore 
be paid (Converse v. United States, 21 Howard, 463). In 
United States v. Brindle (110 U. S., 694) the case of Converse-
v. The United States, s~tpra, is affirmed. It is there decided 
that when duties to be performed are of a different character 
and at a different place, whilst "the exact amount of com-
pensation for the service is not fixed, it is clearly to be in-· 
ferred that such compensation as the law implies where la-
bor is performed by one at the request of another, that is to 
say, a reasonable compensation, would be paid.'' 
Converse v. The Un,ited States and The United States v. 
Brindle, supra, relate to cases em braced within the provisions 
of the act of August 31, 1852 (Stat. L., 10, 100, sec.18). Such 
section is substantially the same as He vised Statutes, section 
1763, except that it is iu terms absolutely prohibitory, whilst 
said section of the Revised Statutes assumes that a double 
office may be held and the salary of both paid, although the 
compensation of one may amount to $2,500, if " expressly 
provided by law." 
My opinion is that Donovan is entitled to the compensa-
tion claimed, so far as the objection referred to is concerned. 
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I inclose herewith the certificates above referred to, with 
accompanying papers. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
IN THE MATTER OF CLARK MILLS. 
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 10, 1885. 
SIR: The question presented to me by the papers trans-
mitted by you is, whether in the execution of the trust 
created by deed of Clark Mills under the provisions of the 
act of Congress approved March 3, 1883, any further duty 
in respect thereto devolved upon the President. 
The complete condition of the trust appears in the accom-
panying letter of Ron. A. S. Worthington, United States 
attorney, District of Columbia, to whom the matter was 
referred last summer for information. Delay in this investi-
gation has been inevitable on account of the long search 
that was necessary to be made to get at the facts. The 
money appropriated having been paid in accordance with 
the provisions of the statute, and the $10,000 properly in-
vested and secured under the supervision of the President, 
as it appears, there is no other act which the President can or 
ought to perform. The conservation of the rights of the 
cestui que trust is now with the courts. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
LOTTERIES-NON-MAILABLE MATTER. 
Letters and circulars known (not merely supposed or suspected) to con. 
cern lotteries are non-mailable, and may properly be excluded from 
the mails. 
But letters addressed to lottery associations or lottery agents cannot, 
simply because they are thus addressed, be deemed to be letters con-
cerning lotteries anu as such excluded. 
Newspapers or periodicals containing lottery advertisements are not 
thereby rendered non-mailable. 
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A postmaster cannot lawfully refuse to receive and forward registered 
packages addressed to lottery companies or persons described as agents, 
officers, or managers thereof; nor can he lawfully refuse to issue money-
orders payable to such companies or to persons described in the orders 
as agents, officers, or managers thereof. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 16, 1885. 
SIR: The questions propounded for opinion in your com-
munication of the 19th of November, ultimo, arise upon the 
following provisions of law: 
By section 3894, Revised Statutes, it is provided: "No let-
ter or circular concerning (illegal) lotteries, so-called gift 
concerts, or other similar enterprises, offering prizes, or con-
cerning schemes devised and intended to deceive and defraud 
the public for the purpose of obtaining money under false 
pretenses, shall be carried in the mail. Any person who shall 
knowingly deposit or send anything to be conveyed by mail 
in violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not 
more than five hundred dollars nor less than one hundred 
dollars, with costs of prosecution." (Rev. Stat., 758.) 
This was amended by act of July 12, 1876 (Stat., 90), by 
striking out the word "illegal" where it occurs before the 
word " lotteries." 
By section 3929, Revised Statutes, it is provided "the Post-
master-General, may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that 
any person is engaged in conducting any fraudulent lottery, 
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or of' 
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of 
any kind, or in conducting any other scheme or device for ob-
taining money through the mails by means of false or fraudu-
ient pretenses, representations, or promises, instruct postmas-
ters at any post-offices at which registered letters arrive di-
rected to any such person, to return all such registered letters 
to the postmasters at the offices at which they were orig-
inally mailed, with the word 'fraudulent' plainly written or 
stamped upon the outside of such letters; and all such letters 
so returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to 
the writers thereof, under such regulations as the Postmaster-
General may prescribe. But nothing contained in this title 
shall be so construed as to authorize any postmaster or other 
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person to open any letter not addressed to himself." (Rev. 
Stat., 763.) 
By section 4041, Revised Statutes, it is provided : "The 
Postmaster-General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him 
that any person is engaged in c·onducting any fraudulent lot-
tery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money 
or any real or personal property, by lot, chance, or drawing 
of any kind, or in conducting any otller scheme or device 
for obtaining money tllrough the mails by means of false or 
fraudulent pretences, representations, or promises, forbid the 
payment, by any postmaster, to any such person of any 
postal money order drawn to his order or in his favor, and 
may provide oy regttlation for the return to the remitter of 
the sums named in such money-orders. But this shall not 
authorize any person to open any letter not addressed to 
himself." (Rev. Stat., 778.) 
By the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 360, sec. 20), it is pro-
vided: 
"That mailable matter of the fourth-class shall embrace 
all matter not embraced in the first, second, or third class, 
which is not in its form or nature liable to destroy, deface, 
or otherwise damage the contents of the mail-bag, or harm 
the person of any one engaged in the postal service, and is 
not above the weight provided by law, which is hereby de-
clared to be not exceeding four pounds for each package 
thereof, except in case of single books weighing in excess of 
that amount, and except for books and documents published 
or circulated by order of Congress, or official matter emanat-
ing from any of the Departments of the Government, or from 
the Smithsonian Institution, or which is not declared non-
mailable under the provision of section thirty-eight hundred 
and ninety-three of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the 
act of July twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, or 
matter appertaining to lotteries, gift concerts, or fraudulent 
schemes or devices." 
The first question is as follows: Whether these several 
statutes render non-mailable letters and circulars concerning 
lotteries. 
As section 3894 (supra) prohibits the carrying in the mail 
of any letter or circular concerning lotteries, and makes it 
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penal to send anything in violation of the said prohibition, it 
follows that letters and circulars known, and not merely sup-
posed or suspected, to be concerning lotteries, are non-mailable. 
The second question is as follows: Is it the duty of post-
masters to withdraw from the mails such letters as they know 
to be concerning lot<teries, and such circulars as they find 
upon examina~ion to be concerning lotteries, etc. ~ 
Unsealed circulars may, by inspection, be knotrn to con-
cern lotteries or not, and when they do may be properly with-
held from the mails, as prohibited matter, and so may letters, 
if known to concern lotteries. It must, however,' be in rare 
instances that the contents of letters can be known, as they 
are generally sealed and in\iolable. 
The third question is in these words: When letters are ad-
dressed to lotteries, lottery associations, or persons described 
in the addre~:<s as the agents of lotteries, or of lottery or sim-
ilar schemes, can postmasters lawfully withdraw them from 
the mails as letters concerning lotteries~ 
I think this must be answered in the negative The stat-
ute does not warrant any such action touching letters of the 
kind mentioned. It does not follow that a letter addressed 
to a lottery association concerns a lottery. , 
The fourth question is as follows: Are newspapers and 
periodicals, otherwise entitled to pass in the mails as second-
class matter, rendered non-mailable when they publish, in 
their regular columns, advertisements of lotteries, or similar 
schemes for distribution of money or property by lot or 
chance or offering prizes~ 
I do not think that a newspaper or periodical is rendered 
non-mailable by containing a lottery advertisement. This 
does not transform the newspaper into a ''circular" within 
the purview of section 3894 (supra). 
The fifth question is in the words following: Can post-
masters lawfully refuse to receive and forward registered 
packages addressed to lottery companies or to persons de-
scribed as agents, officers, or managers of lotteries or other 
similar enterprises offering prizes~ 
This should be answered in the negative. The law, section 
3929 (supra), does not go so far. It authorizes the return of 
regist,ered letters addressed to parties found and declared by 
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the Postmaster-General, upon satisfactory evidence, to be 
engaged in conducting a "fraudulent lottery." To reject such 
matter as
1 
non-mailab-le would be to violate the statute, which 
must be interpreted by its own words, and, furthermore, 
would be to assume an identity between a lottery and a 
fraudulent lottery, in the face of a seeming distinction be-
tween the two in t.he statute. 
The sixth question is in these words: Can postmasters law-
fullyrefuse to sell money-orders payable to lottery companies, 
or to persons described in the orders as agents or officers of 
such companies or concerns f 
This question must be answered in the negative. Section 
40!1, supra, cannot be so extended by implication. Its words, 
which are plain, must have their ordinary sense and cannot 
be understood to warrant the denial of an application for a 
money-order to be made payable to a lottery dealer. The law 
goes no further than to authorize 1;he Postmaster- General to 
order the refusal of payment of any money-order payable to 
a person who has been found, upon satisfactory evidence, by 
him, the Postmaster-General, to be engaged in conducting a 
"fraudulent lottery." 
The seventh question is as follows: Has the Postmaster-
General any legal authority, upon being satisfied that a con-
cern or company is conducting a lottery, gift-enterprise, or 
scheme for the distribution of property by lot, chance, or 
drawing of any kind, to forbid postmasters generally from 
registering packages or selling money-orders made payable 
to such concerns, or to their known agents, on the ground that 
it is unlawful to convey in the mails any matter-that is, con-
cerning lotteries ~ 
If a letter is known to contain matter concerning a lottery 
it may be withheld from the mail. But it does not follow, 
necessarily, that a registered package addressed to a lottery 
dealer, or a money-order made payable to him, appertains to 
his business of lottery dealing. Such evidence certainly would 
not sustain a prosecution for sending by mail a letter concern-
ing lotteries. I think, therefore, this question must be an-
swered in the negative. 
In answering these questions, I have proceeded on the prin-
ciple that the legislation in question should not be extended 
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by construction. It is to some extent penal and very much 
in derogation of the general right to use the mails, and, upon 
a well-settled rule, nothing should be held to be within such 
laws that is not embraced by the very words of the legisla-
ture, or, to borrow the language of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, when speaking of the construction of penal 
statutes," the words employed must be understood in the 
sense they were obviously used." (United States v. Reese, 92 
U.S., 219; Sedg. Stat. and Con. Law, 250,302, 329; Bishop 
on Written Laws, sec. 119.) 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER GENERAL. 
CASE OF ASSISTANT SURGEON POPE. 
A discharge of an officer from the military service, under the act of July 
15, 1870, chapter 294, in order to be valid, must, like a resignation, be 
founded on an offer on the one part and an acceptance on the other. 
Accordingly, where Assistant Surgeon P., in September, 1870, offered to 
taketh~ benefit of that act, and in November following his offer was 
virtually rejected, an order subsequently (in December, 1870) issued 
discharging him from service is held to be invalid and his status in the 
service unaffected thereby. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 19, 1885. 
SIR: Your communication of the 30th October, 1885, has 
received my consideration. 
The case presented by it is as follows: In September, 1870, 
Benjamin F. Pope, then an assistant surgeon in the United 
States Army, applied for a discharge, with a year's pay, under 
section 3 of the act of 15th July, 1870 (16 Stat., 317), which 
provides "that the President be, and he is hereby, author-
ized, at his discretion, honorably to discharge from the service 
of the United States officers of the Army who may apply 
therefor on or before the first of January next, and such offi-
cers so discharged under the provisions of this act shall be 
entitled to receive, in a,ddition to the pay and allowances du~ 
them at the date of their discharge, one year's pay and allow-
ances." 
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On the 2d November, 1870, he was informed that staff of-
ficers would not be discharged with the pay and allowances 
granted by the said act. 
Afterwards it was decided to discharge staff officers at their 
own request under the law, and, accordingly, on the 31st De-
cember, 1870, an order was issued discharging Assistant Sur-
geon Pope on his original application. 
But upon receipt of this order Pope represented that he no 
longer de~ired a discharge, and that on the rejection of his 
application he bad made arrangements to continue in the 
service, and that, under the circumstances, the order was un-
just to him. 
As a consequence of this representation the order of dis-
charge was revoked on the 17th June, 1871, since which time 
the officer has continued to render service and receive pay. 
On the 16th September, 1885, a vacancy, with the rank of 
major, occurred in the 1\fedical Department, and, as Assistant 
Surgeon Pope was at the head of the list of his grade for pro-
motion, he was appointed to fill the vacancy, subject to the 
action of the Senate. 
Upon this state of facts my opinion is asked as to the 
status of Pope. 
A discharge under the act of the 15th of July, 1870, to be 
valid, must, like a resignation, be founded on an offer on the 
one part and an acceptance on the other. (14 Opin., 261.) 
There must, as in the case of an ordinary contract, be a meet-
ing of the minds of the officer and the President upon the 
same identical proposition, or no valid dischargt can be the 
result. 
Applying these principles, then, to the case in hand, it is 
manifest tbat the order of the 31st December, 1870, discharg-
ing Assistant Surgeon Pope was inoperative and void for 
the want of a subsisting offer or proposal on that officer's 
part to take the benefit of the law. After the rejection of 
the offer of September, 1870, it cannot be regarded as con-
tinuing to be accepted afterwards whenever the President 
might see fit, but must be treated as at an end at the moment 
of its rejection. As was said by the vice-chancellor in the 
case of the Sheffield Canal Oo. v. Sheffield & Rother ham Rail-
wa.y Go. (3 Rail way and Canal Cases, 132), the party who has 
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rejected the offer cannot afterwards at his own option con-
vert the same offer into an agreement by acceptance; for 
that purpose he must have the renewed consent of the party 
who made the offer. I am, therefore, of opinion that the 
status of Surgeon Pope has not been affected by the order 
made with a view to his discharge. 
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DEDUCTION FROM PAY OF MAIL CONTRACTORS. 
The power conferred upon the Postmaster-General by section 3962 Re-
vised Statutes to make deductions from the pay of mail contractors 
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary. 
Where a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General and he 
afterwards becomes satisfied that the order was made under a mis-
apprehension of the facts, it is within his power either to directly 
rescind the order or to refer the matter to the Sixth Auditor under the 
provisions of section 409 Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Decmnber 21, 1885. 
SIR: I have the J;tonor to acknowledge receipt of your 
eommunication of the 14th instant (with inclosures) request-
ing my opinion upon the proper construction of section 3962, 
Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: 
'' The Postmaster-General may make deductions from the 
pay of contractors for failure to perform service according to 
contract; and impose tines upon them for other delinquen-
cies; he may deduct the price of the trip in all cases where 
the trip is not performed ; and not exceeding three times the 
price if the failure be occasioned by the fault of the con-
tractor or carrier." 
The case presented by you is that of "a deduction of the 
price of a trip recently made from the pay of the Chicago, 
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company for failure to per-
form a round trip August 24, 1885, on the route of the com- · 
pany from Creston to Hopkins, 1\lo., 27007." 
You say: "The company has now shown by satisfactory 
evidence that the failure was caused by the washing away 
of a hridge on the line of their road, and that it was impos-
sible to have run their trains through on that date. The 
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mails thus delayed were carried by the company the next 
day. They apply for the remission of the deduction, and if 
such deduction were discretionary, in the first instance, or if 
it can be remitted after having been ordered, there is mucl1 
force in the application of the company for such remission.'' 
In construing the language of this statute the universal 
rule, of course, must be applied in presuming the ordinary 
meaning of words, unless that meaning would manifestly 
defeat the objects of the statute. The word "may" in a 
statute sometimes means "must" or "shall," but this is only 
the case when in giving it its ordinary meaning the object of 
• the statute would be destroyed. When power is given to 
public officers, and when public or individual rights call for 
its exercise, language used, permissive in form, is in fact per-
emptory, but this is only so where it is necessary to give 
effect to the clear policy and intention of the legislature. 
(Sedgwick on Construction, 375-377; Thompson v. Carroll, 22 
How., 434; Bishop on Written Law, sec. 112.) 
The words used in the statute under consideration in their 
plain ordinary meaning permit the exercise of discretion on 
the part of the Postmaster-General. 
The question presented is not that of performance or non-
performance'' according to the contract." A case might arise 
when both parties to the contract being innocent, the work 
not being performed, it should not be paid for, but this is not 
the only case which may occur under the statute. There 
may be performance, although not performance '' according 
to the contract," yet if the contractor l.s innocent of fault and 
the public service does not suffer, a proper question arises for 
the discretion of the Postmaster-General. The public inter-
ests, it seems, would not suffer by the exercise of such dis-
cretion on the part of the Postmaster-General in the matter 
of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, 
presented in your letter. Where the contractor is in fault 
there can be no question but that under the terms of the 
statute the Postmaster-General has discretion. I fail to per-
ceive that either the public interests or individual rights de-
mand that language permissive in this statute should be re-
garded as in fact peremptory. A similar question was 
presented to one, of my predecessors (14 Opin., 179), and I 
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 315 
Customs Duties. 
concur in his conclusion that it is within your discretion to 
make de~uctions or not from the pay of contractors accord-
ing to what may appear right and-proper under the circum-
stances in each case . 
.A further question is presented. Can the deduction be 
remitted, having been ordered ' 
No such power is expressly conferred by the statute. A 
remission of a forfeiture under an act of Congress must be 
supported by the terms of the act, and it is a familiar rule 
that the acts of a public officer beyond the scope of his power 
are void. The deduction provided for in the act under con-
sideration, however, is not, where the contractor is innocent 
of fault, in the technical sense either a forfeiture or penalty, 
but it is the withholding of money not earned. If the Post-
master-General becomes convinced the order was made under 
a misapprehension of the f~cts and the amount is in justice 
due to the contractor under his contract it is within the scope 
of the power of the Postmaster-General either to directly re-
scind his order or refer the matter to the Sixth Auditor under 
the provisions of section 409, Revised Statutes. 
It does not appear from your communication whether the 
railroad company mentioned is an ordinary contractor, or 
whether it is merely performing what is called "recognized 
service." In either case, however, I think it is clear the 
railroad company can be regarded as a contractor, and is 
therefore within the terms of the statute. (Railroad Oom-
pany v. United States, 101, U.' S. p. 549.) 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER·GENERAL. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Periodical publications bound in stiff covers in regular book form (each 
volume containing several numbers of any such publication) lose their 
character as periodicals and become dutiable as books under the act of 
March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 21, 1885. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your letter bearing date 18th instant as to the 'matter of 
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the dutiable character of certain books. It appears that 
there was recently imported atNewYorkanumberofbound 
volumes, in stiff covers, of the Statesman's Year Book, 
Portfolio Library of Art, Tour du Monde, Hugo Raconde, 
and Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society, all of which 
publications are issued in parts at regular stated periods, 
but in the present instance having been bound in stiff covers 
in regular book form, each volume containing several of the 
periodical numbers, they were classified as books under the 
provision of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, for ''books, 
pamphlets," etc. (paragraph 384), and in accordance with the 
decision of the Treasury Department of April3, 1884. 
I am of opinion that the said publications, having been 
bound in stiff covers in regular book form, lost their char-
acter as periodicals and became books in the sense of 
the tariff act. Schedule M of the tariff act of 1883 im-
poses a duty of 25 per cent. ad valorem upon '~books, 
pamphlets," etc. I concur with the Department that the 
provisions of the free list relating to periodicals refer to 
such as are forwarded in the usual manner, and not to 
pamphlets which have been bound into books before their 
importation into the United States. Therefore I am not 
prepared to advise any reversal or modification of the de-
cision of April3, 1884~ series 6288. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
STATE OF KANSAS-ACT FOR RELIEF OF. 
In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 305, the preamble thereto 
may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the 
enacting clause. 
In compliance with the provisions of that act, the State is entitled to a 
credit of $11,425 thereunder, and no more. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 28, 1885. 
Sm: Yours of December 23, instant, requesting an opinion 
as to the proper construction of the act of Congress approved 
August 15, 1876, entitled "An act relieving the State of K~n-
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sas from charges on account of ordnance stores furnished to 
Kansas Territory" (19 Stat., chap. 305, p. 206), has been 
received. 
If the preamble and enacting clause of this statute are to 
be construed together, the intention of Congress is easily as-
certained. The preamble recites that-
" Whereas it appears from the books of the Ordnance Bu-
reau of the War Department that the State of Kansas stands 
charged with eleven thousand four hundred and twenty-:fiTe 
dollars for arms issued to the Territory of Kansas." * • • 
The enacting clause direct~ • • • "the State of 
Kansas to be credited on its ordnance account with the 
amounts now charged against it for arms and ordnance 
stores." • * * • 
The preamble states in unequivocal language the amount 
with which the State of Kansas was charged at the date of 
the passage of the act, and the enacting clause directs a 
credit for th~ amounts so charged. It is evident that it was 
the intention ofCongress that the amount named should be 
the extent of the credit, and that the provisions of the act 
should be restrained to the recitals in the preamble. 
What effect has the preamble upon the interpretation of 
this statute~ 
''It becomes important in ascertaining the general intent 
of the legislature." 
It may explain an equivocal expression in the enacting 
c]ause, seldom extends it, and in doubtful cases may restrain 
it. 
Lord Coke considered the rehearsal or preamble a key to 
open the understanding of the statute. 
"Recitations in the preamble must be accepted as at least 
prinw facie and perhaps conclusively correct. * • • 
When viewed as a key to the interpretation they should in 
reason be deemed conclusive of the recited facts, because, 
whether really true or not, they explain the legislative per-
spective in enacting the statute." 
"And whether the words shall be restrained or not must 
depend on a fair exposition of the particular stat~te in each 
particular case, and not upon any universal rule of construc-
tion." (Bishop on the Written Law, secs.49,50,51, and notes.) 
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"Parker, chief-justice, lays down the rule that it is right 
and proper to consider the whole of a statute and p'reamble 
and the probable intention of the legislature, in order to as: 
certain the meaning of any particular section, and that this 
mode of interpretation is justifiable, even where the words 
of the section may be unambiguous." (Smith's Cpmmenta-
ries, sec. 571, p. 707 ; 1 Pickering's Reports, 258.) 
"But though the preamble can not control the enacting 
part of a statute which is expressed in clear and unam bign-
ous terms, yet, if any doubt arise on the words of the enact-
ing part, the preamble may be resorted to to ex1Jlain it. In 
truth, it then resolves itself into a question of intention; or, 
in other words, recourse is had to the primary rules of inter-
pretation." (Potter's Dwarris, p. 269.) 
It is plain, therefore, from the above references that re-
course may be had to the preamble in this case to ascertain 
the intention of Congress in the passage of the act, and also 
for a proper interpretation of the enacting clause. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the preamble in the act 
under consideration should be resorted to for the purpose 
of interpreting the enacting clause, and that the State of 
Kansas, when it has complied with the provisions of such 
act, is entitled to a credit of $11,425 thereunder, and no 
more. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
SUSPENSION OF OFFICER. 
Case of the suspension of Marshall B. Blake as collector of internal rev-
enue for the second district of New York, and the designation of John 
A. Sullivan to perform the duties of that officer, considered. 
The suspension of an officer involves a suspension of his bond; the bond 
required of the person designated to take the place of the former be-
ing substituted therefor while the person so designated is performing 
the duties of the office. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 28, 1885. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
letter of Ron. JosephS. Miller, Commissioner of Internal Rev-
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enue, relating to the appointment of John A. Sullh·an to 
succeed Marshall B. Blake as collector of iuternal revenue for 
the second district of New York, which has been referred by 
yourself to this Department with the request that immediate 
attention may be given to the same. 
It appears from the st~tement of facts submitted that the 
commission of Mr. Sullivan and the order of the President 
suspending Mr. Blake from the office of collector, both being 
dated December 2,1885, were sent by mail on the 3d day of 
December, 1885. On the 15th of December the bond of John 
A. Sullivan as collector of internal revenue for the second 
district of New York, dated December 10, 1885, was received 
and found to be correct. 
On the same day Mr. Sullivan's commission was delivered 
to him in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
with a letter of instructions advising him that the office of 
collector would be transferred to him December 31, 1885, 
and inclosing a letter addressed to Mr. Blake, directing him 
to turn over the office to his successor. A separate letter 
was mailed to Mr. Blake directly on December 15, 1885, ad-
vising him of the date fixed for the transfer. 
Under section 2, Article II, ofthe Constitution, the Presi-
dent has power to nominate and, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to appoint all officers of the United 
States whose appointments are not therein otherwise provided 
for and which shall be established by law. 
The office of collector of internal revenue was created by 
act of Congress, and belongs to a ~lass which requires the 
concurrence of the Senate in the appointment of the incum-
bent. The tenure of the office is not fixed by law, and the 
Constitution, while providing for appointments, is silent as to 
the power of removal. On general principles it would seem 
that the power of appointment carries with it the power to 
remove as a necessary incident. (See 103 U. S~, 227.) 
Before entering upon his office the President is required 
to take an oath that he will faithfully e~ecute it, and one of 
the obligations imposed upon him by section 3, Article II, of 
the Constitution, is to" take care that the laws be faithfully 
.executed." · 
The appointment and suspension of the incumbents of such 
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offices as have been created to enable him to perform this 
duty is his especial function. It is also his prerogative to 
commission all the officers of the United States. The power 
of the President to remove an officer, whose appointment re-
quires the approval of the Senate, without t_hat approval, 
has been much discussed. Until the enactment of the tenure 
of office act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 430) it seems to have 
been virtually conceded by Uongress (Story on the Constitu-
tion, sees. 1537, 1545), and the Supreme Court has accepted 
the legislative action as amounting to a settled construction 
of the Constitution in favor of the power. (Ex parte Hennen,. 
13 Pet., 230.) In that case the co11rt say : 
''All offices the tenure of which is not fixed by the Con-
stitution, or limited by law, must be held either during 
good behavior or (which is the same thing in contemplation 
of law) during the life of the incumbent, or must be held at 
the will and discretion of some Department of the Govern-
ment and subject to removal at pleasure. It can not for a 
moment be admitted that it was the intention of tl.Je Con-
stitution that those offices which are denominated inferior 
offices should be held during life. And if removable at 
pleasure, by whom is such removal to be made¥ In the ab-
sence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation 
it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consiUer , 
the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment. 
This power of removal from office was a subject of much 
dispute, and upon which a great diversity of opinion was 
entertained in the early history of this Government. This 
related, however, to the power of the President to remove 
officers appointed with the concurrence of the Senate; and 
the great question was, whether the removal was to be by the 
President alone or with the concurrence of the Senate, both 
constituting the appointing power. No one denied the power 
of the President and Senate jointly to remove where the 
tenure of office was not fixed by the Constitution; which was 
a full recognition of the principle that the power of removal 
was incident to the power of appointment. But it was Yery 
early adopted as tbe practical construction.of the Constitution 
that this power was vested in the President alone, and such 
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would appear to have been the legislative construction of the 
Constitution." (See also 103 U. S., 227.) 
But in the determination of the question now submitted 
it is not necessary to discuss the power of the President to 
remove from office. This is not a case of removal but of sus-
pension. Secti0n 1768 of the Revised Statutes provides as 
follows: 
"During any recess of the Senate the President is au-
thorized, in his discretion, to suspend any civil officer ap-
pointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
except judges of the courts of the United States, until the 
end of the next session of the Senate, and to designate some 
suitable person, subject to be removed in his discretion by 
the designation of another, to perform the duties of such 
suspended office in the mean time; and the person so desig-
nated shall take the oath and give the bond required by law 
to be taken and given by the suspended officer1 and shall, 
during the time he performs the duties of such officer be en-
titled to the salary and .emoluments of the office, no part of 
which shall belong to the officer suspended. The President 
shall, within thirty days after the commencement of each 
session of the Senate, except for any office which in his 
opinion ought not to be filled, nominate persons to fill an 
vacancies in office which existed at the meeting of the Senate,. 
whether temporarily filled or not, and also in the place of all 
officers suspended ; and if the Senate during such session 
shall refuse to ad·\ise and consent to an appointment in the: 
place of any suspended officer, then, and not otherwise, the 
President shall nominate another person ~s soon as practi-
cable to the same session of the Senate for the office." 
The Senate was in recess on the 2d of December, 1885, 
when the commission of Mr. Sullivan and the order suspend-
ing Mr. Blake were issued. When the President commis-
sioned the one and suspended the other he exercised the dis-
cretionary authority which had been vested in him by an 
act of Congress, and which he bad the undoubted right to 
exercise with or without cause. It is fair to presume that 
cause existed. At any rate the enactment of the law already 
quoted furnishes conclusive evidence that in the judgment 
of Congress the President can not properly perform his duty 
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under the Constitution during the recess of the Senate with-
out the power to suspend and thereby dispense with the serv-
ices of such officers as in his opinion the public interests 
may require. 
Whatever effects might be considered to result from the 
act of suspension, it can not be seriously contended, I think, 
that the bond of the suspended officer remains in force after 
his suspension and while the person designated to fill the office 
in the mean time is performing its duties and receiving its -
emoluments. The suspension of the officer carries with it 
necessarily the suspension of his bond. The bond required 
of the person designated to take his place is substituted for 
the bond of the suspended officer while the person so desig-
nated is performing the duties of the office. 
It appears that the order suspending Mr. Blake was sent 
to him on the 3d of December, 1885, and it is reasonable to 
suppose that he received it in due course of mail. The Senate 
was not in session until the 7th of December, 1885. The 
-order of suspension took effect upon due notice thereof to 
Mr. Blake, unless by its terms it was to take effect at a stated 
time after notice. The receipt of the order by Mr. Blake 
was due notice. (15 Opin. 62.) In my opinion he can not 
,properly or legally resist the transfer of the office to lVlr. Sul-
livan. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTIABLE VALUE OF IMPORTS. 
The values of foreigu coins, as annually estimated and proclaimed by 
the Secretary of the Treasury under the provision of section 3564, Re-• 
vised Statutes, constitute the only lawful basis for computing the in-
voiced value of importations, and duties on the latter are necessarily 
required to be collected on the values of foreign coins so estimated and 
proclaimed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Decembe-r 29, 1885. 
SIR: In your letter of the 26th instant you direct my at-
tention to. section 3564, Revised Statutes, which prescribes 
• 
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the rule for determining the value of foreign coin as expressed 
in the money ofaccountofthe United States, and after observ-
ing that, in consequence of the decline in the price of silver, 
the values of different foreign silver coins, as annually pro-
claimed by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provis-
ions thereof, have greatly declined, and that this has had the 
efl:'ect of reducing the duty exacted on merchandise invoiced 
in such currency, you inquire whether that section necessa-
rily requires the duties upon imported merchandise to be col-
lected on the values of the standard foreign coins as thus 
annually proclaimed. To this inquiry I have the honor to 
reply: 
By section 2838 all invoices of imported goods subject to 
a duty ad valorem are required to be made out in the cur-
rency of the place or country whence imported, and in order 
to determine the dutiable value of such goods it is necessary 
to ascertain the value in United States money of the cur-
rency in which they are invoiced. 
Prior to the passage of the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 
268, a number of statutory provisions existed fixing the rates 
at which foreign coins were to be estimated in computations 
at the custom-house-some prescribing rates for estimating 
the value of particular coins only, others rates for estimating 
the value of the particular coins enumerated therein, and 
also a mode for estimating the value of such as were not 
therein enumerated. But in the case of The Collector v. 
Richards (23 Wall., 246) the Supreme Court declared that 
the provisions of that act abrogated all previous regulations 
on the subject, and it accordingly held that the value of the 
French franc, as estimated by the Director of the Mint and 
proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury on January 1, 
1874, pursuant to the first section of the act, were applicable 
to goods invoiced in French francs and entered at the cus-
tom-house in March of that year, and that the invoiced value 
of such goods must be computed according to the valuation 
of the franc so proclaimed. This valuation exceeded by 7 
mills the value of the franc as fixed by previous legislation, 
and the effect was in that case to increase the duty upon the 
goods. 
In construing the first section of the act of 1873 (which was 
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the one involved in the case then under consideration) it was 
observed by the court that that section and the second sec-
tion of the same act had substantially the same objects in 
view; that the object of the first section was to establish a 
method of computing the value of other foreign coins, similar 
to that employed in the second section in computing the value 
of the sovereign, and to apply such computation in the same 
cases and for the same purposes, amongst which is that of com-
puting the value of invoices of imported goods. "Otherwise," 
remark the court, "there would exist two different methods of 
computing the values of foreign coins and two different rules 
for estimating the values of goods imported frbm different 
countries, giving a different value to goods imported from one 
country from that given to goods of the same cost imported 
from another country.'' And this case has been on two differ-
ent occasions cited with approbation by the Supreme Court. 
(Cramer v. Arthur, 102 U.S., 612; Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U. 
s., 25.) 
The provisions of the first and second sections of the act of 
1873 are reproduced witho~t change in sections 3564 and 3565, 
Revised Statutes-section 3564 containing those of the first 
section. 
The construction put by the Supreme Court upon the first 
section of that act applies with all its authoritative force to 
section 3564. According to that construction the values of 
foreign coins, annually estimated and proclaimed as required 
by the latter section, must be regarded as being the only law-
ful basis for computing the invoiced value of importations. 
In my opinion, therefore, that section necessarily requires 
the duties upon importal merchandise to be collected on the 
values of the standard foreign coins annually estimated and 
proclaimed as above. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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LOTTERIES. 
Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfactory to 
himself, that any lottery,gift-enterprise, or scheme is a means of fraud-
ulently obtaining money through the mails, he is not authorized to 
instruct postmasters to return registered letters or to forbid them to 
pay money-orders because the same are addressed or made payable to 
an individual conducting such lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 7, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit, in reply to your commu-
nication of the 21st December, ultimo, that in my opinion 
the Postmaster-General has no right to instruct postmasters 
to return registered letters or forbid them to pay money· 
orders because addressed or made payable to an individual 
conducting a lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme for the distri-
bution of money or property by lot, chance, or drawing of any 
kind, until be has found,'' upon evidence satisfactory to him," 
that such lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a means of 
obtaining money through the mails by falsehood and false 
pretense. 
I think it beyond doubt that Congress, in section 3929, 
Revised Statutes, intended to draw a distinction between lot-
teries, etc., fairly, and lotteries, etc., dishonestly conducted. 
· I do not think that, because a lottery or gift-enterprise or 
scheme for the distribution of property may be illegal by the 
law of the State where it is carried on, it is, for that reason 
alone, fraudulent under section 3929 (supra), it being clearly 
the intention of Congress, as I have said already, that before 
the above-mentioned mail facilities can be denied to persons 
carrying on lotteries, etc., it must be shown that their busi-
ness involves a use of those facilities for obtaining money 
fraudulently. 
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfrllly, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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PERSONAL EFFECTS-FORFEITURE. 
Where an importation of packages was entered at the custom-house as 
containing personal effects only and not subject to duty, but it turned 
out on examination that the packages contained dutiable merchandise 
of considerable value: Held that the entire packages were not for-
feitable but only the dutiable merchandise; the case being governed 
by section 2802, Revised Statutes, which is unaffected by the provisions 
of section 12 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 13, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 7th January, instant, has 
received my consideration. 
The case submitted for opinion is this: One F. Abbes has 
entered in the custom-house at the port of San Francisco an 
importation of nine ca~:;es as containing personal effects, and 
therefore non-dutiable. It turns out, however, that only four 
of the cases contained goods entitled to free entry, and that 
the other five contained dutiable merchandise of considera-
ble value. The questions presented on these facts are: Sup-
posing the dutiable merchandise to be forfeitable, are the 
personal effects also liable to seizure under t.he provisions of 
section 12 of the act of the 22d June, 1874 (18 Stat., 186), or 
by virtue of any other f:.ltatute, and ''does a forfeiture attach 
to an entire package of imported merchandise when any por-
tion of its contents is liable to forfeiture by a false entry or 
false statement in an invoice, or by omission from such in-
voice for the purpose of evading payment of duties." 
In my opinion the personal effects referred to are not con-
fiscable with the dutiable merchandise, should that be held 
liable to condemnation. Section 2802 of the Revised Statutes 
provides that when an article subject to duty, and not dis-
closed at the time of making entry, is discovered in the bag-
gage of any person, it shall be forfeited and such person shall 
be liable to a penalty of treble the value of such article. 
This section is still the law, and stands unaffected by the 
twelfth section of the act of the 22d June, 1874 (supra), 
which applies to frauds in connection with entries of mer-
chandise acknowledged and avowed. 
If Congress baa intended by that act to subject to forfeit-
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 327 
Fort Brown Reservation, Tex. 
ure the personal effects found in the same case or package 
with dutiable goods fraudujently entered as free, it is hardly 
to be supposed· that such \ntention would have been indi-
cated by declaring that the forfeiture denounced should ap-
ply to the " whole of the merchandise in the case or package 
containing the particular article or articles of merchandise 
to which such fraud or alleged fraud relates." The term 
"merchandise" can not be by itself held to be convertible 
with " baggage" and '~ personal effects," which are the terms 
generally used by Congress in its revenue legislation when 
dealing with the things to which those terms customarily 
refer. 
It is not at all probable either that if Congress bad intended 
for the first time to make personal effects share the fate of 
confiscable property mingled with them,it would have omitted 
to refer specially to section 2802 and left its repeal or modi· 
fication to implication merely. 
The fact that the case presented is the first one of the kind 
that. has arisen since the act of 1874 was passed, is perhaps 
due to the prevalence until a very late day of an interpreta-
tion of the 12th section of the act of June, 1874, accordant 
with this opmion. 
In conclusion, it will be observed that I have answered the 
questions submitted with exclusive reference to the facts con-
tained in your communication. 
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
l!'ORT BROWN RESERVATION, TEX. 
The act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, appropriated a large sum of money 
"to enable the Secretary of War to acquire good and valid title for 
the United States to the Fort Brown Reservation, Tex., and to pay and 
extinguish all claims for the use and occupation of said reservation by 
the United States;" with a proviso that uo part of said sum shall be 
paid·" unt.il a complete title is vested in the United States," and that 
"the full amount of the price, including rent, shall be paid directly to 
the owners of the property." 
Claims of ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, having 
been asserted by diffbrent parties, who propose to convey the same to 
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the Government, their titles respectively, at the request of the Secre-
tary of War, examined and considered by the Attorney-General, 
who indicates in his opinion the persons by whom and points out the 
mode by which a good and valid title to the whole of the reservation 
can be conveyed to the United States and all claims for the use and 
occupancy thereof extin~uished, as contemplated by the said act of 
1885. 
The provisions of that act do not authorize acquisition of title by con-
demnation under the eminent domain power of the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 16, 1886. 
SIR: I have considered the questions presented in your 
letter of the 7th of November last relative to the property 
known as the Fort Brown Reservation, and, in compliance 
with your request, now have the honor to state my views 
thereon. 
The act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, appropriated the 
sum of $160,000 "to enable the Secretary of War to acquire 
good and valid title for the United States to the Fort Brown 
Reservation, Tex.~ and to pay and extinguish all claims for 
the use and occupancy of said reservation by the United 
States," with a pro-viso "that no part of this sum shall be 
paid until a complete title is vested in the United States, 
and the full amount of the price, including rent, shall be paid 
directly to the owners of the property." 
Since the passage of that act several parties who claim 
ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, having 
filed in the War Department papers setting forth their titles, 
these papers were transmitted to me along with the abo-ve-
mentioned letter, in which you ask advice as to whether they 
"'show in whom of the claimants, or in what porportions, if 
any, a good and valid title to the property is vested, and 
what steps are necessary to vest the same in the United 
States, and whether, under the law, condemnation proceed- ' 
ings may be instituted in the courts of the United States 
in Texas." 
It appears by the papers that Pedro G. Cavazos, a resi-
dent of the city of 1\Iatamoros, Mexico, and James Stillman, 
a resident of the city of New York, claim each the title to 
an undivided one-half of the premises-the latter under a 
deed dated ~{arch 25, 1875, from Mrs. Maria Josefa Cavazos 
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to Oharlt?s Stillman (both since deceased), and the former 
under her will dated April 21, 1877, which was probated in 
the probate court of Cameron County, Tex., in January, 
1879. James Stillman also claims to have acquired title to the 
whole of the premises by virtue of certain tax deeds given 
him by the pl'oper local authorities In 1878 at a sale of the 
same for unpaid taxes assessed thereon for the years 1873, 
1874, and 1875. Both of these parties propose to unite in a 
deed of the entire property to the United States; and as 
(apart from the tax deeds referred to) they each deduce their 
respective interests in the premises from the before-men-
tioned deed aml will of l\frs. Cavazos, it becomes important 
.at the outset to ascertain precisely the nature and extent of 
her title. 
The title held by Mrs. Maria J osefa Cavazos is deraigned 
from a Spanish grant made to one Jose Salvador de la Gar-
za in the year 1781, which embraced a very large tract of 
land bordering on the Rio Grande, known as the Agostadero 
del Espiritu Santo, and included within its limit.s the prem-
ises. . On the death of the grantee, which happened during 
the same year, his title under the grant passed to his heirs, 
consisting of two daughters and a son; in equal shares. No 
partition of the tract appears to have ever been made be-
tween these three co-heirs; yet by mutual consent one of 
them went into the exclusive occupancy of the upper or 
western portion, another of the middle portion, and another 
of the lower or eastern portion (these portions having equal 
or nearly equal frontage on the Rio Grande,) with the under-
standing that on a future partition of the tract the share of 
each should be assigned in conformity to that arrangement. 
The premises are situated within the middle portion of the 
tract, which was occupied by the son, Don Blas Maria de la 
Garza, who died in 1802 without issue, but leaving a widow, 
Senora Maria Francesca Cavazos, who under his will suc-
ceeded to all his estate except the fifth part thereof, which 
was left to her niece, the sa1d Maria Josefa Cavazos. Senora 
Maria Francesca Cavazos took possession of and retained 
her husband's estate without division during her life-time. 
She died in 1835, also without issue, and by the disposition 
of her will all her right to the said tract became, with the 
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other property belonging to her estate, vested in Maria Ig-
nacia Cavazos and Maria Josefa Oa\azos. The interest thus 
derived by Maria Ignacia in the same tract was afterwards, 
on a partition of the whole property, relinquished to Maria 
J~efu. ' 
At or soon after the close of the Mexican war title to the 
premises, and to other parts of the said tract lying within 
the middle portion thereof, was claimed by Charles Stillman 
and other parties, based upon labor grants issued by the 
ayuntamiento of Matamoros, and upon locations and surveys 
of head-right certificates, land warrants, donation warrants, 
etc., issued lJy the Republic and State of Texas. In January, 
1849, a suit was commenced in the United States district. 
court for the district of Texas on behalf of Maria J ospfa 
Cavazos and others against the said Stillman and the other 
parties claiming title as above, the object of which was to 
establish and quiet the title of the complainants to the lands 
in controversy, which embraced the premises then and now 
vccupied by the United States and land adjacent thereto. 
ln that. suit all who claimed title under the Spanish grant of 
1781, through the heirs or assigns of the two daughters of 
the original grantee, were also made parties. In January, 
1852, the court made a decree, declaring the title to the lands 
in controversy to be vested in Maria J osefa Cavazos as tenant 
in common with other persons named (parties to the suit) who 
were heirs or assigns of the two daughters aforesaid or who 
claimed thereunder, and also declaring void the adverse titles 
set up by the defendants Stillman and others, derived from 
the ayuntamiento of 1Uatamoros or based upon locations and 
surveys made upon head-right certificates, land warrants, 
etc., issut>d by the Republic or State of Texas, etc. As there 
was no appeal from the judgment of the court in that suit, 
its decree became C'onclusive upon all the parties tiliereto. 
Subsequently a suit was brought against Maria Josefa 
Cavazos and others by the city of Brownsville, which claimed 
title to the premises and other land adjacent as part of the 
former ejidos of Matamoros. This title, tv establish which 
was the object of the suit, was asserted under an act of the 
Texas legislature, passed in 1850, granting to the city of 
Brownsville "all the right, title, and interest of the State of 
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~rexas in and to all the land within the said tract (i.e., the 
former ejidos of Matamoros) that was owned by the town of 
~Iatamoros on the 19th day of December, 1836," etc. The 
suit was tried in the United States circuit court for the 
eastern district of Texas in 1876, resulting in a judgment in 
favor of the defendants. This judgment was afterwards, on 
a writ of error, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 
at its October term, 1879. (See Brownsville v. Cavazos, 100 U. 
s., 138.) 
In the two suits above mentioned the title derived under 
the Spanish grant of 1781 prevailed over all ad verse claims 
- to the land in controversy (which included the premises) de-
rived from the ayuntamiento of .M:atamoros or from the Re-
public or State of Texas, and the validity of that title thereby 
became fully and finally established. And since the above-
mentioned decree of the United States district court, made 
in 1852, the right and interest of all those claiming as heirs 
or assigns of the two daughters of the original grantee, or 
under such heirs or assigns, in and to the land lying within 
the middle portion of the large tract em braced by that grant, 
appear to have been wholly extinguished, thus leaving the 
title of Maria J osefa Cavazos to the premises, so far at least 
as they are concerned, not that of a tenant in common, as 
declared in said decree, but that of a bolder in severalty. 
As already shown, Maria tl osefa Cavazos derived her title 
partly under the will of Don Blas 1\tlaria de la Garza, who 
died in 1802, but mainly under the will of his widow, Senora 
Maria Francesca Cavazos, who died in 1835; and the title so 
derived is claimed by those deraigningtitlefrom Maria Josefa 
Cavazos to include the whole of the premises occupied by the 
United States. But to parts of the same premises title 
is asserted by other parties, based upon certain sales and 
conYeyances alleged to have been made by Senora Maria 
FrancescaCavazos during her lifA-time in 1817 and 1833. 
In the will of the latter it is declared that she has sold to 
Capt. Don Jose Miguel Paredes 10 sitios (square leagues) of 
the portion of the Espiritu Santo tract which she derived 
from her husband, and a copy of a conveyance is exhibited, 
purporting to ba"\'"e been made by her November 24, 1817, 
granting to Capt. Don Miguel Paredes 10 sitios of· said tract, 
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which by the terms of the conveyance '' are bounded on the 
east by the lands belonging to the heirs of her brother-in· 
law, the Capt. Don Pedro Lopez Prieto, and on the west by 
the remainder of the land already mentioned belonging to the 
grantor, on the south by the Rio Grande, and on the north 
by the Aroyo Colorado." This description locates the 10 
leagues granted by such conveyance upon the eastern side of 
the middle portion of the Espiritu Santo tract, that portion 
being the one which was occupied by the husband of the 
grantor, as hereinbefore stated. 
It is alleged that t.he grantee, Paredes, died in 1819, and 
title to the 10 leagues granted to him, as above, is claimed 
under two conveyances to James Grogan; one dated March 
18, 1848, made by Clemencia Prieto, as devisee of the prop-
erty under the will of the said Paredes, and the other dated 
1\'Iarch 7, 1854, made by certain persons as his heirs. From 
James Grogan, n~w deceased, there appears to be a regular 
chain of title thereto by mesne conveyances and otherwise 
down to the present claimants, namely, the heirs of Stephen 
Pow~rs (for 6! leagues undivided) and the wife of C. S. Dana, 
nee Marie Grogan (for 3i leagues undivided.) 
Whilst the eastern boundary of these 10 leagues, according 
to the terms of the grant to Paredes, is identical and co ex-
tensive with the eastern boundary of the middle portion of 
the Espiritu Santo tract, the western boundary thereof does 
not appear to be as yet definitely established, but remains a 
subject of controversy. The parties asserting title to the 10 
leagues, under the aforementioned conveyances to Grogan, · 
claim that the western boundary takes in a large part of the 
Fort Brown property. On the other hand, those who claim 
ownership of the Fort Brown property through Maria J osefa 
Cavazos deny that the western boundary includes any part 
of it; they say that such boundary begins at the rancho 
Tomates, on the Rio Grande, some 200 or 300 yards below 
the Fort Brown property, and runs thence northward a con-
siderable distance to the east of that property. 
In the conveyance from Clemencia Prieto to Grogan the 
10 leagues are described as situated "between the Tomates 
and Santa Rosalia, and extending back to the north for 
quantity (entre los Tomates y Santa Rosalia con su fondo al 
I 
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norte)," both of which points are below the Fort Brown prop-
erty on the Rio Grande. This description apparently favors 
the claim of those who assert ownership through l\1aria Josefa 
Cavazos. But the deed to Grogan from the heirs of Paredes 
conveys simply their right and title to the 10 square leagues 
of the Espiritu Santo tract formerly owned by Capt. Jose 
1\Iiguel ·Paredes, without indicating the situation thereof. 
And in an action to try title, brought jn the district court of 
Cameron County, Tex., in 1875, by Charles S. Dan21. and wife 
and Jacob Mussina, then holding the Grogan title to the 10 
leagues, against Maria Josefa Cavazos and others, the plaint-
iffs in their declaration describe the land claimed by them as 
follows: Bounded "on the north by the Arroyo Colorado; 
on the east by lands lately held by Jose Antonio Prieto, 
one of the heirs at law of Pedro Lopez Prieto and Margarita 
de la Garza, his wife; and on the west by lands owned and 
claimed by the said Maria Josefa Cavazos, one of the defend-
ants herein, being the same 10 square leagues sold by Maria. 
Francesca Cavazos, about the year 1817, to J.ose Miguel 
Paredes." Judgment by default was rendered in favor of 
plaintiffs for the recovery of the land, as above described; 
yet there tbe description does not precisely locate and deter-
mine the western boundary of the 10 leagues, but leaves it 
to be ascertained by lands "then owned and claimed" by 
Maria Josefa Cavazos. 
Upon the whole that boundary must be regarded as still 
in dispute; and inasmuch as there is ~mcertainty whether it 
may or may not when finally established be found to include 
within the 10 le~gues some portion of the Fort Brown prop-
erty, the existence of the claim of the heirs of Stephen Powers 
and Mrs. C. S. Dana, as owners of the 10 leagues, to a part 
of that property, constitutes an objection to the title offered 
by those who assert ownership of the whole of the Fort 
Brown property through Maria J osefa Cavazos. 
Title to a part of the same property is also claimed by the 
heirs of Stephen Powers and others, under a sale and con-
veyance alleged to ba ve been made~S by Maria Francesca 
Cavazos to Maria de Jesus Escamilla, widow of Juan Estavan 
Gutierrez, on the 20th of September, 1833. This conveyance 
purports to grant the labor formerly rented by the said Gutier-
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rez, "which is of the property of the grantor, and which is 
bounded by the lane of Luz Rendon to the principal water-
ing place of the lake, it being understood that all now within 
tbe present fence is included in the said sale.'' It is alleged 
that this labor lies partly in Browns"Ville and partly within 
the limits of the military reservation, including about 23 acres 
of the latter, and that it was on the 30th of March, 1835, con-
veyed by the said Escamilla to Miguel Salinas, who by a deed 
dated December 29, 1R49, con,eyed the same to his son, 
Antonio Salinas. By deed dated March 18, 1862, Antonio 
Salinas, since deceased, con,eyed an undivided one-half 
thereof to Stephen Powers, which is now claimed by the 
heirs of the latter. The remainder of the labor is now 
claimed by other parties as the heirs of Antonio Salinas or 
their assignees. 
In 1851 a suit to try title was instituted in the United 
States district court for the district of Texas by Maria J o-
sefa Cavazos and her husband against William Patterson, 
Antonio Salinas, and others, involving the ownership of 
lands in and about the city of Browns·ville and the military 
reservation, including tlwt labo'i'; and this suit appears to be 
still pending. It is understood that all the defendants therein 
except Antonio Salinas claimed title to the lauds in contro-
versy under labor grants by the a~·untamiento of Matamoras, 
which haYe since been declared invalid by the Supreme Court, 
and must be so regarded. But the title of Salinas rests upon 
the grant from Maria Francesca Ca\azos to Escamilla, men-
tioned above, and the question of its validity remains unde-
termined, and seems to be still a subject of controversy before 
the United States district or circuit court. 
Under these circumstances, the above-mentioned claim of 
Powers's heirs and others to part of tbe Fort Brown property, 
based on the title just adverted to, may well be deemed to 
constitute an objection to the title offered by those claiming 
under Maria Josefa Ca"Vazos. 
Besides the claim of Powers's heirs and others, last referred 
to, an· adverse title to the identical land covered by that 
claim is asserted by Mrs. Charlotte l\'Iiller under a sheriff's 
sale made April 6, 1856, on an exeeution issued upon a judg-
ment rendered September 28, 1854, by the district court of 
• 
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Nueces County, Tex., in favor of Elisha Bass et al., and 
against Antonio Salinas. It appears that the suit in which 
the judgment was rendered was originally brought in 1851, 
in the district court of Cameron County, by Antonio Salinas 
against Bass and others, for the said labor of land, and was 
removed to Nueces Uounty for trial. Judgment was given 
defendants for the land and also for $3,000 damages. Writ 
of error was subsequently sued out by plaintiff, but he gave 
no supersedeas bond, and execution was issued on the judg-
ment for the damages and .his interest in the land sold there-
under for the sum of $20. Afterwards the judgment was re-
versed by the supreme court of Texas on account of a fatal 
irregularity in the rendition of the verdict. (See 25 Tex., 12.) 
But where there has been a sale under execution, the title of 
a bona .fide purchaser is not affected by the subsequent re-
versal of the judgment. (Ibid., 'i 40.) And as the sale in the 
present case does not appear to have ever been set aside or 
annulled, it may properly be considered to be a cloud upon 
the title not only of Powers's heirs, etc., but also of those 
.claiming the same land under Maria J osefa Cavazos. It 
therefore constitutes an objection to the title offered by the 
latter. 
It may here be added that a valid title to that part of the 
Fort Brown property which is used for a natim1al cemetery, 
.containing about 25 acres, has already been acquired by the 
United States, under a condemnatio11 proceeding instituted in 
1872 in the United States district court for the western district 
of Texas, pursuant to the actufCongress of Feburary 22,1867, 
chapter 61. In this proceeding the amount of the appraised 
value of the land taken ($5,000) was deposited in court sub-
ject to its order, and subsequently, in 1879, the court ordered 
the same to be paid over to Pedro G. Cavazos, who claimed 
it under the will of Maria Josefa Cavazos. 
The result to which the foregoing facts lead is, that Maria 
Jose fa Ca vaJZos hel~ at the date of her deed and wj)J here-
in before referred to, a good and valid title in fee to the whole 
of the premises within the limits of the military reservation 
of Fort Brown, excepting the portion thereof (25 acres) then 
already acquired by the United States for the purpose of a 
national cemetery, subject, however, to the above-mentioned 
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claim_s of the heirs of Stephen Powers and other parties to 
par~s of the same premises, which are controverted claims, 
the validity or invalidity whereof (from their nature) can 
only be satisfactorily determined in the courts. 
Under the will of Maria Josefa Cavazos, her son, Pedro G. 
Cavazos, claims title to an undivided one-half of the entire 
premises, excepting only that portion already owned by the 
United States (the other undivided one-half having been con-
veyed to Charles Stillman by her deed above adverted to). 
The wil1 is dated April 21, 1877, and in it the testator, after 
reciting that she was then negotiating for the sale of the 
Fort Brown property to the United States through her attor-
ney and agent James R. Cox, of Auburn, N. Y., devises to· 
her son Pedro the whole of that property "as at present oc-
cupied by the Government of the United States," and author-
izes him to deed and convey the same to said Government,. 
upon any terms approved by her said agent and attorney. 
The testator also bequeaths to her said son al1 of her right,. 
claim, and demand for rent, use, and occupation of the said 
premises from the year 1848 up to the date of her decease,. 
and authorizes him to collect and receive and receipt for the 
same, and the price of the sale aforesaid to be made, which 
shall be in full discharge -of all her claims against said Gov-
ernment. After the above devise and bequest follows this 
clause: " In trust, nevertheless, as to the whole of said re-
ceipts, both for the price and the rent or use, for the uses and 
purposes which I may hereafter propose or provide by a 
further testament, then such avails of said property are to 
be by him accounted for and apportioned or divided among 
my heirs, according to law; but the said Government of the 
United States so purchasing or paying are not to be in any 
wise accountable or responsible for the mvestment or distri-
bution of the proceeds or avails." 
It will be observed that by this instrument the testator's 
interest in the Fort Brown property goes to the devisee, not 
absolutely, but only upon certain trusts, with power to con-
vey the same to the Government "upon any terms approved 
by her said agent and attorney." The bequest of the claim· 
for use and occupation is likewise made upon the same trusts, 
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with authority to receive the proceeds thereof and also the 
proceeds of the property. 
On the petition of Pedro G. Cavazos the will was admitted 
to probate by the county court of Cameron County at a reg-
ular term thereof, in January, 1879, and he was thereby ap-
pointed "executor and testamentary trustee of the said last 
will and testament of the saidMariaJosefaCavazos,deceased," 
and directed to give a bond in the sum of $100,000, condi-
tioned as by law required, and to take the oath as by law 
provided. But at a subsequent term, in November, 1882, it 
appearing that there had been a failure on his part to give 
the bond and take the oath as above directed, the court 
ordered and decreed" that the said Pedro G. Cavazos be, 
and he now hereby is, in all things removed from his saiJ 
trust as such executor and the same declared vacant." There-
upon Thomas Carson was appointed administrator with the 
will annexed, and directed to give bond in the sum of $100,000, 
and to take the oath required by law; and afterwards, at 
another term of the court, held in January, 1883, the said 
Carson :filed his bond and oath as such administrator, which 
were approved by the court. ·' 
At the August term, 1885, of said court Carson, as admin ·· 
istrator, etc., :filed an application therein, setting forth the-
appropriation made by Congress to acquire title to and pay 
for the use and occupancy of the Fort Brown reservation,. 
the existence of adverse claims by Powers's heirs and others· 
to parts of the prennses, and asking that he be authorized 
and empowered to compromise and settle the claims of the 
estatA of ~1aria Josefa Cavazos with the United States and 
the adverse claimants referred to, and upon payment by the 
United States of the sum found due for the rents and prop-
erty to give thereto proper acquittances and conveyances. 
This application was made under a statute of the State of 
Texas, which provides that "whenever an executor or ad-
ministrator may deem it for the interest of the estate he rep-
resents * • * to make compromises or settlements in 
relation to property or claims in dispute or litigation it shall 
be his duty to present an application in writing to the county 
court, at a regular term thereof, representing the facts; and 
if the court upon the hearing of such application shall be 
273-VOL XVIII--22 
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satisfied that it will be for the interest of the estate to grant 
the same an order to that effect shall be entered upon the 
minutes, S'~tting forth fully the authority granted." (Rev. 
Stat. of Texas, 1879, art. 1934.) 
The abo"e application was granted during the same term, 
and the administrator was by the court authorized as such 
"for and in behalf of the estate of said Maria ,J osefa Ca\azos, 
deceased, to unite with the other tenants in common and co-
owners of said middle third of said Espiritu Santo tract of 
land, and the other claimants to said Fort Brown reser\ation, 
in a sale of the land embraced in said Fort Brown resen·ation 
to the United States, and to make, execute, and deli\er to the 
said United States fullandcompleteacquittances,releases, and 
conveyances of all and singular the right, title, and estate, 
which he, the said Thomas Carson, now has and holds as ad-
ministrator of the estate of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased, 
in and to the la:nd embraced within said Fort Brown reserva. 
tion, and in and to all sums of money due by the United States 
as rents for the use and occupancy of the same." 
Thus conflicting claims to the premises and to the right to 
(lispose of the same to the Government appear to exist be-
tween Pedro G. Cavazos, as devisee, etc., under the will of 
Maria Josefa Cavazos, and Thomas Carson, as administrator 
cum testamento a.nnexo of her estate, in view of which the more 
prudent, and perhaps the only safe course would be, in ac-
quiring title to the premises and extinguishing the cL.lims of 
that estate for use and occupation, to require both these claim-
ants to unite in a proper conveyance and acquittance thereof. 
Upon the foregoing considerations it is submitted that a 
good and valid title can be acquired by the United States to 
the whole of the Fort Brown reservation (exclusin~ .. of the 
National Cemetery, which alrea~dy belongs to the Go\ern-
ment), and all claims for the use and occupancy thereof ex-
tinguished, by conveyance and relinquishment from tlte own-
ers of the pr·operty in the following way : 
(1) By a deed to tlte United t;tates granting the whole of 
the premises, and acknowledging payment of and relin-
quislting all claims for the use and occupation thereof, exe-
cuted, acknowledged, and delivered by the said James 
Stillman, and Pedro G. Cavazos (under the power conferred 
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upon him as devisee as aforesaid), and Thomas Carson, the 
latter as administrator cum~ testamento annexo of the estate of 
Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased. 
(2) In addition to that deed, a quit-claim deed to the 
United States, embracing the same premises, and containing 
a release of all claims for the use and occupancy thereof, 
executed, acknowlerlged, and delh·ered by the following 
parties, namely: The heirs of Stephen Powers; C. S. Dana 
and his wjfe, nee J\1:arie Grogan; the heirs of Antonio 
Salinas; H. E. Woodhouse, Francisca Yturria, Mat. Ger-
hard, Juan Salinas, Vicente Salinas and R. D. Hinojosa, his 
mortgagee, and Charlotte Miller. So far as the papers show, 
these ~omprise all the parties who are interested in the ad-
verse claims (as against those deriving title under J.\lfaria 
Josefa Oavazos), to which reference is hereinbefore made. 
In behalf of Pedro G. Cavazos and James Stillman, it is 
urged that by virtue of a certain condemnation proceeding 
originally instituted in the county court of Cameron County, 
in 1853, under a statute of the State of Texas, and by virtue 
of a deed executed by the said Cavazos and Stillman on the 
20th of April, 18~5, which is offered for the acceptance of 
the Government, a good and valid title to the wl'lole of the 
Fort Brown re'servation niay now be acquired by the United 
States upon payment to them of the consideration named in 
the deed ($160,000). · 
At the time of the institution of the said proceeding, the 
United States had been in the actual occupation of the prem-
ises for several years, but no law of Congress then existed 
authorizing the acquisition of the same for the Government 
in that or any other mode. The proceeding was accordingly 
initiated without lawful authority, andnothingwasdone there-
under at the period referred to beyond the rendition of a-ver-
dict by a jury assessing the -value of the land, which was ap-
praised at $50,000, and the approyal thereof by the court. 
~iany years afterwards, in February, 1879, the said court, on 
a motion made in behalf of certain parties below named claim-
ing ownership of the premises (no one appearing in opposition 
thereto), entered a judgment of condemnation, by which it 
was decreed that upon the payment by the United States of 
the said sum of $50,000, together with interest thereon from 
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the 29th of No\ember, 1853, at ther ate of 8 per cent. per 
annum, into the National Bank of the City of Galveston, to 
be disposed of as thereinafter provided, the whole right, title, 
and interest of the City of Brownsville, and of Maria J osefa 
Cavazos, deceased, and also of the said Pedro G. Cavazos, her 
successor in interest, in and to the premises, shall vest for-
ever in the United States, etc. 
The above-mentioned deed recites the institution of the 
said proceeding and the rendition of the verdict therein in 
1853, the subsequent entry of the judgment of condemnation 
in 1879, etc., and in consideration of the payment of $160,000 
to .the grantors, conveys the premises in fee simple to the 
United States, covenanting "that all and every of the duties, 
obligations, and conditions imposed by the said judgment of 
the district court of Cameron County, Texas, hereinbefore 
referred to, upon the said the United States of America, in 
respect to the complete condemnation and lawful acquisition 
of the said lands and premises, are now and hereby, in con-
sideration of the above described payment of $160,000, fully 
completed, discharged, dissolved, satisfied, and performed; 
and the recording of this conveyance in the clerk's office of 
said county of Cameron shall be conclusive evidence of the 
full and complete satisfaction and discharge of said judgment 
and of all the obligations thereof." 
The aforesaid proceeding was instituted under the third 
section of an act of the Texas legislature, passed December 
19, 1849, by which it was provided that where the executive 
officer or authorized agent employed by the United States to 
purchase land for public purposes shall be unable to ascer-
tain who the real owner or owners of the land desired to be 
purchased may be, or where it is uncertain in whom the title 
to such land may be, it shall be lawful for such officer or 
agent to apply to the judge of the district court, giving a 
full description of the land; and after eight weeks' notice of 
such application shall have been given in some newspaper 
published in the county where the land is situated, such 
judge shall call a jury to assess the value of said land, etc.; 
and the amount of the value of the land so ascertained is to 
be paid into the treasury of the State, there to be to 
the order of the owner or owners when known, and t 
.. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 341 
Fort Brown Reservation. Tex. 
of the court is to make a conveyance of the land under the 
orders of the court, which conveyance shall be as valid and 
binding as if the same had been made by the real owner of 
the land. · -
It will be observed that the judgment of the court, as en-
tered in 1879, does not conform to the provisions of the stat-
ute. The latter requires the amount of the appraised value 
of the ·property to be paid into the treasury of the State, 
"there to be subject to the order of the owner or owners 
when known," and makes it the duty of the clerk of the court 
to execute a conveyance of the land. The judgment requires 
the payment to be made elsewhere, namely, into the National 
Bank of the City of Galveston, and declares that thereupon 
· ''the whole right, title, and interest of the city of Browns-
ville and of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased, and also of 
Pedro G. Cavazos, her successor in interest." in and to the 
premises shall vest in the United States. Besides, the deed 
does not even call for a compliance with the directions of the 
judgment as regards payment, but requires this to be made 
directly to the grantors therein. 
Irrespective of the circumstance that the proceeding re-
ferred to was originally begun by persons acting in behalf of 
the United States without lawful authority therefrom, and 
subsequently promoted by other persons acting in behalf of 
certain parties claiming ownership of the premises, it is 
doubtful whether a valid title can be derived thereunder by 
reason of the non-compliance with the pro\isions of the stat-
ute as above pointed out, and hence whether the deed would 
operate to pass anything more than such interest in the 
premises as the grantors themselves possess. Moreover, a 
title acquired under the State statute would be a qualified 
one-i. e., ''for the purposes aforesaid and none other;" 
whereas the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, cited above, 
requires that a " complete title," in other words, an absolute 
one, shall be vested in the United States before any part of 
the sum thereby appropriated is paid. 
In reg~rd to the question whether, under the provisions of 
that act, condemnation proc·eedings may be instituted in the 
United States court in Texas, I am of the opinion that such 
provisiOJlS do not authorize acquisition. of title through the 
342 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Fort Brown Reservation, Tex. 
exercise of the eminent domain power of the Government. 
'l'he aim of the statute is, as well to extinguish claims for the 
past use and occupation of the land ·as to secure title thereto; 
but this could not be fully accomplished by proceedings of 
that character. The statute seems to contemplate the attain-
ment of its object solely through a voluntary conve,van~e of 
the land and discharge of such claims by the owners of the 
property. 
I ha"Ve already indicated the parties by whom, and the 
mode by which~ a good and valid title to the Fort Brown 
reservation can be conveyed and all claims for the use and 
occupancy thereof extinguished, as contemplated by the pro-
visions of the aet of 1~85. Should these parties, or any of 
them, fail or: decline to give the necessary deeds and acquit-
tances for such compensation out of the appropriation made 
by that act as you shall deem it reasonable and just to allow, 
this may present such an obstacle as to render it expedient 
for the Government . to have recourse to some other method 
of settling the claims, both for the land and its use. In such 
event, and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, 
I suggest that application be made to Co~gTess for the pas-
sage of an act authorizing any person claiming ownership of 
the land or any part thereof within the limits of the reserva-
tion to institute a suit against the United States in the Court 
of Claims for the recovery of compensation therefor, including 
also compensation for its use and occupation, with a pro-
vision requiring such suit to be brought within a certain time 
after the passage of the act, and in default thereof that the 
claim be forever barred; and also requiring, where two or 
more parties bring separate suitR, based upon conflicting 
claims to the same land, that such suits be consolidated and 
tried together, etc., and also giving the court power to grant 
all proper relief as between the respective claimants as well 
as between each of them ami the United States. With the 
aid of such legislation, in my judgment, all obstacles in the 
way ot securing for the United States a good and valid title 
to the land, and of extinguishing all claims for its w;e and 
occupation, can be surmounted and those objects fairly and 
just.Jy accomplished. 
In addition to the papers which accompanied your letter 
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of the 7th of November, other papers have since been for-
warded to this Department by you with request that they 
be considered in connection therewith.. Among the latter 
are papers transmitted with your letter of the 9th instant, 
relating to a claim of the h1'irs of Miguel Salinas for the rent 
of certain houses and compensation for loss sustained by 
their destruction, and also by the destruction of crops, fences, 
etc., at Fort Bro\\n, during the :Mexican war. When the 
American forces arrived at the Rio Grande, opposite Mata-
moros, in the spring of 1846, they found the said Salinas in 
possession of part of the land upon which they en~mped­
whether as tenant or proprietor does not appear. The land 
was undf'r fence, and upon it were growing crops, and also 
some small houses. Seven of the latter were, about the 
middle of April, hired from .\Ir. Salinas, by the quartermaster, 
at a stipulated rent, for the use of the .... <\rmy; but shortly 
afterward (some two or three weeks only) they were de-
stroyed by direction of the officer in command of the troops. 
The fences were also in great part destroyed and the mate-
rial used in the construction of the fort there erected and as 
fuel. 
It appears that while but a very small part of the claim of 
the heirs (only $12.88) is for unpaid rent of the houses referred 
to, the remainder (amounting to several thousand dollars) is 
for compensation for the loss of property destroyed, etc. 
This claim does not, I think, come within the scope of the 
appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, herein before 
mentioned. That appropriation is limited to the following 
objects: payment of the purchase money for the land within 
the limits of the reservation, and payment to the owner 
thereof of compensation for its past use and occupation; 
neither of which seems to touch the subject-matter of the 
claim referred to. 
I. return herewith the papers which accompanied your 
letters, together with others relating to the m::J.tter which 
have been received directly from parties interested therein. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
I 
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CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
"Medicinal soap" is dutiable as soaps not otherwise provided for at !20 
per centum ad valorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal preparation 
or compound. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 16, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication, bearing date the 12th instant, relating to cer-
tain so-called ''medicinal soap" prepared by Messrs J. D. 
Stiefel in Germany and imported by Messrs. W. H. Schieffelin 
& Co., a\N ew York. 
After a careful examination of the question submitted, I 
concur with the appraiser that the " soaps" referred to are 
n~t dutiable at the rate of 50 per centum ad ~alorem as 
"proprietary medicines," but that they are dutiable as 
"soaps" not otherwise provided for at 20 per centum ad va-
lorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal preparation or com-
pound. For the additional reasons suggested by you as to 
the difficulty of making a successful defense of any suits 
which might be brought in consequence of the presel!._t classi-
fication of such merchandise without the concurrence of the 
appraiser at the port of importation, I deem it advisable that 
the decisions in question be ~o modified as to conform to the 
classification recommended by the appraiser at New York. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 1.'HE TREASURY. • 
LIGHT-HOUSE KEEPERS. 
Legislation of Congress in regard to the appointment of light-house 
keepers considered. 
Section 4669, Revised Statutes, confines the power of the Light-House 
Board to the adoption and enforcement of such regulations as concern 
the management and control of light-house keepers, inspectors, and em-
ployes for the purpose of properly administering the Light-House Es-
tablishment. · 
The statute does not authorize the Board to adopt and enforce regulations 
·controlling in any manner the appointment of light-house keepers or 
other inferior officers, or to designate the appointees. 
DEP .A.RTMEN1.' OF JUSTIOE, 
Jam wry 18, 1886. 
SIR : The legislation of Congress in regard to the appoint-
ment of ligbt-honse keepers bas not been uniform. Some-
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times the appointing power has been vested in the President 
and sometimes in the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The power to appoint such keepers is, in many instances, 
embodied in the act authorizing the erection of the light-
bouse, and these acts, conferring the appointing power re-
spectively upon the President and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, occur in about an equal number of statutes, and are not 
inconsistent with subsequent acts and have not been repealed 
either expressly or by implication, but remain in full force. 
The power to appoint such keepers in such instances has not 
therefore been disturbed, but remains where it was placed 
by Congress, in the original statutes authorizing the erection, 
equipment, and appointment of keepers of the respective 
light-houses. 
Previous to 1852 various powers were conferred upon the 
Secretary of the Treasury of a general character and other-
wise, such as authorizing him to erect light-houses, to furnish 
them with supplies, to fix the salaries of keepers, and to ap-
point keepers, when directed to do so by the special provis-
ions of any act. 
The Secretary of the Treasury retains the absolute power 
to regulate the salaries of the keepers under the provisions 
of section 4673, Revised Statutes. But the general power to 
superintend t.he Light-House Establishment and to fix salaries 
does not embrace and carry with it the power to appoint such 
keepers. It requires an act of Uongress to vest the appoint-
ment of inferior officers in the President, courts of law, or 
, heads of Departments (Cons., Art. II, sec. 2; Ex parte Hennen, 
13 Pet., 230). This principle appears to have been well 
understood and adopted in each instance in the legislation 
upon the subject of light-houses prior to 1852. By consent 
or acquiescence the power to appoint light-house keepers ap-
pears to have been exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury 
prior to and since the approval of the appropriation act of 
August 31, 1852, (10 Stat., 112, 119.) By this act Congress 
constituted the Light- House Board oft he United States, and 
authorized such Board to discharge certain designated and 
well-defined administrative duties, under the superintend-
ency and subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
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The same act, with slight and immaterial changes, so far 
as it applies to the duties of the Light·House Board, is in-
cluded in the codification of the statutes of the United States. 
(Rev. Stat., 906.) 
Under the provisions of the sections of the codification 
arises the question in controversy, an<l which is presented for 
consideration. (Rev. Stat., Title LV, 906.) . 
Various duties de\olve upon the Board under the several 
sections of the statute, but the question presented may be 
determined by a consideration of t.wo sections of the Revised 
Statutes, the first of which defines the general administrative 
duties of the Board, and reads as follows: 
" SEc. 46 38. The Light-House Board shall be attached to 
the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his 
superintendence shall discharge all administrative duties re-
lating to the construction, illumination, inspection, and su-
perintendence of light-houses, light-vessels, beacons, buoys, 
sea-marks, and their appendages, and embracing the security 
of foundations of works already existing, procuring illumi-
nating and other apparatus, supplies, and materials of an 
kinds for building and for rebuilding when necessary and 
keeping in good repair the light-houses, light-vessels, bea-
cons, and buoys of the United States; and shall have the 
charge and custody of all the archives, books, documents, 
drawings, models, returns, apparatus, and other things ap-
pertaining to the Light-House Establishment." 
For the purpose of more efficiently discharging the duties . 
defined in the section above q noted, or otherwise~ the Board, 
with the approval of such secretary, is authorized to pre-
scribe proper regulations, under a subsequent section, to wit: 
"SEc. 4669. The Light-House Board, with the approval of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe, and from time 
to time may alter or amend and cause to be distributed, such 
regulations as they de€m proper for securing an efficient, 
uniform, economical administration of the Light-House Estab-
lishment." 
Under the latter section the Light-House Board claims and 
has assumed the power to prescribe rules abridging the ap-
pointing power of the Secretary of the Treasury, or such 
power in whatsoe\er officer it may· exist under the statute, 
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so as in reality to bring such appointments within their abso-
lute control and jurisdiction, thereby confining the function 
of the proper appointing officer to a mere confirmation or re-
jection of nominations. Was it the intention of Congress to 
empower the Light-House Board under section 4669 (supra) 
to prescribe regulati.ons governing the manner of the ap-
pointment of light-house keepers~ Or was it the intention 
to limit such regulations to the general duties of the Board, 
to be exercised with the approbation of the Secretary, as 
provided in section 4658 ( S'ltpra) a,nd otherwise~ 
If the intention of Oongress is to be gathered from a con-
sideration and comparison of the act of August 31, 1852 . 
(10 Stat., 112-119) with the codification (Rev. Stat., 906), the 
latter is undoubtedly the correct conclusion. 
Section 4669 (supra) is are enactment of section 13 of the 
act of August 31, 1852 (10 Stat., 112-119), and reference may 
be bad to the latter in order to arrive at a proper construc-
tion of the former. 
Section 13 (s~tpra) explains what is meant by regu1ations, 
and provides that such regulations are to be distributed 
among the light-keepers, inspectors, and employes of the 
Light- House Establishment, for the purpose of securing an 
efficient, uniform, and economical system of administering the 
same, and to secure responsibility from such inferior officers. 
The section reads as follows : 
''SEC. 13. And be it f~trt7wr enacted, That the Light-House 
Board, by and with the consent and approbation of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, be authorized and required to cause 
to be prepared and distributed among the light-keepers, in-
spectors, and others employed in the Light-House Establish-
ment, such rules, regulations, and instructions as shall be 
~necessary for securing an efficient, uniform, and economical 
system of administering the Light-House Establishment of the 
United States, and to secure responsibility from them, which 
rules, regulations, and instructions when approved shall be 
respected and obeyed until altered and annulled by the same 
authority." 
It is true the commissioners in the revision have shorn 
section 4669 of its explanatory provisions, but in doing so 
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no new or extended powers were expressly conferred upon 
the Board, and none can reasonably be 'implied. 
Congress has not conferred power upon the Light-House 
Board to designate such appointments as is expressly done 
in the act of August 30, 1852 (10 Stat., 63), in relation to in-
spectors of hulls and boilers. 
Reference is especially made to an opinion upon a similar 
question by Attorney-General Bates and citations therein. 
(10 Opin., 204.) 
The President has long since ceased to exercise the ap-
pointing power that exists under the respective statutes, 
and it has been for years the practice of the Secretary of the 
Treasury to make such appointments. In a majority of cases 
the law now in force does not vest the power to appoint light-
house keepers in either the President, the courts of law, O]\ 
heads of Department, and from this anomalous condition of 
the law has arisen the custom of the Secretary, in connection 
with the discharge of his other duties, to appoint such 
keepers. 
The rule of practice followed by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury i~ one of many years standing, and, by reason of a failure 
to enact proper laws for the purpose of curing the defect of 
omission herein mentioned, may be said to have acquired the 
recognition or sanction of Congress. The Secretary will 
undoubtedly, for the good of the service, be justified in con-
tinuing to act in accordance with such rule of practice until 
Congress shall enact appropriate and definite laws upon the 
subject. This is a proper matter for the consideration of 
Congress, to which the attention of that branch of the Gov-
ernment should be called. 
I am of the opinwn, therefore, upon a general review of 
the authorities, that section 4669, Reviseg Statutes, confines 
the power of the Light-House Board to the adoption and en-
forcement of such regulations as have reference to the man-
agement and control of light-keepers, inspectors, and em-
ployes, for the purpose of securing responsibility from them, 
and for the further purpose of properly administering the 
Light-House Establishment; but the statute does not author-
ize such Board to adopt and enforce regulations abridging or 
controlling in any manner the appointment of light-house 
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keepers or other inferior officers, nor does it authorize such 
Board to designate such appointment.s. The authority to 
appoint is vested elsewhere, as indicated in this opinion. 
Respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PURCHASE OF ARMY SUPPLIES. 
Purchases of supplies for the Army made in open market after advertise-
ment, where no bi1s ha.ve been received in response to such advertise-
ment, are emergency purchases within the meaning of the act of July 
5, 188-t, chapter 217, and should be "at once reported to the Secretary 
of War for his approval." 
When parts of machinery, or of stoves or ranges or patented articles, are 
needed, such articles are required by that act to be purchased in the 
same way as other quartermaster's supplies-that is, by contract after 
advertisement, except in cases of emergency, in which cases the pur-
chases are to be reported to the Secretary of War for approval. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J anua1·y 20, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of the 18th ultimo directs my attention to 
certain provisions of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 217, rel-
ative to the purchase by the Quartermaster's Department of 
supplies for the Army, and also to a circular letter of instruc-
tions issued by the Adjutant-General, dated January 19, 1885, 
touching the same subject, and inquires: ~'Whether, when 
purchases are made in open market after advertisement, and 
no bids have been received in response thereto, such pur-
chases are not really emergency purchases within the mean-
ing of the law above referred to; and whether, when parts of 
machinery, or parts of stoves or ranges, for repairR, or pat-
ented articles, are required, they can be purchased in open 
market without advertisement; and, if so, whether such pur-
chases should be regarded as emergency purchases." 
To these inquiries I have now the honor to reply: 
The act of 1884 provides that thereafter " all purchases of 
regular and miscellaneous supplies for the army furnished by 
the Quartermaster's Department and by the Commissary De-
partment for immediate use shall be made by the officers of 
such department, under direction of the Secretary ofWar, 
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at the places nearest the points where they are needed, the 
conditions of cost and quality being equal: Provided~ also, 
That all purchases of said supplies except in cases of emer-
gency, which must be at once reported to the Secretary of 
War for his approval, shall be made by contract, after public 
notice of not less than ten days for small amounts for imme-
diate use, and of not less than from thirty to sixty days 
whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, the circum-
stances of the case and conditions of the service shall war-
rant such extension of time. The award in every case shall 
be made to the lowest responsible bidder for the best and 
most suitable article, the right being reserved to reject any 
and all bids." 
By the law in force at the date of thiS enactment it was 
made the duty of the officers of the Quartermaster's Depart-
. ment, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to pur-
chase such supplies (sec. 1133, Rev. Stat.), and all purchases 
thereof were required to be made " by advertising a sufficient 
time previously for proposals respecting the same," where im-
mediate delivery of the article was not demanded bJ- the pub-
lic exigencies; but where the public exigencies required im-
mediate delivery, the articles were authorized to be procnred 
"by open purchase or contract at the places and in the man-
ner in which such articles are usually bought and sold be-
tween individuals" (sec. 3709, Rev. Stat.). These statutory 
provisions were supp1Amented by other provisions in the na-
ture of instructions thereunder, contained in the Army Reg-
ulations of 1881 (see paragraphs 1478, 1486-1490, and 1523). 
The latter, among other things, required that where the exi-
gencies of the. ser~ice demanded a purchase to be made in the 
open market without advertisement, the fact should be re-
ported to the proper bureau, with a detailed statement of the 
quantity, quality, and price of each article so purchased, the 
names of the sellers, and the circumstances which rendered 
such a course necessar_y. 
The second clause or proviso in the above-quoted extract 
from the act of 1884 (to which the present inquiries appear 
to have especial reference) requires as a rule that "all pur-
chases" of quartermaster's supplies shall be made by contract 
after public notice, as there prescribed, the oply exce'ption 
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therefrom being purchases'' in cases of emergency." In these 
cases purchases may be made, as before, without previous 
public notice, in open market,. and in the manner in which 
such articles are usually bought and sold between individ-
uals (sec. 3709, Re\. Stat.), but they are ·now required to be 
"at once reported to the Secretary of War for his approval." 
The latter requirement is imposed as an additional check upon 
the purchasing officer 
The object of this legislation is to secure for the Govern-
ment the benefit of competition in obtaining supplies and 
to prevent favoritism in making purchases thereof. It con-
templates one general mode of purchase, namely, by contract, 
after advertisement, with "the lowest responsible bidder, for 
the best and most suitable article," with but a single ex-
ception, and that is where an "emergency " exists requiring 
the purchase to be otherwise made. Such emergency may 
arise not only before the required public notice can be gi,en, 
but after it has once been given, in consequence of the fail-
ure to receive any bids or proposals; in either case the pur-
chase thereupon would be an emergency purchase, and come-
under the requirement of the statute for an ip1mediate report 
to the Secretary of War for his approval. This requirement 
is, I think, designed to extend to all purchases which are not 
made agreeably to the general mode above indicated ; and 
hence it applies to the purchase of parts of machinery, or 
parts of stoves or ranges, for repairs, or of patented articles, 
where the same is (as in cases of emergency, and those only, 
it may be) made in open market. 
I am therefore of opinion that purchases in open. market 
under the circumstances stated in the first of your inquiries 
are emergency purchases within the meaning of the statute, 
and also that when parts of machinery, or of stoves or 
Tanges, or patented articles, are needed, these supplies are 
required by the statute to be purchased in the same way as 
other quartermaster's supplies-i.e., by contract, after public 
notice, except in cases of emergency, in which cases the pur-
chase should be reported to the Secretary of War for his ap-
proval. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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CLERKS AND EMPLOY~S OF DEPARTMENTS. 
Provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, relating 
to leave of absence of Department clerks and other employes, con-
strued. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 24, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of the 16th instant has been received, in 
which ·yon ask whether or not you are authorized to with-
hold the salary of a clerk who is absent on account of sick-
ness over thirty days in a year. 
The act approved March 3, 1883, section 4, provides that, 
"All absence from the Departments on the part of said clerks 
or other employe.s in excess of such leave of absence as may 
be granted by the heads thereof, which shall not exceed 
thirty days in any one year except in case of sickness, shall 
be without pay." 
The meaning is, that an absence from the Departments in 
excess of thirty days shall be without pay except in case of 
sickness; that in a case of sickness an absence in excess of 
thirty days shall be with pay, so long as the Department 
shall retain upon its roll the sick employe; tllat after thirty 
days of absence in a case of sickness no leave of absence 
for a different cause can be granted with pay; that when 
thirty days' absence in any one year has been granted with 
pay, additional absence can be granted to the same party 
with pay in case of sickness. 
Very respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ACQUISITION OF SITES FOR PUBLIC BUILDINGS. 
Under an act of the legislature of New York, passed April2, 1885, a valid 
title to certain lands situated in the cities of Troy and Auburn, in that 
State, which have heretofore been selected for the sites of Government 
buildings authorized by Congress to be erected there, may be acquired 
by the United States by condemnation proceedings instituted in the 
State court pursuant to its provisions. 
The acts of Congress of March 3, 1885, chapters 331 and 360, providing 
for the purchase of such sites, may properly be taken to authorize the 
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acquisition thereof in any :::node which is in conformity to the laws of 
t.he State. Hence where, by a law of the State, the property may be· 
condemned and title thereto acquired under the eminent domain power 
of the State, recourse may be had as well to this mode of acquisition 
as to any other under the authority conferreu by those acts. 
DEPARTMENT 014' JUSTICE, 
January 27, 1886. 
SIR: Your. letter of the 11th ultimo, calling my attention 
to the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 331, which authorizes the 
purchase in the city of Auburn, N. Y., of a site for a public 
building for the accommodation of the post·office, United 
States courts, and for other Government uses, and to the act 
of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, which makes provision for the 
purchase of a site for a post-office and court-bouse building at 
Troy,N. Y., and also to an act of the legislature of New York 
passed April 2, 1885, entitled "An act granting the consent 
of the State of New York to the acquisition by the United 
States of certain lands for the purpose of the erection of 
Government buildings at the cities of Troy and Auburn," 
etc., presents for my consideration the following question: 
"Whether title to such lanfl.s as may be selected for the 
purpose named can be acquired, under the laws above re-
ferred to, by proceedings in condemnation, should the Depart-
ment be unable to acquire title to the same by purchase." 
The sixth section of the act of the New York legislature,. 
above mentioned, provides that if title to the land (which i& 
not to exceed one acre in quantity in each place) or any portion 
thereof can not be acquired by purchase, application in behalf 
of the United States may be made to the supreme court for a 
writ of inquiry of damages, and thereupon the damages shall 
be ascertained, and the same be paid, in the manner prescribed 
by certain other statutory provisions therein named. In pro-
ceedings under these provisions, where it appears that the 
writ has been quly executed, the court is authorized to make 
an order declaring that, upon paying into court the amount 
of the damages ascertained, the United States shall be enti-
tled to an absolute estate in the real property described in 
the writ and in the appurtenances belonging thereto. 
This legislation authorizes title to the property to be ac· 
quired by the United States, in the contingency stated in 
273-VOL XVIII--~3 
354 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Acquisition of Sites for Public Buildings. 
the question under consideration, through condemnation pro-
ceedings instituted in the State court under the eminent do· 
main power of the State. 
Two inquiries here arise: first, whether a title so acquired 
would be valid and sufficient; second, whether authority thus 
to acquire it is conferred by the provisions of the acts of 
Congress of 1t;85 above referred to. 
There is some diYersity of opinion upon the subject of the 
power of a State to exercise its right of eminent domain for 
the purposes of the General Government. In the casP of 
T1·ombley v. Humphrey (23 Mich., 471) the supreme court of 
Michigan denied the existence of such power, asserting the 
doctrine that the right of eminent domain can only be exerted 
by a State for its own purposes-that the State can not any 
more exercise this right for purposes which appertain to the 
United States, tlJough to be accomplished within the terri-
torial limits of the former, than as if the two governments 
were wholly foreign to each other. On tbe other hand, the 
court of appeals of Maryland in Reddell v. Bryan, (14 l\Id., 
444); the supreme court of California in Gilmer v. Lime Point 
~ 18 Cal., 229); t,he supreme judicial court of l\iassachusetts in 
Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Omnpa.~ny (106 Mass., 356); and 
tile court of appeals of New York iu ~Matter of Petition of the 
United States, etc. (96 N. Y., 227), lay down a different doc-
trine, and ha,·e affirmed the validity of State laws author-
izing condemnations of land under the eminent domaiu of the 
State for the uses of the United States. In each of these 
last-mentioned cases the use of the United States for which 
the land was taken (namely, for the construction of an 
aqueduct in the first, the establishment of a fortification in 
the second, the erection of a post-office building in the ~bird, 
and the improvement of navigation in the fourth) was re-
garded as an object of public utility in which the State was 
equally interested with the General Government, and there· 
fore a publin use, in respect of which its right of eminent do· 
main might properly be exercised. The court of appeals of 
New York in the cases above cited remark : '' vvbile the 
Federal Government, as an independent sovereignty, bas the · 
power of condemning land within the States for its own use, 
we see no reason to doubt that it may lay aside its sovereignty, 
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and, as a petitioner, enter the State courts and there accom-
plish the same end through proceedings authorized by the 
State legislature. If the State may delegate its power to a 
private corporation of another State for the benefit of a 
canal located within its borders, as was held by this court in 
the matter of Peter Townsend (39 N.Y., 171), so it may to an 
independent political corpor .... ation where the use is public and 
the convenience shared by its own citizens." \ 
The decision of the court of appeals of New York' in the 
case just adverted to, sustaining the validity of a law in that 
State which authorized the acquisition of title to land by 
virtue of the eminent domain power of the State, for the 
purposes of the General Government, seems to me to re-
lieve from an doubt as to its validity the legislation of 
the same State hereinbefore referred to authorizing sites for 
post-office buildings at Auburn and Troy to be acquired 
through the exercise of the same power. The title so · ac-
quired for those purposes pursuant to such legislation, em-
bracing as it would an "absolute estate" in the premises, 
would, I think, be both valid and sufficient. 
As to the other point, namely, whether authority thus to 
acquire title to the property is imparted by the acts of 1885 
above mentioned, I think the direction in .. the one case "to 
purchase or otherwise provide a suitable site" and the pro-
vision in the other ~'for purchase of a site'' may proyerly be 
taken to authorize the acquisition in any mode which is in 
conformity to the laws of the State wherein the property 
is situated; and hence where, by a law of the State, the 
property may be condemned and title thereto acquired under 
its eminent domain power, recourse may be had as well to 
this mode of acquisition as to any other' under the authority 
conferred by those acts. 
On examination, I find that such bas been the practical 
construction heretofore given similar provisions. Thus, 
under authority of the provision made by the act of March 
3, 1857, chapter 97, "to purchase a site and construct addi-
tional defenses for San Francisco," condemnation proceed-
ings were instituted in a court of the State of California, 
pursuant to a law of that State, for the acquisition of Lime 
Point (case of Gilmer v. Lime Point, supra). So, un~er au-
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thority of the joint resolution of March 12, 1868 (No. 20), 
providing for the" purchase" of a site for a post-office build-
ing, etc., in Boston, similar proceedings were instituted, pur-
suant to a law of Massachusetts, in a court of that State, for 
the acquisition of such site (case of Burt v. Merchctnts' lns~tr­
ance Company, supra), and here Congress subsequently~ by 
act of March 3, 1871 (chap. 115), made an appropriation 
''to pay the award for the necessary land condemned under 
authority of the ~tate of Massachusetts for the purposes of 
said building;" thus recognizing the correctness of the con-
struction practically given the joint resolution as above. So, 
under authority of the provision in the act of June 8, 1872, 
chapter 362, empowering the Secretary of the Treasury "to 
purchase a lot of ground in the city of Philadelphia for a 
post-office site," etc., similnr proceedings were resorted to in 
order to acquire title to a part of the site, in pursuance of 
statutes of the State of Pennsylvania passed March 6 and 
April 10, 1873 (Laws of Pa., 1873, pp. 70, 72). Other in-
stances might be mentioned, but the above are thought to 
be sufficient to indicat(} the construction which has in prac- • 
tice been given to provisions like those under consideration. 
I may, however, add that Attorney-General Cushing, in an 
opinion dated .April 24, 1855 (7 Opin., 114), deemed the ac-
quisition of land by the United States, for the use of the 
Wasbingt()n Aqueduct, through the means of condemnation 
proceedings instituted in a Maryland court under a statute 
of that State, to be a ''purchase" within the scope of the 
joint resolution of September 11, 1841, and that the validity 
of the title might be certified by the Attorney-General there-
under. 
In this connection, I observe that while authority to "pur-
chase" land for the uses of the General Government within 
the States has thus been taken to authorize its acquisition 
pursuant to State laws through the exercise of the eminent 
domain power of the State, such authority bas been held to 
be insufficient of itself to authorize the land to be acquired 
by virtue of the eminent domain power of the United States. 
Touching this point, I beg to refer to an opinion of Attorney 
General Devens, dated May 16, 1879 (16 Opin., 329), and to 
one of Attorney General Brewster, dated February 1, 1883 
I 
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(unpublished),* both addressed to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. The view there adopted is, that to warrant the eminent 
domain power of the United States to be invoked, the terms 
of the statute must plainly permit its exercise; that the word 
purchase does not, as commonly used, impart authority to 
exert that power; and that where Congress intends to con-
fer the authority other terms clearly indicative of such in-
tent are ordinarily made use of by that body, as in the acts 
of March 9, 1882, chapter 28, and August 7, 1882~ chapter 
433 (appropriation for custom-house site at Fall River). 
But assuming that there is want of authority, in the terms 
employed in the acts under consideration, to put in motion 
the eminent domain power of the United States and acquire 
the sites in question thereunder, this does not necessarily· 
imply a want of authority to make use of similar means af-
forded by the laws of the State, in the exercise of its right 
of eminent domain, for the purpose of obtaining title to the 
property. 
In answer to the question proposed, I have therefore the 
honor to reply, that in my opinion title to the sites men-
tioned may, under the circumstances stated, lawfully be ac-
quired by condemnation proceedings ins.tituted in the State 
court pursuant to the statutes above referred to. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
FORT KEOGH MILITARY RESERVATION. 
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has no interest in any of the 
lands within the boundaries of the Fort Keogh military reservation, 
excepting the right of way therein granted to that company by the 
second section of the act of July 2, 1864, chapter 217, to the extent of 
200 feet in width on each side of its road, including all necessary ground 
for station buildings, workshops, depots, etc. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 1, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the papers 
which accompanied your letter of the 12th of Oc~ober last, 
*Since published in 17 Opin., p. 509. 
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in relation to an application made by citizens of 1\.'I.iles City, 
Mont., in behalf of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 
asking that that company be allowed to erect shipping pens 
for cattle upon its right of way within the Fort Keogh mili-
tary reservation, and also that permission be granted stock-
men to drive their cattle across the reservation to such ship-
ping pens. 
The question proposed for my consideration is, "as to 
what interest, if any, the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany may have to any portion of the lands embraced within 
the limits of the above-mentioned reservation." 
This calls for an examination of the grant made to that 
company by Congress in the act of July 2, 1864,chapter 217. 
By the second section of that act a right o{ way through 
the public lands "is granted to the company for the con-
struction of a railroad and telegraph" to the extent of 200 
feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass 
through the public domain, including aU necessary ground 
for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine-shops, 
switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water stations," etc. 
The third section grants to the company, for the purpose 
of aiding in the construction of its railroad and telegraph 
line, "every alternate section of public land, not mineral, 
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alter-
nate sections per mile on each side of said railroatl line," 
etc., ''not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, 
etc., at the time the line of said road is <lt>fi.nitel.v fixed and 
a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office." 
It appears by the papers that the Fort Keogh military 
reservation, which lies wholly within the 40-mile limits of the 
. grant last mentioned, was established by an Executive order 
dated March 14, 1878, but that the map of definite location 
of the railroad through the reservation was not filed until 
June 25, 1881; and as the lands within the reservation were 
then already appropriated, they were by the terms of that 
grant excepted therefrom, and the company consequently 
acquired under the grant no interest or right in or to an; 
portion thereof. (Kansc~;s Pacific Railway Company v. Dun· 
nzyer, 113 U. S., sec. 629.) 
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But it would seem that the grant of the right of way in the 
second section of that act differs from the land grant above 
referred to jn this, that it contains no reservations or excep-
tions. "It is a present, absolute grant, subject to no ex-
eeptions, except those necessarily implied, such as that the 
road shall be constructed ·and used for the purposes desig-
.nated." (Railroad Company v. Baldwin, 103 U. S., 426.) In 
the case just cited, which involved the construction of a sim-
ilar grant of right of way, the land was vaeant and unoccu-
pied public domain at the date of the act making the grant. 
After the passage of the act, but before the definite location 
of the railroad line, it was sold by the United States, and 
subsequently the line was definitely located thereon. The 
point was, whether the grant of the right of way took effect 
from the date of the definite location of the road or from the 
date of the act making the grant. The Supreme Court 
adopted the latter view, and accordingly held that the pur-
chaser took the land subject to that right. Agreeably to the 
doctrine of this case, the military reservation of Fort Keogh 
having been established after the grant of right of way to 
the railroad company, though before the definite location of 
its line, it must be deemed to be subject to that right through 
the same. 
In answer, then, to the question proposed by you, I reply 
that in my opinion the Northern Pacific Rai\road Company 
has no interest whatever in any of the lands em braced within 
the limits of the reservation, other than the easement granted 
thereto by the second section of the act of 1864, namely, a 
right of way for a railroad and telegraph-that it has such 
right to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of its 
road, "including all necessary ground for station buildings, 
workshops," etc. · 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
• 
I 
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APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE. 
Statutory pit>visions relating to the appraisement and reappraisement 
of imports subject to duty considered, and held that, in the absence of 
any regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury to that effect, the law 
does not permit importers to appear before the appraisers, with counsel 
or otherwiEe, for the purpose of producing witnesses to be examined 
in their own behalf, or to cross-examine witnesses called by such . 
appraisers. The entire matter is under the control of the Secretary, 
and subject to such rules and regulations as he may from time to time 
establish in relation thereto. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 1, 1886. 
SIR: Yours of recent date in regard to the appraisement 
of imported merchandise has been received, and in it you 
ask an opinion upon the following proposition, to wit: 
~'The main differences between certain importers and the 
customs' authorities are, that the importers insist on being 
permitted to appear by counsel at such reappraisement and 
to cross-examine witnesses, examine and criticise the confi-
dential testimony and papers which may be submitted to the 
general and merchant appraiser who may conduct the ap-
praisement, and that they have the right to produce such 
witnesses as they may deem proper for examination by the 
reap praisers." 
The question presented arises between importers and the 
customs authorities at the city of New York. 
Reference is had in this opinion to sections 2614, 2615, 
2785, 2902, 2922, 2930 and ~949 of the Revised Statutes, 
as containing the provisions of law governing the matter 
presented for consideration. Upon examination of the fore-
going sections it will be observed that the statute requires-
(!) That such appraisers, including the merchant apprais-
ers, shall take and subscribe an oath to diligently examine 
and inspect such merchandise, and report the true value 
thereof to the best of their knowledge and helief. 
(2) That the owner, consignee, or proper agent thereof 
shall make an entry of such imported merchandise under 
oath, in which shall be stated among other things the prime 
cost. And the orig·inal invoices, or documents in lieu thereof, 
with the bills of lading, must be produced to the collector. 
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(3) That upon the filing of such entry, and the papers 
required therewith, it shall be the duty of the customs officers, 
by all reasonable ways and means in their power, to ascer-
tain, estimate, and appraise the true and actual market value 
and wholesale price of such merchandise at the time of its 
exportation in the principal markets of the country from 
whence it was imported, regardless of the in\-oice and affi-
davit of such importer. 
(4) If the importer, owner, agent, or consignee of such 
merchandise shall be dissatisfied with the appraisement afore-
said, he may, if he has complied with the law, give notice 
thereof in writing to the collector. 
(5) The collector shall then select one discreet and experi-
enced merchant, to be associated with one of the general 
appraisers wherever practicable, or two discreet and experi-
enced merchants, citizens of the United States, familiar with 
the character and value of the goods in question, to examine 
and appraise the same, agreeably to the provisions of the 
statute. 
(6) The appraisers may can upon and examine upon oath 
any owner, importer, consignee, or other person touching 
any matter or thing which they may deem material in ascer-
taining the true market value or wholesale price of any mer-
chandise imported. 
(7) Such appraisers may require such importer on oath to 
produce to the collector or to any permanent appraiser any 
letters, accounts, or invoices in his possession relating to such 
merchandise. 
(8) The Secretary of the Treasury, from time to time, shall 
establish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with 
law, as will secure a just, faithful, and impartial appraisal 
of all merchandise imported into the United States, and just 
and proper entries of the actual market value and wholesale 
price thereof, as aforesaid. 
It is plain that the appraisers may make and report such 
appraisement upon knowledge obtained by examinatioD and 
inspection of the imported goods, without resorting to other 
sources or means of information. 
The mode of appraisement from the time of the entry of · 
the importer until the final determination of the question is 
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one continuous act of appraisement under the statute. The 
use of such terms as "appeal" and "reappraisement" are 
not warranted by the provisions of the law. Nor have the ap-
praisers been invested by law with any of the powers of 
a judicial tribunal. They are not authorized to make rules 
and regulations for their own government in ascertaiumg 
values and concluding appraisements, but are goverued by 
the provisious of the statute and such rulr>s and regulations 
as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time 
establish. 
The appraisers are selected for their supposed knowledge 
and familiarity with the values of the goods imported, and 
may act upon such knowl~dge, when they have examiued 
aucl inspected the merchandise, without additional evidence; 
or they may, in their discretion, call the owner, importer, con-
signee, or other person, and examine him upou oath in regard 
to any material matter. Such examinations may or may not 
be made according to the discretion of the appraisers. Such 
examinations can not be demanded by tbe importer, but may 
bt~ required by the appraisers. And as the letters, accounts, 
or invoices in the possession of the importer may be produced, 
by direction of the appraisers, under the law for the secret 
inspection and custody of the collector or permanent appraiser, 
no good reason can be assigned why the statements of owners, 
importers, consignees, or other persons, taken as required by 
law by such appraisers, may not be held as secret informa-
tion by the customs officers, under a rule or regulation to 
that effect established by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Such a rule is not inconsistent with any law of the United 
States. 
There is nothing in the law upon the subject under consid-
eration vesting the customs officers with judicial powers at 
any stage in the appraisement, nor has Congress fettered the 
proceedings with statutory rules; but the establishment of 
such rules has lJeen wisely delegated to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. The law authorizes the appraisers to require 
owners or importers to appear before them and make state-
ments under oath, but the rules and regulations in relation to 
· the manner of conducting such examinations are to be estab-
lisiled by tile Secretary of tile Treasury. He must report the 
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rules and regulations adopted by him to Congress, with his 
reasQDs therefor. 
I am of the opinion therefore that the law, in the absence of 
a rule of the Secretary of the Treasury to that efl'ect, does not 
permit importers to appear before such customs officers, with 
counsel or otherwise, for the purpose of producing witnesses 
to be examined in their own behalf, or to cross-examine wit-
nesses called by such appraisers, or to criticise confidential 
papers therein, but the entire matter is under the control of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and subject to such rules and 
regulations as he may establish in relation thereto from time 
to time. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 'IRE TREASURY. 
REFUND OF DUTY. 
Cement barrels being deemed non-dutiable charges, it is recommended 
that the instructions of the Treasury Department of July 20, 1885, be 
so amended as to apply to cases of exaction of duties on such barrels 
where the value thereof was added by the importer at the time of entry 
under a requirement mac.le by the order of April 10, 1884, as contained 
in the circular of that Department of April 12, 1884. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 5, 1886. 
· SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt ofyour 
communication of the 3d instant, inclosing copy of a letter 
dated New York, the 29th of July last, from Messrs. Hartley 
& Coleman, in which they ask that your Department's instruc-
tions of the 20th of that month for the settlement of suits 
and appeals covering the question of the exaction of duties 
on barrels containing cement may be considered as applica-
ble to cases of exaction of duties on such barrels where the 
cost or value thereof was added at the time of entry by the 
importers, under and in pursuance of an express requirement 
of the order of April 10, 1884, as contained in Department's 
circular of April 12, 1884. 
My opinion is requested upon the claim made in said letter 
that, as the cost of the barrels was added by the importers 
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under such positive order of the Department and against 
their written protests and appeals, the legal effect is the same 
as if the addition had been made by the collector or appraiser 
after entry. 
It appears that the instructions of your Department of the 
25th of July, 1885, as to settling suits for refund of duty on 
cement barrels, limited the cases to "those where the en-
tries did not include the cost of barrels, and where the cost 
was added by tho appraiser or collector to the entered value 
for the purpose of assessment of duty." Understanding the 
meaning of said limitation to be that where the addition was 
made on the entry by the importer, he was bound to pay duty 
thereon, whether the item added was properly exempt from 
duty or not, I am of opinion that said limitation should be 
reconsidered and revoked. I can perceive no difference be-
tween the cases in which the cost of the barrels was added 
by the importers under the positive order of the Depart-
ment and against their written protests and appeals, and 
the cases in which the addition has been made by the col-
lector or appraiser after entry. Although in form the addi-
tion is the act of the importer, it is in reality the act of the 
Department. In the case of Meyers v. Shurtleff (23 Fed. 
Rep., 577) it was decided that, according to the true construc· 
tion of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, cement barrels 
are non-dutiable charges. That decision seems to have been 
acquiesced in by the Government as final. It is accordingly 
recommended that the instructions of your Department bear-
ing date the 20th of July, 1885, be so amended as to apply to 
cases of exaction of duties on such barrels where the cost or 
value thereof wa,s added at the time of entry by the import-
ers under and in pursuance of a requirement made by the 
order of AprillO, 1884, as contained in Department circular 
of April12, 1884. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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STEAM REGISTERS. 
Sections 4418, 4419, and 4491, Revised Statutes, concerning steam regis-
ters used on vessels propelled by steam, considered; and held that a 
steam register, in order to be the subject of approval under section 4419, 
must be of a description which satisfies the requirements of both section 
4418 and section 4419. • 
The terms "persons engaged in navigating the vessel," as used in section 
4419, comprehend the officers and crew, those who are in the service of 
the vessel, and employed in its management, the working of its ma-
chinery, etc., during the voyage. The register is not only to be taken 
from the control of all persons so employed, but to be secured from such 
control by the inspectors. 
DEP ARTi\1ENT OF JUSTlCE, 
February 11, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of the 30th of December last informs me 
that'' a controversy" has for a number of years existed be-
tween the board of supervising inspectors of steam-vessels 
and the owners and proprietors of what is known as the" Ed-
son recording steam-pressure gauge," touching the proper con-
struction of certain statutory provisions contained in sections 
4418, 4419, and 4491, Revised Statutes. 
By the first of these sections it is provided that the local 
inspectors of steamboats shall ''satisfy themselves * * * 
that there is a sufficient number of gauge-cocks properly in-
serted, and, to indicate the pressure of steam, suitable steam 
registers that will correctly record each excess of steam car-
ried above the prescribed limit and the highest point at-
tained," etc. 
The next section provides that " the steam registers shall 
be taken wholly from the control of all persons engaged in 
navigating such vessel and secured by the inspectors." 
The remaining section reads as follows : " No kind of in-
strument, machine, or equipment for the better security oflife, 
provided for by this title, tihall be used on any steam-vessel 
which shall not first be approved by the board of supervising 
inspectors and also by the Secretary of the Treasury." 
The view taken by the board of supervising inspectors ap-
pears to be that they have no discretionary power under sec-
tion 4491 to approve any steam register that does not come 
within the provisions of the other sections named ( 4418 and 
4419), both in regard to its adaptability as an indicator and 
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recorder of the pressure of steam and its capability of being 
placed beyond the control of those who may be engaged in 
navigating the vessel, and thus secured by the local inspect-
ors. On the other. hand, the parties interested in the "Ed-
son recording steam-pressure gauge" (as it seems from J·our 
letJ;er) regard the board as in duty bound to approve any 
steam register that satisfies the provisions of section 4418, 
irrespective of the requirements of section 4419. 
Referring to. these conflicting views, you, at the instance of 
the board, request an opinion" upon the construction of the 
statutes in controversy." 
If what is here proposed for my consideration were noth-
ing more than a subject of controversy between the board 
and the parties above mentioned, it would not present a 
question upon which the Attorney-General is authorized to 
gi \·e an official opinion. It is made his duty to give opinions 
at the call of the heads of Departments, but this is limited 
to questions of law arising in the administration of their re-
spective Departments (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.). Where the sub-
ject· matter is not of that character, and consequently not 
within the scope of the duty thus marked out, he is without 
authority to officially ad vise thereon. 
Presuming the subject before me, however, to be one that 
concerns not only the duties of the board but the exercise of 
your own functions under section 4491, whatever other fea-
ture it possesses, I may well regard it as a matter arising in 
the administration of your Department, and so not open to 
that objection. 
The point on which my opinion is desired, though not dis-
stinctly stated in your letter, I understand to be this: Whether, 
with respect to steam registers, tte approval called for by 
section 4491 is limited to those instruments which come 
within the terms of section 4418 and which are also capable 
of being secured as required by section 4419. 
The ~nswer to this is plain. The provisions of section 4491 
extend only to such instruments, machines, or eq uipments 
as are" provided for in Title LII; and since no steam regis-
ters are therein provided for other than those covered by 
sections 4418 and 4419, the register, in order to be the sub-
ject of approval under 4!91, must be of a description which 
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.satisfies both the sections mentioned. It is not enough that 
the instrument meets all the requirements of section 4418. 
Unless it can be taken wholly from the control of the per-
sons engaged in navigating the vessel and secured by the 
local inspectors, as required by section 4419, it does not prop-
erly fall within the provisions of section 4491. 
There has been some discussion as to the meaning of the 
terms "persons engaged in navigating" the vessel, as em-
ployed in section 4419. In a generaJ sense, those terms com-
prehend the officers and crew, all who are in the service 
-of the vessel, and employed in its management and the work-
ing of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. I incline to 
take the view that they are meant to be understood in that 
broad sense. The register is not only to be taken from the 
-control of "all" persons so employed, but to be secured from 
such control by the inspectors. The aim of the statute thus 
seems to be to place the register under the exclusive control 
of the inspectors themselves. Whether this is practicable 
with regard to the use of any steam register now constructed 
can not properly be considered to govern the interpretation 
of the statute, but the intent and meaning thereof mus~ be 
gathered from its language. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. B. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Where certain merchandise, consisting of a fabric composed of silk, cot-
ton, and worsted, met all the requirements of Schedule L of the act 
of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, and also fulfilled all the conditions im-
posed by Schedule K of the same act for classification for duty there 
under: Held that under section 2499, Revised Statutes, it should be 
classified for duty under Schedule L, which imposes the higher rate 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
Febr'uary 18, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the rec0,ipt of your 
-communication of the 16th instant, requesting my npinion 
upon a question involving the classification for duty of cer-
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tain merchandise called silk seals, imported under the tariff 
act of :March 3, 1883. 
It appears from your statement that the merchandise in 
question consists of a fabric composed of silk, cotton, and 
worsted, silk being admittedly the component of chief value, 
but worsted also forming a component of no inconsiderable 
value. The question presented is whether the merchandise 
is dutiable at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem under 
the provision in Schedule L, act pf March 3, 1883, or whether 
it is dutiable under the provision of Schedule K, which im-
poses duties at the rate of 35 cents per pound and 40 per 
centum ad valorem on all manuf~ctures composed in part of 
the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other animal, when weighing 
over 4 ounces per square yard. Inasmuch as these goods 
fulfill the conditions imposed by Schedule K, and also meet 
the requirements imposed by Schedule L, it seems to me that 
the case is governed by section 2499 of the Revised Statutes, 
incorporated in the act of March 3, 1883. That section pro-
vides as follows : 
'' There shall be levied, collected, and paid, on each and 
every non-enumerated article which bears a similitude either 
in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be 
applied to any article enumerated in this title as chargeable 
with duty, the same rate of duty which is levied and charged 
on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of 
the particulars before mentioned; and if any non-enumerated 
article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles on 
which different rates are chargeable, t,here shall be levied, 
collected, and paid on such non-enumerated article the same 
rate of duty as is chargeable on the article which it resem-
bles paying the highest duty, and on all articles manufact-
ured from two or more materials the duty shall be assessed 
at the highest rates at which the component material of 
chief value may be chargeable. If two or more rates of duty 
should be applicable to any imported article, it shall be clas-
sified for duty under the highest of such rates: Provided, 
That non-enumerated articles similar in material and quality 
and texture and the use to which they may be applied to ar-
ticles on the free-list, and in the manufacture of which no 
dutiable materials are used, shall be free." 
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It appearing that two rates of duty are applicable to the 
merchandise referred to, I am of opinion that the action of the 
collector, to the effect that of these rates the higher should be 
selected, was correct. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CASE OF MOORE, WHITFIELD, ETC. 
Opinions of May 5 and July 7, 1885 (see ante, pp. 167, 223), reaffirmed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 2, 1886. 
SIR: I have duly considered your communication of De-
cember 14, 1885, together with the papers accompanying it, 
which asks for a further consideration of the accounts of 
Moore, Whitfield, and Woodson, in connection with the sale 
of certain Indian trust lands. 
As you state in your communication, I have on two pre-
vious occasions (May 5 and July 7, 188fl) rendered your 
Department opinions in this matter, and· now, after the third 
examination of this case upon the papers presented, I see 
no cause to change those opinions, or either of them. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND .. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
LOSS OF MONEY-ORDER FUNDS. 
The act of March 17, 1882, chapter 41, which authorizes the Po~tmaster­
General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of money~order 
funds in certain cases, does not annul the requirements of regulation 
1099 of the" Postal Laws and Regulations," whereby the postmaster 
is to make good the loss should he fail to comply with such regula-
tion. 
Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regulation is in 
force, to disregard it in a case where he is satistied that the postmaster 
had in fact remitted the money lost, but did not have the remittance 
witnessed as the regulation requires. 
273-VOL XVIII--24 
370 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Loss of Money-Order Funds. 
The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being limited 
by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is made ''in compli-
ance with the instructions of the Postmaster-General," such compliance 
forms a necessary element in each case to bring it within th~ statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 3, 1886. 
SIR: I have considered the questions in the case of the 
postmaster at Washington, Ark., which were submitted to 
me in your letter of the 14th of December last. As stated 
by you, the case is this: 
" On the 29th of November, 1884, the postmaster there 
(Miss Rosa Wallace) bad on hand $381 surplus money-order 
funds, which by the· regulation she was required to deposit 
in a depository office named, and was required to remit the 
same in registered packages in the mail. In order to pre-
serve evidence of such remittance of a character that admits 
of no contradiction, special instructions are given as section 
1099, Postal Laws and Regulations. (Here follows that sec-
tion.) 
"As will be seen, the above regulation requires that, in 
every case of a remittance of money-order funds made by 
means of paper money, the postmaster should be able to prove 
by at least one disinterested witness that the money was act-
ually inclosed in a properly registered package addressed to 
the postmaster at the post-office designated to receive the de-
posit, and furthermore that said package, with the money 
inclosed therein, was securely locked in the mail pouch, and 
was taken from the post-office and out of the postmaster's 
possession by the contractor, employe of the railway mail 
service, mail carrier, or other person duly authorized to dis-
patch the same to its destination. The regulation also pro-
vides that should the remitting postmaster fail to comply 
with the foregoing in~tructions, he will be required, if the 
money is lost, to make good the amount. 
"Miss Wallace (the . postmaster at Washington) states 
that she scheduled the money for remittance, and inclosed it 
in an envelope properly sealed and addressed on the night 
of November 29, and placed it in a large iron safe during 
the night, together with other packages, to be forwarded in 
the mail train which passed at 8 o'clock the following morn-
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ing; that the next morning she went to the post-office, took 
the registered packages and locked them in the mail pouch, 
and. they were duly forwarded. At the Hope post-office the 
bag was found to be cut, and the whole bundle of letter 
packages, some t.welve in all, were reported missing, amongst 
them the one in question, and have ne\er been found; and 
there is much e-vidence justifying suspicion that the pack-
ages were stolen in the la~t-named office. She thereupon 
duly presented Ler claim for credit under the act of 1\farch 
17, 1882. chapter 41. 
" The evidence in the case showed that she had no witness, 
as required by regulation 1099, Postal Laws and ltegu.la-
tions, of the several steps in preparing and forwarding the 
remittance, although a credible witness happened to be pres-
ent in the morning and casually saw her put in the mail-
pouch packages tied together and appearing to be regiHtered 
matter, and remembers the fact, although not then called 
upon to witness it. 
" The regulation was adopted and promulgated before the 
passage of the act of March 17, 1882, and has never been 
modified or changed by the _act of the Postmaster-General. 
but has been applied in many cases." 
In connection with the foregoing you submit the following 
questions: 
"(1) \Vhether the act of March 17,1882, above cited, oper_ 
ated to annul the requirement of regulation 1099, so far as it 
declares t.hat the postmaster shall make good the amount in 
case the regulation is disregarded. 
• "(2) If the regulation be in force, has the Postmaster Gen-
eral the right to disregard it in a particular case, where he 
is satisfied that the postmaster bas in fact made the remit-
·tance, but bas failed to have witnesses to the transaction as 
the regulation requires." 
The act of March 17, 1882, in so far as it relates to the loss 
of money-order funds, confers upon the Postmaster-General 
power to grant relief to postmasters in the following cases: 
First, where the funds, while in the hands of the postmaster, 
are lost by hurglary, fire, or other unavoidable accidents. 
Second, where the funds; being remitted by the postmaster, 
are lost or stolen while in transit. ·The present inquiry is 
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confined to the provision of the statute and the regulations 
of the Post-Office Department applicable to cases of the lat· 
ter description only. 
The statutory provisionjust adverted to authorizes the Post 
master-General " to credit postmasters with the amount of 
any remittances of money-order funds made by them in com-
pliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-General which 
shall have been lost or stolen while in transit by mail from 
the office of the remitting postmaster to the office desig-
nated as his depository." This provision does not annul regu-
lation 1099, which embodies ''special instructions about re-
mittances," but rather recognizes it as a duty of postmasters 
to comply therewith in making their remittances. And as 
the authority to credit them with lost remittnnces is limited 
to cases where the remittance is made'' in compliance with 
the instructions of the Postmaster-General," such compliance 
forms a necessary element in each case to bring it within the 
statute. 
The Postmaster-General may undoubtedly amend or modify 
the existing regulation or instructions upon the subject of 
these remittances, but the amendment or modification could 
only be made to apply to cases of loss thereafter happening. 
Cases of loss which have already occurred must be viewed 
with reference to the instructions in force at the time of their 
occurrence. The Postmaster-General has no dispensing 
power as to them. For while in force and operating they are 
as binding as if they were statutes, and if in any such case 
there has been failure on the part of the postmaster in 
making remittance to comply with the instructions, the ' 
loss is not one for which, under the act of 1882, the Post-
master-General is authorized to give him credit. 
Agreeably to the foregoing considerations I answer both 
the questions submitted by you in the negative. 
I am sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLA~D. 
'rhe POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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CADET ENGINEERS. 
The cadet engineers in the Navy (graduates of the classes of 1881 and 
1882) who were discharged unJer a misconstruction of the act of Au-
gust 5, ltJ82, chapter 391, not having been legally removed, are still the 
lawful incumbents of their respective offices, and should be recognized 
as in the immediate line of promotion, in their proper order, to fill the 
vacancies that may occur in the office of assistant engineers. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 6, 1886. 
SIR: Yours of the 27th'ultimo in reference to cadet engi-
neers, who are graduates of the classes of 1881 and 1882, has 
been received. In view of the recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court in the cases of The United Sta,tes v. Redgrave, 
and The United States v. Perkins, affirming the decisions of 
the Court of Claims .(20 C. Cls. R., 226, 438) you ask an opin-
ion upon the questions which are hereinafter considered in 
the order in which they are presented. 
(1} ''Whether the cadet engineers who, after being notified 
of their discharge under the act, accepted the same with the 
accompanying pay, or, after protesting, waived their objec-
tions and then accepted the pay, are or are not affected by 
the decision; or, in other words, whether they are by their 
own act debarred from participation in the benefit of the 
decision." 
The court held in Leopold v. United States (18 C. Cis. R., 
546) that the act of Augm;t 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 285), is pros-
pective and not retroactive, and therefore not applicable to 
the classes of 1881 and 1882. The subsequent decisions of 
the Court of Claims and of the Supreme Court have settled 
this as the law. 
The cadet engineers of these classes became inferior officers 
under the Constitution, and Congress by expres8 enactment 
vested the power to appoint them in the Secretary of the 
Navy, subject, however, to the restriction and limitation as 
to removals which is found in section 1229, Revised Statutes, 
to wit: "And no officer in the military or naval service shall 
in time of peace be dismissed from service, except upon and 
in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that efl'ect 
or in commutation thereof." 
Inasmuch as it has been held by the Court of Claims in 
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Perkins'v. United States (20 C. Cis. R., 438) and affirmed by 
the Supreme Court, that " the discharge of a cadet engineer 
by the Secretary of the Navy in 1883} under a mistaken con-
struction of the act of 5th August, 1883 (22 Stat., 284), and 
contrary to the Revised Statutes, section 12291 was void," it 
is evident the cadet engineers, who have passed the requisite 
examinat:ons, can only be relieved of their official obliga-
tions and duties by one of two methods, either by sentence of 
a court-martial or by resignation. The former proposition 
does not enter into the matter under consideration. The 
honorable discharge of the cadet engineers having been held 
void by the courts, can it be said that those who accepted 
their pay without protest or that those who protested against 
the legality of the discharge, and subsequently accepted 
such pay, intended thereby to give to their acts the force 
and effect of resignation~ This construction could not· rea-
sonably be given to such acts. Such protests and acts could 
not change the legal force of the statute either for or against 
them. 
''A resignation may he effected by the concurrence of the 
officer and the appointing power; its essential elements 
being an intent to resign on the one side and acceptance on 
the other. The principle upon which it rests is agreement." 
(14 Opin., 259; and JJ;Jirnmack's Case, 97 U.S., 436.) 
One of these cadet engineers bas been discharged at his 
own requet:;t. 'rhe other twenty-nine have not been legally 
removed, have not resigned, and are still the proper and 
legal incumbents of their respective offices, and have been 
such notwithstanding the misconstruct,ion of the act of 
August 5, 1882. 
That act recognized the rank and office of cadet engineers 
(graduates) and made an appropriation to pay them for their 
services, and the courts have. held that such act did not make 
cadet engineers (graduates) of the classes of 1881 and 1882 
naval cadets. 
"(2) What disposition shall be made of such cadet engi-
neers after their restoration to the Navy Register~" 
As the courts have declared the honorable discharges is-
sued under the act of August 5, 1882, void, the cadet engi· 
neers (graduates) retain their offices and rank without regard 
to such discharges. The misconst.ruction of said act has 
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placed them in an anomalous position, and embarrassed the 
Department. These cadet engineers (graduates) were in the 
-immediate line of promotion to assistant engineers, and, only 
for the misconstruction of the act aforesaid, they would now 
bold the commissions to the latter office erroneously h'eld by 
others. It appears the office of cadet engineers (graduates) 
was ignored in making promotions, under the misconstruction 
of the act of August 5, 1882, and naval cadets who were in-
ferior in rank were promoted to the vacancies in the office of 
assistant engineer, which vacancies should have been filled 
by promotions from the cadet engineers. The cadet engi-
neers are, by the-decisions of the courts, in the direct and 
immediate line of promotion to vacancies to the office of 
assistant engineers. 
Congress, by inadvertent legislation, caused a state of 
affairs to exist not intended or contemplated. The persons 
now erroneously holding the commissions as assistant engi· 
neers can not well be disturbed. But the misconstruction of 
the act of August 5, 1882, having been definitely pointed out 
by the courts, the cadet engineers (graduates) who have so 
long been deprived of their rights, are now entitled to have 
them restored, and this can only be accomplished by recog-
nizing them as in the immediate line of promotion, in their 
proper order, to fill the first vacancies that may occur in the 
office of assistant engineer. 
As to the disposition of the naval cadets who are entitled 
to promotion, I would suggest a reference of the matter to 
Congress for immediate consideration. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that all of the twenty-nine 
cadet engineers (graduates) are in the service as officers, and 
entitled to participate without distinction in the benefit of 
the decisions of the courts referred to in your communica-
tion; and that such cadet engineers (graduates) remain in 
their proper order, in the immediate line of promotion to the 
first vacancies that may occur in the office of assistant engi-
neer, and have preference thereto over naval cadets of inferior 
rank, and that Congress should he requested to enact a law 
regulating the promotion of naval cadets, and providing for 
the discharge of any surplus thereof. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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HAZING A1' THE NAVAL ACADEMY. 
Where the record of the proceedings o~ a court-martial in the case of a 
nava~ cadet of the second class, who was tried under the act of June 
23, 1874, chapter 453, for the offense of hazing, showed that the acts 
complained of were pulling the nose, striking at, striking, and other-
wise maltreating a naval cadet of the fourth class: Held, that these 
facts, in conjunction with other circumstances, present a case contain-
ing all that is e~sential to constitute the offense of hazing within the 
meaning of the statute, and that the court had jurisdiction of the com-
plaint. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 12, 1886. 
SIR : I have examined the question submitted in your let-
ter of the 18th ultimo, transmitting the record of the proceed-
ings of a court-martial in the case of Naval Cadet Glen 
Waters, namely: " Whether the court had jurisdiction of the 
case." 
This is one of several cases recently tried before the court-
martial referred to for violation of the act of June 23, 1874, to 
prevent hazing at the Naval Academy, in all of whieh the 
charges had relation to or were based upon the same occur-
rences. 
In the case under consideration the charge and specifica-
tions were these : 
~' Charge : Violation of the act of Congress approved on 
the 23d day of June, 1874, to prevent hazing at the Naval 
Aeaclemy. 
"Specification .first: In this that the said Naval Cadet Glen 
·Waters~ while attached to and serving at the said Academy, 
on or about the 31st day of December, 1~85, in the cadet 
quarters of said Academy, did~ haze' Naval Cadet Louis L. 
Driggs, a cadet of the fourth class, attached -to and serving 
at the said Academy, by pulling the nose of the said Driggs, 
and otherwise maltreating the said Driggs. 
"Specification second: In this that the said Naval Cadet Glen 
Waters, between October 1 and December 31, 1885, in the 
cadetquarters,did haze Naval Cadet Louis L. Driggs, a cadet 
of the fourth class, attached to and serving at the said 
Academy, by striking at said Driggs and otherwise annoy-
ing the said Driggs." 
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Here the inquiry arises, do the allegations in the above 
charge and specifications, assuming them to be true, amount 
to the "offense commonly known as hazing," within the 
meaning of the act of 187 4 ~ If so, then undoubtedly the 
court-martial not only had jurisdiction of the complaint, but 
was bound to entertain it and to determine its truth or falsity 
upon the testimony adduced. 
In a former opinion addressed to you, dated November 12, 
1885, I had occasion to examine the subject, what constitutes 
the offense of hazing, mentioned in that act-the act itself 
containing no definition of such offense, and it being un-
known either to the common or statutory law of the land. 
The result reached was, that for a definition of the offense re-
course must be had to the rules and regulations in force at the 
Naval Academy at the time of the passage of the act, and 
that according to these the offense consists in the maltreat-
ment of a new cadet of the fourth class by any of the cadets 
of the senior classes. In paragraph 170 of the regulations 
of the Academy of 1876, it is described as "molesting, an-
noying, ridiculing, maltreating, or assuming unauthorized 
authority over the new cadets of the fourth class " by the 
older cadets. 
It is averred in the specifications that the person upon 
whom the ofl'ense is alleged to have been committed was at 
the time " a cadet of the fourth class, attached to and serving 
at the said Academy;" and it elsewhere appears in the reqord 
that the person charged with the offense was then a cadet of 
the second class; while the acts of the latter which go to 
form the gravamen of the complaint are (specification first), 
"pulling the nose of the said Driggs, striking the said Driggs, 
and otherwise maltreating the said Driggs," and (specifica-
tion second) "striking at said Driggs, and otherwise annoy-
ing the said Driggs," be being a cadet of the fourth class. 
These facts plainly exhibit a case of maltreatment, which, in 
conjunction with the other circumstances mentioned, contains 
all that is essential to constitute the offense of "hazing" in 
the sense of the statute. 
The cmut-martial, then, having jurisdiction of the case as 
set forth in the complaint, it had power under the statute to 
inquire into au·the facts and circumstances thereof and make 
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a findiug thereon. Whether the facts and circumstances dis-
closed by the evidence did or did not establish the offense 
charged was for the court to decide, and whether the dr· 
cision rendered was correct or erroneous this could not affect 
the validity or effect of its fiuding when approved by the 
proper authority. 
It is suggested that if the facts in evidence, as shown by 
the record, make out a case of personal rencounter or fight 
between the parties, the court was thereby ousted of its juris-
diction, and its finding was consequently a nullity. But 
conceding, for the present purpose, that the facts do make 
out a case of that sort, this would only go to show that the 
decision of the court was wrong, not that it acted without 
jurisdiction. If the court had cognizance of the offense charged 
its jurisdiction to receive evidence and to determine from tue 
testimony given whether the accused was guilty of that offense 
could not be defeated by the state of facts developed on the 
trial (Regina v. Bolton, 1 L. B., 66; Wilkinson v. Dutton, 3 
B. & S. 821), unless the absence of some jurisdictional fact, as 
that the victim of the maltreatment was not a cadet of the 
fourth class, or that the accused was not a cadet of one of 
the senior classes, should thereby be made to appear. 
Whether the acts of the accused which were proved on the 
trial constituted the offense wherewith he was charged was 
a fact which the court had to decide; but how could it decide 
without the possession and exercise of jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter~ 
The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction ; 
and it is coram judice whene,·er a case is presented which 
brings this power into action. (United States v. Arredendo, 6 
Pet., 709). It is a general rule that when the court has 
jurisdiction by law of the offense charged, and of the party 
who is charged therewith, its judgments in the case are not 
nullities. (Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S., 328.) When it ap-
pears that the law has given the tribunal capacity to enter -
tain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be 
charged or affected, that such complaint has actually been 
preferred, and that such person or thing uas been properly 
brought before the tribunal to answer the charge therein 
contained. the jurisdiction has attaehed, the right to hear 
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and determine is perfect, and the decision of every question 
thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus 
conferred, and whether determined rightfully or wrongfully, 
correctly or erroneously, is alike immaterial to the validity, 
force, and effect of the final judgment, when brought collat-
erally in question. (Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Olaio Stat., 494.) 
The principles stated in the authorities just cited have 
become axiomatic and apply to the court and case under 
consideration. Upon examination of the record I find myself 
unable to reach any other conclusion than that the case was 
within the jurisdiction of the court. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
ABATEMENT OF TAX ON DISTILLED SPIRITS. 
A large quantity of whisky, part of which had been in warehouse be-
yon,d the bonded period of three years, was accidentally destroyed 
by :fire in July, 1884, without any fraud, collusion, or negligence of 
the distillers, and while the same remained under custody of an in-
ternal-revenue officer in a distillery warehouse. The tax thereon had 
not peen paid. Application having been made to the secretary of the 
Treasury for an abatement of the tax under section 3221, Revised 
Statutes: Advised that the Secretary has authority, by the terms of 
that section, under the state of facts shown, to abate the tax on said 
spirits. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
JJ!arch 19, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 15th instant, in which you request an 
expression of opinion as to the authority of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, under section 3221 of the Revised Statutes, to 
abate the tax on distilled spirits under the circumstances as 
stated. 
It appears from the statement that A. Overholt & Co., dis-
tillers in the twenty-second district of Pennsylvania, applied 
to the Secretary under said section 3221 for an abatement 
of the tax on 333,825 gallons of whisky which the proof 
showed to have been accidentally destroyed by fire on the 
night of the 23d of July, l.S84, without any fraud, collusion, 
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or negligence of the distillers, while the same remained under 
the custody of an internal-revenue officer in the distillery 
warehouse of the claimants. Of the total amount thus de-
stroyed, it was found that 22,962 gallons had been in the 
warehouse some twenty-three days beyond the bonded period 
of three years allowed by section 3293, Revised Statutes, as 
amended by section 4 of the act of May 28, 1880 (21 Stat., 145). 
Section 3221 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows: 
" The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the prdduction to him 
of satisfactory proof of the actual destruction by accidental fire 
or other casualty, and without any fraud, collusion, or negli-
gence of the owner thereof, of any distilled spirits, while the 
same remained in the custody of any officer of internal revenue, 
in any distillery warehouse or bonded warehouse of the 
United States, and before the tax thereon has been paid, may 
abate the amount of internal taxes accruing thereon, and may 
cancel any warehouse bond, or enter satisfaction thereon, in 
whole or in part, as the case may be. And if such taxes 
have been collected since destruction of said spirits, the said 
Secretary shall refund the same to the owners thereof out of 
any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." 
Section 4 of the act entitled ''An act to amend· the laws 
in relation to internal revenue,'' approved May 28, 1880, 
provides among other things that, "in case the distiller or 
owner fails orrefuses to give the bond hereinbefore required, 
or to renew the same, or neglects to immediately withdraw 
the spirits and pay the tax thereon, before the expiration of 
the time limited in the bon<l, the collector shall proceed to 
collect the tax by distraint," etc. The same section provides 
also "that the tax on all distilled spirits hereafter entered 
for deposit in distillery warehouses shall be payable before 
and at the time the. same are withtlrawn therefrom, and 
within three years of the date of the entry for deposit therein." 
Undoubtedly the collector could have proceeded to collect 
the tax by distraint immediately upon the expiration of the 
bonded period of three years allowed by law, but it seems 
that he has not done so, ao.d that the tax upon the distilled 
spirits iu question has not been paid. Section 3221, being in 
the nature of a remedial statute, must be construed liberally; 
but, without invoking this principle, I am of opinion that 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 381 
Bonded Warehouse. 
before the tax bas been paid the Secretary of the Treasury 
has authority, by the express terms of the statute under the 
state of circurpstances as shown, to abate the tax on the dis-
tilled spirits. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
BONDED WAREHOUSE. 
Where domestic merchandise, exported in good faith, has been imported 
baclr again, and is subject to duty, it is entitled to be admitted to 
entry for storage in a. bonded warehouse under section 2962, Revised 
Statutes. 
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 25, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 19th instant, as)dng an 
opinion as to ''whether imported goods, wares, and mer-
chandise the product or manufacture of the United States, 
which, under section 2500, Revised Statutes, are liable to a 
duty equal to the tax imposed by the internal-revenue laws, 
are entitled to the privilege of the bonded-warehouse system 
prescribed by sections 2962, etc., of the Revised Statutes," 
has received my consideration, and I have to say in reply 
that, in my opinion, such goods, wares, and merchandise are 
entitled to the privilege of the bonded-warehouse system. 
The law (sec. 2962, Rev. Stat.) admits to entry for storage 
in a bonded warehouse "any merchandise subject to duty," 
brought into any port of entry of the United States, and to 
deny the right to enter for storage reimported domestic mer-
chandise is to refuse to give proper effect to the words of the 
Jaw. 
The opinion of my predecessor of the 2d July, 1883, to 
which you refer, does not admit of the construction that bas 
been put on it in the Treasury Department. That opinion 
goes no farther than to lay down that the privileges extended 
to importations can not be enjoyed by domestic merchandise 
taken out of the country upon a formed plan to bring it back 
again, and that in such case there is a merely colorab,le ex-
portation, and, consequently, no reimp:>rtation in the statu-
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tory sense. And this op-inion is applicable onl~1 to cases 
where domestic merchandise exported in good faith has 
been reim ported. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
AMERICAN CARRYING TRADE. 
Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121 " to remove certain bur-
dens on the American merchant marine and to encourage the Ameri-
can carrying trad~," etc., considered in connection with the eighth 
article of the treaty of 1827 with Sweden and Norway. 
No warrant is found in the treaty for the claim that the shipping of that 
power is entitled to the benefits of the act without submitting to its 
conditions. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
]}I arch 26, 1886. 
Sm: As requested by you, I have reviewed in the light of 
the note of the minister of Sweden and Norway to you, a 
copy of which bas been furniRhed me, the opinion of this 
Department of the 19th September, 1885, upon the claims of 
certain foreign powers to be admitted to th6 benefits of the 
fourteenth section of the act of Congress of the 26th June, 
1884~ entitled " An act to remove certain burdens on the 
American merchant marine and to encourage the American 
carrying trade, and for other purposes," without submission 
to the geographical conditions and limitations of that law, 
and find it quite as difficult to yield to the claim of Sweden 
ancl Norway under the eighth article of the treaty of 1827 as 
to the supposed claim under the" most favored nation" clause 
of that treaty. 
The eighth article of the treaty of 1827 is in these words: 
"The two high contracting parties engaged not to impose 
upon the navigation between their respective territories, in 
the vessels of either, any tonnage or other duties, of any 
kind or denomination, which shall be higher or other than 
those which shall be imposed on every other navigation 
except that which they have reser,ed to themselves, respect-
ively, by the sixth article of the present treaty." 
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It is not denied that the benefit of the reduced tonnage 
duty of the act of the 26th June, 1884, is open to the ship-
ping of Sweden and Norway on the conditions of that law 
wh_ich ap~ly to ''every other navigation," but it is claimed 
that the shipping of that power is entitled to the benefits of 
the act without submitting to its qualifications or conditions. 
For this view I can find no warrant whatever in the treaty, 
the object of which, in the article now under consideration, 
was to secure the shipping of each of the contracting parties 
from discriminations imposed by the other and not prac-
ticed against other powers. 
The act of 1884 admits all nations to its benefits, but these 
can only be enjoyed upon the terms on which they are offered, 
and Sweden and Norway are expected to submit to those 
terms in common with all other nations. The act of Congress 
must have effect, as the last expression of the law-making 
power, even though it should be in conflict with the treaty, 
which, however, I do not think it is. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant~ 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
The article called toluidine, being a product of coal-tar, is within the 
provision of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. covering ''all prepara-
tions of coal-tar not colors or d~·e. not specially enumerated or provided 
for," and is dutiable thereunder. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
· March 30, 1886. 
SIR: By your letter of the 19th instant it appears that a 
certain article of merchandise, called toluidine, was by a De-
partment decision, dated the 8th of December last, held to be 
dutiable under the general provision of the act of 188:i, cov-
ering "all preparations of coal-tar, not colors or dye, not 
specially enumerated or provided for" therein. (T. I., new, 
83.) It is now claimed that the article mentioned should be 
classified as "aniline, crude," which is exempt from duty 
under that act. (T. I., new, 559.) 
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The latter view is put upon the ground, I understand, that 
crude aniljne, as an article of commerce, is practically unknown, 
and that as toluidine, xylidine, curnidine, and other similar 
products, constitute the only articles of commerce approxi-
mating to crude aniline, they should be admitted free of duty 
as crude aniline. However, each of those articles (toluidine, 
xylidine, etc.), being a product or preparation of coal-tar, 
comes fairly within the terms of the provision quoted above, 
''all preparations of coal.tar, not colors," etc., and in the 
absence of any other provision in .the same act under which 
such article may be classified, it is undoubtedly dutiabl~ 
under that. The ground suggested for classifying it as crude 
aniline-its approximation to crude aniline--is to my mind 
insufficient. 
I perceive nothing in the accompanying papers which satis-
fies me that the Department decision above referred to is 
erroneous, and therefore do not recommend a reversal or 
modification thereof. 
I am, sir, v~ry respectfully, 
JOHN GOODE, , 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
TITLE TO " POINT PETER/' GEORGIA. 
History of the title of the United States to the tract of land known as 
"Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's River, Georgia, 
given, and adverse claims to ownership of the premises set up by one 
Alex. Curtis, a resident of Georgia, shown to be utterly groundless. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 20, 1886. 
SIR : I have examined the papers which accompanied your 
letter of the 8th ultimo, in relation to a certain tract of land 
known as ''Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's 
River, Georgia, and in compliance with your request have 
now the honor to state to you my views concerning the title 
of the United States to the premises. 
It appears that by a deed made January 10, 1818, the land 
referred to was conveyed to the United States in fee by 
Samuel Breck, sole surviving executor of the last will and 
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testament of John Ross, deceased, in consideration of the 
sum of $6,000. The grantor in that deed derived title from 
Samuel Howard and wife, dated October 21, 1815. There-
citals in the last-mentioned deed and other evidence show 
that the premises were originally granted by the State of 
Georgia to Jacob Weed, May 1~, 1787, and on the 6th of 
:\fay, 1806, were sold and by a deed of that date conveyed to 
the said Samuel Howard by the United States marshal for 
the district of Georgia as the property of James Seagrove, 
pursuant to a decree of the United States circuit court for 
that district, rendered in a suit for the foreclosure of a mort-
gage of the premises given by the said Seagrove, dated De-
cember 17, 1804. The originals of the aforesaid deeds of 
Howard and wife and Samuel Breck, and a certified copy of 
the above-mentioned deed of the United States marshal, are 
among the papers herewith. In what way Seagrove suc-
ceeded to the title of Weed does not appear ; but informa-
tion on. that point is deemed unimportant, in view of the 
great length of time which has since elapsed and other cir-
cumstauces. 
Such is the history of the title of the United States a·s dis-
closed by the papers. In the first place, the State of Georgia, 
on the 12th of May, 1787,granted away all its interest in the· 
premises. Next, title thereto is deduced to the United States. 
by a regular chain of conveyances fouuded upon a judicial 
sale in 1806 on the foreclosure of a mortgage decreed in 1804 ;. 
and as it may well be presumed that the mortgagee had in-
quired into the title of the mortgagor, and would not have· 
advanced his money upon one which was doubtful, the sale 
under the foreclosure proceedings constitutes a very satis-
factory commencement in the chain of title (especially after 
the lapse of so long a time), a previous grant from the State 
being shown. 
Standing, then, upon that sale, together with the previous 
grant of the State, as the foundation of the title which was 
subsequently conveyed to the United States by the aforesaid 
deed of Samuel Breck, Role surviving executor, etc., I enter-
tain no doubt that the Government acquired by that deed, 
and now holds thereunder, a good and valid title to the 
premises. 
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But it seems that a title adverse to that of the United 
States is set up by Mr. Alex. Curtis, ·a resident of Georgia, 
originating as follows: In 1870 Daniel R. Proctor having 
located a head-right warrant, issued under the laws of Georgia 
upon the premises, applied for and obtained a grant of the 
same from the governor of the State. The grantee, Proctor, · 
by deed dated March 6, 1876,' which was recorded in January 
following, conveyed all his right, title, and interest in the 
premises to the said Curtis, who alleges that he bas since 
spent considerable sums of money in fencing, clearing, and 
otherwise impro·dng the land, etc. 
Curtis claims that the deed of con,eyance to the United 
States is invalid, because no't recorded within one year from 
its date, agreeably to the law of the St<lte; that the right of 
disposing of the land subsequently lapsed to the State; and 
furthermore, that uncUsturbed occupancy for a period of 
seven years gives title, etc. These claims are utterly ground-
less for the following reasons: 
(1) Under the laws of Georgia failure to record a deed 
concerns none excepting those who derive title from th.e sctme 
g-r~mtor by a deed of subsequent date; as against others, the 
validity and operation of the deed are under no circumstances 
afl'ected by such failure. (Roe v. Doe ex dem. Neal, Dudley, 
16H; Whittington v. Doe ex dem. Wright, 9 Ga., 23; Hand 
v. McKinney, 25 Ga., 648; Martin v. Willis, 27 Ga., 407; 
Anderson v. Dugas, 29 Ga., 440); and an unrecorded deed 
thirry years old, apparent1y genuine, and coming from the 
proper custody, is admissible in evidence without proof of 
execution. (Whitman v. Thiot et. al., 6! Ga., 11.) So that 
al ·hough the deed of Breck to the United St.ates, executed 
in 1818, was not recorded until 1885, after the execution and 
registration of the deed of Proctor to Curtis (both of which 
occurred in 1876), yet as these deeds emanate .from differ-
ent grantors, the latter deed, notwithstanding it was recorded 
within a year from its execution, is entitled to no preference 
over and can avail nothing as against the former deed, 
which, for aught that appears, has the same validity now 
that it had on the day of its delivery. 
. · (2) Ti tie to the land having passe(l out of the State by the 
Grant to Weed in 1787, it thereupon ceased to be subject to 
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be regranted-by the State, whether under the head-right or 
any other laws. ( Viclcety v. Benson, 26 Ga., 590.) There is no 
pretension that the title has since returned to the State by 
escheat on proper inquest of office, which is the only mode 
whereby it could lapse to the State. Moreover, escheated 
lands in Georgia are disposed of under statutory provisions 
specially applicable thereto; they are not subject to grant 
under the head-right laws of the State. Only such land as 
is of the public domain of the State and vacant is sub-
ject to grant thereunder. The premises not being land of 
that description, and furthermore the State having no t·itle 
whatever thereto, the grant thereof to Proctor in 1870, on 
the location of a head-right warrant, could not impart a 
valid title. 
(3) By the laws of Georgia, adverse possession, no matter 
for what length of time, gives no title against the State; nor 
can it give any title against the United States for the reason 
t,hat statutes of limitation of a State-which are necessary to 
perfect a title thus acquired-do not apply to them. (United 
States v. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 
Wall., 92; Lindlsey v. Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet., 666; Doe ex dem. 
Daggett v. Roe et al., 20 Ga., 467.) 
In your letter it is stated that jurisdiction over the prem-
ises was ceded to the United States by an act of the legisla-
ture of Georgia of December 22, 1808. On examination of 
that act (of which a copy is herewith) I find that it grants 
jurisdiction to the United States over all lands then acquired 
or which may thereafter be acquired by them for the purpose 
of erecting forts or fortifications in that State; but this is 
coupled with a proviso that "the said United States do or 
shall cause forts or fortifications to be erected thereon." The 
proviso may be construed to operate as a condition prece-
dent, which renders it at least doubtful whether the cession 
of jurisdiction as to any land was intended to take effect 
until the erection of a fort or fortification thereon. 
I am, sir, very respectfully5 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
JOHN GOODE, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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CHINESE LABORERS. 
The remedy for the alleged evil of Chinese laborers passing through the 
territory of the United States to, and returning from, China and other 
foreign countries, is proper matter for the consideration of Congress. 
Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of July 18, 1882 (17 Opin., 416), 
construing the act of May 6,1882, chapter 126, cited with approval. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 26, 1886. 
SIR: Yours of the 3d instant, inclosing communications of 
Bon. W. W. Morrow, in relation to" the alleged evil of Chi-
nese laborers passing through the territory of the United 
States to, and returning from, China and other foreign coun-
tries," has been received. 
I have examined the opinions of my predecessor, in con-
nection with the law now in force, and adhere to the state-
ment contained in my letter of recent date, that the remedy 
for the alleged evil is proper matter of legislation for the 
Congress of the United States. 
The act of Congress (22 Stat., 58) restricting the coming of 
Chinese laborers to this country has been amended since the 
opinions were rendered by my predecessor, and the excep-
tions to the general provisions of the original act have been 
fully set out and made more explicit. ~23 Stat., 115.) 
The opinion of 18th July, 1882, was based upon the con-
struction of the enacting clauses of the statute, while the 
opinion of December 2o, 1882, turns largely upon the in-
tention of Congress as expressed in the preamble to the act. 
In the absence of apparent ambiguity in the enacting 
clauses, I deem it preferable to give e:fl'ect to the statute 
without reference to the preamble. Under such circum-
stances, the preamble should not, in my judgment, control 
the entire statute. 
I still maintain my position, as above stated, that it is 
properly a matter for Congress to determine, but if an opin-
ion upon the subject is insisted upon, I do not hesitate to say 
the opinion of my predecessor, dated 18th July, 1882, ex-
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presses the intention of Congress, and presents a fair and 
clear construction of the law now in force upon the coming 
of Chinese laborers into the United States. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
Construction of the act of J nne 25, 1868, chapter 72, known as the eight-
hour law, as given by former Attorneys-Generals, and also by the Court 
of Claims and Supreme Court, stated, and particular cases of alleged 
violation of the act considered with reference thereto. 
The act is a legislative declaration that for the -persons described therein 
eight hours a day is a reasonable day's labor; and where the public 
interests can be subserved, this should be a guide to officers, both 
civil and military, in contracting for the public service. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 1, 1886. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of 17th ultimo, inclosing letters from George 
G. Orr, Atlanta, Ga.; John Connolly, Cincinnati, Ohio; T. C. 
Rowe, secretary, etc., San Francisco, Cal.; Stephen Groves, 
Ron. S.M. Stockslager. 
You ask that I examine the reports of the officers of the 
Army on these accompanying papers and inform you 
whether in my opinion the conditions which governed the 
employment of any class of labor by these officers involves 
a violation of the eight-hour la,w, and whether any of the em-
ployes herein mentioned, who have been required to work 
more than eight hours per day, should Be considered as 
coming within that rule. 
The construction of the act of June 25,. 1868, chapter 72, 
(embraced in section 3738, Revised Statutes), has been fre-
quently before this Department and has received careful 
consideration. Almost every question upon which even a 
fanciful or conjectural doubt could be raised in the interpre-
tation of this statute, has been brought to the attention of 
my predecessors; and the answers to the applications for 
opinions have been singularly full and exp1icit. 
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And more, these questions have been submitted, and, 
after full argument, they have been decided in both the 
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United. 
States. 
Before answering the questions presented to me, I refer to 
the following authorities for the statement I have made: 
Opinion of Attorney-General Evarts (12 Opin., 530); opin-
ion of Attorney-General Hoar (13 Opin., 29); opinion ~fAt­
torney-General Akerman (13 Opin., 424); opinion of Solicitor-
General and Acting Attorney-General Bristow (14 Opin., 37, 
45); opinion of .Acting Attorney-General Hill (14 Opin., 128); 
opinion of Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin., 58); United 
States v. Martin (10 C. Cis. R., 276); United States v. Martin 
(94 IT. S., 400). 
In an opinion of l\Ir. Attorney-General Brewster (MS.), a 
copy of which I inclose with this, the whole matter is reviewed 
and a valuable exposition of the law given. I concur fully 
in the views therein expressed. 
From these opinions of my predecessors, and the decisions 
of the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, may be deduced the following propositions, which, I 
think, will meet any case heretofore presented or that may 
hereafter be presented to you: 
(1) That the act of 1863 (sec. 3738, Rev. Stat.) prescribes the 
length of time which shall constitute a day's work; but it 
does not establish any rule by which the compensation for a 
day's work shall be determine1l-this being-left to be fixed in 
the ordinary or customary manner where the law does not 
otherwise provide. 
(2) That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages 
simply because of the reduction thereby made in the length 
of the day's work ; but, on the other hand, it does not require 
that the same wages shall be paid therefor as are received by 
those who, in similar private employments, work a greater 
length of time per day. This matter of wages is to be dealt 
with as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, having due 
regard to the public interests. 
(3) That it does not forbid the making of contracts for labor, 
fixing a different length of time for the clay's work than that 
prescribed in the law. 
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( 4) The provisions 9f the act are not applicable to mechan-
ics, workmen, and laborers who are in the employment of a 
contractor of the United States. It was not intended that 
the act should extend to any others than the immediate em-
ployes of the Government. 
(5) All persons who are employed and paid by the day are , 
included within the act, even though they do not fall within 
the strict language of " laborers, workmen, and mechanics." 
· Under date of January 23, 1886, 1\fr. George G. Orr com-
plains to the President that carpenters at Fort Spokane were 
compelled from September, 1882~ until July, 1884, to work· 
more than eight hours per da,y, and asks that they be paid 
as for extra time for labor done beyond those hours. 
Where there is a special agreement between the employer 
-in this case the Go\ernment-and tlle laborer that the la-
borer shall work less or more than eight hours a day, and it 
is reasonable, there is nothing in the· statute to prohibit such 
a contract. 
The statute is regarded ~'as in the nature of a direction 
from a principal to his agent, that eight hours is deemed to 
be a proper length of time for a day's labor, and that his 
contracts shall be based upon that theory. It is a matter 
between the principal and his agent. in which a third party 
has no interest. The proclamation of the President and the 
act of 1872 are in harmony with this view of the statute. 
We are of opinion, therefore, that ccntracts fixing or giving 
a different length of time as the day's work are legal and 
binding upon the parties making them." (United States v. 
JJiartin, 94 U. S., 404.) 
If the carpenters at Spokane understood that they were to 
work nine or ten hours per day or to be discharged, and con-
tinued in employment with that understanding, they must 
be held to the conditions of a contract both voluntary and 
reasonable, and they can not now recover as for O\ertime. 
Mr. Connolly writes that 1\Iajor King for three years vio-
lated the provisions of this statute in" ork upon the Tennes-
see Ri'Ver. But the record transmitted to me shows that the 
stone-cutters and stone-masons accepted the employment 
with a full knowledge of the time of labor required and the 
compensation. It is altogether a mistake that by some reser-
.. 
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vation in mind the employe can have a claim against the 
Government for compensation for hours beyond the eight 
hours designated in the statute, he having accepted the em-
ployment with the understanding he is to labor the length 
of time required. 
Mr. T. C. Rowe, corresponding secretary Union 22, Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners, writes that this statute is 
violated by contractors on the Presidio Reservation. It has 
been decided in this Department that ''the letter of the act 
of Congress limits its operation to laborers, workmen, and 
mechanics employed by or on behalf of the Government of 
the United States, and has no application beyond the im-
mediate employes of the Government." (14 Opin., 38.) 
The contract is between the contractor and the workmen; 
and the Government has no control over these relations. 
Mr. Stephen Groves writes that ship carpenters at St. 
Louis had been required to work ten hours a day by Major 
Ernst. 
The facts show that these employes always worked under 
contract~ and recei\ed compensation by the month or by the 
bJ:>ur. There was no Yiolation of the statute. 
The same observations apply to the matter, referred from 
S. 1\f. Stockslager, of watchmen, etc., at Jeffersonville, Ind. 
I can see no violation of the statute there; the men being 
willing to accept the employment for more hours than eight 
per day. 
There is one consideration, however, to which I desire to 
call your attention. The enactment of this statute was a 
legislative declaration that for the persons specified. eight 
hours a day was a reasonable day's labor. And where the 
public interesbi can be subserved this should be a guide to 
officers, both ci·dl and military, in contracting for the public 
service. There must of necessity be eases where it is im-
possible to consjder this as an arbitrary rule. There are 
other cases where the party for whose benefit the statute 
was made prefers to have the time extended, and he has that 
privilege. 
In conclusion, I am of opinion that the Jaw has not been 
violated in any case presented to me; and I hope I have, in 
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answering :your requests, covered all cases which may be 
brought to your notice. 
I inclose the papers referred to me. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .AR. 
PROMOTION IN THE N.A VY. 
On February 18, 1886, E., a rear-admiral, was, under section 1444, Revised 
Statutes, transferred from the active to the retired list of the Navy, 
and T., a commodore (being first in the line of promotion), was, after 
having successfully passed an examination, nominated by the Presi-
dent to be a rear-admiral to fill tqe vacancy caused by the retirement 
of E. While this nomination was before the Senate awaiting action 
thereon, T. attaiued t.he age of sixty-two years, and under said section 
was transferred from the active to the retired list to rank as commo-
dore: Advised that, according to the law and usage of the service, T. 
was entitled to be a rear-admiral from the 18th of February, 1886, by 
relation, and to receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date, and, 
if the Senate should confirm his nomination, might be commissioned 
as a rear-admiral and placed on the retired list as of that grade. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
May 4, 1886. 
SIR: An opinion is asked by you upon the following case: 
,On the 18th of February, 1886, Rear-Admiral Earl English 
was, by virtue of section 144:4 of the Revised Statutes, trans-
ferred from the active to the retired list of the Navy, and 
Commodore William T. Truxtun was nominated by the Presi-
dent to be a rear-admiral on the active list of the Navy to 
fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of Rear-Admiral 
English, after having been duly examined and found qualified 
for promotion. ' 
While this nomination was before the Senate awaiting 
final action, Commodore Truxtun attained .the age of sixty-
two years, and was, by force of said section 1444, transferred 
from the active to the retired list to rank as commodore. 
If Commodore Truxtun had attained the age of sixty-two 
after confirmation and appointment as rear-admiral be would 
have gone upon the retired list with that rank. 
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The question arising upon this stat~ of facts is "Whether 
this officer could still be commissioned as a rear.admiral if 
the Senate should confirm his nomination for that position 
which is now pending before them. 
Promotion among officers in the line of the Navy goes by 
seniority, and seniority. is determined by the date of com-
mission, that is to say, the date from which the commission 
recites that the appointment to a given grade begins. 
By the law and usage of the sen·ice, a line officer of the 
Navy has as good a right to promotion, if found qualified for 
it, and to his proper rank in the grade to which he belongs, 
as he bas to his pay, and questions involving the right to 
rank or promotion are always important because of the bear-
ing they have on the efficiency of the service. 
By the settled practice of the service promotion to a higher 
grade includes the right to the rank of that grade from the 
date of the vacancy filled hy the promotion. This practice bas 
the distinct recog·nition of Congress. Section 1562 of the 
Revised Statutes provides that where an officer, through no 
fault of his own, is prevented from undergoing an examina-
tion for promotion at the appointed time and shall afterwards 
pass his examination, the increased pay to which the promo-
tion entitles him shall commence from the time when he 
should have been examined in regular course. And by the 
first section of the act of June 22, 187 4 (18 Stat., 19), it is pro-
vided that'' any officer of the Navy who may be promoted in 
course to fill a vacancy in the next higher grade shall be en-
titled to the pay of the grade to which promotedj1·om the 
date he takes rank therein ifit be subsequent to the vacancy 
be is appointed to fill,'' thus not only recognizing the prac-
tice of makiug the right to rank antedate the time of the ap-
pointment to which the rank belongs, but extending it so as 
to give pay from the time rank begins. 
Before the legislation referred to, several of my predeces-
sors had decided. that it was competent for the appointing 
power to give rank by relation in making promotions. ''For 
instance," says Mr. Legare," an officer under arrest on ground-
less charges is not promoted, because promotion were a par-
don; be is acquitted and is nominated by relation back. 
Everybody sees that this is no arbitrary advancement through 
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partiality, but sheer justice and a faithful execution of the 
law. So, if any law entitle an officer to promotion at the end 
of ten years, and the Executive, having neglected to give him 
his due for some time, afterwards confer it, relation back 
seems called for by the law itself. This is Vinton's Case, 2 
Sumner, 299." (4 Opin., 124.) For other recognitions of the 
practice of promoting by relation I beg to refer to the opin-
ion of 1\Ir. Attorney-General Cushing on the Navy efficiency 
act, and to the precedents therein mentioned. (8 Opin., 237.) 
It follows, then, that Commodore Truxtun is, according to 
the law and usage of the service, entitled to be a rear-ad-
miral from the 19th of February, 1886~ by relation, and to 
receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date and be 
placed on the retired list as of that grade, otherwise the non-
action of the Senate touching his nomination would have the 
effect of depriving this officer of a valuable right. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
CADET ENGINEERS IN THE NAVY. 
Cases of Robert B. Higp:ins, Clarence H. Matthews, and William B. 
Day, for reinstatement in the Navy as cadet engineers, considered. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
]}fay 14, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 7th instant, in which you submit for 
decision certain questions that have arisen in the cases of 
Robert B. Higgins, Olarence H. Matthews, and William B. 
Day, who are seeking reinstatement in the Navy as cadet 
engineers, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the cases of Redgrave and Perkins. 
I will consider Mr. Higgins's case separately, as the question 
presented in that is entirely different from the one involved 
in the other two. In his case you ask: 
"..poes the fact of Mr. Higgins's appointment to the office of 
second assistant engineer in the Revenue Marine Service and 
his acceptance thereof conflict with or operate to prevent 
his reinRtatement as a cadet engineer in the Navy~" 
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Mr. Hig·gins must be reinstated, if at all, upon the hypoth-
esis that he has held the office de jure continuously from the 
date of his appointment in 1878 to the present time. 
Is that hypothesis reconcilable with the fact that during 
this period he has held the office of second assistant engineer 
in the Revenue Marine~ The question is not altogether free 
from difficulty. The two offices are incompatible, and the 
general rule is, that the acceptance of a second incompatible 
office operates as a resignation of the first. 
On the other hand~ at the time of the acceptance of the 
second office, Mr. Higgins had been illegally deposed from a 
performance of the duties and from an enjoyment of the 
emoluments of the first office, and to deny him the right to 
accept employment at such a time, though it be incompatible 
with the duties and obligations of a cadet engineer in active 
service, would enable the Navy Department to leave the 
victim of an illegal discharge· no alternative but submission 
or starvation. 
In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, I do not 
think it within the reason of the general rule. Acceptance 
of the second office was not inconsistent with an intent on 
Mr. Higgins's part to resume the exercise of the office of 
cadet engineer as soon as he might be recognized as such. 
Official employment by the same General Government should 
not be held more inconsistent with the title to the office of 
cadet engineer than any other employment from which he 
might derive a support until his rights were recognized. The 
difficulty of reconciling his occupancy of the second office 
with his titl~ to the first is a purely technical one, for any obli-
gations assumed by accepting the second office were between 
him and the same general authority to whom his obligations 
were due as cadet engineer, and a recognition of his rights 
and duties as cadet engineer involved a cancellation of any 
conflicting obligations. But has he been dejure second as-
sistant engineer in the Revenue Marine Service¥ 
He could not resign the first office at will, nor is the doc-
trine of resignation by implication, applicable to civil officers, 
to be favored in the Navy and Army where forms and regu-
lations are prescribed and must be enforced. 
A resignation by a naval officer is inoperative until accepted 
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by the proper authority, and even if the acceptance of the 
second office be held equivalent to a tender ofresignation by 
:Mr. Higgins I am of opinion that he still remained an incum-
bent of the office of cadet engineer, because his resignation 
has not been accepted, and therefore, as the two offices are 
incompatible, he has never been de jure a second assistant 
engineer in the Revenue l\iarine. Taking a broader view of 
the que~tion al1 doubt vanishes. By the error of your pred-
ecessor Mr. Higgins was ejected from an office that he was 
entitled to hold. If he has done anything which could be 
construed into a resignation of the office, the act was a con-
sequence of the injustice he had suffered, and not a willing-
ness to abandon his place. Now that his title to the office 
has been vindicated, he asks that it be restored to him. The 
restoration can be made, justice demands that it should be 
made, and any doubts as to technicalities should be resolved 
in favor of its being made. 
I am satisfied, in view of all the facts, that what be has 
done does not amount to a resignation or- abandonment of 
the office of cadet engineer, that he still holds it, and should 
be reinstated in the actual enjoyment and occupation of it. 
Next as to the cases of Clarence H. Matthews and William 
B. Day : These gentlemen were appointed as cadet engineers; 
completed the four years' course, passed their final examina-
tion, and received the usual certificate of graduation, one in 
June, 1881, and the other in June, 1882. Under the theory 
that the act of August 5, 1882, embraced them within its 
provisions and transmuted them into naval cadets, they were 
two years or more after their graduation as cadet engineers 
returned to the Academy for final examination as naval 
cadets. At such e~amination :Matthews was found disqualified 
physically and Day deficient in certain academic branche8 not 
prescribed for cadet engineers. Both were dropped from the 
roll of the Navy by order of Secretary Chandler on account of 
the failure to pass this examination. You ask whether this 
action was legal' I reply that it was not. The orders drop-
ping them are void, they are still in the service, and entitled to 
reinstatement w~th their classmates upon the roll of the Navy. 
The theory that they were transmuted by the act of. August 
5, 1882, into naval cadets, and -consequently liable to exami-
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nation and dismissal for failure to pass as such, was wholly 
fallacious. (United States v. Redgrave, 116 U.S., 474.) 
Speaking in the case of their classmate, and of cadet engi-
neers after graduation in the four .Years' course, Mr. Justice 
Scofield, speaking for the court, says: 
''They are not subject to academic orders, nor are they 
expected to pursue academic studies, but to take charge of 
and run engines. Their school exercises are ended and their 
life work begun. They are as much in the service and as 
subject to all its requirements as they ever will be. When, at 
the end of the two sears or rather at the end of a course which 
may last three years or more, they are examined, it is for pro-
motion only. This examination is not at the Academy nor 
before the Academic Board, but is the same kind of an ex-
amination that every officer at each step in his advance-
mentis required to undergo. So emphatically does the law 
consider these two years as years of service that it doubies 
the pay." (Leopold v. United States, 18 0. Ols. R., 557.) 
These men after graduation in the four years' academic 
course were officers in the naval service, and could only lose 
their offices against their will, in pursuance of the sentence 
of a court-martial or in commutation thereof. (Perkins v. 
United States, 116 U. S., 483.) 
I return herewith the applications of Messrs. Higgins, 
Matthews~ and Day, as requested. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
COMPENSATION OF IN.TERNAL REVENUE STORE-KEEPER. 
Under the act of August 15, 1876, chapter :l87, an internal-revenue store-
keeper is entitled to receive a ptr d·iem compensation only while 
"rendering actual service." Hence during such time as he is not as-
signed to duty and does not pefform duty no compensation can he 
allowed him, 
DEP ~RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 19, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
letter addressed to you on the 5th instant by the Oommis-
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sioner of Internal Re,Tenue and by your order of the 8th in-
stant referred to me. 
This letter and order of reference submit for determination 
the claim for additional compensation of B. B. McNiel, late 
internal-revenue store-keeper. 
I have carefully considered the brief filed in support of the 
claim, which, together with the letter of the late .Acting 
Commissioner :gogers disallowing the same, were inclosed to 
me and are herewith returned. 
I am of opinion that the claim is without merit, and was 
properly disallowed. 
Mr. ~lcNiel during his term of office was from time to time 
.assigned to duty at various distilleries and has been paid at 
the maximum rate for every day while on duty under such 
.assignments. 
When not under an assignment to duty no service what-
ever was ~equired of him or rendered by him to the Govern-
ment. 
His present claim is for compensation for those days dur-
ing his term wh~n he was not under any assignment to duty 
and not performing any duties. 
The law in force at the date of his appointment and 
throughout his term provides that internal-revenue store-
keepers shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $4: a 
day, to be paid monthly, as mas be determined by the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, and "said store-keepers shall 
only receive compensation when rendering actual service." 
(19 Stat., 152.) 
While the fact that a store-keeper, when not under an as-
signment to duty, was obliged to hold himself in readiness 
to perform any duty that might be assigned, could have 
been considered as an element in determining his compensa-
tion and may have been cousidered in fixing the amount 
when on duty, the express inhibition of the statute prevents 
any such consideration from entering into the determination 
of the time during which the per diem salary is computed. 
The timed uring which the store-keeper ''rendered actual serv-
ice" could alone be taken into account. The interpretation 
adopted by the Commissioner not only gives the words em-
Jloyed their usual and natural significance, but is unem bar· 
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rassed by conflicting considerations arising either from other 
provisions in the law or any general policy or practice in 
connection with the internal-revenue system. 
Indeed it is the only possible construction. Under the 
system arranged by law, the store-keeper in the service was 
either rendering actual service under an assignment to duty, 
or unable to rende:r any service because unassigned. There-
fore the provision quoted either has the meaning assigned it 
or none at all. If it does not prohibit per diem allowance 
when the store-keeper is not assigned to duty, during what 
time does it prohibit the allowance~ 
It is not presumed that Congress 'Yould have inserted any 
clause which was altogether devoid_ of meaning. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
FORT BROWN RESERVATION, TEXAS. 
Deed of conveyance executed by James Stillman and Thomas Carson 
(the latter as administrator with the will annexed of Maria Josefa 
Cavazos, deceased), dated May 12, 1886, and deed of release executed 
by Kate M. Combe aud others, by their attorney in fact, James B. 
Wells,jr., dated April17, 1886, not deemed sufficient to impart a valid 
title to the whole of the Fort Brown Reservation, for reasons stated. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 20, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter to me of the 23d of February last in-
closed a communication from James R. Cox, esq., attorney 
for P. G. Cavazos and James Stillman, together with one 
from James B. Wells, jr., attorney for Charles S. Dana and 
others, and called attention thereto in connection with an 
opinion which I had the honor to submit to you on the 16th 
of January last, concerning the title to the site of Fort 
Brown, Texas. With a subsequent letter, dated March 4, you 
transmitted all the papers then in your Department relating 
to that subject, to enable me to examine the case upon the 
points adverted to in the above-mentioned communications, 
should I desire to do so. 
Action on this matter bas been delayed, at the req11est of 
Mr. Cox, to afford him an opportunity to adduce additional 
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information touching some of the points referred to; but he 
bas failed to produce any such information, and none having 
been recei\eu from other source8, the case stands precisely 
as it was at the date of your last-mentioned letter, with the 
exception of .an additional paper (a copy of the will of Jose 
Miguel Paredes) which has since been furnished at my 
request and is with the other papers. 
Upon further examination and reflection, I remain entirely 
satisfied with thecon~lusions reached in my opinion as to the 
questions there considered, and return herewith all the 
papers which accompanied your above-mentioned letters. 
After the foregoing was written, I received your letter of 
the 18th instant, transmitting additional papers relating to 
the same matter, among which are a number of powers of 
attorney, deeds of conveyance, etc., and 1 equestiJ?g my opin-
ion as to the validity of the title proposed to be conveyed by 
these papers. 
One of the instruments referred to is a deed to the United 
States, dated May 12, 1886, which is executed by James 
Stillman and Thomas Carson, the latter as administrator 
with the will annexed of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased. 
This deed, for the consideration therein stated, grants the 
whole -of the premises embraced in the limits of the Fort 
Brown reservation, comprising 358.8 acres, more or less, 
and relinquishes all claim for past use and occupation of the 
same. 
Another is a deed to the United States, dated .April 17,. 
1886, executed by the following parties: Kate M. Combe and 
husband, .Annette P. Hicks and husband, Agnes A. Browne 
and husband, and Frances C. Powers, by their attorney in 
fact, James B. Wells, jr.; B. 0. Hicks, as guardian of Frances 
E. Powers; B. 0. Hicks and 0. B. Combe, as executors of the 
last will of Stephen Powers, deceased; Francisco Yturria, 
Vicente Salinas, Matt. Gerhard, Juan Salinas, Marie Gro-
gan Dana and husband, by their attorney in fact, James B. 
Wells,jr. It releases to the United States, for the considera-
tion mentioned therein, all right and interest of the grantors 
to or in the same premises, and relinquishes all their claims 
and demands for the use and occupancy thereof. 
While all of the parties to the latter instrument are either 
273-VOL XVIII---~6 
402 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Fort Brown Reservation, Texas. 
claimants under the so-called •·Salinas" title or under the 
"Paredes" title, they do not comprise the whole of such claim-
ants. 
Thus it would appear by the abstract of title and accom-
panying exhibits that a part of the "Salinas" claim is still 
in H. E. Woodhouse and Tiburcio Salinas, neither of whom 
is a party to the deed. Besides, tllere are others not parties 
to the deed who assert title to the premises embraced by the 
same claim adversely to the grantors in such deed, namely: 
Charlotte Miller and the heirs of Henry Miller deceased; the 
title of these resting upon a sheriff's sale under an execu-
tion against Antonio Salinas, through whom the "Salinas" 
claim is derived. 
As regards the" Parede~" claim, the title thereto is partly 
in the heirs of Stephen Powers and partly in Marie Grogan 
Dana, wife of Charles S. Dana. All of said lleirs are parties 
to the · deed; but one of them (Frances E. Powers) is a . 
minor, aud although the deed is executed by her guardian, 
yet 1 here is nothing to show that he has been duly authar-
izell s.o to do. :ur~. Daua executes the deed by attorney, 
hnt tlw pO\YPr of attt~ruey given by lJer is limited t'> ~~ relea~e 
;i,r 1tt'r 1ight to the'' S<lliua~" claim (in "hieh she He,·er han 
~1ny interest), and is tllerefore inadequate for the purpose of 
relinq uishing her rights under the "Paredes" title. 
So far, then, as the "Salinas" and "Paredes" titles are 
concerned, the last- ment.ioned deed appears to be insufficient 
to extinguish the rights of claimants under those titles for 
the following reasons : (1) H. E. Woodhouse and Tiburcio 
Salinas, who apparently have claims under the former title, 
are not parties to the deed; (2) Charlotte Miller and the 
heirs of her deceased husband, Henry Miller (whose claim 
is a cloud upon that of the other claimants under the" Sa-
lina.s" title), are not parties thereto; (3) No authority is 
shown for B. 0. Hicks to execute the deed as guardian of 
Fra.nces E. Powers, a claimant under the "Paredes" title; 
(4) The power of attorney given to James B. Wells, jr., by 
Mrs. Dana and husband (Mrs. Dana being a claimant under 
the last-mentioned title) is defective as above pointed out. 
With respect to the instrument first hereinbefore men-
tioned, its sufficiency to pass title depends solely .upon 
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whether it is of itself a valid conveyance of the entire inter· 
ests of both James Stillman and the estate of Maria J osefa 
Cavazos in tlle premises. As a conveyance of the Stillman 
interest simply, it is not objectionable. But I entertain 
some doubt whether it is free from objection as regards the 
interest of the Cavazos estate. By the will of Mrs. Cava-
zos all the title which she had in the premises devolved upon 
her son, Pedro G. Cavazos, as a devisee in trust. There was 
no executor named in the will, but on the probate thereof 
the said Pedro was appointed ''executor" and required to 
give bond; failing in tllis he was removed, and Mr. Carson 
appointed administrator with the will annexed. The duties 
and powers of such administrator are regulated by and de-
pend upon statute. The rights and powers of the devisee in 
trust are imparted by the will. The latter may be removed 
by a court of competent jurisdiction in a proper proceeding 
before it for that purpose and a new trustee appointed to 
execute the trust; but I do not understand that this has 
been done. The administrator, Carson, who has signed the 
deed, could do so only by virtue of such authority as he is 
invested with as administrator. Apparently the trust 
created by the will, together with the legal title to the trust 
property, is still in Pedro, subject, of course, to the right of 
the administrator to deal with such property in proper cases 
arising in the due administration of the estate. Under these 
circumstances I think that in order to convey an unobjec-
tionable title to the entire interest of the Cavazos estate in 
the premises, including release of all claims for past use and 
occupation thereof, the said devisee, Pedro G. Cavazos, 
should be a party to the deed as well as the said adminis-
trator Carson. 
In reply to r,he inquiry contained in your letter of the 18th 
instant, I therefore beg to state, that in my opinion the in-
struments above referred to are not sufficient to convey a 
valid titlf3 to the whole of the Fort Brown property, for rea-
sons already indicated. 
The papers which accompanied that letter are herewith 
returned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. G .A.RLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
Obstruction to navigation of certain rivers within the State of California, 
caused by hydraulic mining, considered; and udvist:d that the case is 
one calling for the interposition of the restraining arm of equity in an 
appropriate action on behalf of the United States, with a view to 
remedying the evil. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 25, 1886. 
SIR: Your several communications, with the accompany-
ing papers, relating to the alleged serious impairment of the 
navigation of certain waters of the State of California, and 
the threatened destruction of the navigation of some of those 
waters by the debris which is being constantly discharged 
into them from gold mines worked by hydraulic pressure, 
and asking to know if there is any way, and. if any, what 
way, by which the executive department of the National 
Government can take action properly, with a view to stop-
ping the evil complained of, have received my considera-
tion. 
Commerce between the people of the several States and 
with foreign nations existed at the time the Constitution of 
the United States was adopted, as it had always theretofore 
existed between the nations of the earth, jure gentium, and 
was so recognized by the Constitution, which simply gives 
Congress the power to regulate it as a subsisting right. 
(Vide, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1, 222_.) 
This regulating pOW(-\r is, it is well settled, not confined to 
the su'Qjects of traffic, but extends to the channels through 
which traffic is carried on, and therefore embraces a jurisdic-
tion in Congress over the navigable waters of the country as 
to all things appertaining to them as highways of trade and 
intercourse and especially as to whatever a.fl:'ects navigation. 
(Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How., 
431; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.~ 714; Transportation 
Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 700.) It rests with Con-
gress, therefore, to say whether any of those waters shall be 
bridged, and on what plan the bridge shall be constructed. For 
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a like reason Congress establishes light-houses, lays down a 
system of regulations to which all vessels navigating our 
waters are required to conform, and adopts measures for the 
improvement of navigation, to the extent even of changing 
the channels of rivers. (South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S., 
410.) For such and like purposes these waters are "the 
public property of the nation and subject to all the requisite 
legislation· by Congress." (South Carolina v. Georgia, supra; 
Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra.) 
It was to promote commerce as a thing existing quite as 
independently of the Constitution as the right to life and 
the pursuit of happiness that the power to regulate it was 
given, and given exclusi ~ely becCJnse essentially a unit. And 
the States having thus abdicated control over commerce, a 
high and imperative duty watJ bid on the National Govern-
ment to protect and encourDJge it, 
As to many things belonging to commerce Congress has 
legislated, while as to many others it has preserved silence, 
but its very silence is a regulation of them, for it indicates 
the purpose to leave them absolutely free. (Welling v. Michi-
gan, 115 U. S., 446, 455, and the cases referred. to.) 
The power to regulate commerce is one of the instances in 
which the Constitution operates proprio vigore, and its effect 
as to the navigable waters of the Union was to establish 
them as highways, open to the free and unrestricted use of 
all persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. To 
secure this great end was one of the inducements to the States 
to surrender control over their waters. 
Whether, then, Congress has spoken or not spoken, the 
duty of the United States towards commerce in its several 
departments of traffic, intercourse, and navigation is equally 
imperative. 
It follows, therefore, if what has been said is well founded, 
that the Constitution has placed the National Government 
under a high duty to take effective measures to repel all acts, 
whether of States or individuals, having a tendency to injure 
the navigation of waters over which interstate or foreign 
commerce is carried on. 
Nor is this duty of the United States to be deduced wholly 
from the self-executing commercial power of the Constitution, 
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for every enrollment and license under our navigation laws 
to carry on the coastwise trade engages the national faith 
to protect the license from unauthorized interference, such 
as by injuring the navigation of waters open to that trad~. 
This brings me to the consideration of the question sub-
mitted. 
The papers before me furnish convincing evidence that the 
navigation of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and 
their tributaries has been seriously impaired and in some 
places destroyed, and, moreover, is threatened with complete 
destruction by the washings into them from gold mines worked 
by the hydraulic process. It seems that the evil extends to 
the Suisun and San Pablo Bays into which these rivers 
empty, and even manifests itself in the great bay of San 
Francisco. 
The navy-yard at Mare Island and other Government works 
requiring an unobstructed access to the sea must be seriously 
damaged if hydraulic mining as now conducted is allowed 
to continue; and Congress, in the rhyer and harbor bill for 
1884 (23 Stat., 143), expresses its sense of the injurious con-
sequences of making rivers the receptacles of the washings 
from hydraulic mines by directing that the bulk of the money 
appropriated for the improvement of the Sacramento and 
Feather Rivers should not be used "until the Secretary of 
War shall have been satisfied of the cessation of hydraulic 
mining on said rivers and their tributaries." 
The rivers referred to lie wholly within the limits o{ Cali-
fornia, but they communicate directly with and are navigable 
from the sea, and consequently are the highways of interstate 
and foreign commerce, and fall within the jurisdiction of Con-
gress under the commercial power. 
It can not be doubted, if what is represented be true, 
that the filling up of the channels of these great high ways Of 
commerce is a public nuisanc~, stupendous in extent and 
injury, and that it loudly calls for the interference of some 
restraining power. The question is, can that restraining 
power be exerted by the Government of the United States 
without additional legislation ~ -
There are three ways of correcting a public nuisance in 
the jurisprudence of England-by indictment, by information 
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in chancery at the suit of the attorney-general, and by bill in 
chancery exhibited by some private person who has sustained 
a special damage over and above what can be laid ad commune 
nocumentum (City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal 
Company, 12 Pet., 91, 97, 98; Story, Eq. Jur., § 920, etc.; 
Kerr, Inj., chap. 6, p. 165.) 
There being no provision in the criminal legislation of 
Congress making it an offense to obstruct navigation, the 
remedy by indictment may be passed without further remark, 
it being settled that a thing can not be an offense against 
the United States except it has been declared such by act 
of Congress. (United States v. Britton, 108 U. S., 199, 206; 
United States v. Bevens, 3 Wheat., 336.) 
Can the judicial department of the National Government 
afford a remedy by injunction upon the application of the 
.executive departmel'.t ~ 
Undoubtedly the jurisdiction of that department extends, 
amongst other things, to all cases in law and equity arising 
under the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 2), and it has been 
established by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of t.he 
United States that "the equity jurisdiction conferred on the 
Federal courts is the same that the high court of chancery 
in England possesses; is subject to neither limitation nor re-
straint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the 
different States of the Union." (Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall., 425, 
430; Thompson v. Railroad Companies, G Wall., 134, 137; 
Robi.nson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat., 212, 223; The Wheeling 
Bridge Ca,se, 13- How., 518, 563; United States v. Howland, 
4 Wheat.~ 108, 115.) 
That the United States courts will interfere b~~ injunction to 
restrain a public nuisance-as, for instance, the obstruction 
of navigation by a bridge, at the suit of a party who has sus-
tained a special damage-bas been settled, on great considera-
tion, by the Supreme Court of the United States (The Wheel-
ing Bridge case, supt·a), and as that court accepted, without 
qualification, the doctrine of the English court of chancery as 
to this particular mode of redress against a puhlic nuisance, 
it may be safely assumed that when a proper case is presented 
it will also accept the doctrine, equally well established in 
England, that equity will give relief against a public nui-
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sance by injunction at the suit of the Attorney-General. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has already distinctly recognized 
this doctrine in a ease which did not, however, call for a de-
cision on the point. Its language is, " Besides the remedy 
at law, it is now settled that a court of equity may take juris-
diction in cases of public nuisance by an information filed by 
the Attorney-General. This jurisdiction seems to have been 
acted on with great caution and hesitancy." (City of George-
town v. The Alexandria Canal Company, 12 Pet., 98, 99.) 
This subject of the proper form of remedy against nuisances 
affecting the United States came before Mr. Attorney-General 
Cushing in the matter of the Waukegan Breakwater (6 Opin., 
172), and the conclusion reached by him was, that it was the 
UtHLeniable law of the laud that the Attorney-General of 
the United 8tates has authority, "when occasion requires 
the abatement of a public nuisance to na·\igable waters, to • 
file an information therefor and a bill for injunction in a 
proper court of the United States." 
I am not called upon to consider the effect of any action 
of the State of California authorizing the injurious use of. 
the above-named rivers as receptacles of debris produced 
by hydraulic mining, supposing such action could have 
any possible validity in view of the ''express condition" on 
which the State was admitted into the Union "that all the 
navigable waters within the said State shall be common highways, 
and foret1er free, as well to the inhabitants of said State as to 
the citizens of the United States," without duty or impost ther·e-
for, (9 Stat., 453), for no one pretends that the State has given 
any such authority in express terms, and the argument that 
the authority may be collected by implication from the legis-
lation of the State or the U uited States or both together has 
been completely met and overthrown by the learned circuit 
judge of the ninth circuit in his opinion in the important cause 
of Woodruffv. North Bloomfield Gravel 1.l:fining Company, in 
which the facts now before me were held to constitute a pub-
lic nuisance that might be properly enjoined on a bill filed 
by a private person specially aggrieved. 
Looking, tllen, at the question submitted on reason and au-
thority, I can not entertain a doubt that the e\il complained 
of is levelled at a great national right which is placed by the 
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Constitution under the peculiar protection of the United 
States, that it i~ a case specially calling for the interposition 
of the restraining arm of equity, ihere being an entire absence 
of the ordinary remedy at law by indictment, and that it is the 
duty of the United States to take prompt action, either by an 
information in chancery or by legislation making it penal to 
obstruct or impair the navigation of any water under the 
jurisdiction of the Umted States; and, in view of the urgency 
and importance of the subject, I taKe leave to recommend 
tbat it be brought to the attention of Congress at its present 
session. 
It may be proper to add, in conclusion, that this opinion 
is in harmony with my opinions of the 1st of May and 16th 
June, 1885, which presented the question whether any other 
department of the National Government than the legislative 
had authority to take action to abate as puolic nuisances 
bridges erected over navigable rivers by State authority, one 
of the bridges being over a river wholly within the State of 
Virginia, and the other over that part of the Mississippi 
River which flows e:utirely within the limits of the State of 
Minnesota. And. the same may be said of the opinions of 
one of my predecessors in the cases of the St. Louis and the 
Steubenville dikes. (15 Opin., 515, 526.) 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETA.R¥ OF WAR. 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-CHIEF EXAMINER. 
The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission, created by 
the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, is to be filleJ by appointment by 
the President, with the ad vice and consent of the Senate. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 26, 1886. 
SIR: On the 22d instant you requested my opinion whether 
or not the appointment of t,he chief examiner in the Civil 
Service Commission is to be made by you or the Civil Service 
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Commission. The question turns upon the following words 
in the civil-service act of January 16, 1883: 
"That said Commission is authorized to employ a chief 
examiner, a part of whose duty it shall be, under its direc-
tion, to act with the examining boards, so far as practicable, 
whether at Washington or elsewhere, and to secure accuracy, 
uniformity, and justice in all their proceedings, which shall 
be at all times open to him." And the act then more specific-
ally defines his duties, and fixes his compensation at the rate 
of $3,000 per annum with his traveling expenses. 
It is claimed tllat the chief examiner is an officer to be ap. 
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, under 
clause 2, section 2, Axticle II, of the Constitution, of which 
clause the words pertinent to the questicn are that the Presi-
dent shall appoint "all other officers of the United States 
whose appointments arc not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by law, and Congress may by 
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they 
think proper in the President alone, in the courts, or in the 
heads of Departments." 
The Constitution thus classifies ( 1) officers and (2) inferior 
officers. 
(1) ,;Officers."-Embassadors, ministers, consuls, judges 
of 'the Supreme Court, and all other officli:rs of the United 
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, which shall be established by law. 
(2) "Inferior officers."-Those whose appointments are 
vested by Congress in the President, courts of law, or heads 
of Departments. 
The examiner is certainly, under this act, an officer, as 
distinguished from a mere agent, clerk, or employe. His 
station embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, 
and clutieR, and then becomes an office. (United States v. 
Hartwell, 6 Wall, 385.) 
Under previous constructions of the clause of the Consti-
tution already referred to, this appointment might well ha\Te 
been placed with the bead of the appropriate Department, 
but not with a subordinate commission. (Ex pa,rte Hennen,. 
13 Pet., 230.) 
The examiner whose employment is conferred by the statute 
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upon the Uivil Service Commission does not appear to properly 
belong to the ''inferior officers," the power of his appointment 
not being vested by Congress in the President, a court of 
law, or the head of a Department; and, although the civil-
service act says that "said Commission is authorized to em-
ploy a chief examiner," the power to employ tho chief ex-
aminer as contemplated by the Constitution is relegated to 
the President; as one of "all other officers of the United 
States" established by law. 
The examiner is an officer to be appointed by the President 
Jy and with the ad vice and consent of the Senate. 
VEry respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDE:NT. 
MAIL TRANSPORTATION. 
The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342, authorizing the Post-
master-General "to contract for inland and foreign steam-boat mail 
service, when it can be confined in one route, where the foreign office 
or offices are not more than two hundred miles distant from the do-
mestic office, on the same terms and conditions as inbnd steam-boat 
service, an(l pay for the same out of the appro13riation for inland steam-
boat service," is permanent in character and amendatory of the gen-
eral law; but the authority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is 
limited by the terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the 
same clause. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 27, 1886. 
SIR: In your letter of yesterday my attention is called to 
the following clause in the act of March 3, 1885, making ap-
propriations for the service of the Post-Office Department, 
taken from page 386, twenty-third Statutes: "The Postmao-
ter-General is authorized to contract for inland and foreign 
steam-boat mail service, when it can be confined in one route, 
where the foreign office or offices are not more than two hun-
dred miles distant from the oomestic office, on the same terms 
and conditions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the·. 
same out of the appropriation for inland steam-boat service," 
and then my opinion is asked whether this clause gives a con-
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tinning authority, amendatol'y of the general law, or whether 
it must be regarded as Jjmited to the expenditure of the ap-
propriation made in the act. 
From the context it is quite clear to Jlle that the clause 
referred to confers authority regardless of the appropriation 
made just preceding it, and such legislation has- not been un-
common. Laying aside the w9rding of the who~e section 
and a construction of it by itself, this view is strengthened 
by going back a few clauses in the same act on the same 
page, where an appropriation for rent, light, and fuel is made, 
and in it limitations are fixed to the payment out of the par-
ticular appropriation and as to the term of years, etc. There 
being no such restrictions in the clause you speak of, it may 
well be inferred none were intended. 
. In the latter part of the clause under consideration you will 
observe certain terms and conditions are imposed and an ap-
propriation for inland steam-boat service is specified, and as 
a matter of course your authority under this clause will be 
limited and restricted by those terms and conditions; and with 
this exception I answer your question, the clause referred to 
in your letter gives a continuing authority amendatory of the 
general law. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
PAY OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. 
Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the Navy 
and Marine Corps for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1884, are not 
available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for services ren-
dered during the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1885. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 11, 1886. 
SIR: I have this day received your letter, in which you 
ask "'whether or not moneys appropriated under the heads 
of pay of the Navy and pay of the Marine Corps," 1884 (of 
which there are unexpended balances, without outstanding 
indebtedness against them), "can now be used in payment 
of sums due for pay of the N a\y and pay of the Marine 
(.;orps on account of services in the fiscal year 1885." 
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In answer to the inquiry, your attention is directed to the 
language of the naval act of March ~, 1883, entitled "An 
act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1884, and for other purposes." 
You observe that the language limits the time for which 
the appropriation is available to the ''fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1884." 
This is the language of an annual appropriation bill, and 
made specifically for the service of a fiscal year; and you 
are referred to section 3690 of the Revised Statutes, viz: 
"All balances of appropriations contained in the annual 
appropriation bills and made specifically for the service of 
any fiscal year and remaining unexpen<led at the expiration 
of such fiscal year shall only l>e applied to the payment of 
expenses properly incurred during that year, or to the fulfill-
ment of contracts properly made within that year; and bal-
ances not needed for such purposes shall be carried to the 
surplus fund. This section, however, shall not apply to ·ap-
propriations known as permanent or indefinite appropria-
tions." 
This section makes the appropriation for the service of a 
fiscal year applicable only to the payment of expenses prop-
erly incurred during that year, or the fulfillment of contracts 
properly made within that year. 
Your letter states that there are no outstanding claims 
against the appropriation for the :fiscal year 1884:, so that 
there is no existing contingency relative to the fulfillment of 
contracts properly made within the fiscal year 1884. 
Reference to act of June 19,1878 (20 Stat., 167), limits the 
appropriation for pay of the NaYy, "to be exclusively used 
to pay current obligations for its legitimate purpose as pro-
vided ·by law." 
From this statement, the conclusion is reached that the 
balance remaining unexpended at the expiration of the fiscal 
year 1884 can not be applied to the payment of expenses in-
curred in the year 1R85. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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MAIL CONTRACTS-DOUBLE PAYMENTS. 
H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in the State of 
Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861, up to 
which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the Government 
in full what was due them. Afterwards they collected from the State 
of Arkansas for the same period of service (January 1 to May 31, 1861) 
certain amounts, which were paid vut of moneys belonging to the 
United States that had been seized by the State: Advised that the 
contractors are under a legal liability to make restitution to the United 
States of the amounts so collected, but that their sureties can not be 
held responsible therefor upon the undertaking of the latter. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 16, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt ·of your 
communication of the 13th of February, 1886, returning the 
letter of P. Hanger, of Little Rock, Ark., addressed to the 
Attorney-General under date of January 8, 1886, and re-
ferred to you by his indorsement of the 18th of January last, 
relating to a proposed action to recm·er from him (Hanger) 
moneys of the United States which be obtained by securing 
double payments, one from the United States and one from 
the State of Arkansas, out of moneys of the United States, 
upon three several mail routes in which he was interested. 
From the communication of the Assistant Attorney-Gen-
eral of your Department accompanying your letter, the fol-
lowing facts appear: 
(1) In 1861, Peter Hanger was contractor on routes 7806, 
7807, and 7937, in Arkansas. The service was discontinued 
on these routes, and the contractor was paid for the time in 
1861, viz, from January 1 to May 31, 1861, the sum of 
$4,196.71. It appears also that said Peter Hanger collected 
from the State of Arkansas for the s~me period of service on 
the 2d of October, 1861, the sum of $1~915.44. This sum was 
paid for such service on his making proof that the service 
had been rendered and was unpaid; and that sum was there-
upon paid him out of moneys which the State of Arkansas 
had seized belonging to the United States. Hence it ap-
pears that for said service the contractor bas been paid twice 
out of moneys belonging to the United States. 
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(2) l\Ies8rs. Hanger and Ayliff were contractors for route 
7803, Arkansas. For the service rendered from January 1, 
1861, to May 31, 1861 (the date when the sen·ice was discon-
tinued), there was due them the sum of $14,725.63, which 
was paid in full. It appears also that for the same service 
the State of Arkansas paid to the same contractors, out of 
funds of tlte United States which the State of Arkansas had 
seized, the sum of $10,211.82 on the 2d of October, 1861. The 
last-mentioned amount is, therefore, an overpayment. 
(3) 31essrs. Hanger, Rapley and Gaines were contractors 
for routes Nos. 7801, 7802, 7804, 7831, and 7846. On these 
routes there was due May 31, 18Gl, the sum of $14~265.61, 
which was fully paid to them in the usual method. In ad-
dition to the abo\e-named amount it appears that the said 
contractors recei\ed from the State of Arkansas, out of 
moneys seized by that State and belonging to the United 
States, the sum of $16,102.97 for the same service, covering 
the same period, and on the same routes. 
It is clear, I think, that there is a legal liability upon the 
contractors to make restitution to the United States of the 
sums of money thus overpaid them. The seizure of the money 
by the State of Arkansas was illegal, and the demand made 
upon that State by the contractors for payment was without 
warrant of law. It is a well-settled principle of the common 
law that an action lies for money paid by mistake, or upon a 
consideration which happens to fail, or for money gotten 
through imposition. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has decided (in Bayne et al., trustees, v. The United States, 93 
U.S., 642) that an action will lie whenever the defendant has 
received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and 
which the defendant is obliged by natural justice and equity 
to refund. The form of the indebtedness or the mode in 
which it was incurred is immaterial. While there can be no 
aoubt, I think, as to the legal liability of the said contractors 
to make restitution of the money which has been improperly 
overpaid to them, your Department must decide, as a practi-
cal question, whether reco,·ery is now possillle by reason of 
the circumstances referred to in the report of the special agent 
of the Treasury. In my opinion the sureties of the contractors 
can not be held responsible for the money which has been thus 
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illegally and-improperly collected. According to the form of 
contract which has been furnished to this Department the 
undertaking of the sureties was as follows : 
''They further undertake, covenant, and agree with the 
Uuited States that the said contractors w1ll collect quarterly, 
if required by the Postmaster-General, of postmasters on said 
route the balances due from them to the United States on 
their quarterly returns, and faithfully render an account 
thereof to t~he Postmaster-General in the settlement of their 
quarterly accounts, and will pay over to the Auditor of the 
Treasury for the Post-Office Department, on the order of the 
Postmaster-General, all balances remaining in their hands." 
It does not appear from the statement of facts sn bmitted • 
that there has been any failure on the part of the said con-
tractors to comply with their undertaking in this resp~ct. It 
seems to be conceded that the mail service was performed 
according to the terms of the contract; that such service was 
discontinued by the United States, and a settlement made 
· up to the 31st of May, l~Gl. \Vhen the illegal seizure of the 
money of tho United States by the State of Arkansas was 
made and the payment · wrongfully made to the said parties 
they were no longer mail contractors. Their duties bad been 
fully performed as such and their aceounts had been adjusted. 
In my opinion this operated as an acquittance and discharge 
of the sureties. The sebure of the money by the State and 
the wrongful payment of it can not be construed as a breach 
of the contract by which the sureties were bound. In Miller 
v. Stewart (9 Wheat., G80), Judge Story, in delivering the 
opinion of the court, says: "Nothing can be clearer, both 
upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that the 
iiability of a surety is not to be extended by implication be-
yond the terms of his contract. To the extent and in the 
manner and under the circumstances pointed out in his ob-
figation be is bound, and no further. He has a right to 
stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he does not 
assent to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is 
fatal. And courts of equity, as well as of law, have been in 
the constant habit of scanning the contracts of sureties with 
considerable strictness." 
This doctrtne has been fully recognized by the Supreme 
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Court in United States v. Boyd (15 Pet., 187); McMicken v. 
lVebb (6 How., 292). In the latter case the court said: 
"Even as between principals a court will not bind parties 
to conditions or obligations to which they have not bound 
themselves, according to a fair interpretation of their con-
tract; but as against a surety neither a court of law nor a 
court of equity will lend its aid to affect him beyond the plain 
necessary import of his undertaking. He must be permitted 
to remain in precisely the situation in which he has placed 
himself." 
In view of this well-settled doctrine I am of opinion that 
a suit against the sureties to recover the money improperly 
paid to the contractors would be unavailing. 
Very respectfully, 
JOHN GOODE, 
Acting Attorney- General in this Case. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
THE TRADE-DOLLAR. 
The United States Treasurer is not authorized to receive '1 t.rade-dollars" 
at par in exchange for silver certificates under the third section of the 
act of February 21:3, 1878, chapter 20. Nor are such dollars receivable. 
at par in pay;ment of public dues. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,. 
June 17, 1886'. 
SIR: The petition signed by the presidents of a number of 
national banks, calling your attention to the refusal of the 
Treasurer of the United States to receive trade dollars in 
exchange for silver certificates, and asking that you will di-
rect that officer to receive these do]Jars at par, or, in case of 
doubt as to your power to do so, refer the subject to the At-
torney-General, and other papers having more or less relation 
to the object of the petition, have rect.ived my considera-
tion, and I have the honor to submit an opinion upon the 
questions which seem to be presented, namely: (1) whether 
any power resides in your hands to direct the Treasurer to 
receive the trade-dollar at par in exchange for silver certifi-
cates under the third section of the act of the 28th Febru-
273-voL XVIII--'27 
t 
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ary, 1878 (20 Stat., 25), as coin authorized by the first section 
of tllat act; and (2) wllether the Government is bound to 
receive trade-dollars at par in payment of public dues. 
The coin called trade-dollar was established by the fifteenth 
section of the act of February, 1873 (17 Stat., 427), now con-
tained in section 3513 of the Revised Statu teo, which provides 
that 4 ' the silver coins of the United States shall be a trade-
dollar, * * * and tile weight of the trade-dollar shall be 
four hundred and twenty grains troy." * * * By the same 
section of the act mentioned silver coins were made a legal 
tend~r at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding 
$5, and this provision is now represented by section 3586 of 
thn Revised Statutes. By the second section of the joint 
resolution of the 22d July, 1876 (19 Stat., 215), it is enacted 
that the trade-rl.ollar "shall not hereafter be a legal tender.'' 
By the first section of the act of the 28th February, 1878' 
(supra), it was enacted: ''There shall be coined at the several 
mints of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of 
fonr hundred and twel \e and a half grains troy of standard 
.silver, as pro,iderl. in the act of January eighteenth, eighteen 
:hundred and thirty-seven, on which ~hall be the devices and 
;Superscriptions provided by said act; which coins, together 
with all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States, 
·of likP. weight and fineness, shall be a legal tender, at 
their nominal value, for all debts and dues, public and pri-
vate, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the con-
tract" * * * 
It would seem clear that it was the purpose of Congress 
by this law to deny to some description or descriptions of 
dollar previously authorized the quality of being legal ten-
der for public and prh·ate dues, and that after it went 1nto 
effect receivers of public moneys had no authority to take 
payment in silver dollars not of the weight and fineness pre-
scribed by it, that. is to say, not weighing 412-2- grains, and 
containing 900 parts of pnre metal and 100 of alloy in the 
1,000 parts by weight or, as usually exprE>ssed, "900 line,'' 
for, by directing that silver dollars of a particular description 
should be accepted for public dues, Congress mnst be under-
stood as prohibiting the receipt of any other kind, it being, 
in my opinion, quite inadmissible to take the words of the 
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act as directory only, or as consistent with a discretion of 
any sort. 
And by a parity of reasoning the authority conferred by 
the third section of the act of 1878 on the Treasur~r and 
assistant treasurers of the United States to give certificates 
in exchange for "coin authorized by this act" must be re-
stricted to silver dollars of the weight and fineness requirell 
by the first section. 
If these positions are sound, it follows that unless the trade-
dollar is of the description of dollar called for by the first 
section of the act of 1878 it can not be received from the 
public debtor or exchanged for certificates under the third 
section of that act. 
Turning now to the legislation on the silver dollar, not yet 
mentioned, we find that by the act of the 2d April, 1792 (1 
Stat., 246), it was required to contain 371!6 grains of pure or 
416 grains of standard silver, and this continued to be t.he 
law until the act of the 18th January, 1837 (5 Stat., 130), under 
which the standard of both gold and silver coins wn,s such 
that of 1,000 parts by weight 900 should be of pure metal and 
100 of alloy, and the weight of the silver dollar was to be 
4121 grains, which, at 900 fine, called for 371.25 grains of 
pure silver. In 1873 Congress, by an act approved the 12th 
February (17 Stat., 427, and sec. 3513 Rev. Stat.), declared 
that the silver dollar should be a trade-dollar, weighing 420 
grains and 900 fine, and so contain 378 grainc of pure silver. 
Finally, by the act of 1878 (supra) Congress restored the 
dollar of the act of 1837, and declared, as we have seen, that 
it and all other dollars previously coim·d1 of like weight and 
fineness, that is to say, weighing 4121 grains and 900 fin·e, 
should be legal tender "at their nominal -value" for debts 
public and private; and here it may be pertinently remarked 
that in restoring the silver dollar of 1837 Congress virtually 
restored the dollar of 1792, both coins containing precisely 
the same amount of pure silver (371.25 grains) although the 
older one weighed 3~ grains more than the other, the excess 
being of alloy merely. 
If Congress bad intended to put all silver dollars previously 
coined on .a footing with that established by the act of 1878 
(supra) it would have said so, as it did in the act of 1837 
• 
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when the dollar of 4122- grains was introduced. The lan-
guage of the act of 1878 compels us to deny the quality of 
any legal tender to any dollar that does not weigh 4122-
grains and is not 900 fine. It is useless to argue, as has 
been argued, that the dollars rDined under the act of 1792 
and 1873 contained in the 0ne case as much pure metal as, 
and in the other more, than the . Rtandard dollar, for they 
could not be treated as the equivalents of the latter with-
out exercising a dispensing power over the statute the in-
tent of which in this respect is, I think, almost too clear for 
argument. 
Nor is therP- anything in the consequent resulting from 
this interpretation, so far as I can see, to raise a doubt of its 
soundness. The alleged injustice of rejecting silver dollars 
coined before the act of 1837 is largely, and we suspect alto-
gether, imaginary, there being little probability that any of 
that coinage, not laid away in cabinets and museums, is out-
standing. As to the trade-dollar, its name and history show 
very satisfactorily that it was not expected to find its way 
into the channels of domestic commerce, and when it did so, 
through an unforeseen disturbance in the relative values of 
silver and gold, Congress, by the third section of the joint 
resolution of the 22d July, 1876 (supra), took from it the 
quality of legal tender, furnishing at the same time additional 
evidence of the purpose for which it was created by author-
izing the restriction of its coinage to "the export demand for 
the same." 
But even if the interpretation given the act of 1878 were 
not so clearly right, I should hesitate to advise you to sup-
plant it by another, especially in view of the fact that Con-
gress has resisted repeated vigorous efforts to have the trade-
dollar declared legal tender. 
If the pmver of Congress to legislate on the currency does 
not extend to declaring that a given description of money, 
already in circulation, shall eease to be legal tender for pub-
lic dues, it must be in virtue of some express or implied lim-
itation of the Constitution. I think it clear that no such 
limitation exists in respect of dues arising after the passage 
of the act of 1876. It is unnecessary to inquire as to prior 
debts in the present case. 
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The result of the discussion, then, is that the action of the 
Treasury Department as t~ the trade-dollar complained of is 
iu accordance with the law. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
CLAIM OF PARTICIPANT IN THE REBELLION. 
In 1860 E., a naval officer, became entitled to a share in the proceeds of 
a captured slaver, the amount of which was certified to the Treasury 
Department by the Secreta~y of the Navy, but remains unpaid. In 1861 
E. resigned his commission and entP-red the Confederate service: Held 
that by force of the joint resolution of March 2, 1867 (sec. 3480, Rev. 
Stat.), payment of such share can not now be made, notwithstanding 
the President's proclamation of amnesty of December 25, 1868, and that 
to authorize its payment an act of Congress is necessary. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 17, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 7th May, ultimo, presents 
the following case for an opinion: 
In 1860 one Eggleston, then an officer in the Navy of the 
United States, became entitled, as such officer, to a certain 
sum of money, being his share, according to the scheme of 
distribution prescribed by law9 of the proceeds of a slaver 
captured off the coast of Cuba. The amount thus due was 
certified to the Treasury Department by the Secretary of the 
, Navy on the 19th September, 1860, and on the 20th of tho 
same month the claim was referred to the First Auditor. 
That officer took no action thereon. In 1861 Eggleston re-
signed his commission in the Navy and served in the Con-
federate army. 
Upon this state of facts it is asked whether the President's 
proclamation of amnesty of the 25th December, 1868, annulled 
so much of the joint resolution of the 2d March, 1867 (14 Stat., 
571), and F<ection 3480, Revised Statutes, "as forbids account-
ing officers settling claim·s existing prior to the 13th day of 
April, 1861, in favor of participants in the late insurrection 
or rebellion and against the United States." 
Congress bas said by this joint resolution that money in 
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the Treasury shall not be applied to the payment of claim-
ants" who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained 
the rebellion," or who, during such rebellion, were not 
''known to be opposecl thereto and distinctly in favor of its 
suppression," and that no pardon theretofore granted should 
authorize any such payment. 
The Constitution of the United States (Art. I, sec. 9) pro-
vides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but 
in consequence of appropriations made by law," * * * 
"and Congress has the undeniable right to annex such con-
ditions to the payment of the public money as it sees fit. It 
has exercised that right by the joint resolution of the 2d 
March, 1867 (supra), and the conditions so prescribed must 
be respected, unless it can be shown that one of the conse-
quences of a pardon in~.--:. case like the present is to enable 
the grantee of it to dr::;,w money from the Treasury in a way 
different from that required by Congress. 
This view as to the rebtion of a pardon to the joint resolu-
tion of the2d March, 1867, has been distinctly laid down by the 
Supreme Oourtofthe United States in therecentcaseofHart v. 
Unitecl States (118 U.S.~ 62) affirming a judgment of the Court 
of Claims. If this is tbe law in a case like Hart's, where the 
claimant was pardoned some time before the joint resolution 
was passed, it must be so, a fortior-i, in a case like the present, 
where the pardon was granted after the joint resolution be-
came law. 
As a consequence, it must be replied to your question that 
the proclamation of amnesty of the 25th December, 1868, did 
not defeat the intent of the joint resolution of the 2d March, 
1867, as to the claimant Eggleston, whose claim can not be 
paid without an act of Congress authorizing it . . 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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EMIGRANT HALF-BREED INDIANS. 
Half-breed Indians emigrating to the United States from Canada are 
not precluded by existing legislation from retaining the bounty of the 
United States in addition to that of the Dominion of Canada. 
DEP AR'I'MENT OF JUS'I'ICE, 
June 21, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 19th May, ultimo, with 
the accompanying papers, has received my cousider::;.tion. 
The Dominion Government of Canada asks to be furnished 
official evidence of alleged applications to this Governmeut 
of certain half-breeds commorant in the Territory of Dakota, 
for grants of land or scrip, or both, the declared purpose of 
the request for this evidence being to defeat certain applica-
tions of the same half-breeds, made while they were com-
morant in Manitoba, a province of the Dominion of Canada, 
for the benefit of the Canadian order in council of the 20th 
April, 1885. 
Whether the evidence applied for should be furnished is a 
matter that would seem to reside entirely in the discretion 
of the Department of State, to which the ~~pplication has 
been made, and is not understood to be submitted to me for 
opinion. 
As to the status of the half-breeds in question, they can 
not become citizens of the United States except by some 
authority of law giving them that privilege. No benefaction 
of a pecuniary or property kind extended to thorn by the 
United States can clothe t.hem with the character of eitizens 
unless conferred in such a way as to necessitate the im]!lica-
tion that such was the intention of Congress. In a li'ocent case 
the Supreme Court of the United States has established the 
principle that an Indian, to be a citizen, must, Hl~o cmy other 
foreigner, be naturalized by authority of Congresso (Elk V o 
Wilkins, 112 U. S., 94.) 
In my opinion there is nothing in the Indian legislation to 
prevent these half-breeds from sharing the bounty of the 
United States in addition to that of the Dominion of Canadao 
But whether the order in council extending the Dominion 
bounty excludes applicants who afterwards migrate from 
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the Dominion or accept favors at ti:le bands of another gov-
ernment is a matter on which I am not asked to express an 
opinion. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
'The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
CONTINGENT FUND. 
Under section 3683, Revised Statutes, heads of Departments ~Fe alone 
authorized to gt ve orders for purchases payable from the contingent 
fund and to approve vouchers t.herefor. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 16, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 15th instant, requesting 
my opinion as to whether any one besides the head of a 
Department can order the purchase of any articles to be paid 
for out of the contingent fund, and whether any one but the 
head of a Department can approve the vouchers for such 
purchase under section 3683 of the Revised Statutes, has 
been received, and I beg leave to reply that the authority 
delegated by that section to the heads of Departments is a 
special authority, and cannot be by the head of the Depart-
ment delegated or transferred to any one else, and the head 
of the Department should not only give the order himself for 
the purchase, but should approve the vouchers therefor also. 
Very respe~tfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The ACTING Sl!JCRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PROHIBITED IMPORTATION-FORFEITURE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture of 
articles contained in the same package with other articles imported 
in violation of section 2491, Revised Statutes. 
DEP ARTMEN'l1 OF JUSTIOE, 
July 17, 1886. 
SIR: In reply to your communicatiOn requesting an 
opinion upon the proposition, " Whether under section 2491, 
• 
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Revised Statutes, which prohibits the importation into the 
United States of certain obscene articles therein enumerated, 
and declare~ such articles forfeited upon importation, it is 
within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury, under 
the provisions of Title LXVIII of the Revised b\atutes, to 
remit the forfeiture of articles not obscene contained in the 
.same invoice or package with such as a.re prohibited~" 
In ID)J opinion there can be no such remission. The 
.articles otherwise unobjectionable and entitled to entry 
have become tainted with illegality by association, and were 
therefore taken in delicto, and must share the fate of the 
portion of the contents of the package which has produced 
the contamination. 
I have the honor to be, sir, you obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
BRIDGE ACROSS THE LITTLE KANAWHA. 
Under authority of the legislature of West Virginia it is proposed to con-
struct a bridge over the Little Kanawha, a navigable river within the 
limits of that State, which bridge, if built, will be an obstruction to 
navigation; but its construction being neither expressly nor im-
pliedly forbidden by any law of Congress : Advised that the case is not 
one which warrants the institution of judicial proceedings for the pre-
vention of obstruction to navigation threatened. 
A State may authorize a navigable stream withl.n its limits to be ob-
structed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on 
the subject. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 17, 1886. 
SrF: I have examined the accompan3·ing papers, which 
were received with your letters to me of the 24th ultimo and 
15th instant, in relation to a bridge proposed to be constructed 
by the Ohio River Railroad Company across Little Kanawha 
River near its mouth (about 300 feet from its junction with 
the Ohio) under authority of a law of the State of West Vir-
ginia. 
It is stated therein that the bridge, if constructed as now 
projected, will be an obstruction to the commerce not only of 
the Little Kanawha but of the Ohio River, the Little Kana-
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wha, for some 1,100 feet from its mouth, being used as an ice 
harbor for the protection of the Ohio River boats, and also 
as a landing place for them. Furthermore it is suggested 
therein that the laws of the United States regulating the 
constructi n of bridges across the Ohio may be applicable to 
the bridging of the Little Kanawha at the point above indi-
cated. 
As regards the suggestion just mentioned, I :find nothing 
in the laws referred to (act of December 17, 1872, chapter 4, 
as amended by the act of Febrt1ary 14, 1883, chapter 44), 
which authorizes their application to the constnfction of 
bridges across any other river than the Ohio, and in my view 
the case presented by the papers would not come within their 
operation. 
That case is briefly this : A bridge over the Little Ka· 
nawha, a navigable stream within the limits of West Virginia, 
is proposed to be constructed under authority of the legisla-
ture of that State. If built at the place and according to the 
plan now contemplated the bridge will be an obstruction to 
the navigation of that stream, and also greatly impair its use· 
fulness as a harbor for boats navigating the Ohio .River. But 
the construction of the bridge is neither expressly nor impliedly 
forbiden by any law of Congress. 
Such case, I am satisfied, in view of the doctrine asserted 
and reasserted by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Wilson v. Blackford Qreek Marsh Company (2 Pet., 245), 
Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713), Pound v. Turck (95 
U. S., 459), Escanaba Company v. Chicago (107 U. S., 678), and 
Cardwell v. Bridge Company (113 U.S., 205), would not justify 
the institution of judicial proceedings for the prevention of 
the obstruction to navigation, etc., threatened. It does not 
appear to differ, in any essential feature, from the cases di-
. rectly passed upon by that court in its decisions referred to. 
According to the doctrine there laid down, a State may au-
thorize a navigable stream within its limits to be obstructe1l 
by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on 
the subject. 
I observe that the attention of Congress has at the prPsent 
session been officially called to the proposed bridge (see Ex. 
Doc. No. 12, Senate, Forty-ninth Congress, first session, p. 55), 
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and recently, as I gather from the accompa::::.ying papers, a 
great many citizens engaged in the navigation of the Ohio 
and its tributaries between Pittsburgh and Cincinnati have 
memorialized Congress against the erection of such bridge, 
particularly at the place selected therefor. My opinion is, 
that some action by that body on the subject, having the effect 
to supersede the authority of the State, is necessary before 
any effective steps can be taken, by suit or otherwise, to pre-
vent the construction of the bridge as now projected. 
I am, sir, very, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
CASE OF CHARLES E. HOLMES. 
H. entered the military service in August, 1862, as a volunteer, to serve 
for three years; he subsequently deserted; but he afterwards volun-
ta.rily returned to service under the President's proclamation (of par-
don) of March 11, 1865, and was mustered out of service along with his 
company in July 2, 1865: Advised thu,t the time which elapsed be-
tween his desertion and his return should not be credited to him in a 
discharge or otherwise, but that he is entitled to have his actual service 
credited to him in an honorable discharge. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 21, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the lOth instant, in which you call my 
attention ''to the application of Mr. Charles E. Holmes for 
the removal of the charge of desertion standing against his 
record as a member of Company E, Sixth Maryland Volun-
teen;;, and for an honorable di:scharge therefrom." 
The facts in Mr. Holmes's case, as recited in your communi-
cation, are that he "was enrolled August ~1, 1862, to serve 
;three years, in Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, and 
served therein until June 15, 1863, when he was captured by 
the enemy at Winchester, Va. He was paroled at City 
Point, Va., July 8, 1863; reported at College Green Bar-
racks, Annapolis, Md., July 9, 1863, and the words ' In hospi-
428 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Case of Charles E. Holmes. 
tal' appear opposite his name on the records of said barracks. 
The records do not show what disposition was made of him 
after July 9, 1863, but he admits that he left Annapolis in 
August, 1863. He is repQrted on the muster rolls of his com-
pany for July and August, September and October, 1863, as 
absent paroled prisoner; on the roll for November and De-
cember, 1863, as 'deserted'; the date or place of desertion 
is not stated. His name is dropped from subsequent muster 
rolls of the company to February 28, 1865. He is reported 
on the roll for March and April, 1H65, as 'present,' with the 
remark, 'returned voluntarily under the President's ·proclama. 
tion, April 3, 1865. He was transferred to Company 0, 
First Mary land Volunteers, in May or J nne, 1865, and on 
the muster-out roll of that company, dated July 2, 1865, be 
is borne as mustered out with. the company, with the remark, 
'Deserted June 24, 1863, from Camp Parole, Annapolis, 
Md.; returned under the President's proclamation." 
I understand from the foregoing statement that Mr. Holmes 
received an honorable discharge from Company C, First 
Maryland Volunteers, covering the time of his service in that 
command, and that he now claims an honorable discharge 
from Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, covering the 
time from date of enlistment to date of transfer. 
The discharge claimed, if given, would be a" formal final 
judgment passed by the Government upon the entire military 
record of the soldier, and an authoritative declaration by it 
that he had left the service in a status of honor." (United 
States v. Kelly, 15 Wall., 34.) 
Is Mr. Holmes entitled to such a judgment' When he was 
mustered into service August 21, 1862, he assumed grave 
obligations to the Government. The Government provided 
compensation for the performance and denounced penalties 
against the violation of these obligations. By desertion in 
August, 1863, he violated them, incurring a penalty or penal-
ties. The desertion, persisted in as it was for twenty 
months, involved not only crime, but a total failure during 
that period to perform any service for which compensation 
was provided. He returned to the performance of his obliga-
tions April 3, 1865, upon the terms offered by the President's 
proclamation of March 11, 1865. Those terms were, pardon 
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for his crime upon condition that he should serve the re-
mainuer of his term of enlistment, and, in addition thereto, a 
period equal to the time lost by desertion. His connection 
with Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, ·was severed 
in May or June, 1865, by his transfer to Company C, ]?irst 
Maryland Volunteers, and at the ·close of the war, to wit, 
July 2, 1865, after a total service of about fifteen months, he 
was mustered out with said latter company. By reason of 
this mustering out the Government waived, and he was unable 
to serve out, the full term of enlistment, and, in addition, a 
period equal to that lost by desertion. 
The solution of the question of the effect of this conditional 
pardon and subsequent waiver upon his record and conse-
quent rights as a soldier is not free from difficulty. Cer-
tainly" a full pardon reaches. both the puni~hment prescribed 
for the offense and the guilt of the offender. • • * It 
releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, 
so that in the eyes of the law .the offender is as innocent as 
if he had never committeu the offense. * * * It restores 
him to all his rights." (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., p. 333.) ' 
I am perfectly clear in the opinion that the pardon did re-
lieve Mr. Holmes not only from "corporal punishment for 
the crime," but also from "the status into which his own act 
bad placed him and from the onus df his crime." His record 
is as clear from all stain by reason of desertion as though 
the time from the last performance of duty prior to deser-
tion up to his return had never been. He is clearly entitled 
to full credit for service performed prior to desertion and 
after his return, and his record during those periods is un-
affected in the slightest by the crime for which he was par-
doned. But for the period covereJ. by the desertion I do not 
think he should be held to have '' been present at every roll-
call" performing the duties of and earning a soldier's com-
pensation. 
Without considering the power of the President to produce 
this result by a pardon, it is evident that the pardon ex-
tended in the proclamation was not intended to operate as 
or to take the place of specific performance. 
The crime was pardoned, and with legislative sanction 
0 
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the President's proclamation extended the time within which 
Mr. Holmes might perform his contract obligations and earn 
the compensation provided for performance. The effect was 
to blot out the twenty months which covered the crime and 
consequent failure to do duty, leaving Mr. Holmes just where 
he was before desertion. 
His original contract of service was for three years or the 
war. Having served one year before desertion, his contract 
upon return under the proclamation was for two years or the 
war. He simply took up the original contract where he laid 
it down. His past performance was credited on the total 
measure of his original obligation, and the pardon became 
absolute upon performance of the remainder. As the end-
ing of the war in fifteen months after enlistment would have 
deprh·ed him of the opportunity to earn and the right to de. 
maud compensation dependent on greater length of service, 
so the ending of the war within three months after his return 
ueprived him of the opportunity to make good and the right 
to demand compensation for the services he might have per. 
formed in the twenty months lost by desertion. 
The Goverment was not under any obligation at any time 
to keep him in the service for the full term of tllree years, 
uor to pay him for any length of time after the war ended 
and he was mustered ou!. 
If, after his return, he had served the two years which 
would complete his original term and, in addition, make good 
the time lost by desertion, be would have been entitled to 
just that compensation which be indirectly demands now by 
claiming a discharge covering time from enlistment to date 
of transfer. 
Since he did not serve but three months of that two years, 
and since the clear purpose of tile proclamation was that the. 
compensation should be measured by the service, I am of 
opinion that he should be paid for that service, and not for 
the whole service he might have been, but was not, called on 
to render. 
The pardon was not intended to place a deserter upon 
higher ground nor to secure him more favorable terms than 
were given to the soldier who never faltered in discharge of 
duty. Such · a soldier was compensated for actual service . 
• 
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S.he deserter who accepted the terms of the President's 
proclamation was entitled to no more, no less. Mr. Holmes 
is eutitled to be creuited by his services from date of enlist-
ment to date of desertion, alHl from date of return to date 
on which he was mustered out. The mustering out before 
the expiration of his full term waived continued service as 
a CQndition to immuuity from all guilt, from all punishment, 
from all stain, in the eye of the law, on his record as a sol-
dier by reason of the desertion, but it diu not waive the con-
dition of the original contract, that compensation should be 
proportioned to length of service, nor the condition of the 
proclamation that time lost by desertion should uot be com-
puted in estimating length uf service. 
Neither the President nor Congress could give back to 
Mr. Holmes the time so full of opportunities for serving his 
country that had elapsed after desertion and before the par-
don was given and accepted, and the plain purpose of both 
was to exclude such time from the estimate of his service. 
I have thus generaily stated my conclusions as to the 
effeet of the pardon and waiver of full term of service upon 
:Mr. Holmes' rights on account of service in the Army, because 
such a statement is necessary to a full answer of J-our 
specific questions. 
You ask, "(1) Whether, under the President's proclama-
tion of March 11, 1865, Holmes was entitled by his voluntary 
surrender as a deserter to a cancellation of the record of 
desertion standing against him, and (2) Whether by virtue 
of the said proclamation and his return thereunder be is 
entitled to an honorable discharge from Company E, Sixth 
:\fary laud Volunteers ~" He remained in the service as a 
member of that company until the transfer to Company C, 
First Maryland Volunteers, but the time which elapsed 
between his desertion and his return should not be credited 
to him in a discharge or otherwise. .Mr. Holmes is entitled 
to have the actual ser·dce in Company B, Sixth l\faryland 
Volunteers, credited to him in an honorable discharge. If a 
soldier transferred from one company aud regiment to 
another is entitled to a discharge from the company he leaves, 
then Mr. Holmes is entitled to an honorable discharge from 
• 
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Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, showing his length 
of service exclusive of time lost by desertion. 
The papers inclosed with your communication are here-
with returned. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
CONTI~GENT FUND. 
Opinion of July 16, 1886 (aute, p. 424), in regard to the power conferred 
upon heads of Departments by section 3683, Revised Statutes, respect-
ing purchases payable from the contingent fund, does not apply to the 
Assistant ::iecretary of the Interior while in the exercise of authority 
prescribed for him by the Secretary of the Interior under section 439t 
Revised Statute. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 23, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit, in reply to your com-
munication of the 22d instant, that my opinion touclliug the-
autho;.·ity delegated to heads of Departments under sec-
tion 3683, Revised Statutes, does not apply to the Assist-
ant Secretary of the Interior while in the exercise of author-
ity prescribed for him by the Secretary of the Interior under 
section 439, Revised Statutes. As to the authority so pre-
scribed the Assistant Secretary has the full power of the 
Secretary himself. 
It is to be observed that section 3683, Revised Statutes, 
was enacted in 1842, and section 439, Revised Statutes, in 
1862. With this provision as to the contingent fund before 
Congress when the duties of the Assistant Secretary were . 
designated in 1862, it is to be presumed it was intended to 
include this authority or duty, as well as all others that the 
Secretary ·of the Interior might prescribe to the Assistant. 
This section 439, in other words, empowers the Secretary to 
make the Assistant, as it were, his deputy in all things. It 
follows, then, that the .Secretary of the Interior can lawfully 
devolve the authority vested in him by section :1683, Revised 
Statutes, upon the Assistant Secretary of the Interior. This 
is entirely consistent with my opinion of the 16th instant, to 
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which you refer, which is in effect that the duty mentioned 
in section 3683 can only be exercised by the head of a Depart-
ment, and cannot be transferred to an inferior officer. So long 
as the powers delegated to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior by his superior remain unrevoked, the authority of 
. the former is co-ordinate and concurrent with that of the 
latter. 
The opinion referred to, as you will observe, was given in 
answer to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Treasury~ 
whet];ler the authority delegated under section 3683, Revised 
Statutes, could be exercised by a chief clerk of a Depart-
ment in the one case and by a chief of a division in the other. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 
WATCHMEN IN PUBLIC SQUARES OR RESERVATIONS. 
The watchmen employed by the Government under the act of August 5, 
1882, chapter 389, for service in the public squares or reservations in 
the District of Columbia, are by that act invested with the powers of 
the metropolitan police, and may make arrests outside of such squares 
and reservations fo.r offenses committed within the same. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,. 
July 30, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of' 
your communication of the 29th instant, in which you ask 
" Whether the District commissioners must appoint these 
watchmen (the watchmen provided for by the United States 
Government for service in any of the public squares or reser-
vations in the District of Columbia) additional policemen 
before they can perform the full duties and powers of the 
metropolitan police, or whether tile law confers full authority 
upon the watchmen to arrest persons outside of the reserva-
tions and take them to the police courts for crime committed 
within the reservations or connected therewith in any way." 
The language of the act of Congress, approved August 5, 
1882 (22 Stat., 243), is so clear and explicit, that there can be 
no doubt as to its meaning. 
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The powers aml duties of the metropolitan police are con-
ferred upon these watchmen by the act itself, without the 
intervention of any appointment from the commissioners of 
the District. The legislative purpose was to invest these 
watchmen with the powers and duties of the metropolitan 
police without connecting them with that organization. 
One of these watchmen bas the same authority f.or arrest-
ing offenders and turning them over to the courts for trial 
that a metropolitan policeman would have who was detailed 
to perform a watchman's duties. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
TIMBER UNLAWFULLY CUT ON PUBLIC LANDS. 
The Land Department has authority to make seizure, through .its offi-
cers or agents, of timber unlawfully cut on the public lands. 
Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been sei~ea by duly-
authorized agents of the Land Department, and is in their custody, may 
be disposed of by that Department; and whether this be done by 
public or private sale, with or without previous advertisement, is a 
matter entirely discretionary therewith. 
DEPAR'rMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
· , August 23. 1886. 
StR: By your letter to the Attorney-General of the 14th 
ultimo attention is called to a communication received by 
you from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a 
copy of which was transmitted therewith, touching the dis-
pmdtion of a large quantity of timber alleged to have been 
nnlawfully cut on the public lands in Montana Territory, and 
which bas recently been seized as the property of the United 
States under instructions from that office, and the question 
presented for consideration is, Whether the Commissioner 
may ''direct the sale of the property so seized, and if so, 
whether it may be disposed of at private sale, and in such 
way as may be both to the advantage of the Government 
and to the benefit of the community, without advertising the 
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same~" Having carefully examined this subject, I now beg 
to submit the following in reply: 
The question proposed seems to involve a preliminary 
inquiry, namely, as to the authority of the officers of the 
Land Department to make seizure of timber unlawfully cut 
on the public lands. Upon this point I entertain no doubt. 
Congress has provided a remedy for the protection of the 
timber ou the public lands by imposing certain penal-
ties and forfeitures (see sec. 2461 and 2462, Hev. Stats.; 
also sec. 3 of the act of June 3, 1878, chap. 150, and sec. 
4 of the act of June ~, 1878, chap. 151), which can only 
be enforced by in<lictment or informati~n, and by section 
2 of the act of April 30, 1878, chapter 76, it is further 
provided "that if any timber cut on the public lands shall 
be exported from the Territories of the United States it shall 
be liable to seizure by United States authority wherever 
found." 
But these statutory remedies are not tile only ones availa· 
ble to the Government. In Cotton v. United States (11 How., 
229) it wa,s held that the United States have a right to bring 
an action of trespass quare clausum fregit agaiust a person 
for cutting and carrying away trees from the public lands. 
Agreeably to tile doctrine of that case the United States 
may rm;ort to the same ci vii remedies for the protection of 
their property which are open to any other proprietor. Thus 
tney may seize the timber cut, arrest it by replevin, or recover 
damages in trespass for the taking and conversion (United 
States v. Cook, 19 Wall., 594). These are the ordinary reme-
dies given by the common law for the reco\Tery of personal 
property or its value. Seizure or recaption (which is one of 
them) is a remedy by the mere act of the party injured, and 
may be resorted to for the recovery of such property where 
its exertion will not endanger the public peace. (3 Black. 
Com., 4.) 
Authority to exert this remedy in behalf of the United 
States must be deemed to belong to the Commissioner of the 
General Land-Office, under the supervision of the Secretary 
of the Interior, as a power included in the general duties re-
specting the public lands which are devolved upon him (sec. 
453, Rev. Stat.). Such authority, indeed, has long been 
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asserted and frequently exercised by the Land Department 
through its officers or agents, the latter acting under in-
structions issued by the Commissioner, with the sanction of 
the Secretary. Referring to this, the Supreme Court in 
Wells v. Nickles (104 U. S., 447) observes: 
"The Department of the Interior, under the idea of pro-
tecting from depredation timber on the lands of the Govern-
ment, has gradually come to as~ert the right to seize what 
is cut and taken away from them wherever it can be traced. 
In aid of this, the registers and receivers of the land-office 
have, by instructions from the Secretary of the Interior, been 
constituted agen,ts of the United States for these purposes, 
with power to appoint special agents under themselves. If 
any authority to do this was necessary, it may be fairly in-
ferred from appropriations made to pay the service~ of these 
special timber agents." 
In that case a1 compromise by timber agents with a tres-
passer respecting the ·disposition of timber cut by him on 
the public lands and seized by such agents~ which was made 
in conformity to instructions of the Commissioner of the 
General Land-Office, was held to be valid. This amounts to 
an affirmation of the authority of the Commissioner, through 
those agents, to act for the United States in matters connected 
with timber depredations on the public domain; and I think 
it safe to say, that under such authority the remedy by recap-
tion or seizure, as well as any other of the before-mentioned 
common-law remedies, may be resorted.to for the recovery of 
timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, according to the 
circumstances of the case. While I entertain no doubt as to 
the existence ' of the remedy by seizure, yet its iiability to 
abuse and to become an instrument of oppression demand that 
it should be used with judicious discretion and only in clear 
or emergent cases; and except in such cases the regular pro-
cedure of the courts should be preferred. 
As to the authority of the Commissioner to dispose of such 
timber by public or private sale, where the same bas been 
seized by cluly-aut.horized agents of the Land Department 
and remains in their custody, I apprehend that this power 
exists, subject to the general supervision or direction of the 
Secr~tary of the Interior. There being no statutory pro-
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vision covering a case of that kind, or regulating the dis· 
position of the property, it must be regarded as a subject 
left to the Land Department to be dealt with in such manner 
as in the judgment of that department will best protect the 
interests of the Government. As the property is perishable 
in its nature, and its custody may involve expense, it is not 
only within the power, but it is the duty of the department, 
for the avoidance of loss to the Government, to convert the 
same into money; and whether this be done by public or 
private sale, is a matter entirely discretionary with it. 
While, ordinarily, the public interests (which are always to 
be kept in view) will be best subserved by a public oole after 
advertisement, yet I perceive no objection, legal or other, to 
a private sale either with or without previous advertisement, 
where the mode of disposal is advantageous to the Govern-
ment; but as a general rule public sale should be had. 
In direct response to the question presented by you, I 
therefore submit that, in my opinion, the Commissioner may 
direct the sale of the property seized, and that ''it may be 
disposed of at private sale, and in such way as may be. both 
to the advantage of the Government and to the benefit of 
,the community without advertising the same." 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
POTOMAC FLATS IMPROVEMENT. 
Title of the United States to certain parts (Sections II and Ill) of the 
Potomac Flats Improvement considered, and advised that the prohibi-
tion contained in the acts of August 5, 1886, chapters 929 and 930, 
against the expenditure of money appropriated for the improvement, 
does not apply to such parts. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 28, 1886. 
SIR: Your letters of the 18th and 25th instant, inclosing 
communications addressed to the Chief of Engineers by Maj. 
P. C. Hains, of the Engineer Corps, in charge of the Potomac 
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River Flats Imp1·ovement, together with a map of that im-
provement, call attention to section 6 of the act of August, 
5, 1886, entitled ''An Act to provide for protecting the inter-
ests of the United States in the Potomac Ri 'Ter Flats," etc., 
and also to the proviso in that part of the river and harbor 
act of August 5, 1886, which makes an appropriation "for 
continuing the improvement of the Potomac River in the 
vicinity of Washington," etc., and in connection therewith 
submit the following inquiries, Yiz: Whether there is any 
claim of title adverse to the title of the United States with 
respect to Sections II and III of the Potomac Flats, as de-
scribed on said map, and whether there is any impediment 
to the immediate expenditure of said appropriation on such 
sections. 
In regard to all that part of the Potomac River Flats Im-
provement which is embraced in Sections II and III, as de-
scribed on said map, this Department has no information of 
any claim of title adverse to that of the United States cover-
ing any part of the soil included therein, nor is it believed 
that any foundation for such a claim exists. Formerly the 
whole of the soil referred to constituted part of the bed of 
the river, and was owned by the State of Maryland. While 
it still remained part of the river bed, the United States suc-
ceeded to the title of the State thereto by virtue of the act 
of cession passed by the Maryland legislature December 19, 
1791, and it does not appear that tlwre has been any change 
of ownership since. In an official report to the Secretary of 
tlle Interior dated February 18, 1885, the Commissioner of 
the General Land Office states that the only patent or other 
title paper shown l>y the records of this (the General Land) 
office to ha't'e been issued for any portion of the Potomac 
Flats, so called, is the patent issued December 6, 1869, to 
John L. Kidwell, for 47.71 acres in the Potomac River adja-
cent to the United States Observatory." No part of the land 
covered by this patent lies within either of the !1l>ove-men-
tioned sections. 
The Kid well claim, just adverted to, is located wholly 
within Section I on the map. This section includes a large 
area, extending from Easby's Point (foot of Twenty seventh 
street) to Seventeenth street, and between the points here 
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indicated, fronting the same section, the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Canal Company and others claim riparian rights. But 
below Seventeeth street, and fronting on Sections II and III, 
there is no riparian property except what is owned by the 
United States, and no riparian rights are claimed there by 
any one adversely to the United States, within the knowl-
edge of this Department. 
As t9 the expenditure of the appropriation referred to, the 
act making that appropriation provides that it shall not be 
expended " upon or with reference to any place in respect 
of which the title of the United States is in doubt, or in 
respect to which any claim adverse to the United States 
has been made;" and section 6 of the first above-named act 
of August 5, 1886, also forbids the expenditure of any moneys 
so appropriated "otherwise than upon property in respect 
of which there is no claim adverse to the title of the United 
States," etc. Respecting the area within the limits of Sec-
tion~ II and III on said map it has already been intimated 
that the Department has no information of the existence of 
any claim adverse to the title of the Unite1l States to any 
part of the soil included in that area, or that any such claim 
has ever been asserted. Indeed, the title of the United 
States to ·the land within the whole of that area appears to 
be absolute and free from all doubt. Under these circum-
stances I think it may reasonably be concluded that the 
land is property in respect of which there ''is no claim ad-
verse to the title of the United States," and that it is not a 
"place in which the title of the United States is in doubt, or 
in respect to which any claim adverse to the United States 
has been made," and that, consequently, the prohibition con-
tained in the acts above cited against expending the aforesaid 
appropriation do not apply thereto. 
I accordingly answer the inquiries submitted by you in the 
negative. 
I am, sir, very respectfu11y, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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INDIAN POLICE. 
The powers and duties of the Indian police authorized by the act of May 
15, 1886, chapter 333, cannot be exercised outside of the reservation to 
which they may be assigned. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 28, 1886. 
SIR: The proposition submitted for consideration in your 
letter of the 24th instant is, "Does the jurisdiction of the 
Indian police, authorized by the act of May 15, 1886 (Public 
No. 49), extend .for any purpose beyond the limits of the rel3-
ervation within which they are employed~" 
The language of the act above referred to is, ''The service 
* * * of Indian police to be employed in maintaining 
order and prohibiting illegal traffic in liquor on the several 
Indian reservations.'' No other definition of the power of 
the Indian police is furnished by statute. 
The l'tatute fixes their employment as on the several In-
dian reservations. It would be doing violence to the intent 
of the statute, as clearly expressed by its language, to extend 
the exercise of their power beyond the reservation. The pur-
pose of their appointment is to'' maintain order and prohibit 
illegal traffic in liquor." Their chief duty is rather to pre-
vent crime than to punish criminals. When arrest becomes 
necessary as an incident to the prevention of disorder or the 
traffic in liquor, when the offender is delivered to the proper 
tribunal within the reservation, if its jurisdiction extends for 
purpose of punishment beyond the reservation, the convicted 
criminal will then by the order of tne court be placed in the 
custody of an officer with sufficient authority to execute the 
sentence. 
From the provisions of the statute and the necessarily 
local character of the duties devolving upon the Indian 
police, I am of opinion their power does not ex officio extend 
outside of the Indian reservation to which they may be 
assigned. 
I am, very respectfully, yours, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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WHARVES IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON CITY. · 
.Semble that the Chief of Engineers of the Army is not and never has been 
vested with authority t ' grant licenses for the erection of wharves 
along the river front of the city of Washington, D. C. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 3, 1886. 
SIR: I have considered with much care the question pro-
pounded by you in a letter to the Attorney General, dated 
the 16th of April last, as to the authority of the Chi<~f of 
Engineers to grant licenses for the erection of wharves along 
the river front of the city of Washington. 
It appears by the papers which accompanied your letter 
that this authority is assumed by that officer to belong to 
him by virtue of the act of the Maryland legislature of De-
cember 19, 1791, and the acts of Congress of May 1, 1802, 
chapter 41; .April 29, 1816, chapter 150; and March 2, 1867, 
chapter 167. The Maryland act of 1791 provided that the 
commissioners appointed by the President under the act of 
Congress of July 16, 1790, chapter 28, "should from time to 
time, until Congress shall exercise the jurisdiction and govern-
rnent within the said territory, have power to license the 
building of wharves in the waters of the Potomac and the 
Eastern Branch, adjoining the said city," etc. The offices of 
these commissioners were abolished, and the appointment of 
a new officer, called a superintendent, authorized, by the act 
of Congress of 1802, which contained this provision: ''The 
said superintendent is hereby invested with all powers, and 
shall hereafter perform all duties, which the said commis-
sioners are now vested with, or are required to perform, by or 
in virtue of any act of Congress, or any act of the general 
assembly of Maryland, or any deed or deeds of trust from 
the original proprietors of the lots in the said city," etc. 
The act of 1816 abolished the office of superintendent, and 
authorized the appointment of a commissioner of public 
buildings, and declared that the latter officer ''shall be vested 
with all the powers and perform all the duties conferred 
upon the superintendent aforesaid-." The act of 1867 abol-
ished the office of Commissioner of Public Buildings, and pro-
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vided that ''the Chief Engineer of the Army shall perform all 
the duties now required by law of said commissioner." 
This legislation, however, should be viewed in connection 
with other legislation, namel;y, the acts of CongresR of Feb· 
ruary 27, 1801, chapter 15; February 24, 1804, chapter 14; 
May 4, 1812, chapter 75; and May 15, 1820, chapter 104. 
By the first of these acts Congress completely assumed to 
exercise jurisdiction and government within the territory 
described in the Maryland act of 1791. According to the 
view of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in 
the case of the District v. Johnson (3 l\fack., 120), the power 
to license the erection of wharves which was conferred by 
the last-mentioned act upon the commissioners named 
therein, and which is regarded as of a purely temporary and 
provisional character, ceased to exist by the very terms of 
such act upon the assumption of jurisdiction by Congress as 
above, and consequently did not devolve upon the superin-
tendent created by the act of 1~02, as this act transferred to 
him only the powers then vested in said commissioners. If 
this view is correct, that power was not transmitt~d to the 
Commissioner ofPublic Buildings and from him to the Chief 
of Engineers by force of the subsequent acts of 1816 and 1867. 
Furthermore, it would seem that the act of February 24, 
1804, May, 4, 1812, and May 15, 1820, cited above, devolved 
the same power elsewhere. Thus the act of 1804 provided 
that the corporation of the city of Washington should have 
• power "to erect, repair, and regulate public wharves," etc; 
the act of 1812 authorized the raising of taxes by the same 
corporation, to be expended "in erecting and repairing 
wharves;" and the act of 1820, which gave a new charter to 
the city of Washington, conferred upon the corporation 
power ''to erect, repair and regulate public wharves," etc., 
and ;, to regulate the manner of erecting and the rates of 
wharfage at private wharves." 
The provisions of the last-named act, which embrace 
wharves both public and private, confer plenary power over 
their establishment, and they are manifestly irreconcilable 
with the existence, separate from or independent of said cor-
poration, of an authority .to license the erection of such 
wharves. Commenting on the same provisions, the court iu 
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the case aboYe referred to remarks: "The power, then, 
claimed to be in the Commissioner of Public Buildings or the 
Chief Engineer of the Army, his successor, to issue licenses . 
for the building of wharves would be inconsistent with the 
power given to the city. And therefore, even if the power 
was conferred on the original commissioners, the act incor-
porating t~e city transferred it to the authorities of the city 
of Washington. Therefore, in our judgment, the Engineer 
of the Army never had the slightest power in the world to 
license the erection of wharves on the Potomac and Eastern 
Branch." 
I observe that, in an opinion of Attorney-General Wirt, 
dated July 8, 1818 (1 Opin., 223), in which the subject con-
sidered was the construction of wharves by the proprietors of 
water lots on the Potomac and Eastern Branch, and there-
fore related to private wharves, the power to license the build-
ing thereof possessed under the Maryland act of 1791 by the 
commissioners first in office is regarded (contrary to the view 
of the supreme court of the District of Columbilt in the 
case above cited) as having devolved upon their successor, 
the superintendent, and upon the successor of the latter offi-
cer, the Commissioner of Public Buildiugs, by operation of 
the acts of 1802 and 1816, hereinbefore mentioned, and that 
at the date of the opinion the whole subject of licensing 
thes~ wharves is deeme\l to be under the control of the 
Commissioner of Public Buildings. But that opinion was 
given prior to the enactment of the aforesaid act of 1820, the 
·provisions of which includH private as well as public wharves, 
and, as already intimated, would be clearly inconsistent with 
the exercise of a licensing power by such commissioner; so 
that, if this power had previously resided in the latter, it 
ceased to exis'j in him upon the passage of that act, being 
impliedly revoked thereby. 
The powers granted to the city of Washington by the act 
of 1820 over the establishment of wharves were subse-
quently exercised by the corporation, from time to time, in 
the adoption of ordinances regulating that subject. ( See 
Webb's Digest, p. 423.) 
But there is another point which is suggested by the 
Chief of Engineers in the papers transmitted with your 
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letter, and which calls for examination in connection witlJ 
the present inquiry, and that is, that the dock spaces are 
pnblic reservations, and that it is his duty to see that they 
are not occupied by any private person for any private pur. 
pose whatever; in support of which he cites sections 222 
and 226 of the ReviRed Statutes relating to the District of 
Columbia.· The first of these sections declares. that "no 
open space, public reservation, or other public ground in the 
city of Washington, nor any portion of the public streets or 
avenues in said city, shall be occupied by any pri\ate person, 
or for any private purpose whateYer." This provision is taken 
partly from the act of May 17, 184 8, amending the charter of 
said city, and partly from the act of April 6, 1870, con-
ferring certain authorit.y upon the city relative to parking 
the streets and avenues. The term "public reservation," 
as there employed, signifies an area of ground set apart for 
public purposes in the plan of the city; it would not ordina-
rily be taken to include a dock space; and in my opinion 
neither !hat nor any of the other terms used in the section 
were meant to apply to spaces of that sort. Besides, no 
power is granted by that section to the Chief of Engineers; 
and while section 226 makes it his duty "to cause obstacles 
of every kind to be removed from such streets, avenues, and 
sidewalks in the city of Washington as have been or may 
be improved in whole or in part by the United States, and 
to keep the same at all times free from obstructions," yet 
this duty is by the terms of the statute limited to "streets, 
avenues, and sidewalks" where the same are improved as 
above, anrl cannot be deemed to embrace localities not with-
in that description. There is clearly nothing in these sec-
tions from which a power to license the erection of wharves 
may be derived. 
In answer, then, to the question presented by you, I have 
the honor to reply, that in my opinion the Chief of Engi-
neers is not now and never has been clothed with authority 
to grant licenses for the erection of wharves along the river 
front of the city of Washington. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION IN FOREIGN VESSELS. 
Under the eighth sectionof the act of June 19, 1886, chapter 421, a foreign 
vessel is liable to a fine of $2 for every passenger transported by it 
from one port in the United States to another port in the United States, 
though the continuity of the voyage may have been broken by the ves-
sel touching at an intermediate foreign port. 
DEPAR'l'MENT'" OF JUSTICE, 
September 4, 1886. 
SIR: In your letter of the 25th of August you ask the fol-
lowing question: 
"Under the eighth section of the act 'to abolish certain 
fees for official services to American vessels,' etc., approved 
June 19, 1886, is a foreign vessel liable to a fine of $2 for 
every person transported by her from one American port to 
another when such person takes passage for an intermediate 
foreign port and thence again takes passage for a domestic 
port~ the continuity of the voyage of the vessel being tempo-
. rarily broken ~" 
The language of the section referred to is: 
" SEC. 8. That foreign vessels found transporting pas-
sengers between places or ports in the United States, when 
such passengers have been taken on board in the United 
States, shall be liable to a fine of two dollars for every pas-
senger landedo~" 
By the provision of this act the fine is imposed upon the 
vessel for the wrong·doing of the vessel, and not for any act 
done by the passengers; hence the inquiry is one between 
the United States and the vessel. The custom-bouse 
officers are not burdened with the difficult task of inquiring 
what each passenger did, whether he paid for his ticket, or 
the terms on which he was transported by the vessel, or any 
other act or doing of a passenger, exc~pt as a means of de-
termining where the passenger was taken on board or 
landed. In the case submitted, the fact that the vessel wa~ 
a foreign one is undisputed; that the paRsengers were landed 
at Chicago is equally well established. If there is a crimip 
nating fact which is involved in doubt, it is whether the pas- · 
sengers were taken on board at a port within the United 
• 
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States. They were first taken on board at Cleveland b,y the 
vessel from which they were landed. The voyage was a con-
tinuous one, being, in the language of the case stated, "tem-
porarily broken" at the port of Windsor, in Canada. Thus, 
if it was a broken voyage, one part being from Cleveland to 
Windsor and the other part from Windsor to Chicago, the · 
two parts (if but temporarily broken by the stopping at 
Windsor and after that a resumption and consummation of 
the original purpose) would constitute substantially a con-
tinuous voyage. If there had been no such temporary de-
lay, but the vessel had gone directly from Cleveland to Chi-
cago and carried the passengers from the one port to the 
other, no doubt could have arisen as to the liability to the 
payment of the fine~. The fact that each of the passengers 
paid his fare in two separate payments, and had his trunks 
examined by the custom-house officers, should not be 
allowed to change the result following from the continuity of 
the voyage; for it must be borne in mind that it is the vessel 
that is subjected to tbe fine, and not the passengers. The 
claim for the fine is by the United States against the vessel. 
Those controlling the vessel may arrange with the passengers 
or the officers of the foreign custom-house as it may best 
suit their mutual convenience, but as the United States bas 
no control over the parties to such arrangements, and is in 
no way a party to them, her rights can not be prejudiced or 
the operation of her laws evaded by them. Even if each 
passenger, when taken on board, had intended making 
Windsor the end of his voyage on that vessel, and in conse. 
quence of the temporary suspension of the voyage changed 
his mind and resumed travel on the same vessel, it would be 
entirely in t!1e power of those controlling the vessel to add 
the amount of the fine ($2) to the fare, and thereby without 
loss pay the fine; or the passenger could, at his option, take 
passage on another vessel, and the amercement be avoided. 
A different construction of the law would render tlle act 
practically inoperative and the intent of the law-makers in-
effectual. Hence the conclusion follows that the decisive 
facts in this and similar cases are: Was the vessel a foreign 
one! Did she take the passengers on board at a port of the 
United States and after a substantially continuous voyage 
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land them at another port of the United States? When this 
conjunction of facts exists, the vessel is subjected to liability 
for the fine; and, as these facts are all found to exist in the 
case submitted, the vessel is subject to the penalties pro-
vided by the act. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRE1\A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
POTTAW ATOMIE INDIANS. 
Under the authority granted to the agents and attorneys named in the 
letter of attorney made by certain beads of families and individual 
members of the Pottawatomie Indians, the powers and duties com-
mitted to such agents and attorneys can not be performed by any two 
of them in the absence or without the concurrence of the third. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 9, 1886. 
SIR: Your Jetter of the 6th instant, with the documents 
that accompanied it, was received. 
The inquiry you tlropose is in substance whether, under 
the authority granted to the attorneys named in the power of 
attorney made by certain hea.ds of families and individual 
members of the Pottawatomie nation of Indians, the powers 
and duties can be performed· by any two of them in the ab-
sence of the third. 
I find, in the examination of the power of attorney referred 
to, these words: 
"We, the undersigned, heads of families and individual 
members of the Citizen Baud of the Pottawatomie nation of 
Indians, * * * and also * * * the undersigned mem-
bers of the Huron Band of the Pottawatomie nation of In-
dians, * * * for ourselves, our heirs and assigns, reposing 
full faith and confidence in the fidelity, integrity, and capacity 
of Anthony F. Navarre and Stephen Neyonquet and John 
Anderson, memhers of our said Pottawatomie nation of In-
dians, residing in the Indian Territory, do hereby nominate, 
constitute, and appoint, and by these presents have consti-
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tuted, nominated, ana appointed, said Anthony F. Navarre 
and said John Anderson our lawful agents and attorneys in 
fact," for the purposes therein stated. 
Reading thus far it will appear that only two agents or 
attorneys were empowered to act in the matter delegated. 
It would seem, therefore, that the answer to your inquiry 
must be confined to the authority of Navarre and Anderson, 
unless the omission of Neyonquet's name was a clerical error. 
But while this omission, if it be not a clerical error, might be 
decisive of the question submitted, yet, assuming that three 
agents were appointed, the question may be disposed of on 
other grounds. 
The duty to be performed by the agents nominated was to 
present certain claims of the 1Pottawatomie Indian nation 
before Congress, the Departments, and courts, to contract 
with responsible lawyers for the prosecution of the claims, to 
agree upon the fees to be paid them, and to do and perform 
all other acts necessary to the collection of the claims. 
It is the general rule of the common law that when an au-
thority is given to two or more persons to do an act the act 
is valid to bind the principal only when all of them concur i~ 
doing it; for the authority is construed strictly, and the 
power is understood to be joint and notfseveral. (Story on 
Agency, 42; Greenleaf's Lessee v. Birch, 5 Pet., 139; Sugd., 
Pow., 129; 142, 143; Wardwell v. McDowell et al, 31 Ill., :164.) 
The rule is different when the power is conferred by law. 
Lord Coke says in respect to this difference : " Two or more 
may have a trust or an authoritie ~ommitted to them jointly. 
and yet it shall not survive. But herein are divers diversi-
ties to be observed. * * * Secondly, there is a diversiti11 
between authorities created by the partie for private causes, 
and authoritie created by law for execution of justice." And 
he gives this illustration: "' If a man make a letter uf attor-
ney to two, to do any act, if one of them dye, the survivor 
shall not do it; but it a venire ftwias be a warded to four cor-
oners to impannell and return a jury, and one of them dye, yet 
the others shall execute and return the same." (Co.-Litt., 
181 b.) The sam · doctrine is laid down in Pennington against 
:Moore (Dyer, 38 H. 861, b 34), and in Hoe's Case ( 5 Co.~ 91),. 
and in Vincent and Lee (Oo.-Litt., 113 a; Sugd. Pow. 144). 
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It is a principle in law that when the matter is one of per-
sonal confideuce or trust the power can not be extended be-
yond the express words and clear intention of the donot. 
(Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves., 44; Stile v. Tomson, Dyer, 210 a; 
Perry on Trusts, 496, 497.) 
The power in the present case must, it appears to me, be 
regarded as a personal trust and confidence, and as private 
in its nature. Immediately preceding the nomination of the 
persons named in the letter of attorney there is an express 
declaration of faith and confidence in their fidelity, integrity, 
and capacity; and there is absent from the instrument the 
power of substitution, which is usual in such documents. If 
there be any doubt on this point, it must be resolved, accord-
ing to our Indian policy, in favor of the grantors of the power. 
The acts to be done are not of a public or official character. 
They affect only the rights of individual families and 
members of two bands of the Pottawatomie nation of In-
dians, some residing in the Indian Territory and others in 
the States of Kansas and Michigan. The claim is for indi-
vidual rights, no public or national rights. 
In private cases it is generally a question as to the inten-
tion of the donors, whether the power should be executed by 
all the persons named, or by any one or more of them. lu, 
othe£ words, to speak in the language of trusts, the question 
is as to whether the grantor reposed a personal trust and 
confi.denee in the trustees appointed, or whether he intended 
the power to vest in whomsoever might in fact fill the office 
of trustee. < 
In the case submitted there is, as already stated, express 
language ofpersunal confideuce and trust in respect to the 
agents named, and the power is of a private nature. I am, 
therefore, of tlle opinion that all the grantees of the power 
must unite in order to bind the principals. 
Very respectfully, 
Hon. H. L. MULDRow, 
G. A. JENKS, 
:Acting Attorney- General. 
Acting Secretary of the Interior. 
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ACCOUNTS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 
The First Comptroller is not clothed with power, where in his opinion 
further delay would be injurious to the Government, to direct the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office forthwith to audit any 
particular account relating to the public lands, the settlement whereof 
• is deYolved upon the latter officer. 
The Commissioner, with respect to tue discharge of his duties in such 
matter, is subject only to the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 9, 1886. 
SIR: The question presented by yours of the 18th of .Au-
gust is: ''Has the First Comptroller, in every case where in 
his opinion further delay would be injurious to the United 
States, power to direct the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office forthwith to audit and settle any particular ac-
count which said officer may be authorized to audit and set. 
tle '" 
If such power exists, it is vested in the Comptroller by the 
second section of the act of the 3d of March, 1809, (2 Stat., 
536), which enacts: ''That it shall be the duty of the Comp-
troller of the Treasury, in every case where in his opinion 
further delay would be injurious to the United States, and 
he is hereby authorized, to direct the Auditor of the Treas-
ury and the accountants of the War and Navy Departments 
at any time forth with to audit and settle any particular account 
which the said officers may be respectively authorized to au-
dit and settle." 
At the time of the passage of this act all the accounts of 
the Go,ermrent, except those of the War and Navy Depart-
ments, were audited by the Auditor of the Treasury, there 
bei.ng but oue; hence the accounts now audited by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office were included in the 
duties of the Auditor; and by the terms of the act of the 3rd 
of March, 1809, the Comptroller in a proper case had power 
to direct an immediate audit by the Auditors. 
National growth increased official labor, and on the 25th 
of April, 1812, tae General Land Office was established, and 
at its head a new officer placed-the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office. By the ninth section of the organic act 
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(~ Stat., 717), it is provided, "That all returns relative to the 
public lands heretofore directed to be made to the Secretary 
of the Treasury shall hereafter be made to the said Commis-
sioner, who shall have power to audit and settle all public 
accounts relative to the public lands: Provided, It shall be 
the duty of the said Commissioner, upon the settlement of any 
such account, to certify the balance and transmit the account, 
with the vouchers and certificate, to the Comptroller of the 
Treasury for his examination and decision thereon." At the 
time of the passage of the act of 1809 the direction provided 
by that act could not have applied to the Commissioner of 
the General Land Office, as the office of the Commissioner 
did not exist till 1812. The power was not extended over 
the Commissioner by the act of 1812, nor by any other ex-
press statutory provisio'l, If, then, the power exists at all, 
it must arise by extending the provisions of the act of 1809 
and incorporating them, by implication, into the act of 1812. 
The only ground to sustain this implication is that a part 
of the duties imposed on the Auditor prior to the passage of 
the act of 1809 was, on the redistribution of labor contained 
in the act of 1812, transferred to the CommiRsioner. As a 
priuei ple this could not, as a general rule, be sustained. For, 
if it were true, then whenever a new bureau should be orga-
nized by aggregating difl'erent duties from several bureaus 
or Departments, the head of the new bureau would be sub-
ject to the command of as many different chiefs as there were · 
different sources from which his bureau was ~ composed, and 
the admiui~tration of such a composite bureau would be in-
volved in inextricable confusion. To avoid this confusion, it 
may fairly be inferred that when an officer or bureau is trans-
ferred from one Department of the Government to auother, 
and express general power of direction is conferred on the 
Department to which he or it is transferred, the power of 
direction that existed in the Department from which it was 
transferred is transferred to the Department last clothed. 
with the power. 
The Commissioner of the General Land Office was by the 
act charged with many other important duties whose consid-
eration might be sometimes emergent, of the urgency of 
which other duties the Comptroller might have no oppor-
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tunity to know. That the Comptroller should be authorized, 
without knowledge as to the other dutie~ or what evil might 
accrue from diverting the attention of the Commissioner from 
them, to direct a suspension of those duties and command 
the auditing of a particular account would be an unreason-
~ble implication. A much more reasonable implication 
would arise, in the absence of express legislatiion, that the 
same officer who had supervision of the whole work should 
have the power to direct the Commissioner (in case direction 
became necessary) as to which work should have precedence. 
In conformity to this better reason, the first section of the 
act establishing the Land Office expressly provides: "The 
chief officer shall be called Commissioner of the General 
Land Office, whose duty it shall be, under the direction of 
the head of the Department .(then the Secretary of the Treas-
ury), to superintend, execute, and perform all such acts and 
things touching and respecting the public lands of the 
United States and other lands patented or granted by the 
United States as have heretofore been directed by law to be 
done or performed in the office of the Secretary of State, of 
the Secretary and Register of the Treasury, and of the Sec-
retary of War, or which shall hereafter by law be assigned to 
the said office." Afterwards in the same act this duty of au-
diting is imposed on the Commissioner. The first section then 
prescribes it shall be done under the direction of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, and rebuts the implication that the 
Comptroller still retained the power of direction. 
The ninth section, by its proviso-doubtless to avoid the im-
plication that the audit of the Commissioner should be final-
grants express power to the Comptroller to examine and 
dedde upon the account as audited by the Commissioner, but 
as it does not provide for any power of direction such as the 
act of 1809 authorized the Comptroller to exert over the Audi-
tor, the express granting of one power, which the Oomp-
• troller before exercised over the Auditor, would seem to im-
ply the exclu~ion of the other which is not granted. 
Tbe act of 180!) gave the Comptroller the same power to 
direct an audit forthwith by the accountants of the War and 
Navy Departments that it J.id by the Auditor of the Treasury. 
By the act of March 3, 1817 ('3 Stat., 366), the accounts au-
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dited by the accountants of the War and Navy were trans-
ferred to the Second, Third, and Fourth Auditors, which 
officers were first provided for by that act; but it has never 
been urged or claimed since the passage of the act of 1817, 
as to the Second, Third and Fourth Auditors, that the power 
to direct an audit forthwith existed in t,he First Comptroller 
under the provisions of the act of 1809; on the contrary, in the 
absence of express direction, Att(>rney-General Butler, on the 
26th of March, 1834 (2 Opin., 621), announced tllat by the 
act of 1817 the power before conferred upon the First Comp-
troller over tbe accountants of the War and Navy Depart · 
ments who were superseded by the Second, Third, and.Fourth 
1 1 Auditors, was by implication taken from the First and trans-
ferred to the Second Comptroller, whose office was first cre-
ated by that act. 
On the 3d of 'f arch, 1849, Congress passed the act au-
thorizing the organization of the Department of the Interior. 
The third section of that act (9 Stat., 395), vested all the 
powers formerly exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury 
in the Secretary of the Interior, including the power to 
direct the Commissioner of the General Land Office, with the 
same control in the First Comptroller then exercised by him. 
This act neither enlarges nor diminishes the power of the 
Comptroller, but strongly rebuts the view that the act of 1809 
by implication was extended by the act of 1812 over the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office. For, if it might. 
be difficult for the Commissioner to conform to a double alle-
giance in the discharge of his official duties while in the same 
Department, that difficulty would be largely increased when 
this right to command was lodged in a different Department. 
The act of 1812 has received a clear legislative interpreta-
tion against an implied grant of power to the Comptroller to 
direct the Commissioner, in the revision of the statutes ap-
proved 22d day of June," 187 4. 
Sectioh 5595, Revised Statutes, declares: '' The foregoing 
seventy-three titles embrace the statutes of the United 
States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the 
1st day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sev-
enty-three." The power of direction claimed by the Comp-
troller is not contained in the Revised Statutes. 
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Section 5596 provides: ''All acts of Congress passed prior to 
said first day of December, one thousand eight lmnured and 
seventy-three, any portion of which is embraced in any sec-
tion of said revision, are hereby repealed, and the section ap-
plicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof; all parts of 
such acts not contained i'n such revision having been repealed 
or superseded by subsequent acts, or not being general or per-
manent in their nature.'' A part of the act of 1809 is em-
braced in section 271 of the revision, but by this section its 
operation is confined to the First and Fifth Auditors. 
Section 441 enacts : " The Secretary of the Interior is 
charged with the supervision of public business relating to 
the following subjects: 
* * 
" Second : The public lands, including mines." * * * 
Section 453 ueclares : '' The Commissioner of the General 
Land Office shall perform, under the direction of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the 
surveying and sale of the public lauds of the United States or 
in any wise respecting such public lands." 
Section 271.. re-enacts so much of the act of 1809 as has not 
been superseded by the act of 1812 under which the General 
Land Office was organized, and is as follows : "The First 
Comptroller, in every .case where, in his opinion, further de-
lays would be injurious to the United States, shall direct 
the First and Fifth Auditors of the Treasury forth with to 
audit and settle any particular account which said officers 
may be authorized to audit and settle, and to report such 
settlement for revision and final decision by the First Comp-
troller." 
This enactment does not include among the powers of the 
First Comptroller the authority to direct the Second, Third, 
and Fourth Auditors nor the Commissioner of the GPneral 
Land Office, but expressly limits his power to the First and 
Fifth Auditors. Those officers are omitted doubtless for the 
same reason, which seems to be that the offices were 
ereated after the passage of the act of 1809, and at the 
time of the creation of each it was plaeed under the direc-
. tion of another officer; hence the power of the Comptrol-
ler was superseded. By the act of 1817 the Second, Third, 
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and Fourth Auditors were first provided for and were im-
pliedly subjected to the direction of the Second Comptroller; 
and by the act of 1812 the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office was first provided for, and was expressly sub-
jected to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
afterward more broadly of the Secretary of the Interior. 
Hence in neither case was the power vested in the First 
Comptroller by the act of 1809, to direct an audit forthwith, 
extended by implication to the new officers whose offices 
were made subject at the time of their creation to the di-
rection of the heads of other departments or bureaus. 
This Congressional interpretation is additionally enforced 
• by the provision of section 456, which is: "All returns rel-
ative to the public lands shall be made to the Commissioner 
of the General Land Office; and he shall have power to 
audit and settle all public accounts relative to the public 
lands, and upon the settlement of every such account he 
shall certify the balance and transmit the accounts with the 
vouchers and certificate to the First Comptroller of the 
Treasury for his examination and decision thereon." 
This section, which defines the subjection, and the whole 
subjection, of the Commissioner of the Gener~l Land Office 
to the First Comptroller, so far as express statutory provis-
ion is concerned, was first enacted in 1812, re-enacted sub-
stantially in 1849, and again re-enacted almost literally on 
the l'evision of the statutes, with an entire absence of any 
statutory recognition from the beginning of any power in 
the First Comptroller to di'i·ect the Commissioner to audit 
forthwith. This repeated grant of express power with the as 
often repeated omission of the power sought to be implied 
seems to invoke the application of the maxim expressio ~tnius 
est exclusio alterius. 
While under the provisions of the act of 1817 it might be 
a question of grave doubt whether the act granting the 
power to the Commissioner of the General Land Office to 
audit was not repealed, yet, as the act of 184:9 seems to imply 
that the power was still left to the Commissioner, and since 
1832 it has been exercised by him, departmental usage of 
such long standing would solve the doubt in favor of the 
power of the Commissioner; but, if it was revoked by the act 
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of 1817, then the revision of the statutes, wherein the power 
was expressly conferred, would be in the nature of a new 
grant. If the revision was a grant of power not before in-
trusted to the Commissioner, a8 by the revision he was to 
perform all his duties subject to the supervision and under 
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, the power would 
be lodged in the Secretary. The autonomy of the depart-
mental system, which by the growth of the nation has be-
come indispensable, is best preserved by maintaining, as far 
as is consistent with legislative provisions, the unity of the 
power of personal direction of subordinate officers under the 
heads of the Departments. Doubtless this consideration 
among others influenced Congress in the revision to limit the 
power of the First Comptroller under the act of 1809, as car-
ried into the re\Tision in section 271, to the F.irst and Fifth 
Auditors. If additional support for the views indicated in 
this opinion were needt>d, it may be found in the fact that 
sinc,P the passage of the act of 1812, a period of seventy-four 
years, the power now claimed by the First Comptroller has 
never been aetually exercised, and, so far as known, but once 
even claimed by the Comptroller to exist in him. 
This general review of substantially all the legislation on 
the subject, leads to the conclusion that the provisions of the 
act of 1809 can n9t, by implication, be incorporated into the 
act of 1812 ; hence tlle Comptroller has no power under the 
law to direct the Commissioner to forthwith audit and settle 
an account for survP;ying the public lands when in the judg-
ment of the Comptroller a further delay in the settlemen~ of 
the accounts would be injurious to the United States, but the 
necessary power of direction is vested in the Secretary of the 
Interior. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
.. 
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IMPORTATION BY MAIL. 
Precious stones and other articles, where the same are liable to customs 
duty, are prohibited by the Universal Postal Union Convention of June 
1, 1~78, to be sent through the mail; and if imported by mail they be-
come subject to seizure ant.l forfeiture under section 3061, Revised Stat-
utes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 15, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 8th instant, in which you ask for my 
''opinion upon the follo.wing points:" 
"First. Whether precious stones and other articles enu-
merated in the third paragraph of said article 11 (Universal 
Postal Union Convention of June, 18'78) are forbidden to be 
imported by mail by any special legislation. 
"Second. ·whether the same articles, even if not forbidden 
by special statute to be imported by mail, are forbidden im-
portation by mail by the second paragraph of said article, in 
ease they shall be found to be dutiable; and, if they are thus 
prohibited, whether they are liable to seizure and forfeiture." 
I answer, first, I have been unable to find any" special 
legislation'' forbidding the importation by mail of precious 
stones and other articles enumerated in said article 11. 
The laws passed by Congress at its last session have not 
been printed, and I have not examined them in this connec-
tion. 
Second. Article 11, Convention of June, 1878, provides: 
"It is forbidden to the public to send by mail, (1) letters or 
packets containing gold or silver substances, pieces of money, 
jewelry, or preciom; articles; (2) any packages whatever con-
taining articles liable to customs duty." 
The convention of Lisbon, March 21, 1885, article 8, pro-
vides: "The first three paragraphs of article 11 are sup-
pressed and are replaced by the following provisions : ' It is 
forbidden to the public to senrl by mail, (1) letters or packets 
~ontaining pieces of money; (2) any packet whatever con-
taining articles liable to customs duty; (3) gold or silver 
bullion, precious stones, jewelry, or other precious articles, 
but only in case the legislation of the countries concerned 
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prohibits their being placed in the mail, or their being for-
warded.'" 
The modification in the Lisbon convention of that para-
graph in the convention of Paris which forbids the importa-
tion by mail of" gold or silver substances, pieces of money, 
jewelry or precious articles," does not affect the inhibitiou 
in both conventions against the importation by mail of arti-
cles liable to customs duty. Such of the enumerated articles 
as are liable to customs duty are still prohibited from im-
portation by mail. Their importation by mail being thus 
prohibited is unlawful, and they are liable to seizure and for-
feiture under section 3061, Revised Statutes ( Ootzhausen v. 
Nazro, 107 U. S. 215). 
I herewith return, as requested, the correspondence in-
closed in your communication to me. 
Respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
COLLECTOR'S BOND. 
The omission of the words '' in the State of Vermont" from the official 
bond of the collector of customs for the district of Vermont does not 
impair its validity. The bond held to be valid, either under the stat-
ute or at common law. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 16, 1886. 
SIR : Yours of September 14, 1886, received. You ask an 
opinion as to whether the omission of the words " in the State 
of Vermont'' from the official bond of Bradley B. Smalley, 
collector of customs for the district of Vermont, impairs the 
validity of the ·bond. 
It was the intention, no doubt, to execute the bond accord-
. ing to the provisions of section 2619, Revised Statutes (19 
Stat., 245). . 
The first inquiry, then, is whether the omission would a:fl'ect 
its validity as a statutory bond. The statute authorizing the 
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execution of the bond is a directory one. A mistake occurred 
in the form of an official bond of a paymaster, the conditions 
of which were prescribed by a statute similar to the one now 
under consideration, and in an opinion of the Supreme Court, 
delivered by Mr. Justice Story (United States v. Bradley, 10 
Pet., 365) it is said: 
"It has been urged, however, in the present case, that the 
act of 1816, chapter 69, does, by necessary implication, pro-
hibit the taking of any bonds from paymasters, other than 
those in the form prescribed by the sixth section of the act; 
and therefore that bonds taken in any other form are utterly 
void. We do not think so. The act merely prescribes the 
form and purport of the bond to be taken of paymasters by 
the War Department. It is in this respect directory to that 
Department; and, doubtless, it would be illegal for that De-
partment to insist upon a bond containing other provisions 
and conditions difl'ering from those prescribed or required by 
law. But the act has nowhere declared that all other bonds, 
not taken in the prescribed form, shall be utterly void ; nor 
does such an implication arise from any of the terms con-
tained in the act., or· from any principles of public policy 
which it is designed to promote. A bond may, by mutual 
mistake or accident, and wholly without design, be take.n in 
a form not prescribed by the act. It would be a very mis-
chievous interpretation of the act to suppose that under such 
circumstances it was the intendment of the act that the bond 
should be utterly void. Nothing~ we think, but very strong' 
and express language, should induce a court of justice to· 
adopt such an interpretation. Where the act speaks out, it 
would be our duty to follow it; where it is silent, it is a suffi-
cient compliance with the policy of the act to declare the bond 
void as to any conditions which are imposed upon a party 
beyond what the law requires. This is not only the dictate 
of the common law, but of common sense." 
The above case has been frequently sustained by the Su-
preme Court, and was cited as the law in the case of Jessup 
v. The United States (106 U. S., 151), where a number of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court upon this question are re-
viewed. The decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the 
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validity of bonds executed, under directory statutes, where 
mistakes and omissions have occurred therein, are as follows: 
Jessup v. United States (106 U.S., 147); Un-ited States Y. Mora 
(97 U.S., 421); United States v. Bradley (10 Pet., 362); Brown 
v. The United States (5 Pet., 372). 
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the 
United States can make a contract in the absence of the au-
thority of any statute. This being the case, the bond of 
Smalley is good at common law. In the case of Jessup v. 
The United States (106 U. S., 152), the court, after reviewing 
the authorities, says: 
" The authorities show that the United States can, without 
the authority of any statute, make a valid contract, and that 
when the form of a contract is prescribed by the statute, a 
departure from its directions will not render the contract in-
valid. The bond is good at ,pommon law." 
Other authorities sustain this doctrine, viz, United States 
v. Mora (97 U.S, 421); United States v. Linn (15 Pet., 311); 
United States v. Bradley (10 Pet., 343); United States v. Tingey 
(5 Pet., 115). 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the omission of the words 
as stated does not impair the validity of Smalley's bond as 
collector, but that the bond is a valid one, either.'-under the 
~tatute or at common law. 
Respectfully, 
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury. 
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FREE LIST. 
Where certain law reports, printed in th13 year 1i:l40-'41, were imported 
into the United States in an unbound condition, the printed sheets 
not being even stitched together: Held that they came within the 
provision of the act of March 3, 18:33, chapter 121, exempting from 
duty ''books * * * bound or unbound * * * which shall 
have been been printed and manufactured more than twenty years 
at the date of importation," and were therefore not dutiable. 
DEP.A.RT~IENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 16, 1886. 
SIR: Yours of September 13, im;tant, has been duly con-
sidered. 
The determination of the question presented depends 
upon the construction of two paragraphs of the act of 1_\llarch 
3, 1883, entitled "An act to reduce internal-revenue taxation, 
and for other purposes." ( 22 Stat., 488.) The paragraph of 
the act (ib., 510) which imposes the duty reads as follows: 
"Books, pamphlets, bound or unbound, and all printed 
matter, not. specifically enumerated or provided for in this 
act, engravings, bound or unbound, etchings, illustrated 
books, maps, and charts, twenty-five per centum ad valo-
rem." 
The other paragraph providing what articles of the same 
character shaH be placed upon the free list and exempted 
from duty reads as follows: 
"Books, engravings, bound or unbound, etchings, maps·, 
and charts, which shall have been printed and manufactured 
more than twenty years at the date of importation." . 
The articles imported in this instance are '• certain law 
reports, printed in the years 1840 and 1841, but which are 
imported into the United States in an unbound condition, 
the printed sheets being neither sewed together nor bound." 
The question is whether such imported goods are liable to 
the ad valorem duty of 25 per centum as" printed matter" 
or whether th~y are exempt as "Books * * * unbound 
* ~ * which shall have been printed and manufactured 
more than twenty years at the date of importation." 
The imported law reports are printed matter not bound 
into books, and dutiable, unless they are embraced in the 
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free list. In order to be exempted they must therefore come 
within the class of unbound books, which shall have been 
printed more than twenty years at the date of importation. 
It is admitted they were printed in 1840 and 1841, which 
disposes of this branch of the question. The only question 
remaining to be determined is, therefore, whether the 
printed matter can be classed as unbound books, for if they 
belong to this class they are exempt from duty. There is no 
statutory definition of the word "book" in the United States 
as there is in the English acts. And in the authorities the 
courts have, in nearly every instance, been called upon to 
define it in the copyright, -and not in the revenue statutes. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of 
Mumford v. Wardell (6 Wall., 423 ), in passing upon the title 
to real estate, where a deed was required to be registered or 
recorded in some book in the recorder's office of the county, 
held " that the term 'book ' was satisfied, within the mean-
ing of the act, by copies of the deed on sheets, not bound or 
fastened together in any manner, but folded, * * * the 
sheets not being bound up in the form of books until1856, 
when they were so bound." • 
The English courts have held that a single sheet of printed 
matter, complete within itself, and unbound, is a book and 
the American authorities have to some extent adopted this 
doctrine. But these decisions, as stated before, relate to 
~opyrights under the statutes. They are Clayton v. Stone 
( 2 Paine's C. C. Rep., 382); Stowe v. Thomas (:.! Am. Law 
Register, 229); Clementi v. Golding ( 2 Campbell's N. P. 
Rep., 39). 
If the English courts have held a single printed sheet, 
without binding, to be a book, under a statute in which the 
word is used as it is in the one now under consideration, 
and the American courts have adopted the doctrine, can it 
be said in reason or common sense that a ·number of printed 
sheets, properly paged, and ready for the bindery, is not an 
unbound book and exempt under the revenue laws~ I think 
not. This conclusion is entitled to additional force when 
we take into consideration the fact that the exemption of 
this class of goods from duty, under the condition named, 
is a new feature in r~V"enue legislation, and appears in an 
TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 463 
Mississippi River Commission. 
act of Congress which declares its purpose to be a reduction 
·of taxation: 
The statute imposing a duty on books, and the other items 
mentioned, unless twenty years old at date of importation, 
had for one of its objects, no doubt, the protection of copy-
rights in the United States, and for this reason the foreign 
and American authorities cited above may be appropriately · 
used in reaching a conclusion herein. 
I am of the opinion, ther_efore, that under the facts stated 
in your communication the law reports are unbound books 
which had been printed more than twenty years at the date 
of importation, and therefore they are on the free list, and 
exempt from the customs duty of twenty-five per cent. ad 
valorem. 
Respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS~ 
Acting Attorney-General. 
Hon. C. S. FAIR CHILD, 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury . 
• 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION. 
The salaries and \;raveling expenses of the members of the Mississippi 
River Commission appointed from civil life (Congress having failed to 
make a specific appropriation therefor) can not lawfully be defrayed 
out of the fund provided for the Mississippi River improvement. The 
application of such fund to that object would be inconsistent with 
section 3678, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 18, 1886. 
SIR : l have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 3d instant, as follows : 
" The river and harbor act of A11:gust 5, 1886, of which a 
.copy is herewith inclosed, provides as follows : 
" 'Improving Mississippi River from Head of the Passes to 
the mouth of the Ohio River: Continuing improvement, two 
million dollars, which sum shall be expended under the 
direction of the Secretary of War, in accordance with the 
plans, specifications, and recommendations of the Mississippi 
• 
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River Commission,' etc., and further provides, with reference 
to the appropriation for deepening the channel at Vicksburg, 
that this last-named sum shall not be expended, unless after 
another examination or survey the Commission shall deem it 
advisable. 
''The sundry civil act of July 7, 1884, made provision 
for the Mississippi River Commission as follows: 
"'For salaries and traveling expenses of the Mississippi 
River Commission, and for salaries and traveling expenses 
of assistant engineers under them, and for office expenses 
and contingencies, seventy-five thousand dollars.' 
" Congress at its last session, though imposing continued 
duties upon the Commission, as is above shown, failed to 
make any provision for their salaries and other expenses, and 
the question as to the means whereby such expenses may be 
met is one involving important considerations, affecting, as 
will be readily apparent, the whole work of improvement of 
the Mississippi River. 
" In thus briefly submitting the case, deeming it unneces-
sary to enlarge upon its importance, I have the honor to ask 
that you will please favor this Department with an of>inion 
whether, in view of the facts cited, the salaries and traveling 
and other expenses of the Mississippi River Commission may 
not properly be defrayed from the appropriation for the Mis-
sissippi River improvement, the appropriation made by the 
actof July 7, 1884, as above quote(l, being wholly exhausted. 
"It may be added that expenses incident to the improve-
ment of rivers and harbors are uniformly paid from the 
appropriation for the work of improvement, and that no spe-
cific appropriations for such expenses are made. 
"In view of the importance of continuing the work, an 
early reply is respectfully requested." 
The :Mississippi River Commission was constituted by the 
act of the 28th of June, 1879. (Sup. Rev. Stat., 496). By the 
terms of the organic act it is composed of seven officers, 
three of whom are selected from the Engineer Corps of the 
Army, one fro.m the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and three 
from civil life. The first four, who were selected from offi-
cers in the United States service, were to receive no addi-
tional salary; and $3,000 per annum was to be paid to those 
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selected from civil life. The appointment of the members of 
the Commission is made by the President, by and with tlle 
advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission i~ per-
manent in its nature, and its constituent members are made 
permanent officers of the Government. It is invested with 
large powers and charged with important duties. Many 
different appropriations are to be applied to the different 
works which come under its supervision. The salaries and 
expenses of such a body of permanent officers can not be all 
charged up against one appropriation for one single improve-
ment. The fact that by virtue of their offices they are re-
quired to perform certain duties with reference to such im-
provement will not sustain so broad an inference. In the 
same section of the same act which imposes duties upon the 
Commission duties are also imposed upon the Secretary of 
War. If Congress had failed to appropriate for the salary 
of the Secretary, it w.onld not be seriously contended that 
his salary ought to be paid out of this appropriation. If no 
appropriation had been made for the salaries of the officers 
oi the Engineer Corps or officers of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey, the appropriation under consideration could not be. 
resorted to to pay their salaries. The present appropriation 
is almost identical in terms with the two for the same purpose· 
made by Congress in 1884. They were not considered by 
Congress or the Department as embracing within their pro-
visions the salaries and expenses of this Commission. On. 
the contrary, Congress, after the passage of the two appro-
priation acts referred to, in 1884 (on the 7th of July of the 
same year), passed an act specifically to provide for the sal-
aries and expenses of the Commission. After the passage 
of the act, on the 5th of August, 1886, in the House of Rep-
resentatives, a joint resolution was offered and passed in the 
Senate "for salaries and traveling expenses of the Missis-
sippi River Commission, and for salaries and traveling ex-
penses of assistant-engineers under them, and for office ex-
penses and contingencies, one hundred thousand dollars.'' 
But, probably for want of time, the resolution was not 
passed by the House of , Representatives. 
In other departments of the Government, when there is a 
failure to make appropriations for salaries and expenses of 
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permanent officers, it has not been ~ermitted to pay their sal· 
aries or expenses out of any appropriation made for any 
other specific purpose. That failure has usually been sup-
plied by the passage of a deficiency bill to meet the case. 
There is no sufficient reason to sustain the view that the 
intent of the legislative department in the passage of the act 
under consideration was different from its intent in the pas-
sage of similar acts in the past, or that any new rule as to the 
payment of permanent salaried officers was intended to be 
inangura ted. 
It would be inconsistent with section 3678 of the Revised 
Statutes, which provides that "all sums appropriated .for 
various branches of expenditure in the public service shall 
be applied solely for the objects for which they are made 
and no other," to appl,v the appropriation referred to in your 
letter, or any part of it, t~ the payment of the salaries and 
expenses cff the Mississippi River Commission. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DUTY ON IRON ORE. 
In determining the meaning of "iron ore," as used in the provision of 
t;he act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, which imposes a duty thereon, 
regard should be had to the commercial signification of the term, as 
Congress must be understood to have used the sam~ in its commercial 
sense. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 17, 1886. 
SIR: I have considered the subject contained in your let-
ter, with inclosures, of the 14th of September, instant. You 
state Messrs. l' Nailor & Co. now contend that the provision 
in the tariff act of the 3rd of March, 1883, imposing a duty of 
75 cents per ton upon iron ore, means ore dry at the tempera-
ture of212o, Fah., which, it is understood, is the test or stand- . 
ard adopted in commercial transactions of iron ore." • • • 
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I will thank you to return all the inclosures, with an expres-
sion of your opinion as to whether the provision in the tarifl' 
act of the 3d of March, 1883, for iron ore should be construed 
in the manner contended for b.Y the applicants to mean that 
duty shall be assessed on the ore in a dry state." 
The provision of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, impos-
ing the duty, is ''Iron ore, including manganiferous iron ore, 
also ~he dross or residuum from burnt pyrites, seventy-five 
cents per ton." (22 Stat., 497.) By this a svecific duty of 
75 cents per ton is charged on the importation of iron ore. 
The inquiry involved in yours is substantially, What is the 
legal meaning of iron ore, as used in the statute~ In the 
interpretation of the customs laws Justice Story, in the case 
of Two Hundred Chests of Tea (9 Wheat., 430), declares 
•• Congress must be understood to use the word in its known 
commercial sense." In the case of Barlow v. United States 
(7 Pet., 404) he repeats, •' Congress must be presumed to 
use words in their known habitual commercial sense." The 
same rule for the definition of words has been reiterated in 
numerous cases ever since, the latest of which is as late as 
the case of Drew v Grinnell (115 U. S., 4 77). This is the rule 
now. Whatever is the known commercial signification of 
iron ore is that on which the duty is to be levied. If, as 
stated in yours, "iron ore dried at a temperature of 212° Fah., 
which it is understood is the test or standard adopted in 
commercial transactions of iron ore," be what is known in 
commerce as iron ore, it is the. ore contemplated by the 
statute, and on that basis the duty should be levied. 
I return herewith the inclosures which accompanied your 
letter. 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. 
Sacks, boxes, or coverings of any kind, the duty on which as charges 
was repealed by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, are 
not subject to duty, eit.her separately from or as a part of the value o! 
the goods imported therein, excepting where they come nnuer the 
proviso in that section or fall within some special provision of law. 
The 1 0 per centum ad valorem, mentioned in said proviso, can be im-
posed upon sacks, boxes, or other coverings of imported merchandise 
only where their material or form justifies the conclusion that they 
were used as coverings to evade duties, or where they were designed 
or contemplated to be applied 'to some use other than that of cover-
ings for imported merchandise, even though their use as coverings 
only should continue after the goods had passed beyond the custom-
hom;;e to the market or consumer. 
The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, etc., are, after importation, put to 
other uses, if such uses were not designed at or before the time of im-
portation, and if there was no design to evade duty in using them as 
coverings, will not subject them to the 100 per centum ad valorem 
duty. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 17, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 2d instant submits for 
consideration four subjects : 
First : As sacks, boxes, and other receptacles which are 
ordinarily used in the importation of merchandise wt':mld, if 
imported separately, be dutiable under the respective pro-
visions of the tariff applicable thereto, the question presents 
itself whether they lose their dutiable character by being 
filled with or used for the transportation of such goods. 
Second: In the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson, No.1192, 
of October term, 1885, in the Supreme Court, in considering 
the seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, the 
following language is used: "This implied that if boxes or 
coverings of any kind are not of material qr form designed 
to evade the duties thereon, and are tiesigned to be used in 
the bona fide transportation of the goods to the United 
States, they are not subject to duty." With reference to which 
you state" I will thank you for an expression of your opin-
ion as to whether the 8tatement of the Supreme Court, that 
such coverings are not subject to duty, should be considered 
as mere dictum, used in the process of argument, or as an 
authoritative expression of the views of the court." 
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Third: "The further provision in said section;, by which 
a duty of 100 per cent. ad valorem is authorized in certain 
cases, as above referred to, is also submitted for your con-
sideration." 
Fourth. "The question of the proper interpretation of the 
proviso in section 7 is also' submitted for your consideration." 
The solution of the questions submitted depends upon the 
true interpretation of the 7th section of 'the act of the 3d of 
March, 1883. 
That section provides: " That sections 2907 and 2908 of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States, and section 14 of the 
act entitled "An act to amend the customs revenue laws and 
to repeal moieties," approved June 22,1874, be and the same 
are hereby repealed, and hereafter none of the charges im-
posed bv said sections, or any other provisions of existing 
laws, shall be estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to 
be imported, nor shall the value of the usual allll necessary 
sacks, crates, boxes, or co-verings of any kind be estimated 
as part of their value in determining the amount of duties 
for which they are liable: Provided, That if any packages, 
sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any kind shall be of any 
material or form designed to eYade duties thereon, or de-
signed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transporta-
tion of goods to the United States, the same shall be subject 
to a duty of one hundred per centum ad valorem upon the 
actual value of the same." By this section, whatever in sec-
tions 2907 and 2908 of the Revised Statutes and the four-
teenth section of the act of June 22, 1874, was included as 
charges is excluded from the estimate in fixing the dutiable 
value of the goods to be imported. The three sections re-
pealed by the section 'embrace as charges " the cost of trans-
portation, shipment, and transshipment, with all expenses 
included, from the place of growth, production, or manufact-
ure, whether by land or water, to the vessel in which ship-
ment is made to the United States, the value of the sack, 
box, or covering of any kind in which merchandise is con-
tained, commission at the usual rate, but in no case less than 
two and one-half per centum, and brokerage, export duties, 
and all other actual or usual charges for putting, preparing, 
and packing for transportation or shipment." When these 
• 
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~barges are excluded the goods to be imported are left to be 
valued "at the actual market value or wholesale price 
thereof at the period of the exportation to the United States, 
in the principal markets of the country from which the same 
has been exported." Taken in connection with the provis-
ions of section 2906, Revised Statutes, which remains unre-
pealed, the effect of section 7 of the act of the 3d of March, 
1883, is to make the dutiable value the same as '' the actual 
market value or wholesale price" in the principal markets of 
the country from which the goods were exported at the time 
of the exportation Hence, the market value of the goods to 
be imported, as above stated, as the law now stands, is identi-
cal with the dutiable value. Nor can any of the charges 
above stated be added to that value for the purpose of charg-
ing duties thereon. Sacks, boxes, and coverings of any kind 
in which merchandise is contained are embraced among the 
charges which are not to be included with the value of the 
goods. 
As the statute in the broadest terms excludes all these, 
it is not permissible to add to its terms either the words 
':inside" or ~'outside." The exemvtion extends alike and 
with equal force to both inside and outside sacks, boxes, or 
coverings of merchandise. But the same sacks, boxes, or 
coverings, if imported separately, would be subject to duty. 
The inquiry arises whether each is not to be charged with a 
duty when used as a covering to other dutiable merchandise 
as though separately imported~ Did the legislative power 
so intend it~ The revenue act of 1883, of which section 7 is 
a part, was intended to reduce the revenue of the Govern-
ment, which had become excessive. To reduce taxation on 
imports was the means adopted. The increased dutiable 
value of the importations occasioned by adding the value of · 
the coverings, etc., urider section 2907, if stricken off entirely, 
would be a large reduction, but if the C.J\·erings were only to 
be separated, for purposes of duty, from the value of the 
goods, and then taxed at separate rates, whether such ' a 
measure would increase or diminish the actual tax would be 
very uncertain. It is unlikely Congress would intend a 
reduction and pass an act which was subject to :guch uncer-
tainty as to results. Simplicity in administration is an im-
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portant element of a judicious tax bill. The collection of 
duties under section 2907, which was repealed, would be more 
easily administered than under the act of 1883, if the duties 
on the coverings were only intended to be charges as to rates 
and be levied. The coverings were not by former laws sub-
ject to taxation except as charges on the goods imported; 
yet under the former law they would have been liable to tax-
ation if separately imported. The mere repeal of the charge 
cannot be considered as an enactment of a duty on that which 
before the repeal would not have been subject to duty. The 
proviso to the section under consideration suggests beyond 
mistake that a separate levy of the duty repealed was not 
contemplated by Oougress. That proviso is, "that if any 
packages, sacks, crates, boxeR, or coverings of any kind shall 
be of any material or form designed to evade duties thereon, or 
designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transporta-
tion of goods to the United States, the same shall be subject 
to a duty of one hundred per eeutum ad valorem upon the 
actual value of the same." If the same tax was intended to 
be imposed upon a given article, whether it was used as a 
covering for other goods . or imported separately, it is not 
possible that Congress would have imposed a penalty for an 
evasion which, under such an interpretation of the law, could 
not occur; but if, when used as a covering, it came in free 
from duty, and when separately imported it was subject to 
duty, then there would be a temptation for a colorable and 
fraudulent use as a covering in order to evade duty. The 
proviso was intended to prevent such an evasion. That the 
charges repealed by this section are not subject to a separate 
tax is distinctly ruled in the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson 
in the fo1lowing language, as quoted in your letter: ''This 
implies that if the boxes or coverings of any kind are not of 
a material or form designed to evade duties thereon, and are 
designed to be used in the bona fide transportation of the 
goods to the United States, they are not subject to duty." 
That this is not dictum is well established by the fact that 
it is a distinct answer to what the court in the opening of the 
opinion says is the main point in the case, as follows: "The 
main question left in the case is, whether it was lawful to im-
pose duties on the items for boxes and packing in the invoices 
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on the two cases and the twenty~one cases and on the items 
added to the invoices of the one case, which item was one 
for like boxes and packing." 
The brief submitted in the case b;r Solicitor-General Goode 
on part of the Govtrnment declares: "It will be seen that 
the plaintiffs' protest stated substantially but a single grounfl. 
of objection to the collector's liquidation, which was that the 
cartons were not liable to d,uty." The court agaiu, after a dis-
cussion of an objection raised by the Solicitor-General that 
the plaintiff's in the case had mistaken their remedy, in that 
they had not demanded a reappraisement under section 
2930, rules the objection not well founded, and concludes the 
discussion of that branch of the subject by saying: " The 
exaction of the duty on the packing, whether packing goods 
in a carton or the customs in the outer case, or lining the 
outer case, was not warranted by law." 
Hence it would seem the very subject was distinctly before 
the court, considered by it as flssential to a proper decision 
of the case, was formally ruled upon, and thus became an 
authoritative interpretation of the section undeT considera-
tion. 
But while section 7 does not permit a separate assess-
ment of the boxes, coYerings, etc., nor an assessment as part 
of the value of the goods, in order that this freedom from 
duty may not be fraudulently or wrongfully used to import 
dtitiable goods free, the proviso to the section was added, 
b;y which a penalty of one hundreu per centum ad valorem 
is imposed whenever such aJJ. evasion is attempted. This 
penalty is only incurred, first, when the coverings, etc., 
''shall be of any material or form designed to evade duties 
thereon ; " second, when " designed for use otherwise tllan in 
the bona fide transportation of the goods to the United 
States." The first cause for the imposition of the penalty 
commits to the officer charged with the administration of 
the law the duty of determining from the character, value, 
form, and material, whether the purpose and design of the 
covering was an evasion of duty or a good faith covering. 
If the covering in either material or form is unusual, and 
dutiable under other provisions of law, he is allowed to infer, 
when its character is thus extraordinary, that evasion is 
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designed. The second ground for the imposition of the pen-
alty requires the officer to determine whether the CO\ering 
was designed, at the time of its application to that use, to 
be used again for the same, or some other use of substantial 
commercial value, for which, if separately imported, it would 
be subject to duty, or whether its utility will be substantially 
exhausted as soon as it shall have subserved the use to which 
as a covering it is then devoted. In the former event the 
penalty of 100 per centum should be collected. In the latter 
it should not. The mere fact that it is continued after im-
portation as a co\ering for the same merchandise calls for 
no penalty. The law does not contemplate that as soon as 
the merchandise reaches the port and pays the duty it shall 
then be denuded, and new covering, either inside or outside, 
be v.rovided to protect it either in handling or sale ; neither 
is there any time or place after the importation that the same 
covering, used for the same merchandise as covering, from 
which or in which to make sale of the merchandise, would 
show that it was designed for use for importation, so as to 
subject the covering to a duty at the rate imposed as a pen-
alty in the proviso; nor would the fact that a box might, 
possibly, afterwards be used for fuel, or the covering for 
some other use, subject the box or covering to a penalty, 
unless there is reason to believe such use was des-igned and 
contemplated at or before the time of importation. 
From this general consideration of the subject the conclu-
sions follow-
(1) That the sacks, boxes, and coverings of any kind the 
duty on which was repealed as charges b)~ the seventh sec-
tion of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, are not subject to 
duty, neither as a part of the value of the goods nor sepa: 
rately, except when they come under the proviso to that sec-
tion, or some special provision of law. 
(2) That the portion of the opinion in the case of Oberteuffer 
v. Robertson, quoted in your letter, is not dictum, but an au-
thoritative interpretation of the law on the subject referred 
to therein. 
(=3) That the 100 per centum ad valorem can be imposed 
upon coverings onl~- when their material or form justifies the 
conclusion that they were used as such to evade duties, or 
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when they were des.igned or contemplated to be applied to some 
use other than to that of coverings for transportation to tlte 
United States of the merchandise they then inclose, evl'n 
though that use as a covering only should continue after the 
goods bad passed beyond the custom-house to the market or 
COnE~umer. 
( 4) The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, crates, or cover-
ings of any kind might possibly be used after importation for 
other uses, if such u8es were not designed at or before the 
time of importation, and there was not at the time a design 
to evade duty by their use as coverings, will not subject such 
coverings to the 100 per centum ad valorem duty prescribed 
as a penalty. 
The 100 per centum duty in the proviso, although not in 
terms a penalty, is an unusually high duty. 
The section under consideration clearly excludes the cov-
erings from valuation as a part of the goods. 
The second element in the proviso to the section implies 
no turpitude on part of the importer. 
In balanced cases in a customs act the doubt is to be re-
solved in favor of the importer. 
Hence, although the coverings after the port is reached 
might by a liberal interpretation be construed, if intended 
for use t,hereafter as a cover to the same goods, to be de-
signed" for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation 
of goods to the United States," yet such an interpretation, 
while within the letter, would be a violation of the spirit of 
the act. 
The inclosures transmitted with yours are herewith re-
turned. 
I am, sir, respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting A. ttorney- General. 
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The proper classifications for duty of cert.ain articles of imported mer-
chandise, consisting of T beams, girders, joists, columns, posts, and 
other manufactures of iron used in the construction of buildings, con-
sidered. · 
DEP ARMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 22, 1886. 
SIR : By your letter of the 16th of September instant it 
appears that Joseph Birtwell & Company entered at the 
custom-house at Galveston Hsix hundred and ninety-six plain 
iron beams, eight hundred and twenty-six pieces, boxes, and 
bundles manufactured iron, and one hundred and two riv-
eted lattices, manufactured iron; that, upon examination by 
the customs-officers, it was found to consist ofT-beams, gird-
ers, plain and flanged at the ends and sides; bundles of strut-
ting rods, threaded on the ends, with nuts on; bundles of an-
chor and brace plates and fish-plates, and fifteen boxes, con-
taining bolts, nuts, and braces; wher~upon the same were 
classified by the collector under the provision in the existing 
tariff Scheuule... 0 tariff index, new 178, for ''iron or steel 
beams, girders, joists, angles, * * • building forms, etc.\ 
and other structural shapes of iron and steel," at a duty of 1:! 
cents per pound ; that the importers in their appeal claimed 
that importation was a floor frame, and dutiable as an en-
tirety, as a" manufacture of iron," at a duty of 45 per cent. 
ad valorem, under the further provision in said Schedule C 
(Tariff Index, new 216); and that the decision of the Depart-
ment sustained the classification made by the collector." 
After the above recital of facts you state : " I will thank 
you to consider the matter, and to advise me at your early 
convenience as to what, in your opinion, should be the proper 
classification of such merchandise under the existing tariff 
acts." 
The collector classified the T-beams, girders, etc., under 
tariff index, new 178, which provides: •' Iron or steel beams, 
girders, joists, angles, channels, car-truck channels, TT col-
umns and posts, or parts or Rections of columns and posts, 
deck and bulb beams, and building forms, together with an 
other st.ructural shapes of iron or steel, one and one-fourth of 
one cent per pound." 
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The other articles in the entry he classified under the ap-
propriate provisions of the tariff act specially applicable to 
each. 
The importers maintain that all the articles should be 
treated as an entirety, because when put together they wonl<l 
constitute a floor-frame for one or more floors of an edifiee · 
they were erecting as a State-house, and that they all cou -
stituted a manufacture under the provisions of tariff index 
new 216, which provides: "Manufactures, articles, or wares 
not specially enumerated or provi<led for in this act, com-
posed wholly or in part of iron, steel, copper, lead, nickel, 
pewter, tin, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, or any other metal, 
and whether partly or wholly manufactured, forty five per 
centum ad valorem." 
Unless they are relieved from the special provisions of the 
tariff act applicable to each of the articles imported by the 
operation of the section last quoted, the classification of' the 
collector is right. If they are not to be treated as an en-
tirety as a manufacture, they are severally beams, girders, 
etc., and are substantially enumerated in the act. 
In its broadest sense a manufacture includes whatever is 
made by the hand of man, or by machinery subject to his 
hand. In this sense edifices, building, railroads, and struc-
tures of all kinds would be comprehended. The rule was 
not intended to be used by the legislature in this . broad 
sense. It is used in the general clam;e at the conclusion of 
a schedule in which enumeration and specification was the 
plan. Only such works of man as were too unimportant to 
warrant specification, or such as were so uncommon as to es-
cape the attention of the legislat'ure, were intended to be 
embraced by it. The iron floor frames in the United States 
would be neither unimportant nor unusual. In the magni-
tude of their value or frequency of use nothing enumerated 
in the bill has been more conspicuous, or, if they were to be 
dutiable as an entirety, would be less likely to be omitted 
in the enumeration. The inference is strong that they were 
not intended to be charged as an entirety. At the time of 
importation they were not an entirety. 'Vhat merchandise 
is at the time of importation is what classifies it for duty; 
not what it has been before, or what it may be in the future. 
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The girders, beams, etc., in this case were not a floor frame. 
They were only the prepared material for a floor frame. 
Until actually put together at their final destination the 
material was not a frame. When so put together it would 
be a structure and not a manufacture. It would be realty, 
such as is not appropriately the subject of the customs laws. 
If all the rails, frogs, fish- plates, etc., that constitute the 
material for a railroad track were fully finished for laying 
in a foreign country it would not justify their admission as a 
railroad track under this clause, yet such an importation 
would be as much an entirety as this and as properly a man-
ufacture. It is an unnatural stress on language to call the 
iron frame of a large ~tate-house or the track of a railroad a 
manufacture in a customs law, and I am constrained to be-
lieve the legislature did not so intend. Besides, this gen-
eral clause to Schedule C was only to apply to manufactures 
"not Sllecially enumerated or provided for in this act." Iron 
"girders, beams, nuts, bolts, with an other structural shapes 
of iron" are enumerated and specially provided for. " Stru()-
tural iron " is naturally interpreted to mean iron ada~Jted to 
and prepared for use in a building. The importation in this 
case would seem to be just such material, and therefore spe-
cified and enumerated. Hence it is concluded that the im-
portation in this case should not be classified as an entirety 
as a manufacture, but its several parts should be classified 
under such several specific provisions of the act as are appli-
cable to each class of merchandise in the entry. 
The documents which yours inclosed are, as requested, 
I herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorneg- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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DUTY ON GINGER ALE OR BEER. 
Under the clause in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, providing a 
duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on ginger-ale or ginger-beer, etc., no 
separate or additional duty is to be collected on bottles or jugs con-
taining the same. But where the ale or beer is bottled, the ad valorem 
duty should be levied upon the wholesale value thereof as bottled ale 
or beer in the general market of the country whence ,it is imported. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Reptember 24, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of the 11th of September instant was re-
ceived, and the subject submitted in it has been considered. 
The inquiry for determination is substantially what is the 
interpretation to be put upon the last paragraph in Schedule 
H of the tariff act of the 3d of March, 1883, which is, "Ginger-
ale or ginger-beer, twenty per cent. ad valorem, but no sepa-
rate or additional duty shall be collected on bottles or jugs 
containing the same." 
This enactment embraces two different clauses. The first 
fixes the duty that is to be charged on ginger-ale or ginger-
beer, which is 20 per cent. ad valorem. The rule for det~r­
mining the value is found in section 2906 of the Revised 
Statutes, and is " the actual market value or wholesale price 
ther~of at the period of exportation to the United States in 
the principal markets of the country from which the same 
has been imported"; but the second clause of the paragraph, 
fixing the duty on ginger-ale or ginger-beer, implies that the 
importation, either from its nature or from mercantile usage, 
must or will be in bottles or jugs, but provides "no separate 
or additional duty shall be collected on bottles or jugs con-
taining the same." This clause forbids the charging of a duty 
separately on the bottle or jug, or the addition of the value 
of the bottle or jug to the value of the ale or beer, and 
thereby obtaining an aggregate value of both, and levying 
the 20 per cent. ad valorem on this aggregate value. But it 
does not forbid levying duty upon the full wholesale market 
value of the ale or beer as bottled ginger ale or beer, as val-
ued in the market, if from the constituent ingredients of the 
import it derives its principal and almost sole value from its 
compression and the exclusion of the air from it by the bot-
tling. This distinction between the value of a liquor unbot-
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tled and bottled finds au illustration in a preeeding para-
graph of the same act in the article of still wines, in which a 
specific duty of 50 cents a gallon is imposed on the wine when 
in casks and $1.60 per dozen in bottles, being 53! cents per 
gallon when bottled, in which paragraph precisely the same 
provision occurs as in the paragraph relating to ginger-ale 
and ginger-beer, that ''no separate or additional duty shall 
be collected on the bottles." 
If, then, the-re is a difference between ginger ale or beer 
bottled and unbottled in the market value at the wholesale 
price in the general market of the country whence it is im-
ported, it should be appraised at such value as is applicable 
under the facts as bottled or unf>ottled. 
I return the inclosures received with this. 
I am, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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Certain boxes or cases containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, trial glasses, 
etc., used as coverings for such instruments, held not subject to the 
100 per cent. ad valorem duty prescribed in the proviso of section 7 of 
the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 27, 1886. 
SIR: In your communication of the 24th of September 
instant you state : 
"Referring to the letter of the Acting Attorney-General, 
dated the 17th instant, in relation to the construction of 
section 7, act of March 3, 1883, I have the honor to inform 
you that under date of June 3, 1886, (Synopsis 7553, herewith 
inclosed), the Department decided that certain boxes or cases 
containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, and trial glasses were 
subject to (luty at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem under 
the proviso to said section. 
" The boxes containing the zithers were described as 
wooden boxes, lined with cotton plush; those containing the 
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piccolos and cornets as wooden boxes covered with leather, 
and lined with cotton plush; and those containing the trial 
glasses as wooden boxes, covered with leather, with a glass 
top, and lined with silk plush. 
"These boxes conform in shape to, and are specially made 
as permanent receptacles for, the various instruments im-
ported in them, and in some cases are held for sale as sepa· 
rate commodities, both the instruments and the boxes being , 
imported separately or together. 
''The Department held that the boxes were dutiable at 
the rate aforesaid because they were designed for use other-
wise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the 
United States. 
"Similar decisions have been made in relation to leather 
and wooden cases for opera and marine glasses and tele-
scopes; leather cases for pipes, razor· cases, and violin boxes, 
which are similar in character and uses to those above de-
scribed, as are also the cases cOt1taining flutes, clarionets, 
and a great variety of other instruments and articles. 
"In view of the provisions in section 2, act of March 3~ 
1875 (18 Stat., 469,) I will thank you for an expression of 
your views as to the correctness of such assessments of 
duty." 
The several coverings referred to in yours were clearly not 
intended to evade duty, as they are the usual and ordinary 
coverings for such instruments. Although they may be 
intended for coverings for the same after they shall have 
been imported, there is no reason to believe they were de-
signed for any further use or for sale separately as com-
modities. Hence, for the reasons set forth in the opinion 
transmitted to your Department on the 17th instant, the 
boxes and coverings referred to in yours are not subject to 
the 100 per cent. duty ad valorem prescribed in the proviso 
to the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney· General .. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY • 
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MONONGAHELA RIVER IMPROVEMENT. 
The clause in the provision of the act of August 5, 1B8n, chapter 929, mak-
ing an appropriation for the improvement of the Monongahela River, 
which declares that "no charges or tolls shall be collected on any other 
part of the river on any commerce on said river which originates above 
the works herein appropriated for," does not impose any condition af-
fecting the expenditure of the appropria,tion. There is nothing in its 
language which requires the assent thereto of any person, company, or 
corporation claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the relin-
quishment by any person, company, or corporation of such right, before 
the money appropriated can become available for expenditure. 
DJ!;P.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 27, 1886. 
SIR : Your letter of the 15th ultimo, calling attention to the 
appropriation made by the river and harbor act of AugutSt 5, 
1886, for the improvement of the Monongahela River, informs 
me that that river is being improved for slack-water naviga-
tion, and that the lock for the construction of which the said 
,appropriation is made is the eighth in order from Pittsburgll; 
that the other seven have been built and are now owned and 
controlled by the Monongahela Navigation Company; which, 
it is understood, is a company organized by charter from the 
State of Pennsylvania, by which it is authorized to build locks· 
and dams and operate slack-water navigation on the Mononga. 
bela River from Pittsburgh to the Pennsylvania State line, 
and to collect tolls on all commerce passing through its locks."· 
You add : " Lock ~ o. 9, already built by the United States,, 
is in West Virginia, and Lock No. 8, now in course of con-· 
struction, is in Pennsylvania, but the pool above it is partly 
in West Virginia, and both locks are above those of theN a vi-
gation Company. The commerce originating above Lock No. 
8 goes mainly to Pittsburgh for its market, and must there-
fore pass through all the locks of the Navigation Company, 
and this commerce is understood to have hitherto paid full 
tolls to the said company." 
The provision in said act making the appropriation referred 
to reads as follows : 
''Improving Monongahela River, Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia: Continuing improvement, ninety thousand nine 
hundred dollars; uut no charges or tolls shall be collected 
on any other part of the rhrer on any commerce on sai~river 
which originates above the works herein appropriated for.'" 
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In -view of the clause in this provision which prohibits the 
collection of charges or tolls a8 there descriued., you inquire 
"whether or not the formal assent of the Monongahela Navi-
gation Company to such clause is necessary before the mouey 
appropriated can become available for expenditure." 
While the clause above mentioned clearly forbids the col-
lection of charges or tolls by the Monongahela Navigation 
Oompany on any commerce on the Monongahela Ri\Ter which 
originates above Lock No.8, it can uot, I think, fairly be con-
strued to impose any condition affecting the expenditure of . 
the appropriation such as is contained in your inquiry. 
There is nothing in the language of the clause which requires 
the assent thereto of any person, cog1pany, or corporation 
claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, ·or the relinquish-
ment by ans person, company, or corporation of such right 
before the appropriation can be expended. Where Congress 
has thought it proper to annex conditions of this sort to ap-
propriations for similar objects, terms have been made use of 
plainly indicative of its purpose so to do. See, for instance, 
the appropriation in said act for improving Little Kanawha 
River; also the appropriation for same river in acts of Au-
gust 2, 1882, chapter 375, and July 5, 1884, chapter 229; also 
the appropriation for improving the Monongahela River made 
by act of Marcll 3, 1881, chapter 136. The instances here 
'Oited, to which others might be added, wanant the conclu-
sion that had Congress intended to make the expenditure of 
the appropriation in the act. of August 5, 1886, conditional, 
dependent upon the assent of the Monongahela Navigation 
Company to the cLmse prohibiting the collection of charges 
or tolls, or upon the relinquishment thereby of the right to 
collect tolls or charges, it would have manifested its intent 
so to do in terms sufficiently cl~ar and precise to leave no 
doubt upon the subject. As the provision now stands, I am 
of the opinion that neither such assent nor such relinquish-
ment by that company is necessary before the money appro-
priated can become available for expenditure. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
, Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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T1n cans containing French peas, prepared meats, :fish, fruit, vegetables, 
and milk food-being neither of material nor form rlesigned to evade 
the duties thereon, nor designed for use otherwise than in the bona 
:fide transportation of goods to the United States-are not subject to 
the 100 per cent: ad valorem duty prescribed by the proviso to the 
seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 27, 1886. 
SIR: I received yours of the 23d of September, instant, in 
which you state : 
''I have to inform you that under date of June 25, 1886, 
the Department decided that tin cans containing French peas 
were subject to duty at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem 
under the proviso of section 7, act of March 3, 1883. • * * 
In view of the provisions of .section 2, act of .March 3, 1875 
(18 Stat., 469), I will thank you to inform the Department 
whether such tin cans and similar tin cans containing pre-
pared meats, :fish, fruit, and vegetables and milk food are 
properly dutiable at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem." 
The cans referred to in yours are neither of material nor 
form designed to evade the duties thereon, nor are they de-
signed for use otherwise than in the bona :fide transporta-
tion of goods to the United States, except as a covering to 
the very goods imported, after which they are not adapted to 
any further or additional use. In accordance with the views 
expressed in a letter transmitted to your Department on the 
17th instant, the ca:ns would not be subject to the 100 per 
cent. ad valorem duty prescribed by the proviso to the 
seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883. 
The inclosure referred with yours is herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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PUBLIC BUILDING SITE IN WILLIAMSPORT, PA. 
Title to the additional ground authorized to be purchased by the act of 
July 10, 1886, chapter 761, for the site of a public building to be erected 
in Williamsport, Pa., may be acquired by the institution of condem-
nation proceedings under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, in case 
no agreement for the purchase thereof can be made with the owner. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 2, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of the 23d ultimo calls attention to the 
act of August 3, 1882, chapter 381, providing for the pur-
chase of a site for a public building to be erected in the 
city of Williamsport, Pa., and to the act of July 10, 1886, 
amendatory thereof, wherein authority is given the Secretary 
of the Treasury to purchase additional ground for said site, 
and requests my opinion upon the question whether title to 
such additional ground may be acquired by condemnation 
proceedings instituted under the laws of the State of'Penn-
sylvania. 
In connection with this question, and along with the above 
acts, may properly be considered the act of August 7, 1882, 
chapter 433, which made an appropriation for the purchase 
of said site, and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury 
. '"to acquire by private purchase or condemnation the nec-
essary lands for the public buildings and the light-houses to 
be constructed, and for which money is appropriated by this 
act." 
By the act of the Pennsylvania legislature of June 8, 
1874 (Laws of Pa., 1874, 280), a mode is provided by wh\ch 
the title to all estates and interests in lands in that State 
may be vested in the United States, for any public use or 
purpose whatever, when no agreement can be made with the 
owners of the same for the purchase thereof; and by another 
act of the same legislature, dated February 13, 1883 (Laws of 
Pa., 1883, 1), the consent of the State is given ''to the ac-
quisition by the United States by purchase, by condemna-
tion, or by lawful appropriation, under the right of eminent 
domain, under the laws of this State or of the United States, 
of one or more lots or pieces of land situated in the city of 
/ 
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Williamsport, not exceeding in quantity two acres, on which 
to erect a court-house, post-office, and other Government 
buildings and appurtenances," etc. Under this legislation 
proceedings to condemn, where no agreement for a purchase 
can be made with the owner, may be instituted on behalf of 
the U niteq States in the proper State court, and title ac-
quired through the eminent domain power of the State. 
It would seem that power 'to condemn the additional ground 
needed for the site of the public building at Williamsport is 
expressly granted by the act of August 7, 1882, cited above. 
However, irrespective of the provisions of that act, the au-
thority ''to purchase" given by the act of JulY. 10, 1886 
(although it might not alone be sufficient for invoking the 
eminent domain power of the United States), may properly be 
taken to warrant the· acquisition of the land in any mode 
which is in conformity to the laws of the State wherein the 
property is situated; and hence where, by the laws of the 
State, the land may be condemned and title thereto acquired 
under its en;linent domain power, recourse may be had as well 
to this mode of acquisition as to any other under the au-
thority conferred by the last mentioned act. (See opinion of 
Jan nary 27, 1886.) 
I am accordingly of the opinion that title to the additional 
ground authorized to be purchased by the act of 1S86, in case 
no ag~eement for the purchase thereof can be made with the 
owner, may be acquired by the institution of condemnation 
proceedings under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, 
assuming that the limit of two acres, as above, will not be 
exceeded. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF 1.'HE TREASURY. 
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INDIAN LEASES . 
.Advised that certain mining .leases made by citizens of the Choctaw na-
tion of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal and Min-
ing Company, a Missouri corporation, for the mining of coal, etc., in 
said territory, are not such as may properly receive the approval of the 
Secretary ofthe Interior under existing laws. 
The inhibition contained in section 2116, Revised Statutes, has the same 
application to individual Indians that it has to Indian nations and 
tribes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October_ 14, 1886. 
SIR: Yours of the 8th instant is received. You transmit 
a report of the Commissioner of India·n Affairs relating t(} 
agreements made between citizens of the Choctaw nation of 
Indians in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal and Min-
ing Company, a corporation of the State of Missouri, for the 
mining of coal, etc., in said nation. One of the agreements 
is inclosed. An opinion is requested as to whether these 
agreements are such as may properly receive the approval of 
the Department of the Interior under existing laws. 
A similar question arose heretoforb as to the authority of 
the Interior Department to approve leases of land for grazing 
purposes, entered into by the Indians of the Cherokee, Chey-
enne, Arapahoe, Kiowa, and Comanche tribes in their re-
spective reservations in the Indian Territory. The question 
of the power of the Department of the Interior to authorize 
leases to be made for grazing purposes was submitted t() 
the Attorney-General, and in his opinion of 21st July, 1885, 
it is said: 
" I submit that the power of the Department to authorize 
such leases to be made, or that of the President or the Sec-
retary to approve or to make the same, if it exists at all, must 
rest upon some law, and therefore be derived from either a 
treaty or statutory provision. I am not aware of any treaty 
provision applicable to the particular reservations in ques-
tion that confers such powers. The Revised Statutes con-
tain provisions regulating contracts or agreements with 
Indiam:! and prescribing how they shall be executed and 
approved (see sec. 2103 ;) but those provisions do not include 
contracts of the character described in section 2116, herein-
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before mentioned. No general power appears to be conferred 
by statute upon either the President or Secretary, or any 
other officer of the Government, to make, authorize, or ap-
prove leases of lands held by Indian tribes; and the absence 
of such power was doubtless one of the main considerations 
which led to the adoption of the act of February 19, 1875, 
chapter 90, 'to authorize the Seneca nation of New York In-
dians to lease lands within the Cattaraugus and Allegany res-
ervations and to confirm existing leases.' The act just cited 
is moreover significant as showing that, in the view of Con-
gress, Indian tribes can not lease their reservations without 
the authority of some law of the United States." 
No laws have been enacted by Congress upon the subject 
since the publication of the above opinion. The law has not, 
therefore, conferred any express power upon the President or 
Secretary to approve the mining leases referred to, and no 
such authority can be implied. 1 
Upon an examination of the statutes and treaties, I feel 
_justified in coming to the conclusion that it was the intention 
of Congress that the inhibition contained in section 2116, Re-
vised Statutes, should have the same appliction to individual 
Indians that it has to the Indian nations and tribes. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the mining leases re-
ferred to are not such as may properly receive the approval 
of the Department of the Interior under existing laws. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
A TTORNEY-GENER.A.L. 
Where a request is made for au opinion of the Attorney-General on 
questions of law a~ising in any case, it should be accompanied by a. 
st,atement of the facts of the case as well as of the questions on which 
advice is desired. The Attorney-General can not undertake to find 
and settle the facts from papers that may be submitted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.. October 14, 1887. 
SIR: With every disposition to comply with the request 
for an opinion contained in your communication of the 5th 
488 RON. G. A. JENKS 
Attorney-General. 
of October instant, which has been referred to me for action 
by the Attorney-General as a matter upon which he does 
not feel that be can properly pass, I am constrained to say 
that before the Department can act upon the subject sulJ-
mitted it must be provided with a statement of the actual 
facts as they appear to you on consideration of the case as it 
arises in the a<lministration of your Department. And as 
the law requires that the case presented for opinion should 
be settled by you, it is out of my power to substitute for a 
case so settled the letter of Senator Call and the somewhat 
voluminous papers transmitted with it by you, namely, the 
speech of that Senator, the answer of 0. W. Holcomb, e~q., 
attorney for the Florida Railway and Navigation Company, 
the charter of said company, a copy of the decision of your 
Department of August 30, 1886, and Senate Executive Docu-
ment No. 91; papers and documents which, instead of hav-
ing the qualities of unity and harmony among themselves, 
present questions of fact for solution as well as questions of 
law. · 
It is, for example, impossible for me to give an opinion 
upon the suuject submitted until you determine what the 
fact is as to the alleged location of its route by the Florida 
Railroad Company and the time of that location, which, 
besides being cardinal facts in the case, are earnestly con-
troverted. 
It must, I conceive, be deemed settled that the Attorney-
General can only act on a determinate statement of facts 
furnished by the officer asking his opiuion. (10 Opin., 267; 
11 Opin., 189.) "Where," says Mr. Attorney-General Stan-
bery, ''a question of law arises upon facts submitted to the 
Attorney General, · stwh facts must be agreed and stated as 
facts established." ( 12 Opin., 205.) . 
Said Mr. Attorney-General Williams upon the same point: 
"I deem it proper here to remind yon, that where an official 
opinion from the head of this Department is desired on 
questions of law arising on any case the requeRt should be 
accompanied by a statement of the material facts of the 
case, and also the precise queRtions on which advice is 
wanted. By the observance of this simple rule the real 
point of difficulty in the case will be at once perceived, 
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much inconvenience avoided, and more practicable and satis-
factory result~ obtained." (14 Opin., 367, 368.) 
I hope it will appear as clearly to your mind as it does to 
mine that if I am to find the facts in this important land-
gr<.mt case I can only do so after a trial, and, conse~uently, 
after giving all interests adverse to those of the settlers on 
the land in controversy an opportunity to adduce evidence 
before me, which I have no power to do, for the law expressly 
confines the duty of the Attorney-General to giving opinions 
-on questions of law. (Rev. Stat., sec. 354-356.) 
I am ~ure that these considerations will be sufficient to 
.satisfy you that it is nothing more than simple justice to the 
railroad company and other parties claiming or in any way 
interested in the land that I should decline to settle the 
facts on a presentation ex parte, and then proceed to give an 
opinion upon them. 
As this action of mine does not defeat, but only delays, the 
attainment of the object of your communication, I feel that 
it is better to produce that inconvenience than to run the 
risk of doing injustice by giving an opinion without a case 
autheutieally stated and a specification of the points of law 
arising upon that case·. , 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY 0}1' THE INTERIOR. 
OLEOMARGARINE. 
The various simple and compound substances mentioned in section 2 of 
the act of August 2, 1886, chapter 840, must be "made in imitation or 
semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated or intended to be 
sold as butter or for butter," before any of them can be regarded as 
taxable under that act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 18, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 2d October instant sub-
mits for opinion the question whether or not the various 
simple and compound substances mentioned in the second 
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·section of the act of the 2d ~t\..ugust, 1886, entitled "An act 
defining butter, also imposing a tax upon and regulating 
the manufacture, sale, importation, and exportation of oleo-
margarine," mwst be" made in imitation or semblance of but· 
ter, or, when so made, calculated or intended to be sold as 
butter or for outter," before any of them can be regarded as 
subjects of taxation under the law. 
The question really is whether the language just quoted 
from the second section of the act is a predicate and qualifi-
cation of the whole section, or only of the clause or member in 
immediate connection with whi~h it is found. 
In mv opinion the qualification extends to the whole sec-
tion, a~u is an essential element of the statutory definition of 
oleomargarine. · 
If each of the simple or compound substances mentioned 
in the law is taxable under the act regardless of whether it 
is in imitation or semblance of butter or calculated or in-
tended to be sold as such, it results that some lubricating 
oils must bear the tax, although not supposed to have been 
in the contemplation of Congress. ' 
But the language of the law is repugnant to that view. 
Sections 6, 8, 10, and 13 can not be understood as applying 
to fluid substances. In these sections are found directions 
that oleomargarine shall be "packed" in ''firkins, tubs, or 
other wooden packages;" that no package shall contain less 
than "10 pounds;" that retail dealers shall pack what they 
sell in suitable wooden ''or paper packages;" that ''any frac-
tional part of a pound'' in a package shall be "taxed as a 
pound;" that the imported article shall, in addition to the 
import duty, pay an inte:rnal-revenue tax of "15 cents per 
pound." 
Now, as these embrace all the regulations of the kinds 
mentioned in the act, it would seem to require the conclusion 
that it was solids and not fluids that the legislature had in 
view, and therefore that the oils and extracts referred to in 
section 2 are not taxable as oleomargarine. We do not speak 
of packing fluids, nor do we estimate their quantity by weight, 
nor is it customary to pack them in firkins or tubs or other 
like vessels. 
Again, if the sii:nple o~.l is taxable, it must undergo a repeti-
I 
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tion of the tax should it afterwards enter into any one of the 
combinations or mixtures named in the second section, each 
of which, upon this theory, must be taxed. S? that, unless 
the maker of any of these composite substances produce all 
its constituents himself, the double taxation he sustains must 
put him at a competition with those who do-a very small 
number, I am informed. 
To resolve a doubt upon a statute it is a familiar rule to 
look at the evil the statute was intended to cure. There 
can be no question that the object in this case was to protect 
the trade in legitimate. butter from the damage caused by the 
sale of supposititious"'butter, by requiring the manufacturers 
of the latter to distinguish their product by an appropriate 
brand, and by fettering the production of the article with a 
tax. 
If the words of qualification or restriction at the end of 
section 2 apply only to the clause in which they occur, it is 
rather strange that the definition of butter did not follow 
them instead of forming the subject of the first section and 
being given a prominenee that indicates an application com-
mensurate with the whole scope of the law. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
STATE TAX. 
Where a State imposed a tax ·upon the registration of deeds, and a deed 
to the United States conveying land within such State was put on rec-
ord by an agent of the Government: Advised that, there being no pro-
vision in the State law exempting the registration of deeds to the 
United States from the tax, the Government is properly chargeable 
therewith, and that it should be paid. 
The tax referred to is not, strictly speaking, a tax upon either the instru-
mentalities, agencies, or property of the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 21, 1887. 
SIR: I return herewith a communication ofOoJ. P. 0. Hains, 
Corps of Engineers, under date of the 4th of January last, 
which was some time sincP transmitted to me by you with 
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request for advice as to whether the tax therein mentioned 
should be paid. 
It appears by said communication that the deed conveying 
to the United States the Aqueduct Bridge and approaches 
thereto, in view of the fact that the premises thereby granted 
lie partly within Alexandria County, Virginia, was deposited 
by Colonel Hains in the office of the clerk of that county to 
be recorded. The clerk, having recorded the deed, rendered 
a bill for this service containing two items, one of which is for 
the amount of his recording fee, and the other the amount of 
the tax imposed by the State law on deeds admitted to record. 
Colonel Hains is in doubt as to whether such tax should be 
paid, and the county clerk declines to give up the deed until 
it is paid. 
I find nothing in the State law which exempts deeds of 
conveyance to the United States from the tax refered to; and 
unless their exemption therefrom can be claimed on some 
other ground, they would seem to stand on the same footing 
as regards liability to the tax as deeds of conveyance to in-
dividuals. With respect to the liability of the former deeds, 
I do not think that any constitutional objection exists. The 
tax is upon the registration of deeds, a means provided by 
the State for the prevention of fraud in transactions affecting 
the title to real property; it is not a tax !I POll either the in-
strumentalities, agencies, or property of the General Govern-
ment, strictly speaking. 
The case here does not differ essentially from one where a 
tax is imposed by the State on the process of its courts and 
an action in one of these courts is brought by the United 
States. In such case, doubtless, the United States, unless 
·exempted by the State law, would be liable to pay the tax on 
process sued out thereby the same as any other suitor. w~mld 
be under like circumstances. The United States may or may 
not put its d~ed on record in the county clerk's office, as it 
may or may not bring its suit in the State court; but where 
it does either, it w·ould seem to be, equally with private par-
ties, bound to pay the fees and charges therefor imposed by 
the laws of the State. 
The law of Virginia declares that "no deed shall be ad-
mitted to record until the tax is paid thereon to the clerk," 
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This provision is held by the court of appeals of the State 
to be directory to him, and to give him authority to demand 
and receive the tax before he can be required to admit the 
deed to record: but the registration will be valid though the 
tax be not prepaid. "If he chooses to admit it to record 
without receiving prepayment of the tax," observes the court, 
" he thereby assumes the liability for it, just as if it actually 
had been paid to him. The government (State) loses nothing, 
for his liability for it is the same as if he had actually received 
it.'' (26 Va., 281.) In the present case the clerk waived pre-
payment of the tax, and by so doing has made himself liable 
therefor. If, as I think is clear, the United States were pri-
marily chargeable with it, the burden thereof ought not to· 
be borne by him. I accordingly advise payment of the tax 
by the United States. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS. 
Where certain 3 per cent. bonds of the United States, held by the United 
States Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of a national 
bank, were called in for redemption and ceased to be interest bearing: 
AdviBed that unless the bank substitute interest-bearing bonds for 
the called bonds, the proceeds of the latter must be applied to retiring 
the circulation secured thereby. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 28, 1886. 
SIR: Certain 3 per cent. bonds of the United States, held 
by its Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of the 
First National Bank of North Bend, Nebr., having been called 
in for redemption and having ceased to be interest bearing, 
the bank has been notified by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency to exchange those bonds for intm;est-bearing bonds of 
the United States. 
The bank, in reply, asks to know by what authority the 
demand has been made, allowing that it has once complied 
with section 5159 of the Revised Statutes by depositing with 
I 
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the Treasurer interest-bearing bonds of the United States 
which are worth par. 
An opinion is requested upon the question thus presented, 
namely, whether the stopping of interest on the boncls (1epos-
ited, resulting from the call of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
authorized the Comptroller of the Currency to require the 
bank to substitute interest-bearing bonds for the bonds now 
on deposit. 
It is not open to question that the bonds deposited by a 
national bank to secure its circulation must be interest bear-
ing at the time the deposit is made. On that point the law 
is explicit. It would seem to be equally clear that whatever 
purpose Congress had in view in requiring bonds to be de-
posited b;y nntional banks to be interest bearing, that pur-
pose has continued the same from the first law on the subject, 
in 1863, down to the present time, there being an absence of 
any legislative declaration of a change of intention in that 
particular. 
In resolving the question whether it is essential to a valid 
deposit of bonds by a national bank that the bonds deposited 
should be interest bearing during the whole time of the de-
posit, it may assist us to read the act of 1863, under which 
the national-bank system was introduced, in the light of .the 
circumstances in which it was passed. 
The country was engaged in a great war. It was of vital 
importance to strengthen the credit of the Government by 
increasing the demand for its bonds and by averting the im-
pending calamities of an unregulated and rapidly expanding 
paper circulation. It was to accomplish these objects tllat 
the national-bank system was devised, and it is impossible to 
doubt that it was the intention that the banks composing the 
system Rhould have no bonds on deposit with the Govern· 
ment except such as were still current and as the Govern-
ment was interested in keeping buoyant in the market. And 
this would seem to have been the view of the eminent Secre-
tary of the Treasury to whom is generally ascribed the 
authorship of the national-bank system. In his report of the 
4th of December, 1862, he says, in recommendation of the 
proposed system : 
"The Secretary has already mentioned the support to public 
TO THE SECRETARY- OF THE TREASURY. 495 
National Banking Associations. 
credit which may be expected from the proposed associations. 
The importance of this point may excuse some additional 
()bserTations. The organization proposed, if sanct,ioned by 
·Congress, would require a Yery few years for deposit as 
security for circulation bonds of the United States to an 
amount not less than $250,000,000. It may well be expected, 
indeed, since the circulation, by uniformity in credit and 
value and capacity of quick and cheap transportation, will 
be likely to be used more extensively than any heretofore 
issued, that the demand for bonds will overpass this limit. 
Should Congress see fit to restrict the privilege of deposit to 
the bonds known as five-twenties, authorized by the act of 
last session, the demand would promptly absorb all of that 
description already issued and make large room for more. 
A steady market for the bonds would thus be established 
and tbe negotiation of them greatly facilitated. 
"But it is not in immediate results that tbe value of this 
support would be only or chiefly seen. There are always 
holders who desire to sell securities of whatever kind. If 
buyers are few or uncertain, the market value must decline. 
But the plan proposed would create a constant demand, 
equaling.and often exceeding the supply. Thus a steady uni-
formity in price would be maintained, and generally at a rate 
somewhat above those of bonds of equal credit but not avail-
able to banking associations. It is not easy to appreciate 
the full benefits of such conditions to a Government obligAd 
to borrow." 
That the conclusion arrived at, namely, that it was the in-
tention of Congress that deposits of bonds by national banks 
should be kept interest bearing during the whole period of 
the deposits is correct would seem to be rendered absolutely 
certain by the act of the 12th of July, 1882 (22 Stat., 162), 
"to enable national-banking associations to extend their cor-
porate existence, and for other purposes." 
Section 9 provides that any national bank may, on de-
positing lawful money with the Treasurer of the United 
States, withdraw a proportionate amount of its bonds on de-
posit, subject, however, to the proviso "that not more than 
three millions of dollars shall be deposited during any calen-
dar month for this purpose," and to the further proviso ''that 
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the provisions of this section shall not apply to bonds called 
for redemption by the Secretary of the Treasury, nor to the 
withdrawal of circulating notes in consequence thereof." 
This language, it would seem, leaves no doubt that it was the 
intention of Congress that, when the bonds deposited to se· 
cure the circulation of a bank are called for redemption, pay-
ment of them means retiring ·the circulation they secure, 
unless indeed the bank, as it may lawfully do, should make 
a new deposit of an adequate amount of interest bearing 
bonds. 
It follows then that unless the First National Bank of North 
Bend substitute interest-bearing bonds for the existing de. 
posit of bonds called for redemption, the proceeds of the 
latter must be applied to retiring the circulation secured by it .. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. · GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Spools on which thread is wound for transportation or shipment are duty 
free, under the provisions of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 29, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 26th instant submits the 
question whether the spools on which linen thread is wound 
are subject to taxation separately as spools, or whether they 
are free from taxation, under the provisions of the seventh 
section of the act of March 3, 1883. That section repeals, 
among others, all the charges imposed by section 2907 of 
the Revised Statutes. Among those charges thus repealed 
are included "all the actual or usual charges for putting 
up, preparing, or packing for transportation or shipment." 
In the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson (116 U. S., 499), the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in considering the sev-
enth section of the act of the 3d· of March, 181;3, declares : 
"The exaction of duty on the packing, whether packing the 
goods in the cartons, or the cartons in the outer case, or lining 
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the outer case, was not warranted by law." The spools on 
which the linen thread is wound seems to be the usual manner 
of packing the thread referred to in yours for transportation 
or shipment. The tax as to such spools as packing or prepa-
ration for shipm~nt is, under the ruling in Oberteuffer v. 
Robertson, therefore, repealed, and in accordonce with the 
view expressed in the opinion rendered on September 17, 
1886, it should not be levied on the spools. The Depart-
ment rulings referred to in your letter should be modified to 
harmonize them with the opinion referred to and the views 
now expressed. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE'rARY OF. THE TREASURY. 
INDIAN CONTRACT. 
Opinion of September 9, 1886 (ante, p. 447), as to the validity of a certain 
contract with Pottawatomie Indians, cited and reaffirmed; and ad-
vised that the approval of such contract by the'' business committee 
of the Citizen Pottawatomies" does not cure the defect therein or au-
thorize the Secretary of the Interior to approve it. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEr 
November 3, 1886'. 
SIR: Pursuant to yonr request of this date, asking my-
opinion as to the validity of a certain contract, and your 
authority to recognize the same, alleged to have been ap-
proved by the b~tsiness committee of the Citizen Pottawato-
mies, I beg leave to state that I have examined the matter, 
and I find that on the 9th of Septern ber last the Solicitor-
General rendered you an opinion upon this same contract, 
involving a different question. Referring to that opinion 
(which I approve, and the reasoning of which virtually set . 
ties this question), I find the following: 
"The acts to be done are not of a public or official char-
acter. They affect only the rights of individual families and 
members of two bands of the Pottawatomie nation of In-
dians, some residing in the Indian Territory and others in 
the States of Kansas and Michigan. The claim is for indi-
vidual rights, not public or national rights" 
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The question now presented is whether the appro''<tl of 
the contract by the bu,siness committee of the Citizen Potta-
watomies supplies the defect on which the opinion abm·e 
referred to was given. The law (Rev. Stat., sec. 2103) under 
which this whole proceediug is supposed to have been car-
ried on is very explicit, and leaves no .margin of discretion 4 
- to the Secretary of the Interior. The law must be literally 
complied with, and nothing can be taken by intendment, nor 
can the Secretary dispense with any of its requirements. I 
do not think that the contract is in accordance with the law. 
It should have been a good and valid contract from the 
beginning; and even if it could be admitted that a subse-
quent ratification could make this defective contract Yalid 
and binding, yet it does not appear anywhere in the papers 
what authority this business committee has to bind the inter-
ests of the various parties here involved and to which refer-
ence is had in the quotation already made from the opinion 
of the Solicitor-General. The reasons and purposes of a 
law so exacting as the one referred to, in dealing with the 
Indians through agents and attorneys in this way, are ob-
vious, and these could be easily defeated and rendered of 
no avail if such authority to ratify such a contract as is here 
presented is recognized; and my opinion therefore is, ~-ou 
cannot approve the contract in question. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
JURISDICTION OF CONSULAR COURTS. 
The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon United States consular officers 
by section 408-t, Revised Statutes, is limited to "citizens" oft he United 
States charged with offenses committed in the countries therein rnf~rred 
to. It does not extend to subjects of foreign powers. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 4, 1886. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit a reply to your communi-
catiOn presenting for opinion several questions arising upon 
the petition for pardon of one Peter C. Fullert, convicted by 
• 
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Consul-(Mneral Green of aiding and assisting Paymaster 
Watkins to escape from the U. S. S. Ossipee in the harbor of 
Yokohama, Japan. 
I am of the opinion that the consular court had no juris-
diction over Fullert. 
The criminal jurisdiction of that court is defined by sec-
tion 4084 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 
which is in these words: 
" The officers mentioned in the preceding section are fully 
,empowered to arraign and try, in the manner herein provided, 
all citizens of the United States charged with offenses against 
law, committed in such countries, respectively, and to sen-
tence such offenders in the manner herein authorized ; and 
each of them is authorized to issue all such processes as are 
suitable and necessary to carry this authority into ex~cu­
tion." 
It is a conceded fact that Fullert was, at the time the 
· alJeged offense was committed, a German subject. Whether 
Congress could or cou!d not have made a foreign subject jus-
ticiable in a cons-ular court is a question that does not arise. 
Congress has seen fit to confine the criminal jurisdiction of 
this description of courts to citizens of the United States. 
A reference to the legislation of Congress touching crimes 
and offenses will show that, whenever criminal jurisdiction 
is meant to be exerted, regardless of the citizenship of the 
accused, a term (namely, "person") commensurate with such 
purpose is invariably employed. 
When Congress gives a court jurisdiction to try offenses 
committed by citizens of the United States, especially in for-
eign parts, we must understand it as using the term in its 
legal and ordinary signification, there being nothing in the 
context to show a different intention. 
This conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the opin-
ion of one of my predecessors in a case involving the jurisdic-
tion of a consular court sitting in Japan to render judgment 
in a civil case against a foreign subject. (11 Opin., 474.) 1 
It may be that if Fullert should come to this country he 
might be tried by a Federai court, but I am not called on to 
express an opinion on that point. 
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It follows, therefore, that the proceedings against Fullert 
were unauthorized, and that he should be set at large as one 
held without warrant of law. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
IMMIGRATION LAW. 
Provision of the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 
376, viz, that if among the passengers of li/lr vessel arriving at one of 
our ports is found a "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person m~able to 
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,'' 
such person shall not be permitted to land, considered; and held not 
to apply to the case of a lunatic whose father will engage satisfac-
torily that he will not become a public charge. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 6, 1886. 
SIR: Your commut.ication asking whether an alien resid-
ing in Brooklyn, N. Y., can briug into this country a lunatic 
son whom he is now maintaining in a foreign country and 
will engage satisfactorily shall not become a. public charge, 
has received my consideration. 
The question presented arises upon that part of the second 
section of the act of the 3d August, 1882, entitled '~An 
act to regulate immigration" (22 Stat., 214), which provhleR 
that if among the passengers of a vessel coming into one of 
our ports -is found a "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person 
unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a 
public charge," such person shall not be permitted to land. 
If the case presented is within the statute,__then also would ' 
seem to be that of a child of tender years or a decrepit per-
son coming here under the care and protection of another, 
competent for these purposes. But such cases are mani-
festly not within the statute, whose object is to forbid the 
introduction of immigrants likely to become chargeable. 
If, then, a child of tender years may be brought· .here by 
his parents, why may ~ot one of any age, who is dependent 
from imbecility of mind or body, if his parent will engage 
satisfactorily that he shall not become chargeable? 
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The authority conferred on you by the third section of the 
statute, to require bonds "under and in the enforcement of 
the various provision's of this act," would seem to have been 
given in contemplation of such cases as the one now before 
me. If, therefore, the father of the lunatic will duly comply 
with any regulation you may make looking to the prevention 
of t.his lunatic and others in Jike case from becoming public 
charges, I think he may be brought into the country law-
fully. 
This is but another of the many instances in the books 
where the literal sense of statutes has been made to yielrl to 
the manifest legisl~tive intent. Oates v. National Bank 
(100 U.S., 244); Chew Heong v. United Sta.tes (112 U. S., 555, 
and cases cited); Ryegate v. Wa·rdsboro' (30 Vt., 746); Henry 
v. Tilson (17 ib., 479); Ex parte Ellis (11 Cal., 222); Ingraham · 
v. Speed (30 Miss., 410); State v. Clark ( 5 Dutch., N. J., 96; 
ib. 415 ;) People v. Admire (39 III., 251); Burch v. Newburg 
(10 N. Y., 37 4). 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CLAIM OF MARTIN AND PATRICK W. MURPHY. 
The act of August 4, 1P86, chapter 907, made an appropriation to pay cer-
tain claims, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay to 
"Martin and P. B. Murphy $10,000." It being alleged that this was 
intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that amount, of which Mar-
tin Murphy was a joint owner with Patrick W. Murphy: Advised, 
that should the identity of their claim with that provided for in the 
act be clearly established, the fact that "B "is used in the act instead 
of " W" as the initial letter of the middle name of Patrick W. M nrphy, 
is immaterial, and may be disregarded. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
N o·vember 10, 1886. 
SIR: On the 4th of August, 1886, an act was passed pro-
viding that "the Secretary of the Treasury be and hereby is 
authorized and directed to pay, out of any moneys in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of eighteen 
thousand four hundred and sixty-five dollars and sixty-five 
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cents, in payment of certain claim& against the United States 
Government not heretofore paid because of the defalcation 
and forgeries of John T. Best, late clerk of the engineer of 
the twelfth light-house district, and due the several claimant8 
as follows: Employes at Point Conception Light, three thou-
sand seven hundred· and eighty-four dollars and seventy 
cents; Miguel Ortego, four lbundred and seventy-eight dol-
lars and fourteen cents; Charles Ashton, two hundred and 
seventy dollars; Pigeon Point Light Station, nine hundred 
and eighty dollars and ninety-nine cents; sundry small bills, 
one thousand two hundred dollars and ninety-five cents; 
Martin and P. B. Murphy, ten thousand dollars; 0. B. Shaw, 
one thousand seven hundred and forty eight dollars and 
eightY,·Seven cents." · 
From the transmittals accompanying yours, it appears that 
the $10,000 appropriated to Martin and P. B. Murphy should 
have been appropriated to :Martin and Patrick W. Murphy. 
The inquiry is whether the use of "B" instead of'' W" as 
the middle initial letter in the name of Patrick W. Murphy, 
precludes the payment to Martin and Patrick W. Murphy. 
From the words of the act, the context, and the subject-
matter of the enactment, it appears the law-makers intended 
this appropriation to be applied to a claim that originated in 
the defalcation of John T. Best, that the claim related to the 
. Light-House Board, that the amount claimed was $10,000, 
and that the claim was a joint one in which Martin Murphy 
was a joint owner. Now, as, there is no claim by Martin and 
P. B. Murphy, nor any such person known asP. B. Murphy 
in any way connected with the subject-matter, and the claim 
of Martin and Patrick W. Murphy precisely corresponds with 
the intent and purpose of the act, the whole intent of the en-
actment must fail, or the substitution of the '' B" instead of 
the" W" in the name of Patrick W. Murphy be disregarded. 
The intent of the law.makers should prevail over the mis-
taken middle letter. For as was ruled in the case of Games v. 
Stiles (14 Pet., 327), "the law knows of bnt one Christian 
name, and the omission or insertion of the middle name or of 
the initial letter of that name is immaterial." To the same 
import is the ruling in the case of Keene v . .. :Mead (3 Pet., 263), 
Hence if the identity of the parties and th'e claim of Martin 
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and Patrick W. Murphy is otherwise clearly established as 
the parties and claim referred to in the act, the fact that" B" 
is used in the act instead of" W" as the middle letter in the 
name of Patrick W. Murphy is immaterial, and should be 
disregarded. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION OVER PACIFiC RAILROADS. 
In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City ancl Pacific Railroad 
Company (whose road was in part con~<tructed with the aid of subsidy 
bonds issued under tbe acts of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, and July 2, 1864, 
chapter 216) for Government transportation over the subsidized por. 
tion of its road: Adviqed, that the direction in the second section of 
the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 226 (sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to with-
holtl all payments," etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applica-
ble thereto; that only one-hJ:tlf the amount of compensation due the 
company for such transportation should be withheld, to be applied as 
required by the act of July 2, 1864; and that the remaining one-half 
should be paid over to the company. 
DEPARTMENT . OF JUSTICE, 
November 12, 1886. 
SIR: In a letter received from the Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury, dated the 22d of June last, transmitting a copy of 
a communication addressed to him uy the Second Comptrol-
ler of the Treasury under date of the 16th of same month, 
relative to certain accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific Rail-
road Company for transportation, my opinion is asked upon 
be following question: ''Whether in the settlement and ad-
justment of the accounts of that company for Government 
transportation over the subsidized portion of its road the ac-
counting officers should direct that the full amount of the com-
pensation so earned be withheld under section .5260, Revised 
Statutes, or whether only one-half thereof should be with-
held, under the act of July 2, 1864, and the remaining one-
half directed to be paid to the company." 
It appears by these papers that the Sioux City and Pacific 
Railr~>ad was constructed in part with the aid of subsidy bonds 
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issued under the Pacific Railroad acts of July 1, 1862, chapter 
120, and July 2, 1864, chapter 216. By the former act all 
compensation for services rendered for the Government by 
the company was to be applied to the payment of said bonds 
and interest until the whole amount is fully paid. This pro-
vision was modified by the latter act, which requires only one-
half of such compensation to be so applied. ·subsequently, 
by section 2 of the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 226 (out of 
which section are formed sections 5260 and 5261, Revised Stat-
utes), Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury "to 
withhold all payments to any railroad company and its as-
signs, on account of freigh!s or transportation, over their re-
spective roads, of any kind, to the amount of payments made 
by the United States for interest upon bonds of the United 
States issued to any such company, and which shall not have 
been re-imbursed together with the 5 per.cent. of net earnings 
<]ue and unapplied as provided by law; and any such com-
pany may bring suit in the Court of Claims to recover the price 
of such freight and transportation; and m such suit the 
right of such company to recover the same upon the law and 
the facts of the case shall be determined and also the rights 
of the United States upon the merits of all the points pre-
sented by it in answer thereto by them, and either party to 
such suit may appeal to the Supreme Court; and both said 
courts shall give such cause or causes preceden.ce of all other 
business." 
Tae consideration of this legislation was directly involved 
in the case of the United States v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company (91 U. S. 72). Suit was originally brought by that 
company in the Court of Claims to recover one half of cer-
tain freight earnings on transportation performed for the 
United States between the 1st of Januar-y, 1873, and March 
1, 1874, the whole of which was withheld by the Government 
1or the purpose of applying the same on account of interest 
paid by it upon subsidy bonds issued to the company; the com-
pany conceding the right of the Government to retain the 
other half of the earnings for that purpose. The claim of the 
company was sustained aud judgment rendered in its favor, 
and on appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the 
Court of Claims was affirmed. 
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In the opinion of the Supreme Court delivered in that case 
the obligation of the company with respect to the reimburse-
ment of interest as well as principal was declared to depend 
upon the meaning of the act of 1862 and the amendatory act 
of 1864; and it was held that under the act of 1862 the com-
pany was not required to reimburse the Government, for inter-
est paid by the latter on the said bonds before their maturity, 
any further than this might be done by allowing the Govern-
ment to retain for that purpose all the compensation due the 
company for services rendred, and by paying over to the 
Government 5 per cent. of the net earnings of the road, to be 
applied to the same purpose; that the provision in the act of 
1864, hereinbefore mentioned, was intended to modify the act 
of 1862 so far as to allow the Government to retain only one-
half of said compensation, instead of all, and that the company 
was therefore entitled to receive the remaining half. As to 
the act of 1873, the provision in this act referred to abov~ 
was regarded by the court as not repealing the aforesaid pro-
vision of the act of 1864, and was interpreted to mean "noth-
ing more nor less than the remission to the judicial tribunals 
of the questwn
7 
whether this company, and others similarly 
.situated, have the right to recover from the Government one-
half of what they earned by transportation; and this ques-
tion," COntinueS tbe COUrt, "iR to be determined UpOn its mer-
its. * • * It is hardly necessary to say that it would 
ha,'e been idle to authorize a suit, had Congress intended to 
repeal the provision on which alone it could be maintained." 
Agreeably to that interpretation of the act of 1873, the 
direction thereby given "to withhold all payments, etc., on 
account of freight or transportation," etc., is of a provisional 
character, and does not contemplate that this action shall be 
taken after the right of the bond-subsidized companies to 
recover payment for such freight and transportation shall 
ba ,-e been established by the proper courts and the princi-
ples governing the payment thus been authoritatively ascer-
tained. The purpose of the statute seems to be to have the 
rights of the Government and the obligations of the com-
panies, with respect to the reimbursement of interest paid 
by the Government on the subsidy bonds (a matter that had 
formerly been the subject of discussion in the Executive 
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Devartments and concerning which a diversity of practice 
bad theretofore existed) judicially determined before any 
further payments are made on account of freight or trans-
portation; but after their respective rights and obligations 
have been so determined, and the law governing the matter 
declared and settled by the courts, it may reasonably be 
presumed that tbP; direction to withhold payment, in cases 
where according to the law as thus declared and settled the 
company is clearly entitled to have payment made thereto, 
was not intended to apply or be followed. As remarked 
in an opinion of this Department addressed to the Secretary 
of the Treasury under date of February 6, 1883, which was 
given upon a question similar to the present, there is no 
appearance of an intention to substitute the courts to the 
Treasury as a machinery for ascertaining and paying debts, 
the law about which shall have already been established by 
judgment obtained in the way directed since the passage of 
the statute. 
The Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company is not 
within the scope of the sinking fund act of May 7, 1878, 
chapter 96, and the solution of the question submit-
ted, relative to its accounts for Government transport-
ation performed over the subsidized part of its road, depends 
entirely on the meaning and effect of the provisions of the 
other acts named above. Upon consideration of these pro-
visions as already interpreted by the Supreme Court, I am 
of the opinion that in the settlement and adjustment of said 
accounts the direction in the act of 1873 (sec. 5260, Rev. 
Stat.), "to withhold all payments," is no longer applicable 
thereto; that only one-half the amount of compensation due 
the company for such transportation should be withheld, to 
be applied as required by the act of 1864; and that the 
remaining one-half should be paid over to the company. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE~J.1ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CASES OF NAVAL CADETS CLINTON AND FIFE. 
Where a cadet entered the Naval Academy and became a member of the 
fourth class in 18~5, and also remained a member of the same class in 
1886, he is at the latter period as much an "older cadet,; within the 
definition of the offense of" hazing" as a cadet who, having entered 
the Academy at the same time (1885), has since been advanced to a 
higher class, and (equally with the latter) is capable of committing 
that offense. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 16, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 13th instant, inclosing 
the records of and certain papers pertaining to the cases of 
Naval Cadets James W. Clinton and George B. Fife, has been 
received. 
You ask, first, "When did the appointments of Naval Ca-
dets Olin ton 41nd Fife take effect, so as to render them liable to 
trial upon the charge of hazing o.J Did such appointments tak~ 
effect in May and September -respectively, when the cadets 
were admitted to the Academy, or upon the issuance of their 
appointments, on the 11th of October, 1886 ;" second, "If it 
shall be held that Messrs. Clinton and Fife were on the 11th 
of September, 1886, naval cadets of the fourth class, were 
they, in view of the fact that they had been members of the 
fourth class in 1885, properly chargeable with 'hazing,' the. 
offense having been committed by them against members of 
the fourth class of the present year~" 
I answer, first: Messrs. Cli11ton and Fife became naval 
cadets in the full sense of the term upon the lOth of May and 
4th of September, 1886, respectively. · They had on those 
dates respectively, been duly nominated to the place, accepted 
the nomination, passed successfully the examination required 
by law, taken the oath prescribed for naval cadets, been as-
signed to and entered upon the discharge of the duties per-
taining to the position, and from those dates their salaries as 
such commenced. Their commissions, though issued after-
wards, relate back by express recitals to these dates respect-
ively, and are conclusive evidence of the appointments at the 
dates aforesaid. 
' Second: .As I understand the second question, you de-
508 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Cases of Naval Cadets Clinton and Fife. 
sire to know if a member of the fourth class can commit the 
offense "commonly known as hazing." 
In an opinion of date March 12, 1886, speaking generally 
of the ingredients in the offense of "hazing," as constituted 
by the statute of 187 4, I referred to those who could be guilty 
of the offense as members of the classes senior to the fourth 
class. 
This description of the parties who could commit the of-
fense was accurate enough for the purposes of that opinion. 
Inasmuch as cadets who have been longer at Annapolis than 
''new cadets of the fourth class" are very generally in one 
of the' higher classes, the term '' a cadet of one of the senior 
classes " was used by myself as well as in some of the orders 
issued by the commandant of the Academy as synonymous 
with the term ''other cadets," as employed in other regula-
tions. 
The question now under consideration was not then before 
me, nor was the language used in that opinion chosen with 
reference to it. 
A cadet who entered the Naval Academy a session before 
"new cadets ofth2 fourth class" entered it, and whose present 
membership in the fourth class is due to a failure to pass an 
examination and not to the recency of his entry in the Acad-
emy, is as much an " older uadet " within the definition of the 
offense of "hazing" as those cadets who, entering the Acad-
emy with him and serving a term of equal length, have passed 
their examination and been advanced to classes senior to the 
fourth class. 
I take it that "older cadets" maltreat "new cadets of the 
fourth class " not because of ~uperior academic acquirements, 
but because their familiarity with the routine, the customs 
and personnel of the Naval Academy, enable them to deceive 
others who are without such acquaintance, and to combine 
with each other for the oppression of new-comers. Therefore 
an old cadet in the fourth class is as much within the reason 
of the law as one in a higher class. 
Just how much longer a naval cadet must have been in the 
Academy than '" new cadets of the fourth class" in order to 
be considered an " older cadet " I can not undertake from 
this record to determine. 
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All who are not "new cadets of the fourth class" and there-
fore liable to be victims of" hazing" should, I think, be held 
to be "old cadets" and capable of being the perpetrators of 
the offense. 
I can not lay down any general rule for determining whether 
a cadet should be held a "new cadet of the fourth class" or 
an "' old cadet." In most cases the distinction is clear; but 
in cases like these u-pder consideration each must be decided 
by the proof. The length of service at the Academy which 
takes a cadet out of the one class and into the other must be 
determined by proof as to the local customs and traditions 
and the popular meaning of the terms used in the orders and 
regulations describing each class as understood in the Acad-
emy at the date of the passage of the act of 187 4. 
With this exposition of the statute, the courts-martial will 
have no difficulty, I trust~ i~ deciding the cases as they arise. 
I see nothing in the record that ousts the jurisdiction of 
the court-martial which corrected Messrs. Clinton and Fife, 
though I can not without more information as to the local 
meaning of the term "older cadet" or " old cadet," as con-
tradistinguished from new cadets of the '"fourth class," un-
dertake to say that the evidence warranted the conclusion 
that these gentlemen belonged to the class designated in the 
orders and reguTations of the Academy in force June 23, 187 4, 
against hazing. 
I inclose herewith the papers inclosed with your communi-
cation. 
Respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
' • 
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CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Boxes in which safety and ordinary matches are usually imported ar:e not 
dutiable as part of the merchandise which they contain, but (being 
composed in part of a material designed for a use other than that of a 
bona fide transportation of their contents) they are subject to the duty 
of 100 per centum ad valorem prescribed by the proviso in the sev-
enth section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 17, 1886. 
SIR: I have considered your communication asking an 
opinion whether the boxes in which safety and ordinary 
matches are imported are dutiable as part of the merchan-
dise they contain and at the same rate, or at one hundred 
per cent. ad valorem under the proviso of the seventh sec-
tion of the act of the 3d of March, 1883 .(22 Stat., 523). 
By "boxes" I understand you to mean '' the usual and 
necessary" boxes in which this species of merchandise is sold 
and imported. 
I think it very clear that such boxes are not dutiable as 
part of the merchandise they contain, for it is the express 
mandate of the seventh section of the act referred to that 
" the value of usual and necessary sacks, crates, boxes, or 
coverings of any kind shall not be estimated" as part of the 
value of any goods entered for importation. Certainly there 
is no longer room for quest,ion on this point since the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Oberteu.ffer v. Robertson (116 U. S., 
499). 
It remains, therefore, to inquire whether the boxes in 
question are dutiable under the proviso of the seventh sec-
tion of the act, which is in these words : 
'' If any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any 
kind shall be of any material of form designed to evade duties 
thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in the bona tied 
transportation of goods to the United States, the same shall 
be subject to a duty of one hundred per centum ad valorem 
upon the actual value of the same." 
The boxes containing the safety matches have on the out-
side a prepared surface upon which the matches must be 
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scraped o.f ignition can not be produced, at least without 
great difficulty. The boxts containing the ordinary matches 
have on the outside a roughened surface, like sand-paper, by 
scraping on which ~his kind of matches may be ignited, 
although such scraping is not at all necessary to produce 
ignition, which may be caused by scraping on any surface 
.offering the necessary resistance. 
In each case the boxes are composed in part of a material 
designed for a use other than of '~ a bona fide transporta-
tion" of their contents. To be sure, in the case of ordinary 
matches this use is of a somewhat inconsiderable value, but 
still it is one which is designed and which, at the same time, 
bas nothing to do with the transportation of the matches, 
and, therefore, brings the box of which it is an adjunct as 
dearlY. within the proviso as the prepared surface of the 
safety match-sox 'brings it within the proviso. 
In United States v. Thu'rber (28 Fed. Rep., 59) the court 
seems to lay down that to make the box dutiable under the 
proviso the additional use must appear to be "substantial, 
material, and valuable," but I have reached the conclusion 
that it is enough for that purpose to show that such use was 
designed to be unconnected with the transportation of the 
contents of the box. To go further and require that such 
use shall be "substantial, material, and valuable," is, it seems 
to me, to add to the statute. 
It results, therefore, that the boxes in both cases are du-
tiable under the proviso of the seventh section of the act. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY • 
• 
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CONSTRUCTION OJ;' BRIDGES ACROSS THE OHIO. 
Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chapter 4, and 
February 14, 1883, chapter 44, authorizing and regulating the 6onstruc-
tion of bridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary of War has power 
to disapprove of the plans of such bridges where be is of the opinion 
that they would unduly obstruct the navigation of the river. 
The Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation and 
Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20,1886, chapter 363, to erect 
a bridge across the Ohio between Covington and Cincinnati, has no 
power under that act to sell the franchise granted to i~ thereby. Such 
power is not to be implied from the words "successors or assigns" in 
the act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 23, 1886. 
SIR: I have received your letter of the .1lth of November 
instant, in whiGh you submit for my opinion the following 
questions: 
"(1) Do the provisions of the general laws, viz, the acts 
of December 17, 1872·, and February 14, 1883, which sub-
• ject the plans of bridges over the Ohio River to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of War, give him authority to dis-
approve such plans if he is of opinion that they would unduly 
obstruct the navigation of the river. 
"(2) Can the Railway Transfer and Bridge Company,. 
authorized by the special act of Congress of May 20, 1886, 
sell its privileges thus obtained under the clause in the act 
to 'its successors or assigns.'" 
In answer to the first: the act of the 14th of August, 
1883 (22 Stat., 414), is an amendment to the act of the 17th 
of December, 1872, by which section@ 2 and 4 of the last 
named act are "stricken out" and supplied. The whole act, 
as thus amended, is a general law, authorizing the construc-
tion of bridges across the Ohio RiYer. The second section 
very minutely describes and limits the construction, the 
height, the length of principal span, and piers of the bridges 
authorized by the act. In all this elaborate description, the 
preservation of the navigation of the river is in the mind of 
the legishtor. The fourth section requires an extensively 
published notice to be given to the public by any person 
about to build a bridge; the submission of the design and 
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drawings to the Secretary of War; with maps showing the 
topography of the banks, their lines, the bottom of the river 
above and below, the force and direction of the current at 
different stages of the water, with such other information as 
the Secretary of 'Var may require for a full and satisfactory 
understanding of the subject. After all this shall have been 
done by the projectors, the Secretary is required to refer 
this information to a board of engineers, who are to go to 
the site of the bridge in that vicinity, give notice, hold pub-
lic sessions, hear all objections to the bridge as proposed in 
the plans and maps, by any person interested. In case on 
examination the site is unfavorable, on report of the board 
of engineers, the Secretal'y is empowered to order changes 
in the bridge or its piers, guiding dikes, and any such auxil-
iary works as may be· necessary. Throughout the whole act 
all its elaborate and circumsta:utial provisions fully and 
uncontrovertibly show that the intent of the law is that as 
little interruption shall be occasioned by the bridge to the 
free navigation of the river as is consistent with the exercise 
of the power to build, as granted by the act. This clear in-
tent is to be recognized and effectuated in the interpretation 
and administration of this law. The second section pr~ 
scribes generally the conditions subject to which the briged 
must be built. The fourth section authorizes the Secretary 
by order, after investigation, to add to these conditions in 
case the site be unfavorable. If all the general conditions 
prescribed by the act, and such additional ones as he may 
lawfully order, are complied with, his duty to approve does 
not follow as of course, regardless as to whether the per- · 
formauce of the conditions has been only one of mere form, 
and not substantially in accordance with the intent and pur-
pose of the conditions. Before approving he- should see 
that the intent as well as the form is recognized. Wilen 
this is done, he should approve; when it is not, he should 
disapprove. He should demand as a condition of his ap-
proval that all the conditions should be so performed as that 
the purpose and intent of the conditions should be sub-
served. That purpose and intent are to prevent an undue 
interruption of navigation. Hence, he is authorized to dis-
approve any proposed bridge unless all the conditions, both 
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geueral and special, prescribed by the law, shall have been 
complied with according to the intent and purpose that the 
llavigation of the river shall not be unduly obstructed. The 
opinion of one of my preLi ecessors (14 opin., 254), cited and 
relied on by the party in interest here, relates merely to 
what consideratious should influence tbe Secretar,Y of War 
in his dealing with questions of this kind. And in its gen-
eral summary of these duties (p. 258) the opinion would 
seem by strong implication to rather support the view I 
have expressed, and not to antagonize it. Hence the first 
inquiry is answered in the affirmative. 
The act of the ~Oth of May, 1886, is: "Be it enacted by the 
Senate and House of Representati-e,es in Congress assembled, 
That the Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Rail way Trans-
fer and Bridge Company, and it~ successors or assigns, are 
hereby authorized and empowered to erect a bridge across 
the Ohio River between Covington, Kentucky, and Cincinnati, 
Ohio, subject to the general law regulating the construction 
of bridges over the Ohio !Uver: Provided, however, the said 
bridge shall not be of less elevation than the Covington and 
Cincinnati suspension bridge, a :Hl may be constructed with-
eut a pivot draw span." 
The privilege given by this act is a franchise, pure and 
simple, granted to the corporation tberein named. As is well 
stated in Wood v Bedford and Bridgeport Railroad Company 
(8 Phila. Rep., 94), a corporation "has no right to assign its 
frauchise, either in whole or in part, unless specially author-
ized by law. The general canon of construction applicable 
to legislative grants of this branch, derogating as they do 
from common right and public policy, requires that the 
iutention should be very manifest, if not unequivocally 
t>xpressed; at aU events, not dependent upon ambiguous 
phrases, rendering the implication doubtful." The same prin-
ciple is announced in Stewart's appeal (56 Pa. State Rep., 
522). In the case of Branch v Jessup (106 U.S., 484) the gen-
eral principle is reserved as follows: 
"We do not mean i~ the slightest degree to disaffirm the 
general rule that a corporation can not dispose of its fran-
chise without legislative authority." The definition of a fran-
chise which is given by Blackstone is "a royal privilege or 
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branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a 
subject." From its nature the privilege would indicate a 
personal trust. Being gran ted by a Sovereign it can not be 
extended by implication. Thera is no express power to assign 
found in the grant under consideration. The words "succes-
sors or assigns" in the act are only the ordinary words of lim-
itation of an estate granted -..l perpetuity to a corporation, 
and as a power have no more force than the words" heirs 
and assigns" in au ordinary conveyance to an individual. 
No power to sell is to be implied from these words in such a 
grant. This comes within the well-known rule that grants of 
this character must be strictly construed. Sedgwick Constr., 
291-296; Rice v Railroad Company, ( 1 Black~ 358); Tucker v 
Ferguson (22 Wall., 527) ; Fertilizing Company v Hyde Park 
{97 U. S., 667). Hence the second inquiry is answered in the 
negative. 
And the reasoning herein so far pursued compels an answer 
to your third question in the affirmative. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CUSTOMS LAWS-CHARGES. 
The cost of winding on spools, or skeining, yarn or thread, is one of the 
usual charges for preparing and packing the merchandise for trans-
portation, which, by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, 
are not to be included as part of the dutiable value of such merchan-
dise. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1886. 
SIR : Your communication of the 23d instant states : " It 
will be seen from the inclosed communication from the 
appraiser at Philadelphia that the charge for skeining, 
banking, or lapping woolen yarns, and the charge for spool-
ing or winding the thread on the spools, differ som~what from 
the cost of the Rpools on which the thread is wound, and the 
cost of the parceling or tying in bundles of yarn. In the 
latter case the Department held by its decision of May 21, 
' 
516 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
C!lStoms :Laws-Charges. 
1886 (Syn. 7533), that the skeining of the yarn constituting 
part of the finishing process, and the cost thereof, should be 
included in the dutiallle value. I will thank you to return 
the inclosed letter of the appraiser at Philadelphia, with a 
statement of your opinion, under section 2, act of March 3, 
1875, as to whether the ruling referred to by this Depart-
ment should be reversed, and also as to whether the cost of 
the spooling of linen thread forms a part of the dutiable 
value of such merchandise." 
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the determina-
tion of the question whether the skeining and winding on 
the spools is an element in the manufacture of the thread or 
yarn, or one of the actual or usual charges of putting up, 
preparing, and packing for transportation or shipment. In 
the former event, it would be subject to duty; in the latter, 
it would be only one of the charges imposed by section 2907, ' 
Rev. Stat., which in the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson (116 
U.S., 499) was repealed by the seventh section of the act of 
the 3d of March, 1883, and therefore not subject to duty. 
Whenever the thread or yarn is finished so that if the con-
sumer, if present in the factory, would nnd all the uses to 
which the article finished was usually applied completely 
subserved without further addition or work, the process of 
manufacture ig complete. The preparation beyond that 
·point is intended to prevent destruction or detriment to the 
article in transportation from the point of manufacture to 
the consumer. The winding on the spool~ or in skeins does 
not add a single additional element to the goods, but it does 
prepare th~ goods as finished to be safely and conveniently 
transported. The winding and skeining therefore are within 
the range known as charges in section 2907, and the duty 
thereon was repealed. 
The inclosure transmitted with yours is herewith returned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SEORETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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INDIAN CONTRACT. 
Where a contract made by three attorneys-in-fact of certain persons of 
the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians with E., an attorney-at-law, for 
services of the latter, was not executed by one of the attorneys-in-fact 
until some months after it had been executed by the other two and by 
E., nor until after the services stipulated therefor had been performed 
by E.: Held that the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to 
approve the contract or recognize the cla:m of E. for compensation 
thereunder. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE, 
December 4, 1886. 
SIR: Your communication of the 1st instant touching a 
contract purporting to have been made by the attorneys-in. 
fact of certain persons of the Pottawatomie tribe of Imlians 
with E. John Ellis as attorney-at-law for services rendered 
and to be rendered, with accompanying papers, is received. 
You wish to know whether, in my opinion, this contract 1s 
such a one as will authorize the Department of the Interior 
to recognize Mr. Ellis's claim for compensation thereunder as 
an attorney. 
This subject-matter has been before this Department upon 
two previous occasions for opinions, which were given, but 
they did not involve the point here and now suggested. The 
question now is, whether the execution of the contract by 
Stephen Negonqo.ett, one of the attorneys-injact, on the 23d 
day of November, 18~";6, after the contract had been executed 
by the two other named attorneys-in-fact, and by Mr. Ellis 
himself, and after the services stipulated for had been per-
formed, is valid ~ Referring to the opinion I had the honor 
to render you on the 3d of November last, I find in it this 
expression: "'It" (the contract) "should have been a good 
and valid contract from the beginning." I adhere to this 
view still, and I do not think that, by the law in question, 
there was any contract to operate under until there was a 
complete execution of it b;v all the attorneys-in-fact. I do not 
think that a waiting of two months or more by one of the 
named attorneys-in-fact before hs attempts to execute the 
~ontract, and when the work sought for has been done, as is 
alleged, is permissible. 
The relation of principal and agent is, by the law, rigidly 
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enforced in so far as the rights of the principal are to be in· 
terpreted away, and a stricter adherence to this rule, if possi· 
ble, should be had when the rights of Indians, "the wards 
of the nation,'? are involved. A complete contract is required 
by the law before anything can be done under it, and as there 
is no waiver, exception, or qualification in the law modifying 
this requirement, the Department of the Interior can not 
make one. As the Supreme Court has said, speaking of its 
power in this respect: "We can not supply qualifications 
which the legislature has failed to express." (Fox v. United 
States, 95 U. S., 670.) There is no power given the Depart· 
ment by the law in mere "permissible language;" the lan-
guage used, on the contrary, is without qualification. The 
duty. is therefore mandatory, in every sense of the word (Su· 
pervisors v. United States, 4 Wall., 435). It is not pretended 
that these three attorneys-in-fact should have executed the 
contract at the same time, but it is held that they should 
have all executed it before any proceedings or steps were 
taken or had in the premises; and in this view of the matter 
the subsequent Pxeeution by Stephen Negonquett of this 
supposed contract did not cure the defect, and therefore you 
can not recognize Mr. Ellis's claim for compensation there-
under. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
INDIAN CONTRACT. 
Secretary of the Interior has no power to approve the contract in the 
case presented for any purpose. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 14, 1886. 
SIR: Your letter of yesterday transmitting again to me a 
supposed contract between the band of Pottawatomie Indians 
and Mr. E. John Ellis for an opinion, has been received, and 
you propound to me the following inquiry: ''Can I properly 
and legally approve of this contract," etc. 
From the opinions, three in number, heretofore rendered 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 51~ 
A b ate m en t or He fu n d o f D u t y • 
----------------- -----------------------
to you upon tllis subject, I am clearly of tlle opinion that 
you can ~ot approve this contract for any purpose. It is 
useless to give additional reasons. You will find those 
already given in the opinions of recent date, to wit: Septem-
ber 9, 1886, November 3, 1886, and December 4, 1886. 
Very respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND .. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ABATEMENT OR REFUND OF DUTY. 
The provisions of section 2984, Revised Statutes, authorizing the abate-
mentor refund of duty on imported merchandise which, under the cir-
cumstances therein stated, is injured or destroyed by accidental :fire or 
other casualty, extend to a loss caused by freezing. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 7, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 30th nf December, 1886, submits 
whether the owner or consignee of merchandise, which, while 
in the custody of the officers "in any public or private ware-
house under bond, or in tll<' appraiser's stores undergoing 
appraisal," is injured or destroyed by freezing, is entitled to 
the benefit of the provisions of section 2984 of the Revised 
Statutes. That section is as follows : 
''The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, upon 
production of satisfactory proof to him of the actual [industry] 
[injury] or destruction, in whole or in part, of any merchan-
dise, by accidental fire or other casualty, while the same 
remained in the custody of the offim•rs of the customs in any 
public or private warehouse under bond, or in the appraiser's 
stores undergoing appraisal, or in pursuance of law or regu-
lations of the Treasury Department, or while in transporta-
tion under bond from the port of entry to any other port in 
the United States, or while in the custody of the officers of 
the customs and not in bond, or while within the limits of any 
port of entry, and before the same have been landed under 
the ~:;upervision of the officers of tbe customs, to abate or re-
fund, as the case may be, out of any moneys in the Treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, the amount of impost duties paid 
• 
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or accruing thereupon; and. likewise to cancel any warehouse 
bond or bonds, or enter satisfaction thereon in whole or in 
part as the case may be." 
Where, under the circumstances set forth in the sta.tute, the 
merchandise is "injured or destroyed by accidental fire or 
other casualty" the statute applies. The intent of the enact-
ment js to relieve the owner or consignee from the payment 
of duty ou merchandise in proportion as it has, by accidental 
fire or other unforeseen cause, been.injured or destroyed, while 
actually or potentially in the custody of the officers of the 
customs in the discharge of their duty. It would be a great 
hardship on the merchant whose goods were destroyed by 
accidental fire while in the possession of the officers, to 
add to his misfortune by charging him duty on that which 
was a total loss, and as to which his capital and anticipated 
profits were both irretrievably gone. The hardship would be 
equally as great, if the loss under the like circumstances oc-
curred by freezing, as by fire. The Government, by the en-
actment in recognition of a clear equity, declared that in pro-
portion as the merchandise was injured or destroyed in the 
manner and under the circumstances as set forth in the stat-
ute the taxes thereon should be abated. The manner of the 
destruction which calls for such abatement is ''by accidental 
fire, or other casualty." ''Other casualty," in the connection 
used, is equivalent to "other unforeseen cause" or circum-
stance not to be guarded against by human agency and in 
which man takes no part. If the freezing which injureH or 
destroys the merchandise occurs without the negligence, fault, 
or connivance of the importer, consignee, or owner, it is such 
a casualty as is contemplated by the statute and would come 
under the provisions of section 2984. 
Very respectfully, 
A, H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Attorney-General will not interpret a regulatiOn of practice made by 
the Commissioner of Patents for his own guidance and that of his sub-
ordinates, for the convenient, intelligent, and orderly disposal of the 
business of his office. Such regulations, which the heads of bureaus 
and Departments can. make, modify, or annul at will, or enforce or 
waive, as seems expedient, may well be left for their interpretation to 
the head of the Department or bureau to which they pertain. 
DEPARTI\fENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 7, 1887. 
SIR: Your reference of the 18th of December, 1886~ sub-
mits for an expression of my views the question whether the 
Commissioner of Agriculture is the head of one of the De-
partments referred to in rule 62 of the Patent Office. 
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes provides: "The head 
of any Executive Department may require the opinion of the 
Attorney-General on any questions of law arising in the ad-
ministration of his Department." 
By this enactment the Attorney-General is required and 
empowered officially to give his opinion on questions of law 
only. Rule No. 62 referred to is purely a rule of administra-
tive practice, with reference to the classification and order of 
precedence in the consideration of cases in the Patent Office. 
No question is raised as to the power of the Commissioner, 
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to make the 
rule, nor as to its legality. It is simply a request to interpret 
a regulation of practice made by the Commissioner of Patents 
for his own guidance and that of his subordinates, for the 
convenient, intelligent, and orderly disposal of the business 
of his office. Such a regulation, when not specially authorized 
or demanded by law, is not law in the sense in which that 
term is used in the statute above quoted. If every rule or 
regulation of such a character in all the different departments 
of the Government might be submitted to the Attorney-Gen-
eral for interpretation when doubts arose, it would unduly 
increase his labors as well as delay action while awaiting the 
opinion. Rules such as No. 62 referred to, which the officers 
of bureaus and departments can make or annul at will, or 
enforce or waive as seems expedient, may well be left for in-
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terpretatiou to the administrative discretion of the depart-
ment or bureau to which they pertain. I therefore herewith 
return your communication with the accompanying pap~r. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE InTERIOR. 
SWAMP LAND INDEMNITY. 
Under the provisions of the acts of March 2, 1855, chapter 147, and March 
3, 18G7, chapter 117, the State of Louisiana is entitled to indemnity for 
any swamp lands granted thereto by the act of March 2, 1849, chapter 
87, which were sold by the United States between the date o~ this 
act and the 28th of September, 1850. 
But as to such swamp lands as were excepted out of the grant made by 
the said act of 1849 (viz, "lands fronting on rivers, creeks, bayous, 
water courses," etc.), and as were first granted to that State by the 
act of September 28, Hl50, chapter 84, it is entitled to indemnity only 
for thosn which have been sold by the United States since the 28th of 
September, 1850. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Jcmuary 11, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 15th of December, 188G, submits 
whether, under the provisions of the act of the 2d of March, 
1855, and the act of the 3d of March, 1857, known as the 
swamp land indemnity acts, the State of Louisiana is en-
titled to indemnity for such swamp lands as were sold by the 
United States between the 2d of March, 1849, and the 28th 
of September, 1850. 
On the 2d of March, 1849, the United States granted thP 
State of Louisiana ''the whole of the swamp and overflowed 
lands" within her borders owned by the United States at 
that time H except lands fronting on rivers, creeks, bayous, 
water courses, etc., which bad been surveyed." (9Stat., 352.) 
On the 28th of September, 1850 (9 Stat., 519), an act was 
passed of substantially the same tenor and efl'ect, known a.::; 
the Arkansas swamp land act, which by its fourth section 
applied to each of the other States of the Union in which 
swamp and overflowed lands existed, without the exception 
contained in the act of 1849 as to lands ufronting on rivers, 
creeks, bayou!:!, water courses," etc. This last act was sub-
J 
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stantially a re-enactment of the act of the 2d of March, 1849, 
so far as Louisiana was concerned, with an extension of the 
grant in that act so as to include the lands which had been 
excluded by the exception in the former enactment, as to 
wlJich it was a new and substantive grant on the 28th of 
September, 1850. Both these acts were grants in prmsenti 
by which, from their respective dates, the title to the lands 
therein described became vested in the several States. 
(Railroad v. Smith, 9 Wall., 95; French v. Fya,n, et al., 93 U. 
S., 169; EmigrantCompanyv. Countyof Wrigkt,97U.S.,339; 
Martin v. Marks, 97 U. S., 345; Gaston v. Stott, Oregon Acts 
and De~is., 1874, 534, 554; Fletcher v. Pool, 20 Ark., 100; 
Hempstead v. Underh,ill, Ib., 346; Branch v. 1l1itchell, 24 lb., 
431; Daniel v. Purv·is, 50 1\Iiss., 261.) 
Notwithstanding these grants of the swamp lands to the 
States (by which they had become the owners of the lands, 
and the United States had been substantially divested of 
ownership and could convey no title thereto), after the pas-
sage of the respective acts, through some inadvertance or 
uegligence of the officers of the United States, some of tlle 
swamp lands to which the United States had no sufficient 
title were sold to pre-emptors and others, and the considera-
tion was received therefor. Although the United States 
could not be legally held as a warrantor as to the defective 
and void title thus conveyed, yet in equity and good con-
science she would be bound to refund to each purchaser the 
purchase money received for the land. But, as many such 
purchasers bad improved their lands, full justice could not 
be done them by the mere return of the purclla~:;e money. 
The Siates at any time could assert their title ann eject the 
purchasers. To avoid this injustice and invest the purchas-
ers with titles to the homes they had made under a void pur-
chase from the United States, on the 2d of March, 1855, 
Cong-ress passed an act entitled "An act for the relief of 
purchasers and locators of swamp and o\erflowed lands." 
( 10 Stat., 634.) This statute is remedial, and should be 
interpreted liberally, so as to include whatever is within the 
. mischief inteuded to be remedied. (Potter's Dwarris, 207.) 
The substance of the remedy was that the United States, 
instead of refunding to the purchasers the money which she 
, 
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unjustly obtained from them, would pay it to the States who 
held the title and owned the land, and thereby save the land 
with its improvements to the purchasers, and indemnify the 
States for their loss with the money received. The second 
section, being the indemnity clause of the act·, is as follows: 
" That upon due proof by the authorized agent of the 
State or States before the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office that any of tbe lands purchased were swamp lands 
within the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid, the 
purchase money shall be paid over to the· said State or 
States; and where the land has been located by warrant or 
scrip, the said State or States shall be authorized to locate a 
quantity of like amount upon any of the public lands subject 
to entry at $1.25 per acre or less, and patent shall issue 
·therefor upon the t~rms and conditions enumerated in the 
act: Provided, however, That the decisions of the Commis, 
sioner of the Land Office shall be approved by the Secretary 
of the Interior." 
The first clause of the section provides that " Upon due 
proof that any of tqe lands purchased were swamp lands, 
within the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid, the 
purchase money shall be paid over to the said State or 
States." The words '~ of the act aforesaid" above cited refer 
to the act of the 28th of September, 1S50, as shown by the 
preceding section. Whenever the lands were within the 
intent and mea11ing of the description of swamp lands as con-
tained in the act of 1850, the purchasers were entitled to the 
protection and the State to the indemnity of the act of 1855. 
The description . of swamp lands under the act of 1850 is 
found in the third section, and is: "All legal subdivisions, 
the greater part of which is wet and unfit for cultivatron; or 
when the greater part of the subdivision is not of that char-
acter, the whole shall be excluded therefrom." 
In the act of 1849 the description of swamp lands is: "Sub-
ject to overflow and unfit for cultivation, all legal subdivis-
ions the greater part of which is of that character shall be 
included, but when the greater part of a subdivision rs not 
of that character, th'e whQ].e shaH be excluded therefrom." 
These definitions of swamp lands in the acts of 184\l and 
1850 are substantially the same. Therefore all swamp lands 
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granted by the act of 1849 would be within the '"intent and 
meaning" of the words "swamp lands" in the act of 1850. 
The consideration for the grauts in the acts of 1849 antll850 
was the same. The errors committed by the officers of the 
United States against both grantees was the same in effect. 
The wrongs done to both classes of purchasers were the 
same. If Congress Lau intenued to remedy the wrong and 
to relieve only the purchasers who had purchased from the 
United States titles granted to the States by the act of 1850, 
and leave those who stood in exactly the same relations, 
under circumstancts exactly similar, to the mercy of the State 
of Louisiana or purchasers from her, doubtless, insteau of 
using the language ''within the intent and meaning of the 
act aforesaid" such unjust discrimination against those pur-
chasers would have been indicated by fit words, such as 
"granted by the act aforesaid,~' or some other equivalent 
language. No such language is found in the act of 1855. 
On the contrary the language which is used is equivalent to 
"all who are subject to this same mischief shall have the 
benefit of the same remedy." The ''intent'~ of the act was 
to give a good title to those to whom the United States had 
sold such lands, and the '' meaning" was to indemnify the 
States by giving them for their lands she had sold the pur-
chase money she had received therefor, and tliereby do jus-
tice to both. 
This view is enforced by legislative interpretation by the 
act of the 3d of March, 18fl7 (11 ~tat., 251), by which the 
titles under the acts of 1849 and 1850 are confirmed as on the 
same footing, and by the proviso thereto the act of 1855 is 
extended to the third day of March, 1857, as to both as fol-
lows: 
"Provided, however, That nothing in this act contained 
shall interfere with the provisions ot the act of Congress en-
titled 'An act for the relief of purchasers of swamp and 
overflowed lands, approved March 2, 1855,' which shall be 
anu is hereby continue.l in force and extended to all entries 
and locations of lands claimed as swamp lands made since its 
passage." 
It is scarcely conceivable that Congress would extend the 
act of 1855 from the 2d day of March, 1855, to the 3d day of 
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March, 1857, as to lands in Louisiana, unless those lands 
within the '• intent and meaning-" of the act of 1855 were 
embraced in that act. It is ruled in a well-considered opin-
ion of Attorney-General Speed, found in 11 Opin., 472, that 
the proviso to the act of 1857 should be interpreted as though 
attached to the act of 1855. If so attached, the language 
''au act approved March 2, 1855, shall be and is hereb)T cou-
tinueu in force and extended to all entries and locations of 
lands clairned as swamp lands made since its passage" must 
certainly embrace lands granted to Louisiana by the act of 
1849. The departmental interpretation, which is entitled to 
great weight, bas, in principle, been conformable to this 
view of the statute. In 3d vol. Land Decisions, page 396, an 
opinion of the Commissioner of t.he Land Office, approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 12th of February, 
1885, is found, which decides that the indemnity act of 1855 
was applicable to Louisiana as to lands granted to that State 
by the act of 1849 and sold by the U nitetl States since the 
act of 1850. If that indemnity was payable to the State as 
to any of the lands granted by the act of 1849~ the same 
principle would apply as well to those which we~e sold by 
the United States before 1850 as to those that were sold after; 
if the act of 1855 applied to any of the lauds conveyed by 
the act of 1849 to Louisiana, it must, on the same principle, 
apply to all, for as to such lands the title was as fully vested 
in the State of Louisiana before the passage of the act of 
1850 as ,it was after. Hence it is concluded that as to such 
lands as were granted to Louisiana by the act of 1849, the 
purchasers are entitled to the protection and the State to the 
indemnity for any such lands as were sold by the United 
States between the 2d of .March, 1849, and the 28th of Sep-
tember, 1850, but as to such as were excepted out of the 
grant of 1849, and were first granted to Louisiana by the act 
of 1850, being the lands fronting on rivers, creeks, ba~'ous, 
water-courses, etc., the State is only entitled to an indem-
nity after the passage of the act of the 28th of September, 
1850. 
The papers by you transmitted are herewith returned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. II. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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FREE LIST. 
Hair of the common goat, which is unfit for com bing purposes, should 
be admitted free of duty under the provisions in the free list for hair 
of horses and cattle, and hair of all kinds not specifically enumerated, 
act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 15, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant submits for 
determination whether the hair of the common goat, which 
is unfit for combing purposes, and fit only for mixing mortar 
and other kindred purposes, is subject to duty under class 2 
of Schedule K, '' Wool and woolens." 
The wools or hair of the alpaca goat enumerated in Sched-
ule K are distinctly divided in to three classes. 
Class 2 embraces only" combing wools," among which are 
enumerated "the hair of the alpaca goat and other like ani-
mals." The words u and other like animals" in this clause 
should be interpreted with reference to the subject of the 
·enactment, which is combing wools; for If all goat?s hair 
was intended to be included, the word " goat" would not 
have been qualified and limited by the specific word "alpaca." 
The words ''other like animals" mean animals producing 
hair or wool like that of the alpaca goat. They are intended 
to describe the taxable commodity, and not a genus of ani-
mals. Such hair as is described in yours should be admitted 
free, under the ~'provisions in the free list for hair of horses 
and cattle, and hair of all kinds not specifically enumerated." 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. II. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT. 
Neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of customs has a legal 
right to nominate assistant light-house keepers. 
The Secretary of the Treasury is not restricted to such appointments as 
tbe Board recommends, but may appoint any one who, in his judgment, 
will best discharge the dutie~:~ of the office. 
Where a regulation, made under and within the power granted by sec-
tion 4669, Revised Statutes, is regularly approved, neither the Board 
without the approval of the Secretary nor the Secretary without the 
approval of the Board can change it. But such regulation can not 
abridge or control in any manner the power of appointment conferred 
by law upon the Secretary. · 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 15, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the , 12th instant submits tor my opin-
ion the following propositions: 
"(1) Whether, under the laws and regulations governing 
the Light-House Estal>lishment, the right to nominate assist-
ant keepers of light-ships rest,s with the Light-House Board 
or with collectors of customs; 
"(2) Whether a seaman can be legally nominated hy the 
Board for promotion to assistant keeper of a light-ship, or 
whether Huch appointment, if made, must be deemed an origi-
nal appointment; 
"(3) Whether appointment.s and promotions in the Light-
House Service must be restricted to such as the Board may 
recommend, or whether the Secretary of the Treasury may 
make such appointments and promotions independent of the 
recommendation of the Board; and 
"(4) Whether the Secretary of the Treasury bas power to 
amend or change the existing regulations of the Light-House 
Establishment without the concurrence of the Board." 
In an opmion rendered on the 18th of January, 1886, upon 
examination of the powers of the Light-House Board to make 
regulations, after full consideration the conclusion was reached 
that ''section 4669, Revised Statutes, contines the power of 
the Light- House Board to the adoption and enforcement of 
such regulations as have reference to the management and 
control of light keepers, inspectors, and employes for the 
purpose of securing responsibilit.v from them, and for the 
further purpose of properly administering the Light-House 
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Establishment, but the statute does not authorize such Board 
to adopt and enforce regulations abridging or controlling 
in any manner tlle appointment of light-house keepers or 
other inferior officers, nor does it authorize such Board to 
designate such appointments. The ~ mthority to appoint is 
vested elsewhere, as indicated in this opinion." 
If any power exists, only l;>y virtue of regulations of the 
Board, by which the right to nominate is conferred on either 
the Light-House Board or the collector of customs, it is not a 
legal right, but a mere courtesy, as neither the Board nor the 
collector of customs can be legally authorized by a regula-
tion, unauthorized by law, to abridge or control the power of 
the officer, intrusted by law with the duty to appoint, in the 
exercise of his appointing power. The interpretation of a 
regulation or regulations not authorized by law, and which, 
if they exist, have no legal force, and are obligatory or not 
at the option of the proper appointing officer, is not within 
my province, but must be left to the discretion of the proper 
appointing officer. Hence, to your first inquiry, the reply 
is that neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of 
customs has a legal right to nominate assistant keepers. 
In answer to the third question, except when the power t() 
nominate is expressly given by law, you are not restricted to· 
such as the Board recommends, but may appoint any one who· 
in your judgment (being otherwise qualified) will best dis-
charge the duties of the office. 
The first branch of the second inquiry is sufficiently an··'' 
swered as above. The second branch, as to whether the 
appointment of a seaman would be a new appointment or a 
promotion,.requires the consideration of a question not in-
volved in the former opinion. Promotion generally signifies an 
exaltation or advance from a lower to a higher rank or grade 
in the same general line of service under the same employer. 
If the seaman referred to in yours was, before the appoint-
ment, regularly in the Light-House Service, in a subordinate 
capacity as seaman, and that is in the same general line of 
service, such appointment to the higher grade would be 
deemed a promotion. 
To the fourth inquiry submitted: Section 4669, Revised 
Statutes, empowers the Board, with the approval of the Sec-
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retary of the Treasury, to make regulations. Regulations 
within the power thus granted, when made and approved, 
are until amended or altered obligatory. The Board, as a 
Board, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized by 
the statute to amend or alter such regulations. Hence, after 
a regulation, within the power granted by the statute, is 
regularly made and approved, neither the Board without the 
approval of the Secretary, nor the Secretary without the 
action of the Board, can change such regulation. But, as 
announced in the former opinion as q noted, the power to 
make regulations does not ext.end to al;>ridging or controlling 
in any manner the power of the Secretary in the appoint-
ment of such officers as by law is conferred upon him. If, 
then, any regulation does so abridge or control such power 
of appointment, it is beyond the regulating power of the 
Board, and the Secretar_y of the Treasury may disregard or 
conform to it as in his judgment may best conduce to the 
good of the service. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
_The SEORETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS LAWS-IRON ORE. 
Principles of law stated for determining what is comprehended by th~ 
terms " iron ore,'' as used in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 19, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant submits for consider-
ation substantially the whole question, whether the word 
"iron ore "'(as used in the tariff act of the 3d of March, 1883) 
is iron ore dried at a temperature of 212° Fah., or iron ore as 
it is delivered at the port of entry for weighing. 
Thus broadly stated the response to the question would in-
volve a determination of facts as well as law, which, if under-
taken, would involve an assumption of power not by law 
committed to me. Upon the disputed facts I can not pass; 
but upon Lhe facts found by you and the briefs of argument 
/ 
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made before you, it is not improper to announce such prin-
ciples of law as may materially aid you in reaching a truth· 
ful result. 
In an opinion rendered on the same subject on the 17th of 
September, 1886, the principle was declared that the iron ore 
of the statute was to be interpreted as the'~ iron ore of com-
merce." What the iron ore of commerce was, was left as a 
question of fact to be determined from knowledge possessed 
by or evidence submitted to you. The testimony laid before you 
was found to be inconsistent, the importer mainly testifying 
that ore dried at 212° Fah., is the iron ore of commerce; the 
home producers that ore as ordinarily delivered for weighing, 
.is iron ore by its commercial designation. This discrepancy 
of testimony,according to classes, between witnesses who are 
presumed t9 be equally upright, wo11ld suggest that the state-
ments of one or the other, or both, are to some degree influ: 
enced by intere~t~ or that they each testified from a partial 
view of different facts, by giving different interpretations to 
the word "qommerce." The uncertainty arising from this 
discrepancy of testimony, so far as it may arise from the in-
fluence of "interest, may be overcome by calling upon those 
who buy both imported and home-produceu iron ore. Such 
testimony would seem to be easily accessible, for where there 
is a seller, such as the importer or home producer, there must 
be a buyer, belonging to neither of the classes of sellers, who 
would apparently be disinterested. So far as the discrep-
ancy in the testimony arises from the fact that the witnesses 
testified to uifferent facts, arising from a different understand-
ing of the words " iron ore of commerce," the weight of evi-
dence can be determined by comparing the witnesses' under-
standing of the words w1th the true signification which should 
be given to them as used in the interpretation of customs 
cases. By the act, the duty is a specifiu one on iron ore. 
"Iron or~" as thus used is generic, embracing all the dif-
ferent species of iron ore, regardless of their price, value, or 
accidental component chemical ingredients. The word ''com-
merce" is to be understood as the commerce of our own country 
as it is understood b.r English-speaking Americans. It, too, 
is to be understood in its generic sense, with this exception 
that it is limited to our own commerce in our own markets, 
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and embraces both foreign and domestic. As expressed by 
Justice Story in the .Two Hundred Chests of Tea (9 Wheat., 
480): "Whether a particular article were designated by one 
name or another in the country of its origin, or whether it 
were a simple or mixed substance, was of no importance in the 
view of the legislature. It did not suppose our merchants to 
be naturalists or geologists or botanists; it applied its atten-
tion to the description of articles as they derived their appel-
lations in our own markets, in our domestic as well as in our 
foreign traffic." 
The same thought is substantially repeated in the case of 
Barlow v. The United States (7 Pet., 410), as follows: "Con-
gress must be presumed to use the words in their known 
commercial sense, not indeed in that of foreign countries, if 
it should differ from our own, but that known in our own 
trade, foreign and domestic." The same view is corroborated 
in the case of Elliott v. Swartwout (10 Pet., 151). 
"Commerce," as used, then, in this connection, is to ·be un-
derstood in its comprehensive sense of buying, selling, and 
exchange in -.,he general sales or traffic of our own markets ; 
but especial contracts in which the term "iron ore" is defined 
in the contract by special description or qualifying words 
would be no evidence of the general commercial signification 
of the term. 
But if, from the application of the facts to these general 
principles, you are still unable to determine from the evidence 
before you what state the ore must be in to be the iron-ore 
of commerce, other considerations- may aid you. The intent 
of the law-maker is the law, and outside of the words some 
reflected light may be invoked. Other earlier statutes have 
imposed customs duties on iron-ore which have been collected, 
probably for a very considerable time before the passage of 
the act of 1883. In the administration of such laws, doul>t-
less, departmental practice has established what was under-
stood and acted upon as to the collection of customs on iron-
ore. If that practice and departmental interpretation were of 
long standing, and uniform, prior to 1883, if the interpreta-
tion had been false and vicious it is to be presumed Congress 
would have guarded against a-like interpretation upon the pas-
sage of the act under consideration. But, as no such guards 
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are found indicating a repudiation of any prior interpretation, 
the presumption is very strong that the legislator, in the en-
actment of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, adopted and un-
derstood the iron-ore of commerce to be what the departmental 
practice had established it. On the 8th of September, 1879, 
a decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
No. 4183, ruling that ''the total quantity landed as shown 
by the weigher's return * * * without allowance for 
increase of weight from moisture on certain iron-ore" was 
subject to duty. If this decision was in accordance with 
departmental practice prior to that date, and was adhered 
to afterwards as the rule, it would be a pregnant fact to guide 
you to the same conclusion. 
The result of the legal principle above considered is sub-
stantially-
(1) In customs laws, as in all others, the intent of the law-
makers is the law. 
(2) Where, in the expression of that intent, a name is used 
describing an article which has a well-established commer-
cial signification, that commercial signification should be 
adopted. 
(3) When the name is general and the tariff specific, it 
embraces the whole class, and questions of price, value, or 
accidental chemical components are immaterial. 
(4) The commercial signification of a name is that which 
those engaged in foreign and domestic sale, purchase, and 
exchange generally adopt to describe the article. 
(5) If it be disputed what this commercial designation em-
braces it is to be determined upon a clear preponderance of 
evidence. 
(6) The ordinary rules of evidence are to be applied with 
reference to interest, character, and weight of testimony, to 
be received from those engaged in or familiar with com-
merce, trade, and traffic in the article. 
(7) Where a clear preponderance of evidence can not be 
adducPd, departmental construction tacitly approved by Con-
gressional recognition should turn the scale and be accepted 
as sufficient evidence of the legislative intent. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Wool-tops, imported in the ordinary condition of scoured wool, are not 
subject to the penal double duty imposed by the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121, on "wool of the sheep, etc., which shall be imported in 
any other than ordinary condition as now and heretofore practiced," 
etc. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
· January 21, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 21st of December, 1886, 
with the accompanying papers, submits whether " wool-tops" 
which ''are the result of th~ com bing process, in which the 
long hairs are separated from the short hairs, the long hairs 
being known as wool-tops while the short hairs are known 
as noils,~' should be subjected to double duty under the pro-
visions of clause No. 356, Tariff Index. The clause reads: 
"The duty qn wools of the first class which shall be im-
ported washed shall be twice the amouht of the duty to which 
they would be subjected if imported unwashed; and the duty 
on wools of all classe~ which shall be imported scoured shall 
be three times the duty to which they would be subjected if 
imported unwashed. The duty on wool of the sheep or hair 
of the alpaca goat, and other like animals, which shall be 
imported in any otlwr than ordinary condition as now and 
heretofore practiced, or which shall be changed in its char-
acter or condition for the purpose of evading the duty, or 
which shall be reduced in value by the admixture of dirt or 
any other foreign substance, shall be twice the duty to which 
it would be otherwise subjected." 
The subject of this clause is with reference to the condition 
of wools as washed, unwashed, and scoured. The words "in 
any other than ordinary condition" in the clause must be in-
terpreted with reference to the subject to which the clause 
refers, as to the condition of the wool as to being washed, 
unwashed, or scoured. The double duty imposed would in-
dicate a purpose of the legislator to subject to a penalty goous 
in any such condition as to washing or scouring as would be 
calculated to evade the legitimate duty charged on such a 
class of goods, or which the importer purposely intended and 
attempted to bring in on a lower classification than the proper 
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one. Tlw appraiser reports that at, and a lung time be-
fore, the passage of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, ''wool 
was imported in the form of tops." It is undisputed that. 
the wool-tops in this case were in the" ordinars condition' 
of scoured wool. I am therefore of the opinion that the 
decisions of the Department of the Treasury, S. 4777 and 
S. 7217, imposing the double duty should be modified and 
changed so that the wool referred to in yours and other 
similar importations be relieved from the penal double duty. 
I return your inclosures herewith. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Mahogany boards and planks are not dutiable as manufactures of rna_ 
hogany, under the clause in ScheduleD (act of March 3, 1883, chapter 
121) imposing a duty on ''manufactures of cedar wood," etc.; but they 
fall within the designation of lumber in the clause in same schedule 
which imposes a duty ou "sawed boards, planks, deals," etc., and are 
dntiable under the latter clause. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 21, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant submits the inquiry 
''whether mahogany boards and planks fall within the desig-
nation of lumber, within the provisions of Tariff Index No. 
219, which is: 
''Sawed boards, planks, deals, and other lumber, of white 
wood, sycamore, and bass wood, one dollar per thousand feet, 
board measur~. All other articles of sawed lumber, two 
dollars per thousand feet, board m~asure; but when lumber 
of any sort is planed or finished, in addition to the rates 
herein provided there shall be levied aud paid for each side 
so planed or finished fifty cents for each one thousand feet, 
bohlrd measure; " 
Or whether such boards or plank are to be construed as 
"manufactures of mahogany," within the meaning of Tariff 
Index No. 232, which is as follows: 
''Manufactures of cedar wood, granadilla, ebony, mahog-
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any, rosewood, and ~atin wood, thirty-five per cent. ad 
valorem." 
Both of these clauses occur in Schedule D, " wood and 
wooden wares." Throughout that schedule the different de· 
grees of advancement in w bicb the a£·ticle therein enumerated 
may be found in process of manufacture, from the crude ma-
terial to the perfected product, are used as a basis of classi-
fication. The timber, the lumber, the lumber planed, the 
unfinished final product, and the finished p11oduct gh-e rise 
to difl'erent classifications and rates of duty, the rates in-
creasing as the proc·ess of manufacture advances, the rate 
imposed on the import described in Tariff Index No. 232, 
''manufactures of cedar wood, granadilla, ebony, mahogany,'' 
etc., being the highest, and corresponding with the other 
clauses of the schedule, Nos. 230 and 233, as the perfected 
product. Tllis would indicate that at least some degree of 
advancement in the process of manufacture was intended in 
clause No. 232 beyond the mere crude material intended for 
nothing special, except for sale or to be manufactured. The 
word "manufactures" in this clause is intended to describe 
an article that bas been madA or formed by hand or machin-
ery for some known and specific use or purpose, either a!:) a 
whole or a :ijnisbed part or element in such an article. When 
a mahogany tree is cut down and cut in appropriate lengths 
for transportation, and its bark or useless excrescenees re · 
moved by ax or saw, it might, in some possible sense, be 
called a manufacture, but the statute .did not intend to im-
pose the highest rate of duty on such an article. A distinc-
tion i made by Justice Woodbury in the case of Lawrence \ . 
Allen (7 How., 785), as follows: 
"Here, the juice or sap oft he india-rubber tree while liquid 
or in its milky staw, whether then called caoutchouc or some 
other name, is still a natural substaiJce and in its natural form; 
and in one sense, and to a certain extent, its being hardened 
and changed in color no less than consistency and bulk, by 
fire and evaporation, whatever new form it may then be 
turned into is a manufacture • * * yet, from the words 
of the law, as well as its design, it is manifest that the india-
rubber is not meant to be taxed as a manufacture, though so 
hardened and changed, unless at the same time it is put into 
• 
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a shape which is suitable for use and adapted with a design to 
be used in a way that is calculated to rival some domestic 
manufacture here. rather than merely to furnish a raw mate-
rial in a more portable, useful, and convenient form for other 
manufactures here. In the latter case, within the policy and 
purpose of the tarift law yielding protection, it is manufact-
ured, or in other words, not rnc(;de abroad for use in its exist-
ing form, except as a raw material, like pig-iron, or pig-lead." 
To the same effect see UnitedStates V". Potts (5 Cranch, 284). 
This distinction would seem to be entirely apvlicable to the 
question submitted. The mahogany boards and plank de-
scribed in yours are chiefly designed for no particular design, 
purpose, or use, only" to furnish a raw material in a more 
portable, useful, and convenient form for other manufact-
ures." Hence they are not dutiable as manufactures of ma-
hogany under Tariff Index No. 232. 
Clause 219, Tariff Index, divides lumber into two classes, 
and imposes on the first class a duty of $1 per thousand feet 
and on the second $2 per thousand. The first class in this 
clause describes by name the less vaiuable character of lum-
ber, and the second class. by general description em braces the 
more valuable. Among the latter, mahogany, cherry, walnut, 
and other valuable woods, doubtless are intended to be com-
prised. The imposition of duties, according to state of ad-
vancement in this schedule between the growing timber and 
the perfected manufacture, would clearly indicate that the 
ordinary American signification of the words "timber" and 
''lumber" is adopted by the law-makers, by which timber is 
generally understood to mean trees felled and unfeUed, and 
the larger sills, beams, plates, etc., for houses, or correspond-
ing materials for ships and other large structures. Lumber, 
as so understood, is a further advancement in the prepara-
tion of the material for convenience and economy in transpor-
tation, and embraces such materials as are described in clause 
No. 219, Tariff Index, as "sawed boards, plank deals," joist, 
studdings, etc. Lumber, as so understood, is generic with 
reference to the kind of wood of which it may be composed, 
and if intended to he limited to any species of wood is qual-
ified by the name of the wood, as "pine lumber," "cherry 
lumber,"" ash lumber," etc. Hence, the.roahogany lumberre-
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ferred to in yours is included in the generic term ''lumber," 
and would, when merely sawed into boards and planks, come 
within the clause No. 219, Tariff Index, and is dutiable ac-
cordingly. 
The inclosures transmitted with yours are herewith re-
turned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND .. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
FREE LIST. 
A steam-pump and boring apparatus, used in deep prospecting for oil and 
coal, with connectmg iron tubes, etc., brought into this country by a 
coal and petroleum seeker for the purpose of pursuing his profession 
here, do not come within the meaning and intent of the clause in the 
act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, exempting from duty "implements, 
instruments, and tools of trade, occupation, or employment of persous 
arriving in the United States,'' and should not be admitted free. 
DEPAR1.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 29, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 21st instant submits whether" a 
steam-pump and a drilling and boring apparatus, such as is 
used for deep prospecting for oil and coal; certain iron tubes, 
varying in length from 12 to 25 feet each, and tools for u~e in 
connection therewith; which articles were brought into the 
United States by Leon Mulet, who is represented to be a coal 
and petroleum seeker, and brought them with him for the 
purpose of pursuing his profession in this country," should 
be admitted free under the provisions of the clause of the 
tariff act, Tariff Index No. 15, which is as follows: 
"Wearing apparel in actual use and other personal e:ftects 
(not merchandise), professional books, implements, instru-
ments, and tools of trade, occupation. or employment of per-
sons arriving in the United States; but this section shall not 
be construed to include machinery or other articles imported 
for use in any manufacturing establishment or for sale." 
It is claimed that the importation should be admitted free 
as the " implements, instruments, and tools of trade, occu-
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pation, or employment of persons arriving in the United 
States." 
The boring of artesian wells is closely allied in the variety 
of machinery, tools, apparatus, implements, appliances, and 
materials, to the driving of tunnels, engines, piping, tubing, 
pumps, reamers, bits, steam-boilers, cables, ropes, packing; 
and a very large assortment of different classes of manufact-
ure are used and are essential to its intelligent prosecution. 
In the use of a11 this material the employment of several per-
sons of varied acquirements and occupations is necessary. 
The steam-pump, piping, etc., are not intended for manual 
use, but constitute, when combined, usually a large and pow-
erful structure, which in no sense could be called a mere 
"tool, implement, or instrument." The profession which with 
this machinery undertakes to furnish or control the necessary 
structure, material, and human help is that of a constructor 
or superintendent. The clause in question was not intended 
to receive so broad an interpretation. From its context it 
would seem to apply to such implements, instruments, and tools 
as were intended for the actual per~onal use of the immigrant, 
or those following one and the same trade or occupation, 
'under his personal supervision or employment . . The employes 
in the boring of an artesian well belong to different occupa-
tions, varying from the common laborer to the skilled black-
smith, engineer, or driller. The implements, tools, apparatus, 
and structures for all the different classes of work, do not 
come within any single recognized trade, occupation, or em-
ployment. It is possible an exceptionally skilled mechanic 
or machinist might be capable of successfully working at 
each, but a true interpretation of the customs laws can not be 
based upon such exceptio:Jal cases; and, in my opinion, the 
pump, connecting pipes, etc., referred to in yours, should not 
be recognized as coming within the intent of the clause of 
the act above quoted. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE. 
In tbe act of June 19, 1878, chapter 329, which repeals section 1861, 
Revised Statues, the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing clerk, l1t 
$5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employment of 
but one clerk at the per diem mentioned. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 8, 1887. 
SIR: In reply to yours of the 29th ultimo, in which my 
attention is directed to the act of J une -19, 1878 (Stat. L., 
vol. 20, 193)! under the head ''Government in the Territo-
ries," repealing section 1861, Revised Statutes, I beg to say: 
Section 1861 reads thus: ''The subordinate officers of each 
branch of everJ' legislative assembly shall consist of one 
chief clerk, who shall receive a compensation of eight dollars 
per day, and of one assistant clerk, one enrolling clerk, one 
engrossing clerk, one sergeant-at-arms, one door-keeper, one 
messenger, and one watchman, who shall each receive a 
compensation of five dollars per day during the sessions, and 
no charge for a greater number of officers and attendants, 
or any larger per diem, shall be allowed or paid by the United 
States to any Territory." 
The repealing section of 1878 provides: "That the sub-
ordinate officers of each branch of said Territorial legislatures 
shall consist of one chief clerk, who shall receive a compen-
sation of six dollars per day; one enrolling and engrossing 
clerk, at five dollars per day; sergeant-at-arms. and door-
keeper, at five dollars per day; a messenger and watchman, 
at four dolla1 s per day each; and one chaplain at one dollar 
and fifty cents per day." 
Is the copulative "and" disjunctive or conjunctive in 
meaning in these phrases~ 
Section 1861 enumerates "one" enrolling clerk, one engross-
ing clerk, at five dollars per day," and makes provision for 
the payment of both. 
It is right to interpret the word "and" with a disjunctive 
meaning when such meaning entirely coincides with the rest 
of the statute and with the evident intention of the legisla-
ture. If there is evidence that a disjunctive meaning does 
not harmonize with the. whdle statute, and does not repre-
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sent the intention of the legislature, then such meaning is 
not admissible. 
The repealing act aims at a reduction of United States. ex-
penses, and this is the controlling idea. Another paragraph 
of this section provides for ';one messenger and watchman 
at four dollars per day each." The word '' each" makes the 
difference-being for two persons" one messenger and watch-
man." The word "each" was not used after ''one enrolling 
and engrossing clerk." 
If it intended to pay $5 to an enrolling clerk and $5 to an 
engrossing clerk, it was its duty to use similar language, 
namely, "one enrolling and one engrossing clerk at $5 per 
• day each." 
The legislature probably meant just what it said. 
Using the punctuation as it stands, there is no doubt that 
this is the meaning of the legislature. It is better for the 
accounting officers of the Treasury to adopt this punctuation. 
as mandatory in the settlement of Territorial accounts; and 
/it is better therefore to avoid misleading a disbursing agent 
into a loss, and this idea should prevail with the Territorial 
officers. 
This practical conclusion may not, however, be considered 
the legitimate conclusion. 
Does this punctuation express the meaning of the legisla-
ture~ 
The Supreme Court (105 U.S., 34, last paragraph) quotes 
the opinion of Lord Kenyon that '' courts in construing acts 
of Parliament or deeds should read them with such stops as 
will give effect to the whole." 
Applying this to the text in question, it will be seen that 
while this printed punctuation gives" effect to the whole" 
another punctuation leads to an opposite conclusion. 
If punctuation be disregarded the provision will read: 
" That the subordinate officers of each branch of said Ter-
ritorial legislatures shall consist of one chief clerk who shall 
receive a compensation of six dollars per day one enrolling 
and engrossing clerk five dollars per day sergeant-at-arms 
and door·keeper at :five dollars per day a messenger and 
watchman at four dollars per day each." 
This reading assigns a per diem of $5 each to an enrolling 
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clerk and an engrossing clerk-and conflicts with no lan-
guage of the act-allll it also gives ''effect to the whole." 
In this alternative of constructicn another criteriou wust 
be used, and that is the intention of the leg·islature, aud 
that being plainly to reduce expenses it must l>e determiued 
the law provides for only one clerk to enroll and engross at 
Government expense. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE IN1'ERIOR. 
CHINESE EXCLUSION• ACT. 
Body servants or nurses (Chinese) are not persons "other than laborers" 
within the meaning of section 6 of the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126, 
as amehded by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter·220, when they come to 
this country to ply their vocations, and are excluded . 
• Where, however, such servants or nurses accompany visitors entitled to 
enter the United States, and only remain here temporarily during the 
stay of such visitors, they do not fall within the scope of the legisla-
tion referred to. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Febrtttary 14, 1887. 
SIR: In reply to your communication sub!;llitting for opin-
ion the following questions : 
"(1) Whether body servants or nurses may be considered 
as persons 'other than laborers' within the meaning of sec-
tion 6; and (2) whether Chinese persons, laborers or not, 
coming into the United States as servants or nurses in the 
service of temporary visitors other than those mentioned in 
section 13 may properly be considered as 'in transit merely 
across the territory of the United States,' within the mean-
ing of these terms, as used in the opinion of the United States 
Attorney-General referred to in the inclosed circular of Jan-
nary 23, 1~83; " 
I have the honor to submit the following opinion: 
In answer to the first question I have to say that Chinese 
''body servants or nurses" are not persons other than labor-
ers, within the meaning of section 6 of the act of 1882, as 
amended by the act of 1884, entitled "An act to execute 
certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese," when such 
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"body servant~ or nursetS '' eome within the United States to 
plJ· their vocations in competition with our own people simi-
larl,y employed. 
In answer to the second question, I beg to submit that Chi-
nese persons accofllpanying, as servants or nurses, visitors 
entitled to enter the United States, and only temporarily re-
maining here during the stay of such visitors, whether to be 
regarded as "in transit merely across tbe territory of the 
United States," within the meaning of the opinion of Mr. 
Attorney-General Brewster of the 26th December, 1882, or 
not, they fall within a description of Ohinese laborers who, 
according to the reasoning of that opinion, were not intended 
to be excluded from the country by the legislation above 
mentioned. 
According to the opinion of my predecessor, it was the 
Chinese laborer, who came to · our shores for the purpose of 
exercising his calling as laborer in competition with our own 
labor, that was intended to be excluded as a disturbing ele-
ment. But it can ·not be said, in my opinion (concurring as 
I do in the views of my predecessor, whose reasoning I need 
not repeat) that a Chinese servant accompanying a temporary 
visitor to tbis country belongs to that class of Chinese la-
borers against whom our ports are closed as endangering 
"the good order of certain localities." 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TRElSURY. 
DRAGOON BARRACKS LOT AT ST. AUGUSTINE. 
The piece of land known as the Dragoon Barracks lot, in St. Augustine, 
Fla., and the buildings thereon, being the property of the United 
States, may be appraised and disposed of in the manner provid~d by 
the second and third sections of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 214. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
February H>, 1887. 
SIR: I have considered the communication of the assistant 
commissioner of the General Land Office, and other papers, 
relative to the Dragoon Barracks lot in St. Augustine, Fla., 
which were referred to me by yon on the 28th ultimo. 
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By these pape1·s it appears that said lot was set apart for 
military purposes under the act of June 28, 1t;32, cltapter 
152, and that recently, in accordance with the provisions uf 
the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 214, it has been turned over 
to the ~ecretary of the Interior for disposition under the 
latter act. In 1869 or 1870 a frame building was erected 
thereon by the Freedmen's Bureau for school purposes, and 
subsequently a cottage was built upon the premises for the 
accommodation of the teachers of the school, which has been 
turned over to the American Missionary Society for its use. 
This, however, did not alter the purpose of the reservation 
from what it originally was. It still rell}ained a military 
reservation, and as such came within the operation of the 
act of 1884. 
Assuming, then, that the ownership of the buildings men-
tioned, as well as the ownership of the land, is in the United 
States, the whole of the property may be appraised and dis-
posed of in the manner provided by the second and third 
sections of that act. On the other hand, if the ownership of' 
the buildings is not in the United States, but only that of 
the land, I am nevertheless of the opinion that the latter 
may be appraised and disposed of as provided by the second 
section of the same act. Of course, in such case, the pro-
prietors of the buildings should be notified to remove them 
from the premises. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SEIZURES IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY. 
Where property is seized by the military authorities in the Indian 
country for violation of the laws relating to the Indians, on or a~ soon 
as practicable after report is made to the United States attorney it 
should be placed in the custody of the proper civil offic~rs. 
The provision of section 3086, Revised Statutes, by which property 
seized under any law relating to the customs is left in the custody of 
the collector or principal officer of the customs of the district, is not 
to be considered as embraced in the prpceedings contemplated in sec-
tion 2125 Revised Statutes, so as to permit the military employed in 
making seizures to retain the custody rf the property to abide adjudi-
cation. 
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DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUS'l'ICE, 
February 16, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 8th instant requests my opinion 
.on the following question, contained in the communication 
of the -acting judge advocate of the Department of the Mis· 
souri: 
"In cases of arrest in the Indian territories, where civil 
proceedings only result, and when it is not deemed expedient 
to transport the prisoners arrested to the seat of the district 
court at Wichita, Kans., would it not be proper to hold the 
goods authorized by law to be seized, making to the district 
attorney the report required by section 3086, Revised Stat-
utes (customs officers), and hold these goods in custody abid-
ing the action of the civil authorities~" 
Section 2137, Revised Statutes, provides that the traps, 
guns, ammunition, aud peltries of persons found hunting, 
who are unauthorized to hunt or trap on Indian reservations, 
shall be forfeited. 
Section 2150 authorizes the President to employ the mili· 
tary to make such seizures as are authorized by law in the 
Indian country. 
Section 2125 provides : ''When goods or other property 
shall be seized for any violation of this title (Indians), it 
shall be lawful for the person prosecuting on behalf of the· 
United States to proceed against such goods or other property 
in the manner directed to be observed in the case of goods, 
wares, or merchandise brought into the United States iu 
violation of the revenue laws." 
Section 3086 declares that "all merchandise or property 
ol' any kind seized under the provisions of any law of the 
United States relating to the customs shall, unless otherwise 
provided for by law, be placed and remain in the custody of 
the collector or other principal officer of the customs of the 
district in which the seizure shall be made, to abide adjudi-
cation by the proper tribunal or other disposition according 
to law." 
The seizure suggested by the inquiry is the taking posses-
sion, without legal process, by the military forces, of the 
property believed by the Government officer or agent to be 
subject to forfeiture. This possession without process is in-
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tended to be limited in time to such reasonable period as 
may be necessary to obtain legal process to deterrniue by 
judicial proceedings in the civil courts whether the goods 
seized are liable to forfeiture. The proceedings in the civil 
courts are in rern, which implies the property to be passed 
upon is in the possession of the court, actually or construct-
ively. Hence, under the revenue laws of the United States, 
in interpreting the provisions of the sixty-ninth section of 
the revenue act of 1799 (1 Stat. L., 678), in the case of Ex parte 
Hoyt, collector (13 Peters, 279), it wa~ ruled: ''The collector . 
is not entitled to the custody of the goods seized under the 
collection act of 1799 any longer than until proper proceed-
ings have been ii1sLituted ulHler the eigbty-ninth section of 
that act to ascertain whether they are forfeited." 
This decision would, without further disetu;;sion, answer 
the inquiry submitted, were it not that section 3086, wllich 
supplied the place of the sixty-ninth section of the act of 
1799, differs from it in that it expressly provides that the 
merchandise seized shall ''remain in the custody of the col-
lector or other principal officer of the customs of the district 
in which the seizure shall be made, to abide adjudication by 
the proper tribunal, or other disposition according to law.'' 
But this change in the law of 1799 does not prescribe that 
the person or officer who makes the seizures shall retain the 
~custody, but limits it expressly to the collector or the prin-
·cipal officer of the customs, both of whom are local and bonded 
officers. If, then, the military who make the seizure are to 
reta;in the custody of the property SAized to abide official ad-
judication, it must be on some other ground than that the 
military forces were employed in the seizure; for, regardless 
of the fact as to whom the seizure may be made by, the col-
lector or principal officer of customs becomes the custodian. 
No othet sufficient reason exists. After the seizure, all pro-
ceediu gs as to the property are carried on by the civil officers 
of the Goverument. The employment of the military forces 
by the President to make the seizure, authorized as it is by 
the statute, is substantially the employment of the military 
outside of the ordinary duties of the Army, in a civil or quasi-
civil rlnty. 
The residence of the military forces is constantly liable to 
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change, and that change may be sudden aml to distant 
points, outside of the jurisdiction of the court where the 
z·iglltfulness of the seizure is required by law to be deter-
mined. The property seized or it8 proceeds, from the nature 
of the proceeding, must be so secured as to be constantly 
subject to the direct commands, orders, and decrees of the 
proper court, and in such hands that a failure to obey such 
orders or decrees can be directly and immediat.ely punished 
by the court. Were the custody of the. property left in the 
hands of the military forces, the danger of misunderstanding 
.and collision between the civil and military authorities 
would be incurred. The possibility that the property might 
,suddenly be carried beyond the jurisdiction of the court 
would be involved. 
From these considerations it is concluded that the special 
provision of section 3086, by which the property seized is 
left in the custody of the collector or priucipal officer of the 
·Customs for violation of the revenue service, i:s not to be con-
sidered as em braced in the proceedingR contemplated in 
section 2125, so as to permit the military forces employed in 
making seizures to retain the custody of the property t.o 
.abide adjudication, but that on or as soon as is reasonably 
practicable, after report is made to the United States district 
attorney, the property should be placed in the custody of the 
proper ciYil officer. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRE1.'ARY OF WAR. 
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS. 
A judgment against the United States for the sum of $44,800.74 was 
given by the Court of Claims in favor of a claimant on April 20, 1885, 
and on same day the latter presented this judgment to the Treasury 
Department for payment. On July 14, 1885, the United States were 
allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court, and on the next day a cross 
appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed the claimant. On January 
31,1887, the judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, and a man-
date subsequently issued therefrom ~lirecting the Court of Claims to 
enter judgment in favor of the claimant for the sum of $130,196.9tl. 
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Pursuant to such mandate judgment for this sum was entered by the 
Court of Claims on February 10, 1887, and claimant thereupon pre-
sented the judgment so entered to the Treasury Department for pay. 
ment, demanding interest ou the latter sum from April 20, 1885, at 5 
per cent. per annum: Held th-at as the judgment of the Court of 
Claims was not affirmed, but on the contrary was 1'e11ersed by the Su-
preme Court, interest is not allowable thereon under the provisions ot 
section lO~JO, Revised Statutes. 
Only such judgments of the Court of Claims as have been appealed 
from to the Supreme Court and affirmed by the latter are interest-
bearing under that s~ction, antl they become interest-bearing from the 
date of their presentation in good faith for payment. 
Semble that a presentation made by a claimant who afterwards takes 
an appeal from the judgment is of no avail. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 17, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the lOth instant, submits the follow-
ing: 
'" On the 20th day of April, 1885, in the Court of Claims, 
the Pacific Railroad, claimant, recovered a judgment against 
the United States for the sum of $44,800.74. On the 14th 
day of July, 1885, the United States applied for and gave 
notice of appeal from said judgment to the Supreme Court, 
which application was on the same day fully allowed by the 
Chief-Justice of the Court of Claims. On the 15th day of 
July, 1885, the claimant made a similar application that was 
also allowed. On the 20th day of April, 1885, the claimant 
presented this judgment to the Treasury Department for 
payment, and, on the ilth day of May, 1886, the same was 
reported to Congress for an appropriation, and a sufficient 
sum was appropriated to pay the same, without interest, 
which sum is now available for that purpose. These appeals, 
Nos. 728 and 1303 respectively, were duly docketed in the 
Supreme Court and prosecuted to a hea.ring therein, and on 
the 31st day of January, 1887, the judgment of the Court of 
Claims was reversed, and a mandate ordered directing the 
Court of Claims to enter judgment in favor of the claimant 
for the full amount of the claim, viz, $130,196.98. On the 
lOth day of February, 1887, judgment on the mandate was 
entered in the Court of Claims, and the judgment thereon 
presented for payment. The claimant now demands interest 
on the latter sum from the 20th day of April, 1885, the date 
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of the first judgment in the Court of Claims, at 5 per centum 
per annum, and asks the Department that a recommendation 
ue made to Congress that an appropriation be made to cover 
such interest. As a matter of law, based on the foregoing 
facts and existing statutes, is the claimant entitled to any 
interest whatever; and if so, for what sum, and for what 
period?" 
The general rule is, that the Government does not pay in-
terest. The exceptions to this rule are, when interest is pro-
vided for specifically by lawtul contract or by express statute 
law. The canon of construction, that all laws which give 
away public money are to be construed strictly against the 
party to whom it is given, must be applied in the const,ruc-
tion of statutes allowing interest against the Government. 
The statute allowing interest on judgments of :the Court of 
Claims, applicable to the questions presented in your letter, 
is section 1090, Revised Statutes, viz: "In cases where the 
judgment appealed from is in fayor of the claimant, and the 
same is affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest thereon at 
the rate of 5 per centum shall be allowed from the date of 
its presentation to the Secretary of tbe Treasury for payment 
as aforesaid, but no interest shall be allowed subsequent to 
the affirmance unless presented for payment to the Secretary 
of the Treasury as aforesaid." 
The clause ~'as aforesaid," twice occurring in thise sction, 
refers to the preceding section (1089), which fixes what judg-
ments of the Court of Claims shall be paid by the Secretary 
of the Treasury, and what evidence shall be presented to him 
before he is warranted in making payment. This section 
divides the judgments of the Court ofUlaim~ into two classes: 
the first, those which are not appealed to the Supreme Court; 
and second, those which are appealed and affirmed. Section 
1090 allows interest on the latter class onl~·. Judgments of 
this class affirmed, become interest-bearing from the date 
they are certified in legal form and duly presented by the 
claimant for payment. The necessary elements of the indebt-
edness fixed by the statute authorizing the payment of in· 
terest by the Government are: 
(1) It must be a judgment of the Court of Claims. 
(2) It must be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
550 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Interest on Judgments of the Court of Claims. 
(3) It muot be affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
( 4) It. must be a final judgment of the Court of Claims. 
(5) It must be presented duly certified for p~yment. 
Until all these requisites have been complied with, the· 
judgment bears no interest. The facts stated by you show 
that the claim presented is a judgment of the Court of Claims, 
and that it was appealed both by the United States and the 
claimant to the Supreme Court. The .first two conditions are 
complied with. The third, under the facts stated and certifi-
cate presented, is not fulfilled. The certificate presented by 
the claimaut, by virtue of which he demands interest, is as 
follows: ".At a Court of Claims held in the city of Washing-
ton ou the 9th day of February, 1887, in the cause aforesaid,. 
a mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States was 
filed reversin the judgment of the Court of Claims rendered 
on the 20th day of .April, 1885, for the claimant in the sum of 
$44,800.74, and directing that judgment be entered for the full 
amount claimed by said railway company; and, in pursuance 
of said mandate, the court now orders, adjudges, and de-
crees that the said claimant, the Pacific Railway Company,do 
have and recover of and from the United States the sum of 
$130,196.98." 
This copy of the judgment is all you have before you. It 
is all the statute requires you shall have to act upon. The 
statute says you shall only pay interest on judgments affirmed. 
The certified copy of the judgment shows this judgment was 
reversed. It is not permissible to take such liberties with the 
language of the statute as to interpret the word "affirmed" as 
meaning" reversed." Neither can you assume to construe the 
word "reversed," in the certificate, into the word "affirmed," 
used in the statute. As stated by .Attorney-General Black, 
in 9 Opinions, 59: "But if Congress has all the money of the 
United States under its control, it has the whole English lan-
guage to giveitawaywith, and it is so easy to usede.finiteterms 
iu a law like this that when they were not used we will pre-
tsume them not meant." If Congress had intended the wonl::; 
''affirmed" in the statute and" reversed" iu the certified COJJ.Y 
of the judgment to be construed by you as synonymous it 
would have said so. 
With full recognition of the learning and due defer~nce for 
I 
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the opinion of the Court of Claims, I am unable to concur in 
\ 
the conclusions reached by tha.t court in the case of Ho'bbs v. 
The United States (19 C. Cls. R., 226). I cannot conceive that 
Congress intended the office1s of the Treasury, when a judg-
ment came duly certified for payment, to enter into an analy-
sis of that judgment, and allow interest on such part or parts 
thereof as the Supreme Court concurred in the view of the 
lower court, and refuse to allow on those which were modi-
fied or added thereto. In a case involving any items, this 
analysis would be very onerous. In many cases it would im-
pose on the administrative officer the interpretation of de-
crees requiring a high order ofjudieial knowledge and much 
research. It would lead to great uncertainty in administra-
tion. When it is further considered that the law has limited 
the evidence submitted to you to the record of the judgment 
only, which furnishes neither the opinion nor :fiudings of the 
Court of Claims, nor the opinion nor action of the Supreme 
Court specifically on the several findings, it seems obvious 
that the plain fact of what the judgment is, and the result 
set out in the copy presented, without any analysis or subdi-
vision, is to l)e the sole guide in determining whether interest, 
so far as this question is concerned, is to be charged or not. 
When the Supreme Oourt declar,· s the judgment is reversed, 
it must be accepted as reversed; when it declares the judg-
ment is affirmed, that fact is not open to question. If re-
versed it bears no interest; if affirmed, and the other require-
ements exist, it bears interest. In this case, the certified 
copy shows the judgment reversed; tllerefore it bears no 
interest. 
The conclusion thus reached on the third element essen-
tial to constitute an interest-bearing judgment disposes of 
the whole case submitted; but it may be added, before allow-
ing interest on judgments, the rema·ining two necessary 
facts above mentioned must be shown to exist, for section 
1092 provides that '"The payment of the amount due by any 
jndgrnent of the Court of Claims, and of any interest thereon 
allowed by law as Lereinbefore provided, shall be a full dis-
cllarge to the United States of all claims and demands touch-
ing any of the matters involved in the controversy." 
That the payment ''shall be a full discharge" of the whole 
\ 
552 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Customs Duties. 
controversy clearly implies that, so long as the controversy 
is stiil pending, with the possibility of increase in amount, 
the payment was not intended to be made. The law can not 
properly be regarded as intending that a dew and on the Sec-
retary of the Treasury for the payment of that which he could 
not fully discharge by payment, and which he is forbidden 
to pay unless fully discharged,. should be such a default on 
the part of the Government as would subject it to interest. 
By the statute the claimant is not authorized to present his 
judgment only to comply with a mere unsubstantial form, 
by demanding that which can not be done, and which the act 
of the complainant under the law prevented compliance with, 
in order to enable him to draw interest from that date. The 
complainant must present it in good faith for payment. If 
it is presented for any other purpose it is not such a presen-
tation as the statute req aires. Hence, I apprehend it is only 
where the payment of the judgment of the Court of Claims 
appealed from is left as final aud undisturbed by an affirm-
ance by the Supreme Court, and a copy of the judgment has 
been duly presented for payment, that interest runs from the 
date of presentation. But when the claimant himself within 
the niuety days takes his appeal after presentation, it is such 
evidence that tbe presentation was not made for payment, 
but as a means to secure interest on his claim, as would 
make such presenting of his claim of no avail. 
The papers with yours transmitted are herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
The article known as" Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder" is dutiable at 
50 per centum ad valorem, under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 
DEP lt.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant requests, substantially, 
my views as to the construction of clause No. 99, Tariff In-
dex of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, with reference to the 
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appeal of R. Francklyn & Co. from the assessment of duty 
<HI an importation of "Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder.'' 
If those portions of the clause which have no direct bear-
ing be eliminated, it provides: "All powders recommended 
to the public as proprietary articles, or prepared according 
to some private formula as remedies or specifics for any 
disease or diseases or affections whatever afi'ecting the human 
or animal body~ not specifically enumerate<l or provided for 
in this act, fifty per centum ad valorem." 
With reference to the last sentence in this clause, it is only 
necessary to say the importation is not elsewhere in the act 
specifically provided for; and if not dutiable under the 
:elause, it would be subject to the provisions of section 2513, 
as non-enumerated. That the importation is a powder is un-
disputed. The collector of the port of New York, with his 
communication of the 24th of November, 1886, furnishes a 
pamphlet taken from an importation of the powder, pre-
pared by the manufacturer and intended for distribution 
with the goods imported, which contains the purpose for 
which the article was made and the uses for which it is 
recommended, with testimonials as to its utility and effi-
ciency. If the statements and testimonials furnished by the 
manufacturer be true as set forth in this pamphlet, they 
establish all the facts necessary to subject the importation 
to the provisions of the clause quoted above. The whole 
pamphlet has for its purpose the recommendation of the pow-
der. It alleges that William Cooper and nephews are the 
''sole proprietors and manufacturers" of this powder. It 
advertises it by the proprietary name of ''Cooper's Sheep 
Dipping Powder." It describes it as having a character of 
its own, distinct from all other competing preparations. It 
claims an especial merit from the particular mode of manu-
facture. It cautions the public against spurious imitations. 
It seems to have all the characteristics to constitute it a pro-
prietary article, · as that term is defined in the case of Fergu-
son v. Arthur (117 U.S. R., 488.) On page 5 of the pam-
phlet, after quoting other advertisements concerning other 
cures for "scab in sheep," it claims especial merit as a '" spe-
cific for scab." It expressly declares'' Cooper's Dip has al-
ways been a certain specific for scab at ordinary strength." In 
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describing "scab in sheep'' the pamphlet d~clares it ' 6 a dis-
ease * * * working fearful havoc;" a" fearfully virulent 
and infectious disease;" a "terribly formidable disease;" and 
dEscribes the disease as one of "an insidious and virulent 
nature." The testimonials printed seem to corroborate tllese 
statements. If these statements be true, the powder is 
dutiable as assessed. 
The ground taken by the importer, that "disease" and 
"affection" are synonymous in strictly scientific lang·uage, 
does not relieve the importation from the effect of the enact-
ment; for the word is in popular use, and, as is ruled in the 
case of Maillard v. Lawrence (16 How., ~61), "the popular 
or received import of words furnish the general rule fo!' the 
interpretation of public laws, as well as of private and per-
sonal .trausactions." It is clear from the language of the en-
actment itself, '• disease or diseases or affections whatever 
affecting the human or animal body," that, if the words be 
synonymous, the term "dl's€ase" was intended to be inter-
preted in the broadest generic sense. As popularly under-
stood in this sense, the people do not stop before using the 
term ~o inquire whether s~entifically an ailment was caused 
by a microscopically small insect under the skin or among 
the tissues of the body, or was the result of poisonous gas 
inhaled through the lungs. The fact that it is not produced 
by perceptible actual external violence, and is harmful to 
health, and may occasion suffering or death, is sufficient to fill 
the popular definition of "disease" as used in the statute. 
The second ground assumed by the importer, that the 
powder is a prevention of the scab and not the cure, in that 
it only kills the insects that are alleged to cause the disease, 
is not tenable. One of the main purposes of any remedy for 
disease is to remove the cause, so that the health-restoring 
powers of nature may overcome the effect. It is not at all 
inconsistent with the character of a remedy for, that it is a 
preventive as well of the disease. It may be both ; and if 
the allegations of the manufacturer be true, the powder de-
scribed in this importation is both. He claims it will kill the 
insect before the scab has resulted, and it will cure the scab 
after it has developed, b.v remodng from under the skin the 
cause which produced it, so as to permit the recuperatiYe 
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powers of nature to assert themselves with effect. To de-
stroy an agent harmful to health befOie it is attached to or 
bas affected the body is to prevent-to destroy it after it has 
penetrated the body and produced effects which will be per-
petuated and progressive in the body and baleful to health, 
is an ordinary means to cure. 
Hence, it is concluded no sufficient reason appears to ex-
ist to warrant a change in your former ruling, No. 7472, on 
substantially the samR questions involved in this appeal. 
Very respectfully, 
A.H.GARLAND • ., 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHEROKEE STRIP. 
The lands lying in the "Cherokee Strip" which are leased to the whites 
are not lands of the United States within the meaning of section 5388, 
Revised Statutes. 
The woru "foreigner,'; in section 2134, Revised Statute3, i8 used in its 
ordinary signification-meaning one who is born out of the United 
States and is not naturalized, or who owes allegiance to any other gov- . 
ernment than that ofthe United States. 
Property seized by the military under the provisions of section 2137, 
Revised Statutes, should, as soon as practicable, after report of seizure 
to the United States attorney, be placed in the custody of the proper 
civil officers. 
Section 5388, Revised Statutes, makes no provision for seizure of prop-
erty belonging to a wrong-doer. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1887. 
SIR : By your letter of the 18th instant, you request my 
opinion on three questions: 
The first is, HAre the lands leased to the whites in Cher-
.okee Strip lands of the United States referred to in section 
5388, Revised Statutes, or otherwise~" 
The Cherokee Strip referred to in your inquiry, I assume, , 
is the land described in the seventeenth article of the treaty 
of the 19th of June, 18G6 (14 Stat., 804), by which the land 
therein described is ceded to the United States in trust as 
set forth in the treaty. Section 5388 is almost a literal re-
enactment of the act of the 3d of March, 1859, the title to 
which is "An act to protect the timber growing upon lands 
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of the United States reserved for military and other pur-
poses." The enactment in its terms limits its provisions to 
lands "which, in pursuance of law, may be reserved or pur-
chased for military or other purposes." The section being 
highly penal, the reservation or purchase contemplated 
therein must be for some specific national purpose or use of 
the United States. The beneficiary of the proceeds of the 
land contained in the strip, by virtue of the provisions of the 
trust, is the Cherokee tribe of Indians. When the United 
States became the trustee the purpose of the trust was, and 
siill js, the sale of the lands according to the terms of the 
treaty. This is not such a purpose or reservation for the use 
of the United States as is contemplated by section 5388, re-
ferred to in your first inquiry. 
Your second inquiry js, '' What does the word' foreigner' 
embrace in section 2134, Revised Statutes~" 
The word referred to embraces those who are born out of 
the United States, who are not naturalized, and who owe 
allegiance to any other Government than that of the United 
States; an alien. It is used in its ordinary signification. 
This section was originally enacted as the sixth section of 
the act of the 30th of June, 1834 (4 Stat., 730). The fifteenth 
section of the same act imposes the same penalty prescriued 
by this section on any citizen or other person residing among 
the Indians who shall carry on correspondence with any for-
eign power to incite any Indian nation to war against the 
United States. This fifteenth section described specifically 
the mischief which was intended to be guarded against by 
the sixth section. The history of the early days of theRe-
public inspired the belief that many of the Indian wars and 
outbreaks were instigated by the influence of aliens un- . 
friendly to the Government. This induced the policy of 
forbidding access to the Indian tribes for foreigners without 
passports from the proper Government official. Section 2134 
was originally enacted in pursuance of that policy, and was 
literally re-enacted in the Revised Statutes. In the context, 
·both in the Revised Statutes and in the act of 1834, when 
others beside foreigners are intended to be embraced, the 
language "any person other than an Indian" is used. In 
the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (5 ·Peters) it is ruled 
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"An Indian tribe or nation witilin tile United States is not a 
foreign state within tile meaning of sect,ion 2 of the third 
article of the Constitution." ''They may more correctly, 
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations." From 
this it would seem to follow that a citizen of the United 
States is not described as a foreigner as to the Indian 
tribes resident in the United States, in the legislation of the 
National Government. 
Your third inquiry is: ''Can timber, hunting traps, etc., 
seized under the provisions of sections 5388 and 2137, Re-
vised Statutes, be held by the militars to await the result of 
prosecution, as in the case of goods seized by custom-house 
officers 1" 
By reference to my letter of the 16th of February, 1887, 
you will find the subject involved in this question fully con· 
sidered. The result there reaclled is that property seized by 
the military under the provisions uf section 2137 should, as 
soon as is reasonably practicable after report of the seizure 
shall have been made to the United States district attorney, 
be placed in the custody of the proper civil officer. Section 
5388 makes no provision for seizure of the property which 
belongs to a wrong-doer, but subjects him to the penalties of 
:fine and imprisonment. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
INDIAN IMMIGRATION. 
A body of Indians bom and dwelling outside of the territorial limits of 
the United States, and still maintaining their tribal relations, can not, 
without authority of Congress, enter upon and occupy our public 
domain as emigrants. 
The power of tlie President to set apart a portion of the public domain 
for the exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include the case of a 
reservation for Indians not born or commorant in the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 28, 1877. 
SIR: Your letter of the 24th instant, with the accompany-
ing inclosures, presents for consideration the statement that 
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a body of about one thousand Indians, who are natives of 
and residents within the limits of Briti~Sh Columbia, about 
20 miles from the line of Alaska, who ha\'e attained an ad-
vanced state of civilization, are self-supporting, and are 
organized into a community governed by a council, wish to 
emigrate into Alaska. You inquire, "Whether the Indians 
as alJove described can go into Alaska as emigrants and then 
secure such rights alS are accorded to the residents of th9.t 
Territory who are not Indians; and as they wish to go as a 
colony, whether, under existing laws, it would be competent 
for the Presideilt to set aside as a reservation for such colony 
such reas()nable portion of unoccupied land in that Territory 
as they may select for their location." 
Immigration of peaceful iudividual Indians who have dis-
solved tribal relations is not prohibited by statute and is 
not inconsistent with the general policy of our Government, 
but a band of Indians boru within the United States, who 
maintain their tribal relations, is regarded by the law sub-
stantially as an independent domestic nation under the 
guardianship of the United States. If such tribe be born and 
reside outside of the United States, and still maintains the 
tribal or national character, it can not be entitled to emigrate 
and locate on public lauds of the Government; for the very 
fact of a national existence implies possession of a place of 
habitation, laws, customs, or traditions vf government, with 
some or all of the attrilJutes of a body politic. Such a 
people thus organized, locating upon a body of public lands, 
would exclude such occupancy and enjoyment as is contem-
plated by our land laws by such persons as are entitled to 
purchase and appropriate, or subject them to usages, customs, 
and traditions inconsistent with the general laws. The per-
manent guardianship or supervision of such a domestic de-
pendent nation can not be assumed by the executive depart-
ment of the Government without the authority of positive 
laws, except as to those Indians who are born within the 
United States. If the Indians referred to in yours should 
as distribed individual Indians immigrate, the rights of 
such individual Indians would not in any respect rise higher 
that those of any other foreigner, and they would be much 
less than foreign white emigrants, lJecause the provision of 
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law for naturalization would not apply to them. The pro-
visions of the homestead law, by the fifteenth section of the 
act of the 3d of March, 1875 (18 Stat., 420), which extended 
the benefits of the homestead law to Indians who have aban-
doned the tribal relation properly qualified, is limited in its 
operations to Int1ians ~'born iil the United States." The pro-
viso to the eighth section of the act of the 17th of May, 1884 
(23 Stat., 26), only reserves in Alaska the rights of Indians 
and other persons then in possession or claiming lands 
therein. There seems to be no provision of law assuring to 
suchioreign Indians any legal right to acquire lands. The 
geueralland laws of the United States, except the mining 
laws, have not been extended to Alaska. The President, 
then, can not by virtue of any necessity arising in the ad-
ministration of those laws set aside a reservation. His power 
to declare permanent reservation for Indians to the exclu-
sion of others on the public domain does not extend to In-
dians not born or resilient in the United States. The case 
you submit does not c me within the scope of any power 
granted to the Executive; but while the present policy of the 
Government and tendency of legislation is to aid and en-
courage the Indian tribes to advance in civilization and en-
lightenment, so that at no distant period they may be qualified 
to become a part of the homogeneous mass of the American 
people, skilled and educated in the arts of peace, with all 
the rights and privileges of citizenship, if the case submitted 
be one properly the subject of relief, that relief must be sought 
at the hands of Congress. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
• 
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REGISTRY OF VESSELS. 
A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in form 
or burden in a foreign port may be registered anew on her arrival in 
t,he United States; but the new registry can not be made unless the 
ship and owners conform to the requirements necessary for an original 
registry. 
If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the vessel 
as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it was built iu 
the United States it would not be entitled to registry. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 4, 1887. 
SIR: I understand from your letter of the 24th of Feb-
ruary, 1887, with the papers therewith transmitted, that Peter 
Wright and son desire to register as "a vessel of the United 
States" the steam-ship Ohio, and with reference thereto yon 
ask my opinion as to "whether a vessel of the United States, 
sent abroad for alteration in form or burden in a foreign 
port other than a lake port, may be registered as a vessel of 
the United States anew on her arrival in the United States.'' 
The law with reference to the registry of vessels is stat-
utory. The essential requisites of a vessel, tC! authorize an 
original registry, are set forth in the second section of the 
act of the 31st of December, 1792, which was substantially 
re-enacted as section 3142 Revised Statutes, and so far asap-
plicable to the case submitted are as follows : ''Vessels built 
within the United States and belonging wholly or in part to 
citizens thereof * * * may be registered." 
The Ohio was built in the United States, regularly regis-
tered according to law, and was and yet appears to be owned 
wholly by a corporation of citizens of the United States. The 
fact that she was and is now registered as a vessel of the 
United States is sufficient ground for a presumption that all 
the facts necessary to warrant registry existed. But a change 
has been or is about to be made by repairs or alterations to 
the vessel in Glasgow, Scotland. She is undergoing re-
newals or alterations in her boiler and machinery; the deck-
houses on her spar-deck are to be extended and the cabin 
below removed, which will increase the carrying capacity 
of the vessel. Under the provisions of section 4170, Revised. 
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Statutes, which also was originally enacted in 1'f92, such 
changes will require a new measurement and a new registry. 
The real question to be answered is : Do the changes de-
scribed, being made in Scotland, preclude the registry as " a 
vessel of the United States¥" 
The general rule of law is, a ship is always presumed the 
same though all the materials which at first had given it 
existence have been succesRively changed; though all the 
mern bers of a body or its parts are changed through the lapse 
of time, nevertheless by force of substitution the body is still 
presumed the sawe; it is always the same people, the same 
Senate, the same legion, the same edifice, the same flock, the 
sawe ship (Emerigon, Insu., pp. 144, 145). How far is this 
general principle affected by our law in reference to the 
registry of vessels t 
Section 4170, Revised Statutes, so far as relevant to this 
inquiry, is: ''Whenever any vessel which has been regis-
tered is altered in form or burden, by being lengthened or 
built upon, or from one denomination to another, by the mode 
or method of rigging or fitting, the vessel shall be registered 
anew by her former name, according to the directions here-
inbefore contained, otherwise she shall cease to be deemed a 
vessel of the United States." 
This section would seem to very accurately describe the 
changes that are made, or to be made, in the Ohio. If the 
changes were made in the United States instead of Scotland, 
the vessel, without doubt, would be entitled to registry as 
the 8ame vessel with the same name. To allow new registry 
the section does not require that the alteration or change 
shall be made in the United States. In the interpretation 
of section 4170, the words" in the United States," can not 
be added so as to have it read "or is altered in form or bur-
den in the United States." Such a change would be legis-
lation and not interpretation. It would very materially 
change the statute as written. The navigation act may well 
require, to encourage ship-building, that no vessel shall be 
entitled to the provisions of registry as a vessel of the United 
States unless built in the United States; but to declare, 
with a knowledge of the perils of the sea and the vicissitudes 
of distant navigation, that any or every alteration or refit-
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ting of the vessel, after it has been built or launched, should 
forfeit the rights of registry and denationalize the ship, would 
be quite a difl"erellt matter, and one that should not be in-
corporated into the navigation laws by mere int('.rpretation. 
That the general navigation laws were not to bear such a 
construction is shown by the fact that the twenty-third sec-
tion of the act of the 28th of July, 1866, re·enacted as sec-
tion 3114, Revised Statutes, provides specially for the le,·y-
ing of duties on the value of repairs, refittings, etc., in a 
foreign country of vessels licensed under the laws of the 
United States on the northern, northeastern, and north-
western frontiers foreign or coasting trade; but no implica· 
tion is contained in the act that such repairs should forfeit 
the right to license as to vessels so repaired. If, in connec-
tion with this, it be borne in mind that section 4312, ReYised 
Statutes, originally enacted in 1793, requires the same quali-
fications for the enrollment of such vessels for such tra<le as 
are required by law for registry for general foreign trade, 
the inference is strong that mere repairing in a foreign 
.country is not such a change in the ship as to prPclude 
registry. But section 4170 does require that the applicant 
·for new registry shall comply with "the directions herein-
before contained." The directions referred to are tl.wse con-
tained in the act of 1792 as re enacted. The new registry 
can not be made unless the ship and owners conform to the 
requirements necessary for an original registry, and furnish 
the e\' ittence in conformit~· to law. If the refitting, altering, 
or repairing in the foreign country amounts to such a sub-
stantial rebuilding of the ship as that the owner could not 
truthfully make the oath that she was built in the United 
States, such a ship would not be entitled to registry; but if 
the modification, alteration, or repairing leaves the main 
structure substantially identical so that it can truthfully be 
regarded b~· those familiar with maritime afhtirs as an altera-
tion or repairing· only, and not a substantially new construe 
tion, when considered as a whole, it may rightfully, upon 
compliance with the other requirements of the navigation 
laws, be granted a new registry. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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LEMHI INDIAN RESERVATION. 
Where Indians on a reservation made by order of the President are or-
ganized tribes or bands, and placed under the charge of an agent ap-
pointed by the Government, the laws applicable to Indian reservations 
must be regarded as applicable to t.hem. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 7, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 1st of March, 1887, with the in-
closed papers, presents a petition by Charles H. Thompson, 
in behalf of a mining company which he represents, asking 
you to make an order directing the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs "to instruct the agent in charge of the Lemhi Indian 
Reservation" that be is not to interfere with the petitioner 
or prevent him from constructing H a ditch from a point on 
the Lemhi River, within the reservation, through a part of 
the reservation, for the purpose of carrying water from the 
river for use below for mining and agricultural purposes." 
It is Rtated the division of the water and the right to dig 
the canal or ditch would be useful to the petitioners and bene-
ficial in its effect to the Indians. These same facts exist in 
many cases where one man could use his neighbor's property 
with advantage both to himself and his neighbor; bu't still, 
as a rule, it is better to maintain the rights of property under 
the law. All the questions involved in this case are substan-
tially answered by an opinion rendered to your Department, 
July 21, 1885. 
But tbe petitioners allege the reservation is not a legal one, 
and in consequence thereof the Indians for whom the reser-
vation was made are only tenants at will of the Government. 
But the rights of tenants at will, so long as the landlord does 
not elect to determine the tenancy, are as sacred as those of 
a tenant in fee. If the reservation is not authorized by law, 
on dispossessing the Indians by the Government the land 
would be subject to the general laws applicable to the public 
domain; but while Indians in a reservation made by order 
of the President are organized in tribes or bands, and as such 
maiutain a quasi-national character; are placed under the 
charge of an agent appointrd by the Government according 
to law; and are in the actual peaceable possession, the laws 
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applicable to Indian reservations must be recognized as ap-
plicable to them. In the case of Purnpelly v. Green Bay Com-
pany (13 Wall, 166), the principle is ruled that taking such 
privileges as are asked by the petitioner would be the exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain. 
Attorney-General Devens, in an opinion reported in 16 
Opinions, page 553 (in which I concur), maintained that the 
United States had power to grant such privileges as are 
asked for by the petitioner in this case; but the power to make 
the grant exists only in Congress, and without action by Con-
gress it can not be lawfully exercised. The conclusion then 
is, in the absence of Congressional action, the right should 
not be granted to the petitioners in this case to enter upon 
the Lemhi Reservation, unless the Indians be lawfully re-
moved or dispossessed. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SEORETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SHIPPING. 
Vessels used exclusively for pleasure, and not carrying freight or passen-
gers for pay, are not liable to the penalty prescribed in section 4371, 
Revised Statutes. 
Nor are such vessels, when navigating waters of the United States be-
tween district and district, or between different places in the same 
district, subject to the duties prescribed by section 4219, Revised 
Statutes. · 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 10, 1887: 
SIR: By your letter of the 24th February, 1887, you ask 
my opinion as to "whether foreign-built or domestic vessels, 
undocumented under the laws of the United States and used 
exclusively for pleasure, and therefore not carrying freight 
or passengers for pay, are en titled, if owned by American 
citizens, to proceed in waters of the United States between 
district and district, or between different places in the same 
district, without becoming liable to the dues and penalties 
mentioned in sections 4371 and 4219 of the Revised Statutes, 
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and section 7 of the act of June 19, 1886, on their arrival at a 
port of the United States." 
The penalties mentioned in section 4371 as well as section 
7 of the act of the 19t'h of June, 1886, are, by the terms of· 
the enactments, imposed upon and limited to vessels found 
"trading between district and district." The statutes, being 
penal, are not to be enlarged by interpretation. While the 
very enlarged sense in which "trade" is used by lexicogra-
phers and poets may possibly include the mere pursuit of 
pleasure as a relaxation or amusement within the term 
''trading," such is not its common and commercial significa-
tion. In this latter sense the statute should be construed. 
The act of the 7th of August, 1848, reproduced as section 
4214 of the Revised Statutes, and re-enacted and amended 
by the act of the 3d of March, 1883 (22 Stat., 566), indicates 
that a vessel exclusively used only for that purpose, and 
which carried no passengers nor freight, is not embraced in 
the term " trading " as used in section 4371. This last sys-
tem of legislation originates and recognizes a class of v.essels 
used exclusively for pleasure, or by competition to inspire 
improvement in construction and navigation, as one distin-
guished from trade. It relieves the vessels in this new class, 
when properly documented, from the obligation of entry and 
clearing at the custom-houses. Section 4371 only includes 
those '~found trading." The vessels described in yours are 
vessels constructed for pleasure and not trade, and are there-
fore not subject to the penalties prescribed in section 4371. 
'rhe portion of section 4219 to be considered in reply to 
your inquiry is: "Upon vessels which shall be entered in the 
United States from any foreign port or place there shall be 
paid duties as follows : On vessels built within the United 
States, but belonging wholly or in part to subjects offoreign 
powers, at the rate of thirty cents per ton ; on other vessels 
not of the United States, at the rate of fifty cents per ton. 
Upon every vessel not of the United States which shall be 
entered in one district from another district, having on board 
goods, wares, or merchandise, taken in one district to be 
delivered in another district, duties shall be paid at the rate 
of fifty cents per ton." 
The vessels described in the first clause of this statute are 
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those "which shall be entered in the United States from any 
foreign port." This is inapplicable to the subject submitted 
by you, which is confined to vessels" proceeding in waters 
of the United States between district and district, or between 
different places in the same district." The vessels described 
in the second clause are those "having on board goods, 
wares, or merchandise taken in one district to be delivered 
in another district." This clause is not applicable to the 
character of the vessels described in your letter, the lan-
guage of which is, such as are" used exclusively for pleasure, 
and therefore not carrying freight -or passengers for pay." 
The vessels described in yours I understand to mean those 
"not having on board goods, wares~ or merchandise, taken 
in one district to be delivered to another." Therefore the-
duties prescribed by section 4219 are not collectible thereon. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CRUISERS CHICAGO, BOSTON, AND ATLANTA. 
The unexpended balances of the appropriations made by the act of 
March 3, 1883, chapter 97, under the beadings" Bureau of Construction 
and Repair," and "Bureau of Steam Engineering," may be n~:oed in 
completing the bulls and machinery of the cruisers Chicago, Boston, 
and Atlanta, proviG.ed the total expenditure shall not exceed the total 
estimated cost thereof, as reported by the Naval Advisory Board. 
The balance of an appropriation made for a specific purpose may be used 
for that purpose in the discharge of obligations imposed by a lawful 
continuous contract; 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 12, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the lOth instant submits for my opin-
ion the following questions: 
"First. Whether the available balances of general appro-
priations under the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
and Steam Engineering, or a sufficieut portion thereof, can 
or ean not be lawfully put to use in or toward the completion 
of the un:fini~hed cruisers known as the Chicago, Boston, and 
Atlanta. 
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"Second. Whether thea,ailable balances of the appropria-
tions under the respective heads of Bureau of Construction 
and Repairs and Bureau of Steam Engineering can be used 
in completing the bulls and machinery of the Chicago, Boston, 
and Atlanta, provided tbe total expenditure shall not exceed 
the total el:'timated cvst of the hulls of said vessels as re-
ported by the Naval Advisory Doard." 
On the 26th day of July, 1883, the Secretary of the Navy 
made a contract with John Roach for the building of three 
cruisers, the Chicago, Atlanta, and Boston, and dispatch boat 
Dolphin. That contract was authorized by an act of Con-
gress of the 3d of March, 18H3 (22 Stat., 477). The contract 
was reported in full to Congress by the Secretary of the Navy 
in his report of the 1st day of December, 1883 (Report, p. 56). 
It was recognized by name and description by Congress in 
an appropriation made in pursuance of it, in an act of the 
7th of J ulJ, 1884 (13 Stat., 262). The act of the 3d of March, 
1883, contemplated a continuous contract, for which the esti-
mate for tbe vessels made according to express statutory re-
quirements, for the hulls and machinery, was $3,:390,000. The 
appropriation for the year ending J nne 30, 1884, including 
the expenditures of the balances of general appropriations 
for construction and repair, was $1,340,000. As this appro-
priation was so far below the estimate, the inference arises 
that the contract was intended by the original authorization 
to be continuous. The contract as made and reported to 
Congress was continuous. Its obligatory covenants ran to 
the building and finishing of the vessels as to their hulls and 
machinery. 
The seventh paragraph of the contract provides for the 
completion of the vessels for delivery on or within eighteeu 
montbs from its date, and for a lien thereon to insure their 
completion and indemnify tbe Government. 
The eleventh paragraph provides for the enforcement of 
the lien by forfeiture for breach. 
The twelfth paragraph providts for the completion of the 
vessels by the Secretary of the Navy in case of forfeiture, 
with right to take possession of the yard, plant, and tools 
of Roach, the contractor, for that purpose. 
The thirteenth provides that the work on the vessels shall 
568 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Cruisers Chicago, Boston, and Atlanta. 
be proceeded with when so forfeited without unnecessary 
delay to completion; that if the cost~ of completion exceed 
the contract price, John Roach and his sureties shall make 
up the difference; and if, after completion and payment of 
the outlay thereon, any balance shall appear in favor of the 
contractor it shall be paid him. In pursuance of these pro-
visions of the contract the vessels have become the property 
of the United States, unfinished, and their completion under 
the contract is an urgent continuous obligation of the Gov-
ernment, whose discharge is imposed .on the Navy Depart-
ment. It has therefore become the duty of the United States 
to finish the construction of the vessels, which now belong 
to the General Government and are unfinished. 
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Opin., 3), on the 9th of Octo-
ber, 1854, in discussing the subject of unexpended balances 
of appropriations, states: 
''Now the rule of construction and the practice of the 
Government is believed to be universal as applied to ap-
propriations: that where a contract, a personal se:rvice, 
or other claim of the Government is a coptinuous one, there 
the balance remaining of the appropriation made in and for 
one year laps over into the following year. Thus, where an 
appropriation is marle for building a specific number of frig-
ates, though it be nominally in and for the service of one year, 
yet it may be applied in continuation into the next year." 
On the 12th of N o'rem ber, 1854 (7 Opin., 15), discussing the 
same subj~ct and referring to the former opinion, he re·peats 
the same thought as follows : 
"By the copy of that opinion, which is herewith inclosed, 
you will perceive that, upon sufficient consideration of the 
subject, I came to the conclusion that, as a general rule, where 
a contract or other claim of the Go,ernment is a continuous 
one, and still current, there the balance of appropriations 
made for one year for such serdce laps over into the fol-
lowing year, and is continuously applicable. to the same 
object. No room for controversy oo the point can exist, un-
less by the lapse of time the balance be alleged to belong to 
the surplus fund in the Treasury. That happens in two years 
after the expiration of the fiscal year for which an appropria-
tion is made." 
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But, on the 1st day of July, 1870, an act was passed, the 
fifth, sixth, and seventh sections of whicl' are reproduced as 
sections 3690, 3691, and 3679 of the Revised Statutes. The 
effect of this legislation upon continuous contracts was very 
fully and carefully reviewed by Attorney-Genera] Ackerman, 
as reported in 13 Opinions, page 291. 
The first inquiry propounded to him was: "First. Can 
balances of appropriations made for the fiscal years 1869 and 
1870 be applied to the service of the years 1870 and 1871 '" 
The answer is: "Recurring then to your first question, I 
am of opinion that balances of appropriations made for the 
fiscal years 1869-'70 of any description, even when contained 
in annual appropriation bills and made specifically for that 
fiscal year, may be applied to the service of the years 1870-'71 
so far as, first, to pay any current year expenses properly 
incurred in the former year: and second, to pay dues upon 
contracts properly made within the former year, even if the 
contracts be not performed until within the latter or current 
year. This is plainly allowed (by express exception to pro-
hibitions) in the very terms of section 5." 
I concur in this view, that the balance of the appropriation 
made for a given purpose may be used for that purpose, in 
the discharge of the ouligations imposed by a lawful continu-
ous contract, even though the appropriation be contained in 
the general annual appropriation bill, if the terms of the ap-
propriation are applicable to the purpose to which it is pro-
posed to be applied. The language of the appropriation to 
which you refer is: 
''Bureau of Construction and Repair: For * * * com-
pletion of vessels on the stocks; purchase of materials of 
all kinds; and for the general care, increase, and protection 
of the Navy in the lines of construction and repair, nine. 
hundred thousand dollars. 
"Bureau of Steam Engineering: For * * * com-
pletion of machinery and boilers of naval vessels, * * * 
seven hundred and sixty- three thousand dollars." 
The vessels named in yours are now naval vessels of the 
United States. They are in charge of the Department of the 
Navy; they are uncompleted, and by a continuous contract, 
as well as an urgent duty, their completion is by law im-
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posed on that Department. An available balance of a former 
appropriation, appropriated in the above language, stands 
unexpended on the books of the Department. The terms of 
the appropriation acts seem to warrant the application to the 
purpose proposed. 
But there is a limitation in the act of the 3d of 1\farch,. 
1883, which, as to the hulls, machinery, and armament of the 
vessels, must be borne in mind, which is: ''And the Secre-
tary of the Navy is authorized to construct said vessels, and 
to procure their armament, at a total cost not exceeding the 
amounts estimated by the Naval Advisory Board." This 
enactment, being pari materia with the legislation under con-
sideration, must be construed with and regarded as a part of 
it. Hence the expenditure on the bulls and machinery must 
be kept within the limits of the estimate made by the Board. 
This would be true as applied as a whole to the hulls, machin-
ery, and armament, had not the armament been excluded 
from the contract with Roach, and, by subsequent legislation 
and specific appropriations therefor made, which as to the 
armament exceeded the estimate; which relieved the arma-
ment, to the extent the amount the specific appropriation 
exceeded the estimate therefor, from the limitation. Hence,. 
the armament is prevented by the limitation from further 
completion, except to the extent that, by the specific appro-
priations therefor, that limitation as to it was enlarged. The 
bulls and machinery you state have not yet reached the 
amounts of estimates made by the Advisory Board therefor 
by $239,659.77. To that extent the hulls and machinery are 
then relieved from the effect of the limitation. 
Hence, as your first question would include the armament 
as well as the hu11s and machinery, it is answered in the neg-
ative. Your second question is answered in the affirmative 
to the extent above suggested. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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CASE 01!., GUILFORD MILLER. 
On December 29, 1884, M. made a homestead entry of part of an odd sec-
tion ofland lying within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad land-grant, alleging that his settlement. thereon commenced 
June 15, 1878. Said odd section was included in a withdrawal from 
pre-emption or homestead entry, etc., made by the Land Department 
March 30, 1872, for the benefit of said grant, upon the .filing of the map 
of general route. On the definite location of the road, of which a plat 
was filed October 4, 1880, it fell within the "indemr.ity" limits of the 
grant; but the withdrawal aforesaid, in so far as it included odd sec-
tions which thus came within those limits, continued in force there-
after, no restoration of such odd sections to entry having since been 
made. The said odd section was selected as ''lieu land" by theN orth-
ern Pacific Railroad Company December 17, 1883: Held that the land 
entered by M., being in a state of reservation from the date of the 
withdrawal in 1872 until its selection by the company in 1883, was not 
during that periol1 op<3n to homestead settlement, and consequently 
that, he could acq nire no right adverse to the claim of the company by 
his alleged settlement commencing in 1878. 
When public lands have been once withdrawn by competent authority 
from private appropriation under the general land laws, they do not 
again become subject to such appropriation until restored to entry by 
like authority. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 14, 1887. 
SIR: In compliance with your request., I have considered 
the case of the No'tthernPacijic Railroad Company v. Guilford 
Miller, pending on appeal in your Department, and now have 
the .honor to present to you my opinion upon the question 
involved. 
The facts of the case as gathered from the papers sub-
mitted are these: On December 29, 1884, Miller made a 
homestead entry for theSE.! of Sec. 21, T. 15 N., R. 42 E., 
in the \Valla Walla district, Washington Territory, alleging 
that his settlement thereon commenced June 15, 1878. The 
tract so entered lies within the indemnity limits of the land-
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (act of July 
2, 1864, chapter 2J.. 7) and was selected as " lieu land" by that 
company, December 17, 1883. Originally it was included in 
a withdrawal from pre-emption or homestead entry, etc., for 
the benefit of that company, of all the surveyed and unsur-
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veyed odd sections lying within 40 miles on each side of the 
line of general route, this withdrawal having been ordered 
by the Land Department March 30, 1872, upon the filing by 
the company of a map of such route. But on the definite 
location of the road, of which a plat was filed October 4, 
1880, and by which both the "granted" limits and the "in-
demnity " limits were determined, it fell outside of the for-
mer and came within the latter limits. The withdrawal of 
March 30, 1872, in so far as it included odd sections which 
thus came within the indemnity limits, was continued in force 
by an order of the Land Department, dated November 17, 
1880 (the order at the same time restoring to entry other 
lands included in that withdrawal which lay beyond those 
limits), since which time no restoration to entry of such odd 
sections appears to have been made. 
Upon the foregoing facts the following question arises: 
Whether at the commencement of or at any time during 
the alleged settlement by Miller, and before the selection 
made by the railroad company, the tract referred to was open 
to homestead settlement and entry. If so, the right of Miller 
to perfect his entry i~ undoubted; if otherwise, the company 
would seem to have, by virtue of its selection, the better 
claim to the premises. 
The solution of that question depends upon the validity 
and effect of the withdrawal made by the Land Department 
as above. And here I deem it pertinent to observe that, 
with respect to the odd sections Ising within the limits of 40 
miles on each side of the line of general route, the statute 
itself (section 6 of the act of July 2, 1864) operated to reserve 
these sections from homestead settlement upon the filing by 
the company of the map of such route in the Land Depart-
ment (Bultz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U.S., 55), and 
consequently that, as the tract in question was situated 
within those limits and so remained until the filing of the 
plat of definite location of the road, no homestead or other 
right could attach thereto under the general land laws during 
the period between the filing of the map of general route and 
the filing of the plat of definite location, whatsoever might be 
the action of the Land Department in the premises. For 
present purposes, therefore, it is only important to inquire 
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what the condition of the tract was after the filing of the 
plat of definite location (October 4, 1880) whe~ it fell outside 
of the granted limits and came within the indemnity limits. 
Did it then become open to homestead settlement~ or was 
it excluded therefrom by the previous withdrawal ordered 
by the Land Department~ or by the subsequent order of 
November 17, 1880, by which that withdrawal was con-
tinued~ 
Aside from the last mentioned order, two points are pre-
sented by this case for consideration, namely: (1) whether 
the withdrawal of March 30, 1872, which applied to all odd 
sections within 40 mil~s of the line of general route was valid 
and efl'ecti,Te; if so, then (2) whether lands originally within 
that withdrawal remained subject thereto until restored to 
entry by the Laud Department, notwithstanding they after-
wards (by change of line on definite location of the road) fell 
within the indemnity limits. \ 
The withdrawal just adverted to does not rest upon any 
express statutory provision requiring H, but upon a general 
authority in the Land Department, the existence of which 
has been recognized by Congress (act of March 27, 1854, 
chap. 25; Hev. Stat., sec. 2281) and repeatedly affirmed by 
the supreme court (Wolcott v. Des 11foines County, 5 Wall., 681; 
Riley v. Wells, unreported, December term, 1869; Williams 
v. Baker, 17 Wall., 144; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101, U. S. 755; 
see also 8 Opin., 246 ; 16 Opin., 87) and may now be regarded 
as too well established to he questioned. It appears, more-
over, to be in entire harmony with the provisions of the land 
grant act, which, as already intimated, in effect made a cor-
responding withdrawal, and it accords with the practice of 
the Land Department in like cases. But the existen·ce of a 
statutory withdrawal including the same lands, which had 
previously taken effect, may suggest the inquiry whether the 
department withdrawal referred to had any legal efficacy as 
such. In other words, did it operate as a withdrawal when 
the lands covered thereby were thus already withdrawn ~ The 
answer is, that if the act of the department was within the 
competency thereof, and of this there appears to be no room 
for doubt, its validity and force were not affected by the fact 
that it embraced the same subject-matter and was directed 
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to tlle same end as the statute. It operated concurrently with 
the statute, and the lands may properly be deemed to have 
been withdrawn as well by the one as by the other. Although, 
as remarked by the court in Buttz v. Northern Pacific Rail· 
road Company, supra, it did not add to the force of the statute 
itself in that regard, yet it gave notice to all parties seeking 
to make a pre-emption or homestead settlement that lands 
within certain defined limits might be appropriated for the 
road, and was the exljrcise of a wise precaution by the De-
partment to give such information to the local land officers 
as may serve to guide aright those seeking settlements on 
the public lauds and thus prevent settlements and expendi-
tures connected with them which would afterwards prove to 
be useless." Viewed in the above light, I arrive at the con-
clusion that the withdrawal of March 30, 1872, was valid and 
efficient for the purpose intended. 
That withdrawal, when ordered, embraced only the odd 
sections within the 40 mile limits ; but part of these lands 
having subsequently fallen within the indemnity limits, the 
point now is, whether thereafter such part still continued in 
reservation. Upon this I llold the affirmative, being of 
()pinion that when public lands have once been withdrawn 
from private appropriation under the general land laws by 
competent authority, they do not again qecome subject to 
such appropriation until restored to entry by like authority. 
This is understood to be a settled rule of the land-law sys-
tem, and is (as well as the executive power of withdrawal) 
recognized by Congress (see section 1 of the act of April21, 
1876, chapter 72). 
The result to which the foregoing leads is, that at the date 
of the.order of November 17,1880, the tract in question was 
still subject to the withdrawal referred to. That order, in-
deed, as~umes the continuation of such withdrawal as regards 
lands that fell out of the 40-mile limits as above, in formally 
restoring to entry some of these lands while continuing the 
withdrawal as to others. So far as appears, no restoration 
of the said tract took place then or thereafter up to the time 
of its selection by the company. 
Such tract being thus in a ~tate of reservation during the 
period which intervened between the filing of the plat of 
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definite location and the selection by the company, it was not 
during that period (nor was it prior thereto from the filing of 
the map of generai route) open to homestead settlement, and 
therefore no rights thereto adverse to the claim of the com-
pany were acquired by Miller by his alleged settlement. 
I remark that in some of the papers submitted the order 
of ~ovember 17, 1880, is dealt with as if it originated a new 
withdrawal, and the question is much discussed whether it 
was competent to the Land Department to withdraw from 
pre-emption or homestead settlement lands lying within the 
indemnity limits of the grant, after those limits had become 
established by the filing of the plat of definite location of 
the road. 
In denial of the authority of the Department to withdraw 
in such case, it is urged that the provision in the sixth section 
of the act, extending the pre-emption and homestead laws 
"to all other lands on the line of said roa~l when surveyed, 
excepting the lands hereby granted to said company," in 
effect prohibited a withdrawal of any lands within the in-
demnity limits. 
Assuming that its terms comprehend all lands within such 
limits, I do not understand the provision referred to as hav-
ing that effect. It does nothing more than declare what was 
already enacted by general laws. By these laws all unap-
propriated public lands, ~urveyed or unsurveyed, were thrown 
open to pre-emption settlement, and all such lands, when sur-
veyed, were thrown open to homestead settlement, before the 
passage of the land grant act. The provision of the lat.ter 
produced no modification of the previous law as regards the 
lands mentioned, nor did it place any restriction upon the 
exercise of the executive power of withdrawal theretofore 
existing. 
After the indemnity limits were fixed by definite location 
· of the road, a right of selecting "lieu lands" within such 
limits, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, 
accrued to the company under the third section of the act; 
and it would seem to be within the general power just men-
tioned, and also within the discretionary authority specially 
conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by that section, 
to place in reservation those lands to which the right of 
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selection is limited, for the purpose of adjusting the grant 
and effectuating its objects. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRET .A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
APPOINTMENT OF CIVIL OFFICERS. 
The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 353, repealing the tenure-of-office law 
(sectiOns 1767 to 1772, Revised Statutes), leaves unaffected such desig-
nations, nominations, and appointments as shall have been made be-
fore the repeal, and requires all business begun but unfinished before 
the repeal to be completed under the law as it then stood. 
Appointments and r6movalf\ after the repeal are to be made under the 
law as it now exists. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 14, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter of the 9th instant you request me to 
advise you as to the effect of the act of the 3d of March, 
1887, entitled "An act to repeal certain sections of theRe-
vised Statutes of the United States relating to the appoint-
ment of civil officers," upon the appointment, removal, and. 
suspension of officers. 
The first section of the act repeals sections 1767 to 1772, 
inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, known as the tenure-of-
office act. Had this section stood alone much unfinished 
business would have been left which has been begun, as to 
which serious questions might have arisen in consequence of 
the repeal. Some of the provisions of the law repealed seemed 
to be necessary to an orderly consummation of the work be-
gun. This gave rise to the necessity for the second section 
of the act, which is : 
" 'fhis repeal shall not affect any officer heretofore sus-
pended under the provisions of said sections, or any designa-
tion, nomination, or appointment heretofore made by virtue 
of the provisions thereof." 
This section is analogous to, and to be interpreted as, 
like legislation, which frequently constitutes part of re-
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pealing acts, by which the rights and procedure are pre-
served under the old Jaw as to business finished, and com-
menced but not finished. This section requires all action 
begun but not finished during the life of the tenure-of~office 
act to be consummated under the Constitution and the law 
as they existed prior to the repeal, and as to all removals 
from, or nominations and appointments to, office, after there-
peal to be made under the provisions oftheConstitutiou alone. 
As an illustration, section 1768 (which is repealed) provides 
for suspensions from office during the recess of the Senate. 
The place of an officer so suspended was to be filled by 
a temporary designation. After the expiration of the tem-
porary designation the officer suspended resumed the f unc-
tions of his office. There would be no express provision of 
law for the discharge of the duties of this chss of offices if 
the duty of the suspended officer to resume was not pr<,>-
vided for by the reservation in the repeal. The repeal thus 
limited leaves such and similar circumstance<! officers as it 
found them, their rights and their duties neither abridged 
nor enlarged. In case of the failure of the Senate to act upon 
the nomination during the session after the suspension of an 
officer, the officer in commission would resume his official 
functions. After this has taken place the full requirements. 
of the tenure of-office act are complied with. The officer, if 
the law had not been repealed, being an officer in the full 
possession of his office, would have been again subject to. 
suspension, at the official disoretion of the President. Since· 
the law is repealed, after he shall have so resumed he is not 
a suspended officer or an '' officer suspended" under the 
provisions of the tenure-of-office act, but simply an officer 
of the United States, and holds subjt.>ct to the power of the 
President to remove under the Constitution. If this power 
to remove did not exist the right of the officer so suspended 
would be enlarged, which would be contrary to the limita-
tion in section 2, which expressly provides it shall not aftect 
such an officer. The whole act, then, is to be so interpreted 
as to leave unaffected such designations, nominations, and 
appointments as shall have been made and finished before 
the repeal, and to require all business begun but unfinished 
to be terminated under the Constitution and law as they 
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applied, after which, as in all other cases, the constitutional 
powers and duties of the President alone are to be the basis 
of future action. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY. 
REFCND OF DUTIES. 
In December, 1855, several hundred packages of seeds were imported, 
which were entered for consumption and tue estimated duties thereon 
paid. Some of the packages were sent to the appraiser's store for 
examination and appraisement, and the remainder delivered to the 
importer, who (having given bond as required by section 2899, Reviseil. 
Statutes) took possession thereof and stored them in his warehouse. 
Pending the appraisement and liquidation of the entry the warehouse 
took fire and was totally destroyed, with all contents. Thereupon 
the importer applied for a refund of the duty paid on the packages so 
destroyed under section 2~84, Revised Statutes: IIeld that he is not 
entitled to the relief asked, the merchandise destroyed not having 
been, at the time of its destruction, in the custody of the officers of 
the customs, as contemplated by said section 29~4. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
~March 18, 1887. 
'SIR: By your letter of the 28th of February, 1887, you 
ask my opinion on the following case: 
"Messrs. D. M. Ferry & Company, of Detroit, imported 
into that port in December, 1885, nine hundred and sixty-
SIX packages of dutiable seeds, which they entered for con-
sumption, and on which they paid the estim~ted duties. 
Ninety-six of said packages were sent to the appraiser's store 
for examination and appraisement, as is customary, while 
the remainder, consisting of eight hundred and seventy 
packages, were delivered immediately to the importers, wlw 
duly took possession thereof and stored them in their ware-
house or store at Detroit. Pending the appraisement and 
liquidation of the entry, the said private warehouse took fire 
and was totally destroyed with all its contents, including 
tbe said eight hundred and seventy packages of Sl'ed. The 
importers applied to tbe Department for a refund of the 
duties paid on said seeds, under section 2984 of the Revised 
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Statutes, claiming that the said packages were in the custody 
of the Government at the time of the casualty, and that they 
were entitled to a refund of the duties paid on the merchan-
dise destroyed." 
At the time of the loss of the merchandise destroyed, it 
was in the possession and under the control of the importers, 
under the provisions of section 2899. This section provides: 
''No mercllanuise liable to be inspected or appraised shall 
be dAlivered from the custody of the officers of the customs 
until the same has been inspected or appraised, or until the 
packages sent to be inspected or appraised shall be found 
correctly and fairly invoiced and put up, and so reported to 
the collector. The collector may, however, at the request of 
the owner, importer, consignee, or agent, take bonds, with 
.approved security in double the estimated value of such 
merchandise, conditioned that it shall be delivered to the 
-order of the collector at any time within ten days after the 
package sent to the public stores has been appraised and 
reported to the collector. If in the meantime any package 
shall be opened without the consent of the collector or sur-
veyor given in writing, and then in the presence of one of 
the inspectors of the customs, or if the package is not deliv-
ered to the order of the collector according to the condition 
of the bond, the bond shall in either case be forfeited." 
The first clause of t,his section declares merchandise shall 
remain in the custouy of the officers of the customs until in-
spectecl and appraised. The second clause pr~vides an ex-
ception which the officers may make to the requirements of 
the first clause at the request of the importers. Under tllis 
exception the importers received the goods destroyed, the 
customs officers retaining in their custody, instead of all the 
goods as called for by the first clatase, only " one package 
from every ten packages." u der the provisions of section 
2901. Bond was given for the packages delivered to the im-
porter. The bond was substituted for the actual custody of 
the goods. The bond by its terms showed the goods were iu 
the custody of the importers, for it provided for delivery by 
the importers of the goods to the collector, in case he should 
find it necessary to call for such de~ivery in consequence 
of any facts discovered upon the opening of the sample pack-
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ages which were retained for inspection and appraisement. 
A bond conditioned for the delivery of an article by no means 
amounts to the possession of the article, nor imposes the care 
or keeping thereof on the obligee. On the contrary it is in-
cum bent on the obligor to guard and keep it that he may 
comply with the obligations of his bond. Custody, in the in-
tent of this statute, means keeping, guardianship, or care of 
the merchandise. In this case the keeping, guardianship, 
and care of the merchandise was left with the imp9rter. It 
was in his own store-room under the charge and control ex-
clusively of his -own employes. The store-room was not a 
private warehouse ·as contemplated by section 2060, Revised 
Statutes. If the casualty occurred through any negligence, 
it must have been his own; if through misfortune, that mis-
fortune did not arise in any way from any action of the offi-
cers of the customs, or from the character of any building 
under their control in which it might be stored, nor while 
the goods were in their possession. The refund asked for is 
under section 2984, which is-
" The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, upon. 
production of satisfactory proof to him of the actual injury 
or destruction, in whole or in part, of any merchandise, by 
accidental fire or other casualty, while the same remained in 
the custody of the officers of the customs in any public or 
private ware-house under bond,- or in the appraisers' stores 
undergoing appraisal, in pursuance of law or regulations of 
the Treasury Department, or while in transportation under 
bond from the port of entry to any other port in the United 
States, or while in the custody of the officers of the customs 
and not in bond, or while within the limits of any port of 
entry and before the same have been landed under the super-
vision of the officers o:f.ttthe customs, to abate or refund., as 
the case may be, out of ani moneys in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, the amount of impost duties paid or 
accruing thereupon, and likewise to cancel any warehouse 
bond or bonds or enter satisfaction thereon, in whole or in 
part, as the case may be." 
This section, so far as applicable to the facts presented'; 
only authorizes an abatement or' refund of the duties when 
the custody of the goods is ih the officers of the customs. As 
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therefore they were not, in the case submitted, in their 
custody or under their control, the refund asked for is not 
authorized by the statute. 
I am, respectfully yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
INDIAN TRUST FUNDS. 
Where bonds of the State of North Carolina, held by the Treasurer of 
the United States for the benefit of certain Indian tribes, were past 
due and payment thereof demanded and refused: Ad?Jised that the 
Secretary of the Interior may authorize the acceptance of a proposition 
of a third party (a citizen of the State) to pay,the principal and ac-
crued interest of the bonds, provided their market value does not ex-
ceed their face value with the accrued interest, and provided the 
acceptance will best snbserve the trust. 
If the United States has advanced for the State any money on account 
of interest due on said bonds, and there is " any moneys due on any 
account from the United States to such State," it is the duty of the 
Treasurer to retain the interest upon such advances from such moneys. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 19, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of September 27 of last year, 
inclosing "certain correspondence and papers relating to a 
proposition of Mr. A.M. McPheeters, of Raleigh, N.C., to 
pay the principal of $147,000 North Carolina State bonds 
past due, and which are described in the papers, and all in-
. terest which shall accrue on them to the date of payment," 
has been received. 
You inquire: (1) Is it within the power of this Depart-
ment, under existing laws, to aceept or authorize the accept-
ance of the proposition~ (2) If the proposition shall be 
accepted, should interest be calculated on the moneys ad-
vanced by the United States from time to time on account 
of interest due on eaid bonds, as provided in the act of 
March 25, 1870 (16 Stat., 77) ~" 
The bonds referred to, as described in an inclosed paper, 
are as follows: North Carolina uonds, N.C. N. R. Co., issued 
under acts of the legislature of North Carolina approved 
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January 27, 18-19, December 2 and 25, 18.32, and February 
1-1, 1855, and belonging to an Indian trust fund; $19,000 
maturing January 1, 1884, with 6 per cent. intere ' t from 
. January 1,1880, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $7,410; $7,000 
maturing January 1, 1886, with 6 per cent. interest from 
January 1, 1880, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $~,730; 
$121,000 maturing April 1, 1885, with 6 per cent. interest 
from October 1, 1879, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $49,005. 
The principal sum now due without interest amounts to 
$147,000; interest to July 1, 1886, $59,145; total, $206,145. 
The proposition of Mr. A. 1\f. .McPheeters, as contained 
in his inclosed letter to the Acting Secretary of the Interior, 
dated September 17, 1886, is as follows: "Briefly stated my 
proposition is to pay the principal of the $147,000 bonds past 
d'Lte, and which are' described above, and all interest which 
shall accrue on them to the date of payment." 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, by letter to the Secre-
tary of the Interior dated September 25, 1886, recommends 
• the acceptance of 1\fr. 1\IcPheeters's proposition. 
By act of J nne 10, 1876 (19 Stat., 5S), •' all stocks, bonds, 
or other securities or evidences of indebtedness now held by 
the Secretary of the Interior in trust for the benefit of cer-
tain Indian tribes shall, within thirty days from the passag-e 
of this act, be transferred to the Treasurer of the United 
States, who shall become the custodian thereof, * * * 
and th-e Treasurer of the United States shall also become the 
custodian of all bonds and stocks which may be purcllased 
for the benefit of any Indian tribe or tribes after the tram;;fer 
of funds herein authorized, and shall make all purchases and 
sales of bonds and stocks authorized by treaty stipulations 
or by acts of Congress when requested so to do by the Secre-
tary of the Interior." 
In an inclosed letter from 1\fr. A. l\L )fcPheeters to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, dated Raleigh, N. C., August 31, 
1886, he says: ''Payment of tllese bonds was some time 
since formally demanded by tlle Government and refused uy 
the treasurer of this State. I propose to !Jay tlleni." 
If the amount due upon these bonds were tendered to the 
Treasurer of the United States by the railroad company or 
the treasurer of the State of North Carolina there would he 
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no doubt but that it would be your duty to authorize the ac-
ceptance of the money. 
The proposition now made virtually is, that the bonds 
should be sold to a third party for their face value with ac-
cruecl interest. 
It would be in the power of the Secretary of the Interior 
to authorize the acceptance of the proposition above referred 
to, if the sale of the bonds is authorized either expressly or 
impliedly "by treaty stipulations or acts of Congress." No 
information is contained in the papers referred as to which 
of the Indian tribes the Treasurer holds the bonds in trust. 
No opportunity is therefore afforded for an examination for 
express authority in "treaty stipulations or acts of Congress." 
But as the bonds are past due and payment has been refused 
by the treasurer of the State of North Carolina, in the perform-
ance of his duties as trustee the Secretary of the Interior 
has the power. to authorize the acceptance of the proposition 
made, provided the market value does not exceed the face 
value of the bonds with accrued interest, and provided the 
acceptance will best subserve the interest of the trust. In 
such case if the bonds are sold it should .be for the highest 
price to be obtained. 
As to the inquiry, "Should interest be calculated on the 
moneys advanced by the United States from time to time on 
account of interest due on said bonds~" 
The act of March 25, 1876 ( 16 Stat., 77 ), is as follows: 
''Whenever any State shall have been or may be in de-
fault in the payment of interest or principal on investments 
in stocks or bonds issued or guarantied by such State and held 
by the United States in trust, it shall be the duty of the Secre-
tary -of the Treasury to retain thew hole, or so much thereof as 
maybe 11ecessary, of any moneys due on any account from the 
United States to such State, and to apply the same to the 
payment of such principal and interest, or either, or to the 
re·imbursement with interest thereon of moneys advanced by 
thR United States on account of interest due on such stocks 
or bonds." 
The inclosed papers do not show the amount of money, if 
any, "advanced by the United States on account of interest 
due on said bonds." 
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Nor does it appear that there is any money due by the 
United States to the State of North Carolina on any account. 
If the United States has advanced for the State any money 
on account of the interest due on said bonds, and there is 
''any moneys due on any account from the United States to 
such State,'' it is the duty of the Treasurer to retain the in-
terest upon such advances from such money. 
If, however, the money for payment of interest was not 
advanced by the General GoV'ernment at the instance and 
request of the State (and of that there appears to he no 
claim in tlle inclosed papers) compound interest could not be 
recovered by suit upon the bonds, if not expressly stipulated 
therein. (No copies of the bonds are among the papers 
transmitted.) The liability of the State, in case there is no 
indebtedness of the United States to the State, is determined 
by the evidences of indebtedness and not by the act of Con-
gress. The claim of the United States, if any, for interest 
on advances should n~t be required to be paid before author-
izing the sale of the bonds. 
The inclosed papers are herewith returned as requested. 
very respectfully' 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
REMISSION OF FORFEITURE. 
Section 1958, Revised. Statutes, does not confer upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury authority to remit the forfeiture of a vessel condemned by 
the United States district court for Alaska for being engaged in kill-
ing fur seals. 
Under section 5293, Revised States, fifth paragraph, he has power to re-
mit in such case, but only where the forfeiture was impor:;ed ''by vir-
tue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals upon the islands of 
St. Paul and St. George." 
'DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
Ma.rch 19, 1887. 
SIR: I have considered ;your communication of the lOth 
instant, and the accompanying papers, presenting the ques-
tion whether you have the power to remit the forfeiture of 
the schooner San Diego, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, 
by virtue of the sentence of conrlemnation pronounced against 
the said vessel, etc., on the 4th of October, 18~6, in the case 
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of The United States v-. L. JJ1. Handy and the schooner San 
Diego, by the United States district court for the district of 
.Alaska, under section 1956_, Revised Statutes, for being en-
gaged in killing fur seals ; and an opinion is asked as to 
whether such power of remission resides in the Secretary of 
the Treasury under sectwn 1;)58, or the fifth paragraph of 
.section 5293, Revised Statutes, or any other statute of the 
United StatAs. 
Section 1958 'is a reproduction of the eighth section of the 
act of 27th July, 1868 (15 Stat., 240), entitled '•An act to ex-
tend the laws of tlle United States relating to customs com-
merce and navigation over the territory ceded to the United 
States by Russia, to establish a collection district therein, 
.and for other purposes," and its· object was to extend the 
power of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit fines, pen-
alties, and forfeitures in cases covered by the act of the 3d 
March, 1797 (1 Stat., 506), and all laws adding to and amend-
ing the same, to similar cases arising in the collection district 
~~~~ . 
Now the cases falling within the act of 1797 and the addi-
tions and amendments therAof are cases where the fine, pen-
alty, or forfeiture which it is sought to have remitted was ex-
acted" by force of any present or future law of the United 
States, for the laying, levying, or collecting any duties or 
taxes, or by force of any present or future act, concerning the 
registering or recording of ships or vessels, or any act con-
cerning the enrolling and licensing ships or vessels employed 
in the coasting trade or fisheries, and for regulating the 
same." 
The principal object of the statute of 1868 was to establish 
the collection district of Alaska and extend to it the revenue 
and navigation systems of tbe United. States, and as the act 
of 1797 with its additions and amewlments formed a part of 
the legislation on those subjects, it was, as a matter of course, 
re-enacted with the rest of that legislation. 
So far, then, as section 1958 is cemcerned, it is quite clear 
that it gives the Secretary no authority to remit the forfeit-
ure of a vessel for being engaged in killing fur seals, an offense 
which bas no connection with the revenue or navigation laws 
of the United States. 
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It remains to inquire whether the Secretary of tlJC Treas-
ury is vested with power to remit the forfeiture in questi.on 
by the fifth paragra.ph of section 5293, Revised Statutes. 
This provision contains a substantial re-enactment of tlle 
seventh section of the act of the 1st July, . 1870, entitled 
"An act to prevent the extermination of fur-bearing animals 
in Alaska" (16 Stat., 180), which adopted and. appli('d to the 
purposes of its enactment the seventh and eighth sections of 
tlle act of 1868 (supra), thereby extending the provisions of 
law for the enforcement and remission of fines, penalties, 
11nd forfeitures incurred under the customs and navigation 
\aws to fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under this 
::tct ''to prevent the extermination of fur-bearing animals in 
1\-laska." 
That Congre~s deemed the seventh section of the act of 
1870 (supra), necessary shows that it djd not consider tQe 
fines, penalties, and forfeitures prescribed by that law as 
within the power of remission given by the eighth section of 
the act of 18G8 (supra) and confirms the view taken herein 
of the scope of that section. 
The seventh section of the act of 1870 adopted the eighth 
section of the act of 1868 for the purposes of that act only, 
and as the operation of the act of 1870, as passed originally 
and as now given in the Revised Statutes (sections 1960-1972 
aJd section 5293, paragraph 5), is confined to the islandR of 
St. Paul and St. George, it would seem impossible to hold 
that the forfeiture in question, which was not incurred by 
reason of any act done in either of those islands, is within 
the power of remission conferred on the Secretary of the 
Treasury by the fifth paragraph of section 5293, whicb pro-
vides that the Secretary of the Treasury may exercise that 
power" if the fine, penalty, or forfeiture * • • was im-
posed by virtue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals 
upon the isl-ands of St. Paul anu St. George.'' 
It only remains for me to say that my investigations have 
not conducted me to any legislation under which you could 
remit the forfeiture in question. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREAS'CRY. 
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-POSTAL SERVICE. 
The provisions of the interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887, chap-
ter 104, do not extend to the postal service of the United States, nor 
prohibit the transportation by railroad companies, free of charge, of 
such officers or agents of the Government as are employed in that serv-
ice. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 28, 1887. 
SIR: I reply to your letter of the 21st March, 1887, which 
is: 
"It has for many years been the almost universal practice 
of railroad companies engaged in transportation of the mails 
to transport without special charge the inspectors of this De-
partment, including such officers as the Postmaster-General 
is by statute authorized to employ as inspectors or special 
agents; and also to transport without charge postal clerks, 
not only when engaged in the actual service of distributing 
mails upon the car en route and on their return trips, but to 
transport them between their places of residence and the 
point at which they are required by the rules of the service 
to begin their runs, when on the occurrence of their' lay-offs' 
they are at liberty to go home for rest and study. 
" The question has been raised by various communications 
to the Department whether, since the recent act of Congress 
of February 4, 1887, entitled 'An act to reg·ulate commerce,' 
the continuance of such facilities will contravene the law. 
"Inspectors and special agents have habitually received a 
commission signed by the head of this Department, desig-
nating them as inspectors, and requiring all railroads and 
other contractors engaged in the transportation of the mails 
to carry the respectively designated persons without special 
charge for transportation. Similar commissions have been 
issued to postal clerks; but, in addition, passes have been 
granted them by the railroad companies to enable them to 
make return trips, although not actually engaged in distribu-
ting mails, and to travel between the termini of their routes 
and their homes. 
"Your opinion is solicited upon the questions whether 
there be anything in the act referrerl. to which prohibits the 
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practices heretofore prevailing as above stated; and if in any 
particular the act prohibits the continuance by the railroad 
companies of the facilities heretofore afforded, in what degree 
and in what limitations¥" 
The title of the act of the 4th of February, 1887, is "An act 
to regulate commerce." It is not entitled ''An act to regulate 
the United States mail service." The question presented is, 
substantially, Was it the intent of the law-makers that it 
should be construed to include the mail service of the United 
States~ 
The constitutional power authorizing the act is the third 
clause of the eighth section of Article II of the Constitution~ 
which empowers" Congress to regulate C@mmerce with for-
eign nations and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes." If this provision of the Constitution bad 
been understood by the framers of the Constitution to have 
embraced the mail service of the United States in the term 
"commerce," there would have been no sufficie11t reason for 
the introduction of the seventh clause of the same section 
and article: ''Congress shall have power to establish post-
offices and post-roads;" under which last the postal system 
has been organized. The magnitude of that system is such 
that its main operations can only be conducted successfully 
by uniform and general rules. Equal justice in the adminis-
tration of the service requires that the burden of its execu-
tion shall not be subject to the possibility of different rates 
between those portions of the service which may be. performed 
exclusively within individual States and those which include 
service in two or more States. The provisions of the act as 
applied to subjects Intended to be embraced therein do not 
apply to the former, but do to the latter. It is not to be sup-
posed the law-makers intended, under a regulation of com-
merce, to subject a part of the mail service to the provisions 
of the act while another part would be excluded. The mail 
service is a unit, a system organized in pursuance of an 
established Government policy. 
The Postmaster-General, as the head of the Department, 
is placed over the system. He is required by law, among 
. many other specific duties, ''to superintend generally the 
business of the Department and execute all laws relative to 
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the postal service" (Rev. Stat., sec. 396). It could not be the 
purpose of the act under consideration to join the Postmaster-
General with the Commissioner of Interstate Commerce in 
the adminh;tration of the iuterstate commerce act, nor tore-
lieve the Postmaster-General from the duty of superintending 
and executing" all laws relative to the'postal service." No 
intent is manifeRted indicating a division of service, labor, or 
responsibility between the Postmaster-General and the Com-
missioner of Interstate Commerce. The act was intended to 
relate "to the postal service." The system of postal service 
confers upon the Postmaster-General the power to make con-
tracts, some of which must be exceptional, arising from unex-
pected emergencies which could not in all cases be made in 
conformity to prescribed general rules as to price or terms, 
and concerning which the urgency or necessity would preclude 
the possibility of conference for exceptions with the Commis-
sioners of Interstate Commerce. The amount of compensa-
tion is, in many instances, submitted to his judgment. In 
othe,rs the law provides a fixed · price per mile for a given 
service _; others provide for the carriage of persons in the 
service free of charge. .A general examination of the whole 
scope. of postal laws shows that, if t~e interstate commerce 
act were treated as if incorporated into the postal system of 
laws, the change would be so radical as to render it highly 
improbable that so extensive a modification or repeal would 
be left to mere implication; indeed, such a change could be 
recognized only by expre~s language of the statute. In the 
conduct of the postal service the United States, to the exclu-
sion of all others, exercises one of the functions of govern-
mental sovereignty. The service is purely goverumental. It 
is a common law rule of construction that the sovereign is not 
bound by general statutes unless expressly named tb.erein. 
In the Eng1ish courts prerogative was claimed as the foun-
dation of this rule, but American courts have based it upon 
reason, and except from the rule modes of procedure, proc-
ess, with such other transac-tions as are not strictly govern-
mental. But "lftbe statute tends to restrain or diminish the 
power, right, or interests of a sovereign" the rule of con-
struction is adhered to (United States v. Heron, 20 Wall., 
255). "The doctrine that the Government should not, un-
• 
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less named, be bound by an act of limitations, is in accord-
ance with that just cited from Bacon; because, if bound, it 
would be barred of a right; and in all such cases is not to l>e 
construed to be em braced unle8s named, or what would be 
equivalent, unless the language is such as to show clearly that 
such was the intent of the act" (Un-ited States v. Knight, 14 
Peters, 315). If the interstate commerce act were to be ap-
plied to the mail service of the United States it would materi-
ally diminish the power and rights heretofore exercised and 
held under the postal laws, and modify a clearly defined policy, 
established as the result of the experience of the whole na-
tional life. The United States is not specially named in the 
act of the '4th of February, 1887, except in the twenty-second 
section, which provides that" nothing in this act shall apply 
to the carriage, storage, or handling of property, free or at 
reduced rates, for the United Statf>s." If the carriage, stor-
age, or handling of the property of the United S~ates were, 
in all instances, purely governmental, this exception would 
be entitled to great weight, as an implication that, in all not 
excepted, the sovereign was intended to be included in pur-
suance of the maxim ExQeptio fermat regulum 'in casibus non 
exceptis. 
But in many transactions of the Government, as in carry-
ing stores and delivery to the Indian tribes in pursuance of 
treaty or coutract, the action of the Government is quasi-
commercial, and of such a nature that no attribute of sover-
eignty is involved therein. This exception in the statute 
was doubtless intended to relieve rsucb transactions of a 
doubtful character from the provisions of the act. If so in-
tended, the excepting out Qf the enactment of that which,. 
under the less rigid application of the principle of construc-
tion b~- the American courts, might or would not have been 
considered as within the principle, would be an affirmance 
of the principle as applicable to the construction of the stat-
ute. But, in any event, the general principle of construction 
can not l>e avoided by mere implication; for, in the language 
of the ca~e last cited, implication can not produce such re-
sults " unless the language is such as to show clearly that 
such was the intent of the act," which tl.le language in th!g 
case does not do. 
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It is therefore clear the United States mail ~ervice is not 
embraced in or subject to the provisions of the act of the 
4th of February, 1887. That service consists in the receipt, 
speedy transmission, distribution, and delivery of mail mat-
ter to the people. As the act does 11ot include the mail serv-
ice in its provisions, none of the lawful, customary, and 
necessary instrumentalities by which · that service is ·con- · 
ducted is subjected to the law. Among the lawful, custom-
ary, ana necessary instrumentalities for the efficient, con-
sistent, and successful conduct of the service, the Post-Office 
Department is authorized by law to send officers, agents, 
and clerks of the Government to take charge of, protect, and 
distribute the mails, and to search for and investigate errors, 
frauds, or crimes relating to them. Persons thus employed, 
when in the actual Hne of duty or when in pursuance thereof 
going to or returning from their places of residence while in 
the performance of service, or to or from their assigned line 
of duty in the ordinary and customar.r course of the admin-
istration of the service, should be regarded as in the per-
formance of official labor and unaffected by the provisions 
()f the act. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
A.. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
COLLECTION DISTRICT. 
The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 348, amending se~tions 2533 and 2534, 
Revised Statutes, and making Hartford a port of entry in place of 
Middletown, creates a new collection district a,nd also a new office 
(that of collector), requiring a new commissiol} and a new bond. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 28, 1887. 
SIR: On the 3d of March, 1887, Congress passed "An act 
to amend sections 2533 'a1ld 2534 of the Rmrised Statutes, 
and making Hartford a pol'L of entry in place of Middletown/' 
which provided that paragraph third of section 2533 of the · 
Revised Statutes of the United States of Americ3t is hereby 
am'ended so that said paragraph shall read as follows : 
"Third. The district of Hartford, to comprise the waters 
• 
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and shores of the town of Saybrook, Clinton, Westbrook, Old 
Saybrook, Essex, Chester, Hauuam, East Haddam, 1\fiudle-
town, Cromwell, Chatham, Portland, vVeathersfield, Rocky 
Hill, Glastonbury, Hartford, East Hartford, Windsor, \Viud-
sor Locks, East Windsor, South Windsor, Suffield, and En-
field, as bounded on the 1st day of January, 1886, in which 
· Har'tford shall be the port of entry, and Saybrook, Clinton, 
Westbrook, Old Saybrook, Essex, Chester, Haddam, East 
Haddam, Middletown, Chatham, Portland, Cromwell, Rocky 
Hill, Weathersfield, Glastonbury, and East Hartford ports of 
delivery. 
'' SEc. 2. That paragraph third of section 2534: of the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States of America is hereby 
amended so that said paragraph shall read as follows: 
"Thir<l. In the district of Hartford a collector, who shall 
reside at Hartford." 
By your letter of the 21Rt instant you inquire whether, by 
this law, a new office is thus created, and whether a new 
commission and bond must necessarily issue. 
The legal life of the district of Middletown was derived 
from the clauses which are wholly supplanted by the act above 
quoted. No part of the former law relating to it longer sur-
vives. Its name and place are wholly among things of the 
past. A new district is created, not new in name and place 
of collector's residence only, but in territorial limits. 
The new district does not appear to include the waters and 
shores of the town of Killingsworth as the district of :Middle-
town did; but it does contain within its limits the waters 
and shores of twelve other towns which the district of Mid-
dletown did not contain. The waters and shores of eleven 
of the towns comprised in the Middletown district are in the 
Hartford district. Thus the new third district is made to 
consist of twenty-three towns, eleven of which were in the 
Middletown district and twelve were not. From a compari-
son of the two districts it appears tlw name is changed; the 
residence of the collector is changed; the port of entry is 
changed; the ports of deli very are changed and increased 
by four in number ; the territorial limits are changed and in-
creased in number eleven towns, and more than half the new 
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district as to the number of the towns therein does not ap-
pear to have been in the former district. 
The commission of the collector of the Middletown district 
would, if it survived the change, not empower him to exercil:m 
his official functions in the twelve added towns. His bonds-
men could not be held for the new district, which embraces 
greater responsibility than they assumed when they executed 
the bond. In the case of Miller v. Stewart et al. (9 Wheat., 
681) it is ruled: "A bond by a deputy collector of taxes, with 
sureties reciting his appointment. for eight townships and 
conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of said 
appointment, is avoided as against the sureties by the iuter-
lineation of another township, so as to make it an appoint-
ment for nine instead of eight without the consent of the 
sureties." 
But one collector is provided for the new district. That 
co.llector's commission must be co-extensive with his duties, 
which require him to exercise his official functions over the 
whole district. A new commission is required, and a new 
bond is the necessary consequence of the new commission. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ALLOTMENT OF LANDS TO INDIANS. 
By the ninth section of the act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119, an ap~ 
propriation is made " for the purpose of making the surveys and re-
surveys mentioned in section two" of that act. In section 2 there is no 
mention of" surveys and resurveys." But section one of the same act 
contains a provision for " surveys and resurveys. " Advised that the 
appropriation made as above is applicable to the making of "surveys 
and resurveys," as provided for in said secti9ill-such being the clear 
intent of Congress. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUS'J.'ICE, 
March 31, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 29th of March, 1887, is as follows: 
"Referring to the act (Public No. 43) entitled 'An act to 
provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on 
the various reservations, and to extend the protection of the 
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laws of the United States and the Territories over the In-
dians, and for other purposes,' approved February 8, 1887, 
it will be observed tllat section 9 provides · That for the pur-
pose of making the surveys and resurveys mentioned iu sec-
tion 2 of this act, there be, and hereby is, appropriated, out 
of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, 
the sum of$ WO,OOO , to be repaid proportionately out of the 
proceeds of the sales of such land as may be acquired from 
the Indians under the pro,Tisions of this act.' 
"By reference to section 2 of the act, it will be seen that 
no mention is made therein of the making of ' surveys and 
resurveys.' The provision of the law for 'surveys and resur-
veys' of reservations or parts thereof, for the purpose of mak-
ing allotments of lands to the Indians, is contained in the 
first section of the act. 
''A copy of the law of February 8, 1887, is herewith in-
closed. 
"In the original draft of the bill (S. 5!) the pro""ision for 
'surveys and resurveys' was contained in section 2, but in the 
process of passage of the act sections 1 and 2 of the original bill 
were materially altered and modified, and were finally merged 
into one, or the first section. Section 10 of the original bill be-
came section 9 of the act, but there appears to have been a 
failure to make the necessary change in the body of section 
9 of the words ' section 2' to ' section 1.' 
''In view of the foregoing statement, I have the honor to 
request to be advised whether the appropriation rnade by 
section 9 of the act is applicable for the purposes of making 
' surveys and resurveys' of reservations or parts thereof, 
provided for in section 1 of the act/' 
The intent of the law-maker is the law. That the land 
described in the first section shall be surveyed was intended. 
That the cost of the survey of the land shall be paid by the 
appropriation contained in the ninth section is just as clearly 
within the intent. As there are no surveys mentioned in the 
second section, the whole of section 9 must be rejected, or 
the erroneously descriptive reference ''section 2 of." If 
these words be disregarded so that the section shall read, 
"That for the purpose of making the t'Urveys and resurveys 
* * * in this act, there be," etc., the undoubted intention 
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of Congress will be carried out. Otherwise the whole enact-
ment will be nugatory. The inquiry contained in yours 
is therefore answered in the affirmative. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE INTERIOR. 
UTAH TERRITORY. 
Officers in the Territory of Utah who were commissioned and holding 
office previous to the passage of the act of .March 3, 18R7, chapter 397, 
are not required to take the oath prescribed by the twenty-fourth sec-
tion of that act. 
The provision of that section making such oath a'' condition precedent 
to hold office in or under said Territory" applies as well to officers there-
after appointed by the General Government as to those thereafter ap-
pointed by the Territorial government or elected in the Territory. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 31', 1887. 
SIR: I .have considered your communication of the 17th 
instant, and the accompanying letter therein referred to, 
from the chairman of the Utah Commission and the governor 
of the Territory of Utah, presenting, for an opinion, certain 
questions arising upon .the twenty-fourth section of the act ~n­
titled "An act to amend 'An act to amend section fifty-three 
hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,' ap-
proved March twenty .. second, eighteen hundred and eighty-
two." 
The first question asked is: ''Are the officers in this Terri-
tory (Utah) who were commissioned and holding office prior 
to the passage of said act required to take said oath~" mean-
ing the oath prescribed by the said twenty-fourth section. 
In my opinion this question should be answered in the neg-
ative. It is true the law declares the oath required to be'' a 
condition precedent to the right to hold office in or under said 
Territory," but it also declares that the officer shall take and 
sn bscribe the oath "before entering on the duties of his office," 
words which of themselves, in my opinion, have a strong 
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tendency to show that it was officers thereafter to be elected 
or appointed who were in the mind of Congress. 
If it was intended that the law should affect officers in 
commission when it went into operation, it is hard to under-
stanu why Congress ommitted to provide for the conting-ency 
of a failure or refusal to take and subscribe the required oath, 
such as by declaring the recusant's office vacant and the man-
ner in which the vacancy should be filled. Furthermore, if 
Congress harl intended the oath requfrement to apply to 
officers already in commission, we must presume it would 
have provided either that the law should not go into effect 
until a time within which it could be made known in all the 
Territories, or that the oath should be taken and subscribed 
. within a certain time after the law went into force, thu.s pre-
venting the serious doubts that might arise as to the validity 
of official acts performed after the statute took effect but 
before its provisions could be known by the communities 
afl'ected by them, if it should be held tltat the oath require-
ment af)plied to officers in commission when tlte act became 
operative. 
Now, this failure of Congress to guard its legislation with 
respect to the official oath in ~orne such way a~ has been 
pointed out, and the express prov"ision already adverted to 
that the oath shall be taken before the officer " enters on the 
duties of his office," and the consideration that the officers in 
commission when the act went into force ' bad been holding 
office under the act of the 22d March, 1882 (22 Stat., 30), 
which contained a provision that no bigamist, polygamist, or 
person cohabiting with more than one woman, and that no 
woman cohabiting with any such person in any Territory or 
other place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States, should be entitled to vote or be eligible1for or en-
titled to bold any office of honor, trust, or emolument in such 
Territory or under the United States, all go to show that in 
the absence of language compelling such a sense it wouJd be 
unreasonable to attribute to Congress the intention to give 
the act a retrospective effect as to existing officers without 
any adequate reason for resorting to a mode of legislation 
which is never regarded with favor. 
When the act of 1887 was passed there was not the same 
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state of things in the Territories as existed when the act ~f 
1882 was passed-a state of things which made it necessary to 
put in the latter act a provision vacating all registration 
and election offices. On the contrary, the act of 1882 had 
been in force within less than amonth of:fiveyears when the 
new law was passed, and it was but fair to assume that per-
sons having the qualifications to hold office required by the 
act of 1882, and in office under that act when the new act of 
1887 went into operation, were in sympathy with that act, 
and could be relied on to carry out its provisions. 
It is clear, then, to my mind that I would be doing vio-
lence to this law as well as shaking public faith in various 
official proceedings, if I held it to have a retroactive opera-
tion. 
The second question is: "If su9h officers in this Territory 
(Utah) are required to take the oath, what would be the con-
sequence of theiL· failure to comply with the requirement~" 
The answer to the first question renders an answer to this 
question unnecessary. 
The third question is: "Are the Federal office holders, as 
the governor, Utah commissioners, secretary of the treasury, 
etc., to take the oath ~ " 
The law (sec. 24) makes the oath a" condition precedent to 
the right to hold office in or under said Territory," and, in my 
opinion, applies as well to the officers referred to who were 
thereafter to be appointed by the United 8tates to offices in 
the Territory as to the officers holding under and by appoint-
ment thereafter of the Territorial government. This mean-
ingis called for by the use of the particles "in" and ''under" 
in the law, the former being understood to refer to officers ap-
pointed by the United States to perform duties in a Territory, 
and the latter to officers appointed by a Territorial govern-
ment itself. 
The disjunctive particle ''or" that comes between the two 
words ''in" and •' under" as well as a known rule of inter-
pretation requires that each of those words should ha\'"e its 
own proper force. This I have endeavored to give it. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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SINKING FUNDS OF THE UNION .AND CENTRAL PACIFIC. 
Section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 345, relating to the sinking 
funds of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad Cbmpanies, 
applies to moneys belonging to those funds which are uninvested, and 
such moneys may be invested as therein provided. 
But that section does not authorize a sale of the United States bonds in 
which the funds are already, invested for the purpose of re-investment 
in the first-mortgage bonds of said companies. 
Money paid into the sinking funds of said companies, under said act, may 
be invested (1) in United States bonds, as provided in act of May 7, 
1878, chapter 96; (2) in any United States railroad subsidy bonds of 
any of the aided roads de!:!cribed in the act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, 
and its supplements; and (3) in any of the first-mortgage bonds of said 
companies, such as are described in section 5 of the act of March 31 
1887, chapter 345. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
1lfarch 31, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 161h of March, 1887, submits for 
my opinion: 
First. H Whether the provisions of section 5 of the act of 
the 3d of March, 1887, may be construed as applying to 
moneys now in the funds uninvesteu and moneys hereafter 
paid in to be inYested, or whether United States bonds in 
which the funds are now invested could be sold and the 
proceeds re-invested in the first mortgage bonds of the com-
pany." 
Second. H Whether investments can be made in the first-
mortgage bonds of any of the companies, or only in the first-
mortgage l>onds of the company for which the investment 
is made." 
The fifth section referred to is : 
"That the sinking funus which are or may be held in the 
Treasury for the security of the indebteuness of either or Hll 
of said railroad companies may, in addition to the invest-
ments now authorized by law, be invested in any bonds of 
the United States heretofore issued for the benefit of either 
or all of said companies, or in any of the first-mortgage bonds 
of either of said companies which have been issued under th~ 
authority of any law of the United States, and S3curecl by 
mortgages of their roads and franchises which by any law 
of the United States have been made prior and paramount 
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to the mortgage lien or other security of the United States 
in respect of its advances to either of said companies, as 
provided. by law." 
The sinking funds referred to in this section were estab-
lished by the act of the 7th of May, 1878 (~0 Stat., 56), 
known as the Thurman act. "The investments authorized 
by law," the officer by whom they are to be made, the source 
whence the fund. is to be derived, its administrative and final 
distribution, all are fixed by the same act. The section 
referred to in yours is concerning the s~e subject, and is 
substantially an amendment of the prior act. The two are 
to be construed together as one, and, as a whole, they must 
be viewed in connection, so as to make all the parts har-
monious if practicable. The whole law, as thus considered, 
received an authoritative interpretation in the ''Sinking 
Fuud Cases" (99 U. S. R., 725), by which certain principles 
were announced which will aid in the determination of the 
questions submitted. It is there settled the fund is a fund 
of the Union and Central Pacific Railroad established by law, 
mtended for the security and payment of certain of their 
several debts at maturity; that the United States Trea~mry 
is the depository, and the Secretary of tlle Treasury is the 
agent charged with the administration of the fund. The 
power of the Secretary of the Treasury as agent over the fund 
is not enlarged by the section referred to in yours, except 
that he i~ empowered ''in addition to the investments now 
authorized by law" to invest in certain other securities not 
before authorized. His power is a special one fixed by law, and 
must be strictly followed. We can not enter into the inquiry as 
to whether the power is too limited or too extensive; whether 
the interests of the corpor~tions and their creditors would 
haYe been better subserved had the Secretary been allowed 
to make other in vestments, or to buy and sell bonds as to him 
would seem best or not. That question has been already 
passed upon by Congress, and we are limited to determining 
whether Congress empowered him to sell the bonds in which 
the fund has been invested, and with the proceeds to buy 
others. If that power exists now it will continue as long as 
the law remains unchanged. The bonds which might be 
bought with the proceeds of those sold to-day might to-mor-
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row, by a change in the market, appear to be profitable to sell 
and re-inYest. Each change in tlw market might be made an 
occasion for sale and re-investment. A general power to 
deal in the bonds referred to in the act and amendment would 
be the result of such a construction. Whether a good or 
bad investment of the fund might he the result of the exer-
cise of such a power would largely depend upon the agent's 
knowledge of the market and his judgment in the applica-
tion of that knowledge. An error in the sale or purchase 
might result in a loss. During the course of such dealing 
the interest on the fund must be suspended. The Jaw con-
templated no uncertainty on this subject. A certain steady 
gain, and not Rpeculative profits, is shown to be the intent, 
for the third section of the act of 1878 provides that ''the 
semi-annual income thereon shall be in like manner from 
time to time invested, and the same shall accumulate and be 
disposed of as hereinafter mentioned." 
This semi-annual income cl~arly refers to the interest on the 
bonds purchased, and does not contemplate the uncertain 
quantity of profit or loss. The "same shall accumulate" 
leaves no discretion in the agent to subject the fund to a 
possible loss. The gain was intended to he a fixed and cer-
tain accumulation. The law authorizes the Secretary to invest 
the fund e tablished in bonds. This is equivalent to saying 
"with tbe money paid in you shall buy bonds;" it does not 
say, " with the bonds you shall bay bonds." Does the power 
to buy the bonds, or the whole scope of the law, imply the 
power to sell them~ The langaage of the sediou just quoted 
says: ''The semi-annual income shall be from time to time in-
vested." If it had been the intention of the law-makers to 
allow the investment from time to time of the princip~l from 
which the income was derived, such from time to time invest-
ment would not have been limited to the income only. The 
inclu~ion of one is the exclusion of the other. The power of 
an agent to buy does not imply the power to sell. The sub-
ject is considered in Story on Agency, section 88, and the con-
clusion stated in the following lauguage: ''So that we here 
see it laid down in positive terms that the agent to buy has 
no implied authority to sell, and an agent employed to sell 
has no implied authority to buy." · 
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Without a conversion or sale of the bonds now in the Treas-
ury until their maturity there can be no reinvestment. 
The section referred to in your letter only authorizes the 
investment of "the sinking funds which are or may be held 
in the Treasury." The ordinary signification of the word 
"funds" is "cash on hand" (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 
1, p. 701). As a means of purchase this is the only significa-
tion the word could have in this connection, and this is the 
sense in which it is here used. This is shown by reference to 
the third section of the prioT act of which this is an amend-
ment, the '.first clause of which is: 
" That there shall be established in the Treasury of the 
the United States a sinking fund which shall be invested," 
etc. 
It is clear the law-makers did not contemplate that the 
Secretary of the Treasury should buy bonds with anything 
but cash on hand. The law says he is to buy them with the 
fund established. 
Another clause in the same· section states : 
"All the bonds belonging to said funds shall, as fast as 
they shall be obtained, be so stamped as to show that they 
belong to the said fund, and they are not good in the hands 
of other holders than the Secretary of the Treasury until 
they shall have been indorsed by him and publicly disposed 
of pursuant to this act." 
Here the bonds are not spoken of as constituting part of 
the fund, but as investments of or as property of which the 
fund personified is spoken of as the owner, indicating a 
distinction between the money with which the property is 
bought and the property purchas3d therewith. The in-
vestment is showu to be intended as permanent, for the 
property thus obtained must be stamped and rendered 
valueless, except in the hands of the agent of the fund, 
until by him indorsed and publicly disposed of pursuant 
to the act. This is the only authority to sell the bonds. 
The act provides the fund, directs its investment, directs 
the investment from time to time of the semi-annual income, 
and authorizes nothing further with reference to the fund as 
a fund until the final distribution is provided for in the sev-
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enth and eighth sections of the act of the 7th of May, 1878. 
The seventh section of that act is: 
"That the said sinking fund so established and accumu -
lated shall, at the mat~trity of the said bonds so respectively 
issued by the United States, be applied to the payment and 
satisfaction thereof according to the interest and proportion 
of each of said companies in said fund, and of all interest 
paid by the United States thereon and not re-imbursed, sub-
ject to the provisions of the next section." 
Until action is to be taken in pursuance of this section, the 
law authorizes no use of the bonds nor further disposition 
of them by the agent. After the investment is made th~ 
first step required to be taken with reference thereto pursuant 
to law is the sale for the purpose of the application to the 
payment of the debts for which it was accumulated. The 
time when this step is to be taken is at the maturity of the 
bonds. The bonds whose maturity is referred to in this sec-
tion are the United States railroad subsidy bonds issued on 
account of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroads. 
Until those bonds mature, the power to dispose of the United 
States bonds purchased in pursuance of the act does not. 
take effect. Therefore, in answer to your first inquiry, you 
are not authorized to sell the United States bonds in which 
the funds are now invested, for the purpose of reinvesting 
in the first-mortgage bonds of the company. 
In reply to your second inquiry: the fifth section of the 
act of the 3d of March, 1887, authorizes the fund, "in addi-
tion to the investments now authorized hy law, (to) be hJ-
vested in any bonds of the United States heretofore issued 
for the benefit of either or all of said companie~, or in any of 
the first-mortgage bonds of either of said companies which 
have been issued under the authority of any law of the 
United States and secured by mortgages of their roads and 
franchises, which by any law of the United States have been 
made prior and paramount to the mortgage, lien, or other 
security of the United States in respect of its advances to 
either of said companies as provided by law." 
The second section of the same act defines the words " all 
such railroads" to mean "all the railroads that have received 
aid from the Government in honrls." The railroads which 
• 
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have received aid from the Government in bonds are set forth 
in the act of the 1st day of July, 1862, and the amendment 
thereto of the 2d day of July, 1864, and any of the United 
States railroad subsidy bonds issued in pursuance of said 
act as amended are a legitimate security in which to invest 
the fund under the first clause of the quotation under con-
sideration. In the second clause, '' or in any of the first-
mortgage bonds of either of said companies," the word "either" 
is substituted instead of the phrase "either or all of said 
companies" in the former clause. This substitution of 
"either" for" either or all" is intended to limit the invest-
ment in mortgage bonds of the roads to fewer roads than 
are included in the expression "either <lr all." "Either" is 
generally used as signifying " one or the other of two." It 
is thus used here. The two roads, in either of whose first-
mortgage bonds the investment may be made, as referred to 
by the word ''either," are to be determined by reference to 
the act of the 1st of July, 1~62, with its amendments of the 
~d of July, 1864, and the ·7th of May, 1878. By reference to 
these acts it will be found the Union Pacific and the Central 
Pacific Companies compose the main line and central object 
of the legislation, that they and they alone pay in the money 
which constitutes the fund. They are the sole corporations 
embraced in the provisions of the Thurman act, in which 
they are frequently grouped under the word "either." Hence 
it is concluded they are the railroads em braced in the term 
"either" in the clause under consideration~ and investments 
of the fund may be made in the first-mortgage bonds of either 
the Union or Central Pacific Railroads. You may, then, in-
vest any money paid into the sinking fund in pursuance of 
the act of the 7th of May, 1878, now in the Treasury, or which 
may in future be paid in-
First. In United States bonds, as provided in the act of 
the 7th of May, 1878. 
Second. In any United States railroad subsidy bonds of 
any of the aided roads, as described in the act of the 1st of 
July, 1862, and its several amendments. 
Third. In any of the first-mortgage bonds of the Union 
Pacific or the Central Pacific Railroad Companies, such as are 
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described in the third section of the act of the 3d of March, 
1887. 
Within this range the law leaves it to your discretion to 
invest in whichever of the securities will best subserve the 
securing and accumulating of the fund. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ESTATE OF JAMES B. EADS. 
Payment of amonnt due the estate of James B. Eads, deceased, for serv-
ices m connection with the improvement of the South Pass of the 
Mississippi River, may lawfully be made to James P. How and Estill 
McHenry, the executors and trustees under his will, if the certificate 
of the engineer officer in charge shows satisfactorily the performance 
of the services. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April11, 1887. 
Sm : By letter of the 31st of March, 1887, the executors of 
James B. Eads, deceased, request the payment to them of 
$50,000, which they claim to be due to his estate from the 
United States for services and interest in connection with 
the Mississippi jetties. 
By yours of the 1st of April you ask my opinion "whether, 
under the terms of the will and the other papers submitted," 
you will be "justified under the law in ordering this pay-
ment to the executors and trustees under the will in case the 
certificate of services be satisfactory." 
On the 30th of March, 1887, James F. How and Estill Mc-
Henry, as executors of James B. Eads, deceased., presented to 
the surrogate of the county of New York, in the State of 
New York, for probate his will, dated the 2d of October, 1883. 
It was duly proven and decree of probate made thereon in 
regular form. On the same day letters testamentary were 
granted to James F. How and Estill McHenry as executors. 
The only two essential jurisdictional ~acts to warrant the 
exercise of the power to grant letters testamentary by the 
surrogate under the law of :New York "are the death of the 
~estator, and that at or immediately previous to his death he 
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was an inhabitant of the same county with the surrogate.'' 
(Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill'::; Report, 13.4). These two facts 
are sufficiently shown by the records submitted. The adju-
dication by the surrogate where he bas jurisdiction is not 
exposed to collateral impeachment, but is conclusive of the 
validity of the will when not directly attacked. The same con-
clusiveness attaches to the granting of letters testamentary. 
In this case, then, the papers submitted show the will is valid, 
and that James F. How and Estill McHenry are the legal 
representatives of James B. Eads, deeeased, with tbA power 
over his estate provided for by the terms of the will. One of the 
provisions of the will is a::; follows: "James F. How and Estill 
McHenry are appointed as executors and trustees to execute 
and administer this will and to collect and disburse the vari-
ous payments to be made to me under the several acts of 
Congress on account of the jetties, etc., at the South Pass." 
'fbe second section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 
1875 (18 Stat., 463), which provides for the work and payment 
therefor, declared : "The United States hereby promise and 
agree to pay said Eads or his successors or legal representa-
tives," etc. The ninth section enacts ''that in case of death 
or other disability of said Eads before the completion of said 
works the same shall be prosecuted and completed by his 
legal representatives and associates aforesaid, with the same 
powers, rights, obligations, and compensations as if done by 
him in person." The tenth section authorizes the Secretary 
of War, upon fulfillment of the conditions of the act," to draw 
his warrants upon the Treasury of the United States in favor 
of said Eads or his legal representatives in payment of the afore-
said amounts as they respecti 'I ely become due by the pro-
visions of this act." 
If, then, the certificate of the engineer shows satisfactorily 
the performance of the services contemplated by the act for 
wllich the compensation remains due and unpaid, payment 
therefor may be ma<le to his executors to whom letters testa· 
mentary have been granted. 
This is in accordance with legal principles heretofore rec-
ognized by this Department. (7 Opin., 60.) 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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Customs Duties. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Confectionery known as "fruit tablets" is dutiable under the clause in 
the act of March 3, 181:33, chapter 121, namely: "Sugar candy not col-
ored, five cents per pound." 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 13, 1887. 
SIR : Your letter of the 6th of April, 1887, submits for con-
sideration the question raised by the appeal of Wright and 
.Rich, which is, whether certain confectionery known as'' fruit 
tablets" is dutiable under clause 242 Tariff Index, new, or 
243 of the Tarifl' Act of l\larch 3, 1883. These clauses are as 
follows: No. 242, "sugar candy not colored, five cents per 
pound." No. 243, "All other confectionery not specially 
enumerated or provided for in this act, made wholly or in 
part of sugar, and on sugars after being refined~ when tinct-
ured, colored, or in any way adulteratec., valued at thirty 
cents per pound or less, ten cents per pound." The duty 
was collected under the latter. By its -terms this clause is 
applicable only to "other confectionery not specially enu-
merated or provided for w this act." The appellants claimed 
these tablets are " specially enumerated and pro,Tided for" 
by clause No. 242, above quoted, as "sugar candy not col-
ored." The " confectionery is manufactured from sugar and 
flavored with fruit extracts, such as lime, lemon, hoarhound, 
orange, etc., which extracts also tinctured and colored the 
tablets to a certain extent;" but the color or tincture given 
to the cand~y was only the accidental result of the nature of 
the ingredi~?nts used as a flavor. No ingredient was used in 
the manufacture of the candy purposed or intended to beau-
tify or ornament it. The chemist at the port of New ,York 
reports "that in his opinion the tablets in question do not 
represent what are commercially known as colored candies 
or colored confectioneries." A 1 eport of the second appraiser 
at the same port, approved by the appraiser, finds ''if the 
commercial designation is to govern the classification of the 
confectionery under consideration, it should undoubtedly be 
returned for duty at fi.\e cents per pound~ as pro\ided for in 
paragragh 242, Tariff Index, new." The same view is adopted 
and elaborated in carefully considered opinions by the nava~ 
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officer of the port and the Acting Solicitor of the Treasury. 
Certificates of over sixty dealers in the article in different 
large cities of the countr~· attest that it is "commercially 
understood, designated, bought and sold by the trade as 
' sugar candy not colored.' " 
From all the facts found in the papers with yours trans-
mitted, it seems to be well estabiished that the article has a 
well known commercial designation as " sugar candy n~t 
colored." In the cases of _Arthur v. Morrison and Arthur v. 
Lahey (96 U. S. R., 108-113) a well established principle in 
the interpretation of tariff legislation is formulated as follows: 
·''The commercial designation of an article among traders 
and importers, when such designation is clearly established, 
fixes its character for the purpose of the tariff laws." 
It is therefore concluded the tablets referred to in the ap-
peal should have been classified according to their commercial 
designation, under Tariff Index, new, 242, instead of 243, 
under which the duty was collected. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 

INDEX. 
ABATEMENT OF TAX. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 39; INTERNAL REVENUE, 7. 
ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS. 
1. Upon the facts presented in the case: Advised, that it is not incum-
bent upon the Postmaster-General to have an account for mail 
transportation performed in July, 1876, audited in favor of the 
Lak~ Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, until satis-
factory evidence is presented that the company has maintained 
its existence and that there are proper officers to receive andre-
ceipt for the money. 129. 
2. Leave of absence was granted Lieutenant R., of the Army, for one 
year from August 1, 18S1, during part of which period, namely, 
from August 1 to November 1, 1881, he was entitled to cumula-
tive leave with full pay. On March 16, 1882, the order granting: 
said leave of absence was revoked, and a new order was issued 
by direction of the Secretary of War placing Lieutenant R. "oa 
a status of waiting orders for one year from August 1, 1881."' 
He has drawn full pay (not only from August 1 to November 1,. 
1881, to which he was entitled, but) from November 1, 1881, to-
March 16, 1882, when, for this period, he was only entitled t.o. 
half pay: Held, that the difference between full pay and half' 
pay for the last-mentioned period can not be withheld in the ad-
justment of another and subsequent pay account presented by 
Lieutenant R. (But see paragraph 6, p. 610.) 158. 
3. The Secretary of the Interior is warranted in approving certain 
statements of account between the United States and the State 
of Ohio, made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
for cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the period in-
tervening between the passage of the swamp -land act of Sep-
tember 2S, 1850, and March 3, 1857. 170. 
4. Where an account has once beeu duly adjusted, settled, and closed 
by the proper officers, UJlOn a full knowledge of all the facts, 
and no errors of calculation have been made, it can not be re-
opened in the absence of statutory authority. 223. 
i. Tbe provisions of the act of August 7, 1882, entitled ''An act to 
authorize the auditing of certain unpaid claims against the In-
dian Bureau by the accounting officers of the Treasury,'' do not 
extend to the opening of settled accounts. Ibid. 
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6. The case of Lieutenant R. reconsidered in the light of new and ma-
terial facts; and it appearing that there has been no such settle-
ment of his account as was heretofore supposed: Held, that he is 
bound to refund the sum which has been paid him without au-
thority of law. 229. 
7. In the adjustment of a marshal's emolument account, he may be 
allowed credit for expenses of travel incurreti by himself while 
serving process. 290. 
8. So a deputy marshal may be reimbursed for expenses incurred 
while serving process, and also be allowed turee-fourths of the 
profits arising from his services. Ibid. 
9. The First Comptroller is not clothed with power, where in his 
"Opinion further delay would be injurious to the Government, 
to dit·ect the Commissioner of the General Land Office forthwith 
to audit any particuiar account relating to the public lands, the 
settlement whereof is devolved upon the lat.ter officer. 450. 
10. The Commissioner, with respect to the discharge of his duties in 
such matter, is subject only to the direction of the Secretary of 
the Interior. Ibid. 
11. In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific 
Railroad Company (whose road was in part constructed with 
the aid of subsidy bonds issued under the acts of July 1, 1862, 
chapter 120, and July:!, 1864, chapter 216), for Government trans-
portation over the subsidized portion of its road: Advised, that 
the direction in the second section of the act of March 3, 1873, 
ehapter 2:26 (Sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to withhold all payments," 
etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applicable thereto; 
that only one-half the amount of compensation due the company 
lor such transportation should be withheld to be applied as re-
quired by the act of July 2, 1864, and that the remaining one-
half should be paid over to the company. 503. 
AD INTERDf APPOINTMENT. 
See OFFICE. 
ADVANCES. 
The fund appropriated by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 234, to 
defray the expenses of delegates to the Universal Postal Union 
Congress at Lisbon, Portugal, is subject to the re<>trictions, as to 
advances, contained iu section 3648, Revised Statutes. 93. 
ALABAMA CLADIS COMMISSION. 
See COURT OF COMMISSIO~ERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS. 
ALASKA. 
The fourteenth section of the act of May 17, 1884, chapter 53, which 
prohibits the importation of ''intoxicating liquors" into the 
Territory of Alaska, does not apply to wines imported for sacra-
mental use. 139. 
INDEX . 611 
.ALLOTMENT. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 12. 
AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
Q:1e":~tion considered as to whom payment should be made, under 
the circumstances stated, of an award of the American and Mexi-
can Claims Commission in favor of a claimant, a resident of 
Mexico, who has deceased. 99. 
AMERICAN ARTIST. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 14. 
AMNESTY. 
See PARDON . 
.APPEAL. 
An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by 
the Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or validity 
of a resurvey of a private land c~aim. :11. 
APPOINTMENT. 
1. The provisions of.section 1769, R~vised Statutes, relative to filling 
vacancies during a recess of the Senate, are limited to vacancies 
happening by death or resignation or expiration of term of office, 
but do not apply to original vacancies. 28. 
2. When an office is created by a law taking effect during a session of 
the Senate, and no nomination is made thereto, the original 
vacancy thus existing may be filled by the President during the 
ensuing recess of the Senate by a temporary appointment. Ibid. 
3. The power of the President to fill vacancies in office by temporary 
appointment, derived under section 2, Article II, of the Consti-
tution, comprehends all vacancies that may happen to exist in a 
recess of the Senate, irrespective of the time when such vacancies 
first occur. 29. 
4. The appointment of the assistant collector at the port of New York 
(who was formerly employed by the collector with the approval 
of the Secretary of the Treasury) should now be made by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 98. 
5. The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the 
"Inventions International Exposition" at London, such office 
not existing by virtue of any law of the United States. 171. 
6. An Indian residing in the Indian Territory, who is a member of one 
of the tribes there, and subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not eligi-
ble to appointment as a postmaster; he being incompetent, in 
contemplation oflaw, to take the required oath of office. 181. 
7. Where a post-office of either the first, second, or third class (all of 
which classes are filled by appointment by the President) is re-
ducecl to a post-office of the fourth class (which is filled by ap-
pointment by the Postmaster-General), the commission of the 
then incumbent, though he may not have served out the term for 
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which he was appointed, expires, and a new appointment (by the 
Postmaster-General) becomes necessary. 271. 
8. The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission, created 
by the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, is to be filled by 
appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. 409. 
9. The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 353, repealing the tenure-of-office 
law (sections 1767 to 1772, Revised Statutes), leaves unaffected 
such designations, nominations, and appointments as shaH have 
been made before the repeal, and requires all business begun bnt 
unfinished before the repeal to be completed under the law as it 
then stood. 576. 
10. Appointments and removals after the repeal are to be made under 
the law as it now exists. Ibid. 
See CIVIIr SERVICE; LIGHT-HousE ESTABLISHMENT; OFFICE. 
APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE. 
See CuSTOMS LAws, 3, 10, 15, 22. 
APPROPRIATIONS. 
See UNEXPENDED BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
ARMY. 
1. Where an officer of the Army was tendered a place on a ' 1 board 
of experts," created by a city ordinance to determine the most 
durable and best pavement for the streets of the city: Advised 
that, in view of the provisions of section 1222, Revised Statutes, 
the place be not accepted by the officer. 11. 
2. In the matter of the claims of Sergeant Robinson and Corporal 
Speddin, of the Signal Corps, for extra-duty pay for services 
performed by them from July 1, 188:3, to December 20, 1884, it 
appearing that Congress has made no provision for extra-duty 
pay to signal service men in either of the appropriation acts of 
March 3, 1883, chapter 143, and July 7, 188-1, chapter 332, for the 
fiscal years ending June 30, 1884, and June 30, 1885, respectively, 
or in any other appropriation act for the same fiscal years : 
Held that the claimants have no right to such pay for the period 
covered by their claims, unless the right is elsewhere conferred 
by statute, which does not appear. 201. 
3. The claimants being non-commissioned officers, and not employed 
on extra duty as overseers, their claims are not within section 
1287, Revised Statutes. Ibid. 
4. A discharge of an officer from the military service, under the act 
of July 15, 1870, chapter 294, in order to be valid, must, like a 
resignat,ion, be founded on an offer on the one part and an ac-
ceptance on the other. 311. 
5. Accordingly, where Assistant Surgeon P., in September, 1870, 
offered to take the benefit of that act, and in November follow-
irg his offer was virtually rejected, an order subsequently (in 
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December, 1870) issued discharging him from the service is held 
to be invalid and his status in the service unaffected thereby. 
Ibid 
6. H. entered the military service in August, 1862, as a volunteer, to 
serve for three years; he subsequently deserted; but he after-
wards voluntarily returned to service underthePresident's proc-
lamation (of pardon) of March 11, 1865, and was mustered out 
of service along with his company in July 2, 1865: Advised that 
the time which elapbed between his desertion and his return 
should not be credited to him in a discharge or otherwise, but 
that he is entitled to have his actual service credited to him in 
an lionorable discharge. 427. 
ARMY OFFICER HOLDING CIVIL OFFICE. 
See ARMY, 1. 
ARMY SUPPLIES, PURCHASE OF. 
1. Purchases of supplies for the Army made in open market after 
advertisement, where no bids have been received in response to 
such advertisement, are ~mergency purchases within the mean-
ing of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter.217, and should be" at once 
reported to the Secretary of War for his approval." 349. 
2. When parts of machinery, or of stoves or ranges or patented arti-
cles, are needed, such articles are required by that act to be pur-
chased in the same way as other quartermaster's supplies-
that is, by contract after arlvertisement, except in cases of emer-
gency, in which cases the purchases are to be reported to the 
Secretary of War for approval. Ibid. 
ASSIGNMENT. 
See CoNTRACT, 1, ~. 
ASSISTANT COLLECTOR AT NEW YORK. 
See APPOINTMENT, 4. 
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF STEAM-VESSELS. 
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS, 3, 4. 
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES TREASURER. 
See BoND. 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
An attorney was employed by the War Department in 1868 to de-
fend certain parties against whom suits were brought, in the 
result of which the Government was interested. The suits were 
not determined until some time after the passage of the act of 
June 22, 1870, chapter 150, up to which time the attorney was 
continued therein: Advised that the anthorfty under which the 
attorney was originally employed was sufficient, and that the 
Secretary of War is authorized to pay for his services out of any 





1. Where a question is submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to 
the Solicitor of the Treasury for the opinion of the latter thereon,. 
the Attorney-General will not, at the request of the Solicitor, 
consider such opinion and express his views as to its conclu-
sions. 57. 
2. An opinion of the Att.:>rney-General upon any question arising i D 
the administration of the Treasury Department can only be had 
at the instance of the Secretary. - 59. 
3. Where a que!iltion has been submitted by the Secretary to the So-
licitor of the Treasury for advice thereon, the latter is not enti-
tled, by virtue of section 361, Revised Statutes, to call upon the 
Attorney-General for his views on such question. Ibid. 
4. The Soliciter should, in such case, return his aflvice directly to the 
Secretary, who may, if he choose, require an opinion from the-
Attorney-General upon the same quf<stion. Ibid. 
5. It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion to the 
Secretary of the Treasury upon questions relating to the past ac-
tion of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, which was had on a 
matter properly submitted to such board under the provisions or 
s.ection 4491, Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewable by 
the Secretary. 77. 
6. The Attorney-General is not authorized by law to give an official 
opinion to the House of Representatives in response to a reso-
'lution thereof. 87. 
7. Where a call for an opinion from the Attorney-General was made 
by the head of a Department, in compliance with a resolution of 
the House of Representatives, for the information of the latter, 
and without reference to any question of law arising in the ad-
ministration of such Department: Advised that the Attorney-
General is without authority to give an official opinion in such 
case. 107. 
8. ;where a request is made for an opinion of the Attorney-General on 
questitms of law arising in any case, it should be accompanied 
by a statement of the facts of the case as well as of the questions 
on which ad vice is desired. The Attorney-General can not un-
dertake to find and settle the facts from papers that may be sub-
mitted. 487. 
9. The Attorney-General will not interpret a regulation of practice 
made by the Commissioner of Patents for his own guidance and 
that of his subordinates, for the convenient, intelligent, and or-
derly disposal of the business of his office. Such regulations, 
which the heads of bureaus and Departments can make, modify~ 
or annul at will, or enforce or waive, as seems expedient, may 
well be left for their interpretation to the head of the Depart-
ment ur bureau to which they pertain. 521. 
AWARD. 
See AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
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BOARD OF IMMIGRATION. 
It is not the duty of a United States attorney to advise or defend 
boards of immigration; but the Secretary of the Treasury is em-
powered by the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, to employ, and 
pay out of the immigrant fund, counsel for those purposes. 108. 
BOND. 
1. The form of the bond required to be given by assistant treasurers 
of the United States under section 3600, Revised Statutes-
whether the parties thereto are to be jointly and severally, or 
may be only jointly bound, and whether each surety is to bind 
himself for the full amount of the penalty, or may restrict his 
liability to a less amount-is not made the subject of statutory 
regulation, but is left to the determination of the officers by 
whom the houd is to be approved. 274. 
2. But the form ordinarily made use of in practice is that wherein the 
principal ancl sureties are jointly and severally bound for the 
full amount of the penalty. Ibid. 
3. This form being preferable to any other, and its use sanctioned by 
long practice, the adoption of a different form (though it might 
not be inconsistent with the terms of the statute so to do) would 
not be warranted unless the circumstances of the particular 
case were such that the public interests could not otherwise be 
served. 2i 5 . 
.(. The omission of the words" in the State of Vermont" from the of-
ficial bond of the collector of customs for the district of Vermont 
does not impair its validity. The bond held to be valid, either 
under the statute or at common law. 458. 
See SuRETY; SusPENSIO~ OF OFFICER, 2. 
BONDED WAREHOUSE. 
See CUSTOMS LAws, 2, 25. 
BOUNDARY. 
See SHEYENNE ISLAND. 
BRIDGE. 
1. The provision in the act of J nly 5, 1884, chapter ~15, fixing the 
width of the water-way between the spans of the proposed 
bridge across the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., extends 
to the entire structure over so much of the river as is ordinarily 
navigable at some seasons of the year for either boats or rafts. 
133. 
2. The power of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters 
is paramount, and where it comes in conflict with that of a State 
the latter necessarily becomes ineffective. 164. 
3. Yet, until Congress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes 
control of the subject, the power of a State over bridges across 
navigable streams within its limits is plenary. Ibid. 
4. Accordingly, where a railroad company was authorized by the 
laws of Minnesota to construct a bridge across the Mississippi 
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River within the limits of that State: Held that, if such au-
thority is unaffected by any law of Congress, the company may 
act thereunder, though in so doing it will subject itself to the 
risk of future Congressional interference. Ibid. 
5. In the case of the bridges of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Com-
pany across the Southern and Eastern branches of Elizabeth 
River, the facts set forth are insufficient to authorize judicial 
proceedings against said company in behalf of the United States 
on the ground that such bridges are an obstruction to naviga-
tion. 200. 
6. Under authority of the legislature of West Virginia it is proposed 
to cor•struct a bridge overthe~ittleKanawha, 3navigableriver 
within the limits of that State, which bridge, if built, will be 
an obstruction to navigation; but its construction being neither 
expressly nor impliedly forbidden by any law of Congress: Ad-
vised that the case is not one which warrants the institution of 
judicial proceedings for the prevention of obstruction to naviga-
tion threatened. 42fi. 
7. A State may authorize a navigable stream within its limits to be 
obstructed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Con-
gress on the subject. Ibid. 
8. Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chapter 4, 
and February 14, 1883, chapter 44, authorizing and regulating 
the construction of hridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary 
of War has power to disapprove of the plans of such bridges 
where he is of the opinion that they would unduly obstruct the 
navigation of the river. 512. 
9. The Covington anu Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation 
and Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20, 1886, chap-
ter 363, to erect a bridge across the Ohio between Covington 
and Cincinnati, has no power under that act to sell the fran-
chise granted to it thereby. Such power is not to be iv.tplied 
from the words "successors or assigns" in the act. Ibid. 
CADET ENGINEERS. 
See NAVY, 4, 6. 
CALLED BONDS. 
See NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS. 
CASH INDEMNITY FOR S\V .AMP LANDS SOLD. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 3. 
CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 





The lands lying in the "Cherokee Strip" which are leased to the 
whites are not lands of the United States within the meaning of 
section 5388, Revised Statutes. 555. 
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS. 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2. 
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT. 
See CHINESE LABORERS. 
CHINESE LABORERS. 
1. Where a sheriff in Washington Territory apprehended certain China-
men and brought them before a United States commissioner, 
who, having found them to be in the country unlawfully, re-
manded them to the custody of the sheriff, to be sent out of the 
country: Held that the expenses incurred by the sheriff in the 
performance of such service are payable from the appropriation 
made by the act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332, to meet expenses 
incurred in executing the act relating to the Chinese, approved 
May 6, 1882. 90. 
2. The remedy for the alleged evil of Chinese laborers passing through 
the territory of the United States to, and returning from, China 
and other foreign .countries, is proper matter for the considera-
tion of Congress. 388. 
3. Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of July 18, 1882 (17 Opin., 
416), construing the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 1:l6, cited with 
approval. Ibid. 
4. Body servants or nurses (Chinese) are not persons "other than 
laborers" within the meaning of section 6 of the act of May 6, 
1882, chapter 126, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884, chap-
ter 220, when they come to this country to ply their vocations, 
and are excluded. 542. 
5. Where, however, such servants or nurses accompany visitors en-
titled to enter the United States, and only remain here tempo-
rarily during the stay of such visitors, they do not fall within the 
scope of the legislation referred to. Ibid. 
CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW PERMIT LAWS. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 1, 2. 
CIVIL SERVICE. 
1. Wher.e a father and daughter held each an office in the classified . 
service in one of the Departments, and another daughter, having 
passed the required examination, was proposed for appoiu"tment 
in another Department: Held that, by force of section 9 of the 
act of January 16, 1H83, chapter27, the last-mentioned daughter, 
so long as the above state of facts exists, is ineligible for appoi:n~ 
ment to any office or place in the classified service. 83. 
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2. Special examiners of the Pension Bureau authorized to be appointed 
by the act of July 7, 1884, chavter 331, and by the act of March 
3, 1885, chapter 334, come within the purview of the civil-service 
act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27; and in appointing snell offi-
cers the latter act and rulfls thereunder should be observed. 172. 
3. The officers in the Pension Bureau described as medical referee, 
assistant medical referee, medical examiners, and law clerk, be-
ing " exclusively professional," do not fall within the operation 
of the civil-service law; they are excepted therefrom by Rule 
XIX. 187. 
4. Those described as principal examiners for review board are not 
excepted and in appointing them the civil-service law a.nd regu-
lations should be observed, Ibid. ' 
5. The act of January 16, 18i33, chapter 27, to regulate and improve the 
civil service of the United States, repeals by implication section 
164, Revised Statutes. 215. 
CLAIMS. 
1. Upon the facts presented in the matter of the claim ofVann and 
Adair for compensation for their services rendered the Osage In-
dians in 1869 and 1870 respecting the disposal of the lands of the 
latter: Advised, that the payment of the $50,000 awarded by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the 
Interior in 1874 was a satisfaction in full of any claims that the 
said Vann and Adair had for their services. 5. 
2. Sernble that an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia is not 
within the prohibitions of sections 178:t and 5498, Revised Sta.t-
uteA. 161. 
3. The claims of Ely Moore, J. W. Whitfield, and Daniel Woodson, as 
special agents and receivers, for additional compensation for the 
sale of the trust l::j.nds of the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw, 
Peoria, and W ea Indians, considered. 167. 
4. Upon the facts stated : Advised that no action whatever should be 
taken by the Executive Departments on the claim of Ely Moore 
and others for additional compensation for selliJ"ig certain Indian 
trust lands, without legislation by Congress providing therefor. 
223. 
5. Opinions of May 5 and July 7, 1885, 1, touching the claims of Ely . 
Moore and others (see ante, pp. 167, 223), reaffirmed. 369. 
6. In 1860 E., a naval officer, became entitled to a share in the pro-
ceeds of a captured slaver, the amount of which was certified to 
the Treasury Department by the Secretary of the Navy, but re-
mains unpaid. In 1861 E. resigned his commission and entered 
the Confederate service : Htld that by for.ce of the joint resolution 
of March 2, 1867 (sec. 3480, Rev. Stat.), payment of such share can 
not now be made, notwithstanding the President's proclamation 
of amnesty of December 25, 1868, and that to authorize its pay-
ment an act of Congress is necessary. 421. 
INDEX. 619 
CLAIMS-Con tinned. 
7. The act of August 4, 1886, chapter 907, made an approJ?riation to 
pay certain claims, and directed the 8ecretary of the Treasury 
to pay t,o "Martin and P. B. Murphy$10,000." It being alleged 
that this was intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that 
amount, of which Martin.~furphy was a joint owner with Patrick 
W. Murphy: Ad1!ised, that should the identity of their claim 
with that provided for in the act be clearly established, the fact 
that " B" is used in the act instead of " W" as the initial letter 
of the middle name of Patrick W. Murphy, is immaterial, and 
may be disregarded. 501. 
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED S1'ATES. 
See COM;PROMISE. 
CLASSIFICATION FOR DUTY. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 24, 26, 32. 
COLLECTION DISTRICT. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 47. 
COLLECTOR'S CERTIFICATE. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 16. 
IJOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. 
See INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS. 
COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE. 
See AccouNTS AND AccouNTING OFFICERS, 9, 10. 
COMPENSATION. 
1. Opinion of February 13, 1884 (17 Opin., p. 658), on the subject of 
the re-adjustment of postmasters' salaries, rftferred to and ex-
plained. 17. 
2. Statutory provisions relating to the appointment and duties of 
supervisors of elections considered; and held that when they 
have served any given number of days not exceeding ten, and 
it is so duly made to appear, they are entitled to be paid a per 
diem therefor, and that it is not for the Attorney-General to de-
termine whether their period of servi\le is reasonable or unrea-
sonable. 102. 
3. Certain fees claimed by a United States attorney for special serv-
ices held to be "compensation allowed by law" within the 
meaning of the third section of the act of J nne 20, 187 4, chapter 
328, and therefore not precluded by that section from being 
paid. 121. 
4. Section 838. Revised Statutes does not authorize an allowance to 
be made by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney 
for services in internal-revenue cases reported to the latter 
wherein no judicial proceedings have been instituted. 126. 
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5. W. was appointed minister resident and consul-general to Hayti, 
and took the oath of office, but failing to execute a bont'l as re-
quired by section 1697, Revised Statutes, his commission was 
not delivered to him: Held that by the provisions of that sec-
tion he never became qualified to receive the commission or to 
enter upon the duties of the office, and that he is not entitled to 
pay as an incumbent of such office. 157. 
6. Compensation of the United States attorney for the southern dis-
trict of New York, under sections 770, 836, and 827, Revised 
Statutes, considered. 192. 
7. The provision of section 4769, Revised Statutes, authorizing pension 
agents to deduct from the fees of attorneys in each pension case 
30 cents, in payment of the services of the former for forwarding 
the same, is repealed by the act of June 14, 1878, chapter 188. 
251. 
8. D., while a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District of Co-
lumbia, was appointed a referee by the Court of Claims under 
the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, chapter 243, and per-
formed services as such; and in consideration of such services 
the court issued certificates to him fixing the amount of com-
pensation allowed therefor: Held that D. is entitled to receive 
the amount thus allowed. 30:3. 
9. Under the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 287, an internal-revenue 
store-keeper is entitled to receive a per diem compensation only 
while "rendering actual service." Hence during such time as 
he is not assigned to duty and does not perform duty no com-
pensation can be allowed him. 3\:IS. 
10. Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the 
Navy and Marine Corps for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884, 
are not available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for 
services rendered during the fiscal year ending June ~0, 1885. 412. 
See ATTORNEY FEES; CLAIMS, 2, 3, 4, 5; EXTRA-DUTY PAY. 
COMPROMISE. 
1. Where judgment was recovered in the name of the United States 
against G. for damages and penalties, under sections 3490, 3491, 
3492, and 3493 Rev. Stat., the action having been instituted 
and prosecuted by D.: Advised that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury has power, by virtue of section 3469 Rev. Stat., to compro-
mise such judgment, irrespective of the quasi interest which 
D. may have therein. 72. 
2. Claims in favor of the Government, founded on judgments entered 
upon forfeited recognizances taken in the prosecution of of-
fenses against the postal laws, may be compromised by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury under the provisions and upon the consid-
erations imposed by section 3496 Rev. Stat. 277 . 
.a, Such claims do not arise under the postal laws within the mean-
ing of the exception in that section. Ibid. 
I 
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 
CONSUL. 
See CoMPENSATION, 5; FEES OF CoNSULS. 
CONSULAR COURT. 
1. Where a citizen of the United States, trading in the island of Gnap, 
a barbarous or semi-civilized country, was charged with cruelly 
and inhumanly punishing a boy on said islan<l: Advised that the 
case is cognizable by a consul or commercial agent under the 
provisions of section 4088 Rev Stat., and that a special com-
mercial agent might be sent to the island for the trial of the 
accused. 219. 
2. The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon United States consular 
officers by section 4084 Rev. Stat., i& limited to ''citizens" 
of the United States charged with offenses committed in the 
countries therein referred to. It does not extend to subjects of 
foreign powers. 498. 
CONTINGENT FUND. 
1. Under section 3683 Rev. Stat., heads of Departments are alone 
a·nthorized to give orders for purchases payable from the con-
tingent fund and to approve vouchers therefor. 424. 
2. Opinion of July 16, 1886 (ante, p. 424), in regard to the power 
conferred upon heads of Departments by section 3683 Rev. Stat. 
respecting purchases payable f:.-om the contingent fund, does 
not apply to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior while in 
the exercise of authority prescribed for him by the Secretary of 
the Interior under section 439 Rev. Stat. 432. 
CONTRACT. 
1. 'l'he contract entered into by the Chief of Ordnance with the South 
Boston Iron Company in October, 1880, and subsequently trans-
ferrecl by that company to the South Boston Iron Works, may 
still be treated by the Government as obligatory upon the former 
company, notwithstanding such transfer. 88. 
2. Under the provisions of section 3737 Rev. Stat., such transfer 
operated to annul the contract so far as the United States are 
concerned; but these provisi0ns were not made to enable a con-
tractor to avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve 
himself from his obligations by a mere transfer. Ibid. 
3. The Secretary of the N aYy may assent to a modification of the con-
tract for building the new cruisers where the interests of the 
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision 
violated thereby. 101. 
4. Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying 
the mail should be in the name of the United States as directed 




5. The express condition mentioned in section 3741 Rev. Stat., need 
not be inserted in those contracts made with railroad corpora-
tions. Ibid. 
6. Examination of the contract entered into between Mr. John RoaCJh 
and the Secretary of the ·Navy for the construction of the dis-
patch boat Dolphin, and consideration of the rights and duties 
of the United States arising thereunder. 207. 
7. Opinion of June 30, 1885, touching the contract with Mr. John 
Roach for building the Dolphin (ante, p. 207) reaffirmed. 240. 
8. Upon the facts of the case as presented: Advised that the contract 
relating to certain coal mines at Savanna, Choctaw Nation, be-
tween Mrs. A. G. Ream and her husband and the Atoka Coal 
Mining Company, dated November 3, 1883, be considered as in 
full force for the period for which it was executed and approved 
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Secretary of the In-
terior. 242. 
9. The authority to make contracts for carrying the mail between 
ports of the U[l_ited States and foreign ports, given by section 
4007 Rev. Stat., is limited by section 4009 Rev. Stat., with 
respect to the amount of compensation; so that in such con-
tracts under the former section no greater compensation can 
be allowed to American steam-ship lines than the sea and in-
land postage upon the mail transported. 248. 
COURT-MARTIAL. 
1. Review of the finding of the court-martial in the case of Jndge-
Advocate·General David G. Swaim. 113. 
2. Special counsel ruay 1e employed by the Attorney-General, at the 
request of the Secretary of the Na-vy, to assist tho judge-advo-
cate in a trial by court-martial, the compensation of such coun-
sel (in the absence of other provision) to be paid from the appro-
priation for tile contingent expenses of the Navy. 135. 
3. Such counsel should be commissioned by the Attorney-General 
under section 366 Rev. Stat. Ibid. 
4. The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy De-
partment is amenable to the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial 
upon charges and specifications preferred against him for acts 
done as such chief. 176. 
5. Where a civilian witness is brought before a court-martial but 
refuses to testify, the court is not invested with any inherent 
power to punish the witness in such case, either summarily or 
otherwise, as for a contempt. Such power can only be exercised 
by it when given by the positive terms of some statute. 278. 
6. Section 1202 Rev. Stat. arms the court with authority to com-
pel the witness to appear and testify so far as this can be 
done by process; but in securing his testimony the court is re-
stri~ted to the means which it is thus authorized to employ. It 
can not inflict any punishment where the power to impose it is 
not clearly conferred by Congress. Ibid. 
• INDEX. 6~3 
COURT-MARTIAL-Continued. 
7. Where the record of the proceedings of a court-martial in the case 
of a naval cadet of the second class, who was tried under the act 
of June ~3, 1874, chap. 453, for the offense of hazing, showed 
that the acts complained of were pulling the nose, striking at, 
striking, and otherwise maltreating a naval cadet of the fourth 
class: Held that these facts in conjunction with other circum-
stances present a case containing all that is essential to consti-
tute the offense of hazing within the meaning of the statute, and 
that the court had jurisdiction uf the complaint. 376. 
COURT OF COMMISSIONERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS. 
The officers composing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama 
Claims, re-established by the act of June 5, 1'l82, chap. 195, 
were appointed in conformity to the provisions of that act, but 
were not commissioned for any stated period. That act limited 
the duration of the court to two years from the time of its organi-
zation thereunder; but by the act of June 3, 18?4, chap. 62, its 
existence was extended to December :n, 1885; and under the 
latter act the officers of the court continued to perform their 
duties after the expiration of the two years referred to, without 
any other appointment than that originally received: Held that 
the limitation upon the duration of the court prescribed by the 
act of 1882 was not a limitation upon the terms of the officers 
thereof, and that the court remained after the expiration of the 
two years limited by that act, by virtue of the act of 1884, a 
legally constituted body, notwithstanding the officers com-
posing it received no other commissions than those originally 
given. 298. 
COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. 
See CusTOM LAws, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35. 
CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS. 
See JURISDICTION. 
CROW CREEK RESERVATION. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. · 
1. Clause in Schedule F of the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, im-
posing a duty upon "leaf tobacco," considered and commented 
on; and advised that the duty attaches to tabacco of the statu-
tory description, irrespective of the bale or package in which it 
is imported, and that, consistently with the terms of the statute, 
bales and packages may be broken np in order to sort such 
different grades of leaf tobacco as may be contained therein. 
Page 1. 
2. Goods which arrived in a port of the United States on the 30th of 
June, 1883, and from want of time to make other disposition of 
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them remained on board ship until the next day, are to be re-
garded as in a public store or bonded warehouse within the 
meaning of section 10 of the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121. 13. 
3. The subject of the proper appraisement of varnish imported intO> 
the United States from a bonded warehouse in Canada, wherein 
it had been manufactured-a component of such varnish of chief 
value being distilled spirits produced in the United States aml 
exported thence into the said warehouse, where it was com-
pounded into the varnish-considered. 43. 
4. Duty 8D plated silver cords, etc., stated. 47. 
5. The "Foxhall" gold and silver cup is free of duty under sections 
2499 and 2502, title XXXIII, Rev. Stat., as enacted by the act of 
May 3, 1883, chap. 121. 62. 
6. Boards and other artic]eg of sawed lumber of pine are dutiable at 
$2 per thousand feet under the act of March 3, 113d3, chap. 121. 68. 
7. Where a claimant was both seizor and informer under the act of 
June 22, 1tl74, chap. 391, in the case of goods forfeited for vio-
lation of the customs laws, compensation may be allowed him 
by the Secretary of the Treasury in either capacity; and the 
fact that the claimant originally presented his claim as seizor 
does not estop him from subsequently changing it~ form and 
making claim as informer. 69. 
8. A lot of rum was exported December 3, 1883, and reimpol'ted Octo-
ber 20, 1884, which had been manufactured within the United 
States from imported molasses whereon drawback was allowed 
upon the exportation of the rum : Advised that the rum is dutia-
ble under section 2500, Rev. Stat., and not under the act of 
March 3, 
1
181::!3, chap. 121 ; furthermore, that the importers are 
entitled to remove the same under section 34:33 Rev. Stat. 82. . 
9. "Alizarine assistant," an article used in dyeing, is dutiable, as a 
chemical compound, at 25 per centum ad valorem. 106. 
10. Reconsideration of former opinion (see ante, p. 43) in regard to the 
duty upon certain shellac varnish ir:1ported from Canada; and 
adviBed that the warehouse value in Canada is to be taken as a 
basis for computing the duty thereon. 109. 
tt. New legislation is not required by the proviso in section 7 of the act 
of June 10, 1880, chap. 190, in order to give the privilege ofim-
mediate transportation to any of the pla~es named in that sec-
tion which at the time of the passage of that act was without 
the "necessary officers" therein referred to, but which thereafter 
has such officers assigned thereto. 120. 
12. Where meat of American production, cured with foreign salt, was 
exported to Europe (the duty upon the salt being refunded), and 
subsequently brought back to this cpuntry: AdviBed that, on the 
duties upon the salt being re-refunded, the meat may be admitted 
duty free under the act of :March 3, 1883, chap. 121. 139. 
13. Silver ore, ground, is not dutiable under the tariff act of March 3,. 
1883. 148. 
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14 . .An artist of foreign birth, but who has resided in the United States 
for fourteen years and has declared his intention to become a cit-
izen thereof, may properly be treated as an .American artist 
within the meaning of the provision in the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121, declaril'lg free of duty" works of art, painting, etc., 
the production of .American artists." 163. 
15. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens, of October 4, 187H (16 Opin., 
158), that imported merchandise entered upon projorrna invoices, 
in the absence of regular invoices authenticated by United 
States consular officers, when advanced in value on appraisement 
more than 10 per cent., is not liable to the 20 per cent. ad valo-
rem additionrtl duty under section 2900, Revised Statutes~ con-
curred in. 259. 
16. In the case of merchandise of domestic production shipped at ports 
on the Great Lake~:> to other portE> in the United States, by routes 
through Canadian territory, the issue of a certificate by the col-
lector of customs Hhowing that the merchandise so shipped is of 
domestic production is not authorized by law. 261. 
17. The expense of brokerage, auctioneer's commissions, and packing, 
incurred at the place of exportation, are, by the act of March 3, 
1883, chapter 121, not to be ostimated in de1ermining the dutia-
ble value of impor· eu merchandise. 288. 
18. Periodical publications bound in stiff covers in regular book form 
(each volume containing several numbers of any such publica-
tion) lose their character as periodicals and become dutiable as 
books under the act of ]\larch 3, 1883, chapter 121. 315. 
1~. The values of foreign coins, as annually estimated and proclaimed 
by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provh;ion of section 
3564, Revised Statutes, constitute the only lawful basis for com-
puting the invoiced value of importations, and duties on the lat-
ter are necessarily required to be collected on the values of for-
eign coins so estimated and proclaimed. 322. ~ 
20. Where an importation of packages was entered at the custom-house 
as containing personal effects only and not subject to duty, but 
it turned out on examination that the packages contained duti-
able merchandise of considerable value: Beld that the entire 
packages were not forfeitable but only the dutiable merchandise; 
the case being gove1·ued by section 2802, Revised Statutes, which 
is unaffected by the provisions of section 12 of the act of June 22, 
• 1b74, chapter 391. 326. 
21. "Medicinal soap" is dutiable as soaps not otherwise provided for 
at 20 per centum ad valorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal 
preparation or compound. 344. 
22. Statutory provisions relating to the appraisement and re-appraislil-
ment of imports subje~t to duty considered, and held that, in the 
absence of any regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury to that 
effect, the law does not permit importers to appear before the 




ing wit.nesses to be exammed in their own behalf, or to ut·oss-
examine witnesses called by such appraisers. The entire matter 
is under the control of the Secretary, and subject to such rules 
and regulations as he may from time to time establish in re-
lation thereto. 360. 
23. Cement barrels being deemed non-dutiable charges, it is recom-
mended that the instructions oft he Treasury Department of J oly 
20, 1885, be so amen<ted as to apply to cases of exaction of duties 
on such barrels where the value thereof was added by the im-
porter at the time of entry under a requirement made by the 
order of April 10, 18.J4, as contained in the circular of that. De-
partment of April 12, 1884. 36:t 
24. Where certain merchandise, consisting of a fabric comp'osed of silk, 
cotton, and worsted, met all the requirements of Schedule L of 
the act of March 3, 181:l3, chapter 121, and also fulfilled all the 
conditions imposed by Schedule K of the same act for classifica-
tion for duty thereunder: Held that under section 2499, Re-
vised Statutes, it should be classified for duty under Schedul~ L, 
which imposes the higher rate. 367. 
25. Where domestic merchandise, exported in good faith has been im-
ported back again, and is subject to duty, it is entitled to be ad-
mittell to entry for storage in a bonded warehouse under section 
2962, Revised Statutes. 381. 
26. The article .called toluidine, being a product of coal-tar, is within 
the provision of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, covering 
all preparations of coal-tar not colors or dye, not specially enu-
merated or provided for," and is dutiable thereunder. 38:3. 
'27. Where certain law reports, printed in the year 1840-'41, were im-
ported into the United States in an unbound condition, the 
printed sheets not even being stitched together: Held that they 
come within the provision of the act of March 3, 188:3, chapter 
121, exempting from duty "books " * bound or nn bound 
* which shall have been printed and ~panufactured more 
than twenty years at the date of importation," and were there-
fore not dutiable. 461. 
28. In determining the meaning of" iron ore," as used in the provision 
of the al}t of March :3, 1883, chapter 121, which imposes a duty 
thereon, regard should be had to the commercial signification 
of the term, as Congress must be understood to have used the 
same in its commercial sense. 466. 
'29. Sacks, lJoxes, or coverings of any ki uds, the duty on which as chm·ges 
was repealed by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 
121, are not subject to duty, either separately from or as a part 
of the value of the goods· imported therein, excepting where they 
come under the proviso in that section or fall within some special 
provision oflaw. 468. 
30. The 100 per centum ad valorem, mentioned in said proviso, can be 
imposed upon sacks, boxes, or other coverings of imported mer-
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chandise only where their material or form justifies the conclu-
sion that they were used as coverings to evade duties, or where 
they were designed or contemplated ,to be applied to some use 
otlter than that of coverings for imported merchandise, even 
though their use as coverings only should continue after the 
goods had passed beyond the custom-house to the market or con-
sumer. Ibid. 
31. The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, etc., are, after importation, 
put to other uses, if such uses were not designed at or before the 
time of importatiun, and if there was no design to evade duty 
in using them as coverings, will not subject them to the 100 per 
centum ad valorem duty. Ibid. 
32. The proper classifications for duty of certain articles of imported 
merchandise, consisting ofT beams, girders, joists, columns, 
posts, and other mltnufactures of iron used in the construction 
of buildings, considered. 475 
33. Under the clause in the act of March 3, 11383, chapter 121, provid-
ing a duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on ginger-ale or ginger-
beer, etc., no separate or additional duty is to be collected on 
bottles or jugs containing the same. But where the ale or beer 
is bottled, the ad valorem duty should be levied upon the whole-
sale value thereof as bottled ale or beer in the general market 
of the country whence it is imported. 478. 
34. Certain boxes or cases containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, trial 
glasses, etc., used as coverings for sue~ instruments, held not 
subject to the 100 per cent. ad valorem duty prescribed in the 
proviso of section 7 of the act of March :3, 1883, chapter 121. 479. 
35. Tin cans containing French peas, prepared meats, fish, fruit, vege-
tables, and milk food-being neither of material nor form de-
signed to evade the duties thereon, nor designed for use other-
wise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the United 
States- -are not subject to the 100 per cent. ad valorem duty pre-
scribed by the proviso to the seventh section of the act of March 
3, 1883, chapter 121. 483. 
36. Spools on which thread is wound for transportation or shipment 
are duty free, under the provisions of section 7 of the act of 
March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 496. 
37. Boxes in which safety aud ordinary matches are usually imported 
are not dutiable as part of the merchandise which they contain, 
but (being composed in part of a material designed for a use 
other than that of a bona fide transportation of their contents) 
they are subject to the duty of 100 per centum ad valorem pre-
scribed by the proviso in the seventh section of the act of March 
3, lb83, chapter 121. 510. 
38. The cost of winding on spools, or skeining, yarn or thr~ad, is one 
of the usual charges for preparing and packing the merchandise 
for transportation, which, by section 7 of the act of March 3, 
1ts83, chap. 121, are not to be included as part of the dutiable 
value of such merchandise. 515. 
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39. The provisions of section 2984, Rev. Stat., authorizing the abate·· 
ment or refund of duty on imported merchandise which, under 
the circumstances therein stated, is injured or destroyed by 
accidental fire or other casualty, extend to a loss caused by 
freezing. 519. 
40. Hair of the common goat, which is unfit for combing purposes, 
should be admitted free of duty under the provisions in the free 
list for hair of horses and cattle, and hair of all kinds not spe-
cifically enumerated, act of March :~, 1883, chap. 121. 527. 
41. Principles of law stated for determining what is comprehended by 
the terms "iron ore," a~ used in the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 
121. 530. 
42. Wool-tops, imported in the ordinary condition of scoured wool, are · 
not subject to the penal double duty imposed by the act of March 
3, 1883, chap. 121, on " wool of the sheep, etc., w hie1h shall be 
imported in any other than ordinary condition as now and here-
tofore practiced," etc. 534. 
43. Mahogany boards and planks are not dutiable as manufactures of 
mahogany, under the clause in ScheduleD (act oiMarch 3, 1883, 
chap. 121) imposing a duty on "manufactures of cedar wood," 
etc.; but they fall within the designation of lumber in the clause 
in same schedule which imposes a duty on'' sawed boards, planks, 
deals," etc., and are dutiable under the latter clause. 535. 
44. A steam-pump and boring apparatus, used in deep prospecting for 
oil and coal, with connecting iron tubes, etc., brought into this 
country by a coal and petroleum seeker for the purpose of pursu-
ing his profession here, do not come within tile meaning and in-
tent of the clause in the act of March 31 1883, chapter 121, 
exempting from duty "implements, instruments, and tools of 
trade, occupation, or employment of persons arriving in the 
United States," and should not be admitted free. 5:~8. 
45. The article known as "Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder" is duti-
able at 50 per centum ad valorem under the act of March 3, 
1883, chap. 121. 552. 
46. In December, 1855, several hundred packages of seeds were im-
ported, which were entered for consumption and the estimated 
duties thereon paid. Some of the packages were sent to the ap-
praiser's store for examination and appraisement, and the re-
mainder delivered to the importer, who (having given bond as 
required by section 2899 Rev. Stat.) took possession thereof 
and stored them in his warehouse. Pe:Jding the appraisement 
and liquidation of the entry the warehouse took :fire and 
was totally destroyed, with all contents. Thereupon the im-
porter applied fQr a refund of the duty paid on the packages so 
destroyed under section 2984 Rev. Stat. : Held that he is not 
entitled to the relief asked, the merchandise destroyed not 
having been at the time of its destruction, in t.h~ custody of the 
officers of the customs, as contemplated by said section 2984. 578. 
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47. The act of March 3, 1887, chap. 348, amending sections 2533 and 
2534 Rev Stat., and making Hartford a port of entry in place 
of Middletown, creates a new collection district and also a new 
office (that of collector), requiring a new commission and a new 
bond. 591. 
48. Confectionery known as" fruit tablets" is dutiable under the clause 
in the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, namely: "Sugar candy 
not colored, five cents per pound." 606. 
DESERTION. 
See ARMY, 6. 
DISABILITY. 
See PARDON, l. 
DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY SERVICE. 
See ARMY, 4, 5, 6. 
DISPATCH-BOAT DOLPHIN. 
See CoNTRACT, 6. 
DISTILLED SPIRITS. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, 2. 
DISTILLERY WARE HOUSE. 
See INTERNAL HEVENUE, 1, 2. 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 
See BOARD OF IMMIGRATION i COMPENSATION, 3, 4, 6. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
1. The watchmen employed by the Government under the act of Au-
gust 5, 1882, chap. 389, for service in the public squares or res-
ervations in the District of Columbia, are by that act invested 
with the powers of the metropolitan police, and may make ar-
rests outside of such squares and reservations for offenses com-
mitted within the ~:~arne 433. 
2. Semble that the Chief of Engineers of the Army is not and never 
has been vested with authority to grant licenses for the erection 
of wharves along the river front of the city of Washington, D. 
c. 441. 
DOUBLE PAYMENT. 
H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in t.he State 
of Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861, 
up to which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the 
Governme-nt in full what was due them. Afterwards they col-
lected from the State of Arkansas for the same period of service 
(January 1 to May ::H, 1861) certain amounts, which were paid out 
of moneys belonging to the United States that had been seized 
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by the State: Advised that the contractors are under a legal lia-
bility to make restitution to the United States of the amounts 
so collected, but that their sureties can not be held responsible 
therefor upon the undertakiug of the latter. 414. 
DRAGOON BARRACKS LOT .AT ST . .AUGUSTINE. 
The piece of land known as the Dragoon Barracks lot, in St . .Au-
gustine, Fla., and the buildings thereon, being the property of 
the United States, may be appraised and disposed of in the man-
ner provided by the second and third sections of the act of July 
5, 1884, -chap. 214. 543. 
DUTIABLE V .ALUE OF IMPORTS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 17, 19. 
EIGHT-HOUR L.A W. 
1. Construction of the act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, known as the 
eight-hour law, as given by former .Attorney-Generals, and also 
by the Court of Claims and Supreme Court, stated, and in par-
ticular cases of alleged violation of the act considered with ref-
erence thereto. 389. 
2. The ac.; is a legislative declaration that for the persons described 
therein eight hours a day is a reasonable day's labor; and where 
the public interests can be snbserved, this should be a guide to 
officers, both civil and military, in contracting for the public 
service. Ibid. 
ELIGIBILITY FOR .APPOINTMENT. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 1 ; .APPOINTMENT, 6. 
EMERGENCY PURCH.ARES. 
See ARMY SUPPLIES, PURCHASE OF. 
EMIGRANT HALF-BREED INDIANS. 
See IMMIGRANT, 2. 
• EMINENT DOMAIN. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 5 j FORT BROWN RESERVA-
TION, 3. 
EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL. 
See CouRT-MARTIAL, 2, 3. 
ESTATE OF JAMES B. E.ADS. 
See PAYMENT, 2. 
EXPORTATION BOND. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
EXTRA COMPENSATION. 
See COMPENSATION, 8. 
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EXTRA-DUTY PAY. 
See ARMY, 2 .• 3. 
FEES OF CONSULS. • 
See SHIPPING, 2, 3. 
FEES OF PENSION AGENTS. 
See COMPENSATION, 7. 
FERRY-BOAT. 
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS, 2. 
FINE, REFUNDING OF. 
See SHIPPING AcT. 
FINES, PENAL1'IES, AND FORFEITURES. 
1. The power conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section 
26 of the act uf June 26, 1~84, chap. 121, to refund'' a fine, 
penaHy, forfeiture, exaction, or charge ari!?ing under the laws 
relating to vessels or seamen," which has been paid to any col-
lector of customs or consular officer, does not extend to the case 
of a fine, penalty, etc., exacted and paid prior to the date of 
that act, and of which an application for remission was made 
within a year from the date of payment. 282. 
2. Nor does the power of remitting fines, pP-ualties, etc., so arising, 
given hy the same section to the Secretary of the Treasury, ex-
tend to cases where a competent judicial tribunal shall have 
deciderl that such fines, penalties, tltc., were legally imposed. 
Ibid. 
3. Where an importation of packages was entered at the custom-
house as containing personal effects only and not subject to 
duty, but it turned out on examination that the packages con-
tained dutiable merchandise of considera~le value : Held, that 
the entdre packages were not forfeitable, but only the dutiable 
merchandise; the case being governed by section 2802 Rev. 
Stat., which is unaffected by the provisions of section 12 of the 
act of June 22, 1674, chap. 391. 326. 
4. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture 
of articles contained in the same package with other articles 
imported in violation of section 2491, Rev. Stat. 424. 
5. Under the eighth section of the act of June 19, Hl86, chap. 421, 
a foreign vessel is liable to a fine of $2 for every passenger 
transported hy it from one port in the United States to another 
port in the United States, though the continuity of the voyage 
may havf' been broken by the vessel touching at an intermediate 
foreign port. 445. 
6. Section 1%8, Rev. Stat., does not confer upon the Secretary of 
the Treasury authority to remit the forfeiture of a vessel con-
demned by the United States districtconrt for Alaska, for being 
engaged in killing fur seals. 584. 
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7. Under section 5293, Rev. Stat., fifth paragraph, he has power 
to remit in such case, but only where the forfeiture was im-
posed" by virtue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals 
upon the islands of St. Paul and St. George." Ibid. 
FITZ JOHN PORTER, RELIEF OF. 
The bill" for the relief of Fit,z John Porter, '1 passed at the first 
session ofthe Forty-eighth Congress, considered, and objections 
thereto, constitutional and other, stated. 18. 
"FOREIGNER. " 
The word "foreigner, " in section 2134, Rev. Stat., is used in its 
ordinary signification-meaning one who is born out of the 
United States and is not naturalized, or who owes allegiauc~ to 
any other government than that of the United States. 555. 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. 
Consideration of certain propositions relating to the enforcement 
of judgments of foreign tribunals iu civil and commercial mat-
ters, suggested by a resolution adopted at the Conference held at 
Milan in 1H83 by the Association for the Reformation and Codi-
fication of International Law. 84. 
FORFEITURE. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 7 ; FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. 
FORT BROWN RESERVATION. 
1. The act of March 3, 1885, chap. 360, appropriated a large sum of 
money ''to enable the Secretary of War to acquire good and valid 
title for the United States to the ~,ort Brown Reservation, Tex., 
and to pay and extinguish all claims for the use and occupation 
of said reservation by tbe United St11tes;" with a proviso that 
no part of said snm shall be paid "until a complete title is vested 
in the United States," and that ''the full amount of the price, 
including rent, shall be paid directly to the owners of the prop-
erty.'1 327. 
2. Claims of ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, hav-
ing been asserted by different parties, who propose to convey the • 
same to the Government, their titlPs, respectively, at the request 
of the Secretary of \Var, examined and considered by the At-
torney-General, who indicates in his opinion the pbrsons by whom 
and points out the mode by which::- good and valid title to the 
whole of the reservation can be conveyed to the United States 
and all claims for the use and occupancy thereof extinguished, 
as contemplated by the said act of 1885. 328. 
3. The provisions of that act do not authorize acquisition of title by 
condemnation under the eminent domain power of the United 
States. Ibid. 
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4. Deed of conveyance executed by James Stillman and Thomas Car-
son (the latter as administrator with the will annexed of Maria 
Josefa Cavazos, deceased), dated May 12, 1886, and deed of re-
lease executed by Kate M. Combe and others, by their attorney 
in fact, James B. Wells, jr., dated April 17, 1886, not deemed 
sufficient to impart a valid title to the whole of the Fort Brown 
Reservation, for reasons stated. 400. 
FORT KEOGH RESERVATION. 
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has no interest in any of 
the lands within the boundaries of the Fort Keogh military res-
ervation, excepting the right of way therein granted to that 
company by the second section of the act of July 2, 1864, chap. 
217, to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of its road, 
including all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, 
depots, etc. · 357. 
FRANCHISE, SALE OF. 
The Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation 
and Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20, 1866, chap. 
363, to erect bridge across the Ohio between Covington and Cin-
cinnati, has no power under that act to t;ell the franchise granted 
to it thereby. Such power is not to be implied from the words 
"successors or assigns" in the act. 512. • 
FREE LIST. 
See CUSTOMS LAws, 5, 13, 27, 36, 40. 
GENERAL SWAIM'S CASE. 
See CouRT-MARTIAL, 1. 
GUILFORD MILLER'S CASE. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 3. 
HAZING. 
See NAVAL ACADEMY; COURT-MARTIAL, 6. 
HEAD TAX. 
1. The duty imposed by the act of 1882, chap. 376, upon passengers, 
other than citizen~, coming to any port within the United States, 
is to be exacted of convicts, lunatics, etc., although by the 
terms of the statute thfly are not to be permitted to land and 
are required to be returned to whence they came. 135. 
2. The tax of 50 cents imposed by the act of August 3, 1882, chap. 
376, is applicable to all passengers, not citizens of the United 
States, who shall come by steamer or sail vessel from a foreign 
port to any port within the United States, whether as immi-
grants or merely as tourists. 185. 
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3. The duty of 50 cents a passenger, imposed by the act of August 3t 
1882, chap. 376, should be exacted from itinerant persons, not 
citizens of the United States, toties quoties any such person en-
ters one of our ports from a foreign port. 196. 
HOLDING STATE OFFICE. 
See STATE OFFICE. 
HOSPITAL. 
See SuRGEON-GENERAL. 
HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK. 
1. The Secretary of the Interior has power, under the act of Decem-
ber 16, 1878, chap. 5, to lease sites upon the Hot Springs Res-
ervation in Arkansas for the term of five years, and to relet the 
premises for the same term, from time to time, as the leases ex-
pire. 266. 
2. Upon the facts stated : Ai£vised that the Secretary may accept a. 
surrender of a lease of a bath-house site heretofore made to S., 
and cancel the same, and then enter into a new lease of the prem-
ises with the same party for the term of five sears. Ibid. 
3. During the term of the lease, and while the tenant is in possession 
under the same, be may remove from the premises whatever im-
provements he bas · erected thereon for the purpose of trade, 
whether machinery or buildings; but if he leaves the premises 
without removing such improvements, and the Government 
should take possession, they would become the property of the 
latt,er. Ibid. 
IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION IN BOND. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 11. 
IMMIGRANT. 
1. When it appear~d that an immigrant from a foreign State was con-
victed of an offense there, sentenced to imprisonment, and after 
having served a portion of his sentence was given an uncondi-
tional pardon : Held that section 4 of the act of August 3, 1H82, 
chap. 376, and section 5 of the act of March 3, lt~75, chap. 141, do 
not forbid his landing in the United States. 239. 
2. Half-breed Indians emigrating to the United States from Canada 
are not precluded by existing legislation from retaining the 
bounty of the United States in addition to that of the Dominion 
of Canada. 423. 
3. Provision of the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, chap. 
376, viz, that if among the passengers of a vessel arriving at 
one of our ports is found a ;, convict, lunatic, idiot, or any per-
son unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming 
a public charge," such person shall not be permitted to land, 
considered; and held not to apply to the case of a lunatic whose 
father will engage satisfactorily that he will not become a pub-
lic charge. 500. 
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IMPLEMENTS, INSTRUMENTS, AND TOOLS OP TRADE. 
See CUSTOMS LA WS1 44. 
IMPORTATION BY MAIL. 
Precious stones and other articles, where the same are liable to 
customs duty, are prohibited by the postal convention of June, 
1878, to be sent through the mail; and if imported by mail they 
become subject to seizure and forfeiture under section 3061 Rev. 
Stat. 457. 
IMPROVEMENT OP NAVIGABLE WATERS. 
Right of the United States to occupy and use soil within the bed 
of a river for the improvement of its navigation affirmed. 64. 
INDIAN CONTRACT. 
1. Where a contr'act made by three attorneys-in-fact of certain per-
sons of the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians with E., an attorney-
at-law, :(or services of the latter, was not executed by one of 
the attorneys-in-fact until some months after it had been exe-
cuted by the other two and by E., nor until after the services 
stipulated therefor had been performed by E. : Held that the 
Secret,ary of the Interior was not authorized to approve the con-
tract or recognize the claim of E. for compensation thereunder. 
517. 
2. Secretary of the Interior has no power to approve the contract in 
the case presenteli for any purpose. 518. 
See CONTRACT, 8; POWER OF ATTORNEY, 11 2. 
INDIAN IMMIGRATION. 
See IMMIGRANT, 2; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 9. 
INDIAN POLICE. 
The powers and duties of the Indian police· authorized by the act 
of M~ 15, 1R86, chap. 333, can not be exercised outside of th&--..... 
reservation to which they may be assigned. 440. 
INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS. 
1. In the absence of treaty or statutory provisions to the contrary, 
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have power to regulate 
their own rights of ocoopanoy, and to say who shall participate 
therein and upon what conditions; and hence may require 
permits to reside in the nation from citizens of the United Stat¥s, 
and levy a pecuniary exaction therefor. --34 
2. Treaties of 1855 and 1866, in so far as they relate to this snbjec 
considered and construed. Ibid. 
3. Sheep are "cattle'' within the meaning of section 2117 Rev. Sta .,' 
which imposes a penalty for driving any stock, etc., to range and 
feed on Indian lands without the consent of the tribe. 91. 
4. The contiguous tracts of land lying on the east bank of the 
Missouri River in the Territory of Dakota, known as the Old 
Winnebago and Crow Creek Reservations, are protected by the 
• 
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provisions of the treaty of April29, 1868, with the Sioux Indians 
and the executive order of February 27, 1885, restoring portions 
of such tracts to the public domains is in violation of that treaty, 
and consequently inoperative and void. 141. 
5. There is no law en-: powerip.g the Interior Department to authorize 
Indians to lease their lands for grazing purposes. 235. 
6. Neither the President nor the Secretary has authority to make-a 
lease, for such purposes, of auy part of an Indian reservation; 
nor would their app•·oval of any such lease made by Indians 
render it lawful and valid. Ibid. 
7. Adt•ised that certain mining leases maae by citizens of the Choctaw 
Nation of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal 
and Mining Company, a Missouri corporation for the mining of 
coal, etc., in said Territory, are not such as may properly receive 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior under existing laws. 
486. 
8. The inhibition contained in section 2116, Rev. Stat., has the same 
application to individual Indians that it has to Indian nations 
and tribes. Ibid. 
9. A body of Indians born and dwelling outside of the territorial 
limits of the United States, and still maintaining their tribal re-
lations, can not, without authority of Congress, enter upon and 
occupy our public domain as emigrants. 557. 
10. The power of the President to set apart a port.ion of the public 
domain fort he exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include 
the case of a reservation for Indians not born Qr commorant iu 
the United States. Ibid. 
11. Where Indians on a reservation made by order of the President 
are organized tribes or bands, and placed under the charge of 
an agent appointed by the Government, the laws applicable to 
Indian reservations must be regarded as applicable to them. 
563. 
12. By the ninth section of the act of February 7, 1887, chap. 119, 
an appropriation is made " for the purpose of making the sur-
veys and resurveys mentioned in section two'' of that act. In 
section 2 there is no mention of "surveys and resurveys." But 
8ection one of the same act contains a provision for "surveys and 
resurveys." Advised that the appropriation made as above is 
applicable to the making of ' 'surveys and resurveys," as pro-
vided for in said section 1-such being the clear intent of Con-
gress. 593. 
INDIAN TERRITORY. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1. 
INDIAN TRUST FUNDS. 
1. Where bonds of the State of North Carolina, held by the Treasurer 
of the United States for the benefit of certain Indian tribes, 
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were nast due and payment thereof demanded and refused: Ad-
viBed that the Secretary of the Interior may authorize the accept-
ance of a proposition of a third party (a c'itizen of the State) to 
pay the principal and accrued interest of the bonds, provided 
their market value does not exceed their face value with the 
accrued interest, and provided the acceptance will best su bserve 
the trust. 581. 
2. Ifthe United Sta,tes has advanced for the State any money on ac-
count of interest due on said bonds, and there is "any moneys 
due on any account from the United States to su.ch State," it is 
the duty of the Treasurer to retain the interest upon such ad-
vances from such moneys. Ibid. 
INFORMER. 
See CusTOMS IJAWS, 7. 
INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS. 
1. The word ''charter" covers the case of boats licensed, under a 
gem;rallaw, by a county court to traverse ferry routes estab-
lished by such courts. 16. 
2. Steam-vessels plying regularly between Albany and Troy, in New 
York, for freight and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the 
second clause of rule VII, paragraph 2, of " General Rules, «>tc., 
of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam-Vessels.'' Ibid. 
3. The provision for assistant inspectors in section 4414, Rev. Stat., 
is not controlled by the details of section 4415 as to either 
the method of their appointment or the professional qualifica-
tions which may be required by the appointing power. 30. 
4. Should an inspection of life-preservers be found necessary, and in 
order to effect this some assistant to the local board must needs 
be appointed, the appointment of such assistant would be war-
ranted by law. Ibid. 
INSPECTORS OF CUSTOMS. 
Inspectors of customs can not lawfully be prevented by the local 
health officers from landing at quarantine stations in the dis-
charge of their duties; but the former, while visiting andre-
maining at such stations, should observe all reasonable regula-
tions in the interest of public health. 15. 
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS. 
1. A judgment against the United States for the sum of $44,800.74 
was given by the Court of Claims in favor of a claimant on 
April20, 1885, ~nd on same day the latter presented this judgment 
to the Treasury Department for payment. On July 14, 1885, the 
United States were allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court, and 
on the next day a cross appeal to the Supreme Court was 
allowed the claimant. On January 31,1889, the judgment was re-
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versed uy the Supreme Court, and a mandate subsequently issued 
therefrom directing the Court of Claims to enter judgment in 
favor of the claimant for the sum of $130,196.98. Pursuant to 
such mandate judgment for this sum was entered by the Court 
of Claims on February 10, 1887, and claimant thereupon pre-
sented the judgment so entered to the Treasury Department for 
payment, demanding interest on the latter sum from April 20, 
18tl5, at 5 per cent. per annum: Held that as the judgment of 
the Court of Clains· was not ajfi?'Yned, but on the contrary was re-
versed by the Supreme Court, interest is not allowable thereon 
under the provisions of section 1090 Rev Stat. 548. 
2. Only such judgmen~s of the Court of Claims as have been appealed 
from to the Supreme Court and affirmed by the latter are interest-
bearing under that section, and they become interest-bearing 
from the date of their presentation in gooi faith for payment. Ibid. 
3. Se'rnble that a presentation made by a claimant who afterwards 
takes an appeal from the judgment is of no avail. Ibid. 
INTERNAL REVENUE. 
1. Internal-revenue taxes on distilled spir!ts, fermented liquors, to-
bacco, etc., produced in the Indian Territory, and special taxes 
on ·the manufacture and sale of those articles in that Territory, 
may lawfull: be collected within the same. 66. 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury bas power to make a regulation un-
der which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in ware-
house after the expiration of three years, upon the distiller or 
owner of the spirits filing a declaration of his purpose to export 
the same m good faith, and giving a bond to do so within a given 
period. 92. 
3. Where the holders of distilled spirits, bonded for ~xportation, shall 
have failed within the seven months specified in the bond (given 
under the regulations of internal-revenue circular No. 282) to 
withdraw such spirits in fact from the distillery warehouse, a 
forfeiture of the bond follows and the spirits are not protected 
from the domestic tax. 246. 
4. Upon application of the principal and sureties on such bond, and 
for good cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
may, under existing regulations, extend the time named in the 
bond beyond seven months. Ibid. 
5. The spirits covered by an exportation bond, after the failure to 
withdraw them and after the forfeiture of the bond, are liable 
to distraint under the act of May 28, 1880, chap. 108. Ibid. 
6. The condition of the bond having been broken by the failure to 
withdraw the spirits, the Government may also proceed upon 
the bond. Ibid. 
7. A large quantity of whisky, part of which had been in warehouse 
beyond the bonded period of three years, was accidentally de-
stroyed by fire in July, 1884, without any fraud, collusion, or neg-
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ligence of the distillers, and while the same remained under 
custody of an internal-revenue officer in a distillery warehouse. 
The tax thereon had not been paid. Application having been 
made to the Secretary of the Treasury for an abatement of the 
tax under section 3221 Rev. Stat.: Advised that the Secretary 
has authority, by the terms of that section, unoer the state 
of facts shown, to abate the tax on said spirits. 379. 
INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue iR authorized, under cer-
tain conditions, to cause internal-revenue stamps, forth~ pay-
ment of t.ax upon tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 62. 
INTERNAL-REVENUE STORE-KEEPER. 
See COMPENSATION, 9. 
INTERSTATE-COMMERCE ACT. 
The provisions of the interstate-commerce act of February 4, 1887, 
chap. 104, do not extend to the post.al service of the United 
States, nor prohibit the transportation by railroad companies, 
free of charge, of such officers or agents of the Government as 
are employed in that service. 587. · 
JAMES S. MORGAN'S CASE. 
See PARDON, 2. 
JURISDICTION. 
Where an Apache Indian, charged with murdering another Indian 
of the same tribe on an Indian reservation in Arizona, was in 
custody of the Territorial authorities: Advised that the accused 
should be delivered up for trial and punishment to the authori-
ties of his tribe. 138. 
See CONSULAR COURT. 
KANSAS. 
1. In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chap. 305, entitled "An 
act relieving the State [of Kansas," etc., the preamble thereto 
may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning 
of the enacting clause. 316. 
2. In compliance with the provisions of that act the State is entitled 
to a credit of $11,4~5 thereunder, and no more. Ibid. 
LAKE SUPERIOR AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 1. 
LAND-GRANT RAILROADS. 
1. The provision in the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 101, requiring cer-
tain contracts for the transportation of goods for Indian tribes, 
etc., to be let to the lowest bidder after advertisement, does not 
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supersede or repeal the act of March 3, 1R75, chap. 133, section 
5260 Rev. Stat., touching payments to land-grant railroads for 
services to the Government. 41. 
2. Wherever it h; practicable to obtain for the Government the benefit 
. of the act of 1877, without yielding the benefits secured to it by 
the other legislation referred to, this should be done. Ibid. 
3. Upon the facts stated: Advised that so much of the road of the St. 
Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company as lies between St. 
Louis and Pacific (a distance of about thirty-fiv'e miles) should 
not be treated as a land-grant road. 47. 
4. Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated : Advised that 
the suspension of the issue of land patents to the New Orleans 
and Pacific Railway Company, heretofore made, be continued 
until the proper trib'l.nals, courts or Congress, definitely settle 
the rights of the parties in the premises. 221. 
LAND GRANT TO GARLAND COUNTY. ARK. 
Under the circumstances existing in the ~ase, and for reasons 
stated, the institution of proceedings on behalf of the United 
States to recover the title and possession of certain land (part 
of the Hot Springs Reservation) granted to the county of Gar-
land, Arkansas, for the site of a public building, would n6t be 
warranted. 264. 
LANDS, PUBLIC. 
1. 'fhe Land Department has authority to make seizure, through its 
officers or agents, of timber unlawfully cut on the public lands. 
434. 
~. Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been seized 
by duly authorized agents of the Land Department, and is in 
their custody, may be disposed of by that Department, and 
whet~er this be done by public or private sale, with or without 
previous advertisement, is a matter entirely discretionary there-
with. Ibid. 
3. On December 29, Ul84, M. made a homestead entry of part of an 
odd section of land lying within the indemnity limits of the 
Northern Pacific Railroad laud-grant, alleging that his settle-
ment thereon commenced June 15, 1878. Said odd section was 
included in a withdrawal from pre-emption or homestead entry, 
etc., made by the Land Department March 30, 1872, for the ben-
efit of said grant, upon the filing of the map of general route. 
On the definite location of the road, of which a plat wa$ filed 
October 4, 1880, it fell within the "indemnity" limits of the 
grant; but the withdrawal aforesaid, in so far as it included 
odd sections which thus came within those limits, continued in 
force thereafter, no, restoration of such odd sections to entry 
having since been made. The said odd section was selected as 
"lieu land" by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company Decem-
ber 17, 1883: Held, that the land entered by M., being in a, state 
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of reservation from the date of the withdrawal in 1872 until its 
selection by the company in 1883, was not during that period 
open to homestead settlement, and consequently that he could 
acquire no right adverse to the claim of the company by his al-
leged settlement commencing in 1t178. 5il. 
4. When public lands have been once withdrawn by competent au-
thority from private appropriation under the general land laws, 
they do not again become subject to such appropriation until 
restored to entry by like authorit.y. Ibid. 
LAWTON'S CASE. 
See PARDON, 1. 
LEASE. 
1. Certain leases of post-offices, made by the Postmaster-General prior 
to the act of March 3, Ul85, chapter 342, for terms of twenty 
years, hdd not to be obligatory upon the Government. 215. 
2. Where the tenancy of the Government is from year to year, it may 
be terminated by giving such notice as is required by the law of 
the State in which the property is situated. Ibid. 
3. There is no law empowering the Interior Department to authorize 
Indians to leasA their lands for grazing purposes. 235. 
4. Neither the President nor the Secretary of the Interior bas author-
ity to make a lease for such purposes, of any part of an Indian 
reservation; nor would their approval of any such lease made by 
Indians render it lawful aud valid. lbid. 
5. Advised that certain mining leases made by citizens of the Choctaw 
nation of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal 
and Mining Company, a Missouri corporation, for the mining of· 
coal, etc., iu said nation, are not such as may properly receive• 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior under existing. 
laws. 486. 
6. The inhibition contained in section 2116, Rev. Stat., has the same· 
application to individual Indians that it bas to Indian nationa 
and tribes. Ibid. 
See HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK.; INDIANS AND INDIAN 
LANDS, 5, 6. 
LEAVE OF ABSENCE. 
Provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, re-
lating to leave of absence of Department clerks and other em~ 
ployes, construed. 352. 
LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON'S CASE. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 2, 6. 
LIGHT-HOUFlE BOARD. 




1. Legislation ofCongre~s in regard to the appointment of Hght,-house 
keepers considered. 344. 
2. Section 4669, Rev. Stat., confines the power of the Light-House 
Board to the adoption and enforcement of such regulations as 
concern the management and control of light-house keepers, 
inspectors, and employes for the purpose of properly administer-
ing the Light-House EAtablisbment. Ibid. 
3. The statute does not authorize the Board to adopt and enforce regu-
lations controlling in any manner the appointment ofligbt-bouse 
keepers or other inferior officers, or to designate the appointees. 
Ibid. 
4. Neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of customs bas a 
legal right to nominate assistant light-bouse keepers. 528. 
5. The Secretary oft he Treasury is not restrict,ed to such appointments 
as the Board recommends, but may appoint any one who, in his 
judgment, will best discharge the duties of the office. Ibid. 
6. Where a regulation, made under and within the power granted by 
section 4669, Rev. Stat., is regularly approved, neither the Board 
without the approval of the Secretary nor the Secretary with-
out the approval of the Board can change it. But such regu-
lation can not abridge or control in any manner the power of ap-
pointment conferred by law upon the Secretary. Ibid. 
LIGHT-HOUSE KEEPER. 
See LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT. 
LOTTERY. 
See PosTAL SERVICE, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
MAIL CONTRACT. 
See CoNTRACT, 4, 5, 9. 
MARSHAL. 
1. Allowances for travel by United States marshals, provided by sec-
tion S29, Rev. Stat., are" fees" within the meaning of section 83:~ 
Rev. Stat., and should be included in the emolument returns 
required by the latter section to be made by those officers. 12:1. 
2. In the adjnstment of a marshal's emolument account, he may he 
. allowed credit for expenses of travel incurred by himself while 
serving process. 290. 
3. So a depnty marsl!almay be re-imbursed for expenses incurred while 
serving process, and also be allowed three-fourths of the profits 
arising from his services. Ibid. 
MEMBER OF CONGRESS. 
See SuRETY, 1. 
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
See A:'IIEJUCAN A~D MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
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MILEAGF.. 
An officer of the Revenue-Cutter Service is not entitled to mileage 
for travel on duty, bnt may be allowed actual traveling ex-
penses. 121. 
MISbiSSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION. 
The salaries and traveling expenses of the members of the Missis-
sippi River Commission appointed from civil life (9ongresshav-
ing failed to make a specific appropriation therefor) can not be 
lawfully defrayed out of the fund provided for the Mississippi 
River improvement. The application of such fund to that ob-
ject would be inconsistent with section 3678 Rev. Stat. 463. 
MONEY-ORDER FUNDS. 
1. The act of March 17, 1882, chap. 41, which authorizes the Post-
master-General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of 
money-order funds in certain cases, does not annul the require-
ments of regulation 1099of the "Postal Laws and R'3gulations," 
whereby the postmaster is to make good the loss should be fail 
to comply with such regulation. 369. 
2. Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regula-
tion is in force, to disregard it in a case where he is satisfied 
that the postmaster had in fact remitted the money lost, but 
did not have the remittance witnessed as the regulation re-
quires. Ibid. 
3. The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being 
limited by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is 
made "in compliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-
General," such compliance forms a necessary element in each 
case to bring it within the statute. 370. 
MONONGAHELA RIVER IMPROVEMENT. 
The clause in the provision ofthe act of August 5, 1886, chap. 929, 
making an appropriation for the improvement of the Monon-
gahela River, which declares that "no charges or tolls shall be 
collected on any other part of the river ou any commerce on 
saicl riYer which originates above the works herein appropriated 
for," does not impose any condition affecting the ex11enditure of 
the appropriation. The.re is nothing in its language which re-
quires the assent thereto ofanyperson, company, or corporation 
claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the relinquishment 
by any person, company, or corporation of such right, before the 
money aJ'propriuted can l1ecome available for expenditure. 481. 
NATIONAL .BANKING ASSOCIATIONS. 
Where certain;) per cent. bonds of the United States, held by the 
United States Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of 
1 
a national bank, we:re called in for redemption and ceased to be 
interest bearing: Advised that unless the hank substitute inter-
est-bearing bonds for the called bvnds, the proceeds of the lat-
ter must be applied to retiring the circulation secured thereby. 
493. 
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NA V .AL ACADEMY. 
1. To constitute the offense of "hazing" at the Naval Academy, 
under the act of June 23, 1874, chap. 4[>3, it is essential that 
the victim sh<]uld be a new cadet of the fourth clat,;s. Hence, 
unless the charge against the accused alleges that the victim 
was a new cadet of the fourth class, a court-martial organized 
under the statute would have no jurisdiction over it. .An alle-
gation that the victim was a candidate for appointment or ad-
mission to the Academy is insufficient. 292. 
2. Where a cadet entered the Naval Academy and became a member 
of the fourth class in 1885, and also remained a member of the 
same class in 1886, he is at the latter period as much an "older 
cadet" within the definition of the offense of "hazing" as a 
cadet who, having entered the Academy at the same time (1885 ), 
has since been advanced to a higher class, and (equally with 




1. An officer retired on furlough pay under section 1454 Rev. Stat., 
can not be transferred to the retired pay-list under section 1594 
Rev. Stat., with increase of pay; such increase is forbidden by 
the act of August 5, 1882, chap. 391. 96. 
2. Nor can an officer be simultaneously retired on furlough pay and 
transferred to the retired pay-list, so as to give him the pay of 
the latter. Ibid. 
3. No designation other than that made by the President entitles a 
naval paymaster to the place and perquiMites of paymaster of 
the fleet. 156. 
4. The cadet engineers in the Navy (graduates of the classes of 1881 
and 1882) who were discharged under a misconstruction of the 
act of August 5, 1882, chap.391, not having been legally removed, 
are still the lawful incumbents of their respective offices, and 
should be recognized as in the immediate line of promotion, in 
their prop~r order, to fill the vacancies that may occur in the 
office of as~ist~nt engineers. 373. 
5. On February 18, 1886, E., a rear-admiral, was, under section 1444 
Rev. Stat., transferred from the active to the retired list of the 
· Navy, and T .. a commodore (being first in the line of promo-
tion), was, after having successfully passed an examination, 
nominated by t!Je President to be a rear-admiral to fill the va-
cancy caused by the retirement of E. While this nomination 
was before the Senate awaiting action thereon, T. attained the 
age of sixty-two years, and under said section was transferred 
from tbe active to the retired list to rank as commodore: .Ad-
vised that, according t.o the law and usage of the service, T. was 
entitled to be a rear-admiral from the 18th of February, 1886, by 
relation, and to receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date, 
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and, if the Senate should confirm his nomination, might be com-
missioned as a rear-admiral and placed on the retired list as of 
that grade. 393. 
6. Cases of Robert B. Higgins, Clarence H. Matthews, ann William 
B. Day for reinstatement in the Navy as ·cadet engineers con-
sidered. 395. 
NEW ORLEANS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY. 
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS. 4. 
NORTHERN PACIFlC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See Fo:litT KEOGH RESERVATION. 
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
1. Obstruction to navigation of certain rivers within the State of Cali-
fornia, caused by hydraulic mining, considered; and advised that 
the case is one calling for the interposition of the restraining arm 
of equity in an appropriate action on behalf of the United States, 
with a view to remedying the evll. 404. 
2. A State may authorize a navigable stream within its limits to be ob-
structed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Con-
gress on the subject. 425. 
See BRIDGE, 5. 
DFFICE. 
1. Where the office of Sixth Auditor became vacant by the death of 
the incumbent, and the duties thereof devolved by operation of 
the statute upon the deputy auditor: Advised that the period 
during which such duties may be discharged by the deputy is 
limited by statute to ten days. 50. 
2. In the case of a vacancy in the office of Secretary of the Treasury, 
caused by the death of the incumbent: Advised that the duties of 
the office can not be performed by some other officer, under sec-
tions 177, 179, 180, and 181, Revised Statutes, for a longer period 
than ten days. 58. 
3. The office of special examiner of the Pension Bureau is newly cre-
ated by the act of March 3, 18135, chap. 334, as it was by the act 
of July 7, 1A84, chap. 331; the term under each act being for one 
year only. 172. 
4. The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission3 cre-
ated by the act of January 16, 1138:3, chapter 27, is to be filled 
by appointment by the President, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. 409. 
5. The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 348, amending sectwns 2533 and 
2534, Revised Statutes, and making Hartford a port of entry ip. 
place of Middletown, creates a new collection district and also a 
new office (that of collector), requiring a new commission and a 
new bond. 591. 
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OFFICER. 
See STATE OFFICE. 
OFFICIAL BOND. 
See RoND, 1, 2, 3, 4. 
OLEOMARGARINE. 
The varioussimpleand compound substances mentioned in section 
2 of the act of August~. 1886, chapter 840, must be ''made in 
imitation or semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated, 
or intended to be sold as butter or for butter," before any of them 
can be regarded as taxable under that act. 489. 
PARDON. 
1. L., having been commissioned a lieutenant in the United Sl;ates 
Army, and taken an oath as such officer. to support the Constitu-
tion ofthe United States, afterwards bore arms against the United 
States in the war of the rebellion, but on the 6th of February, 
1867, received a full pardon from the President for the part he 
bad taken therein: Held, that the fourteenth amendment of the 
Constitution (section 3), which did not take effect until more 
than a year after such pardon was granted, does not operate to 
exclude L. from holding office under the United States. 149. 
2. Effect of the President's proclamations of amnesty of September 7, 
1867 and December 25, 1868, considered in connection with the 
case of James S. Morgan as submitted. 180. 
PASSENGERS. 
See HEAD TAX; IMMIGRANT, 3. 
PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION IN FOREIGN VESSEL. 
See FINES, PENALITIES, AND FOREITURES, 5. 
PAYMASTER OF THE FLEET. 
See NAVY, 3. 
PAYMENT. 
1. Section 3648, Revised Statutes, does not preclude a payment in 
any case where the money has been actually earned and the Gov-
ernment has received au equivalent therefor; its object ls to 
prevent payment being made to contractors in advance of the 
performance of their contracts, whether for services or supplies. 
105. 
2. Payment of amount due the estate of Jaines B. Eads, deceased, for 
services in connection with the improvement of the South Pass 
of the Mississippi River, may lawfully be mad~ to James F. How 
and Estill McHenry, the executors and trustees under his will, 
if the certificate of the engineer officer in charge shows satis-
factorily the performance of the services. 604. 
See AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
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PENALTY. 
See PINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. 
PENSION. 
1. A pensioner, previous to his death, was in receipt of a pension of 
$72 per month under the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, 
chapter 236, and after his death a pension certificate granting 
$30 per month was issued to his widow under section 4702, Re-
vised Statutes; but the latter claims to be entitled under that 
section, as widow, to the same amount of pension which her 
husband was in receipt of, viz: $72 per month: Held that the 
widow's pension is limited to the amount given for "total disa-
bility" by section 469!1, Revised Statutes. 39. 
2. The claim of Mrs. Burnett for a pension, as widow, considered in 
connection with the acts of June 18, 1874, chapter 298, and June 
16, 1880, chapter 236; and held that th<>Be acts did not change 
or increase her rights, which are still governed, as to the amount 
of the pension to which she is entitled, by section 4695, Revised 
Statutes. 73. 
PENSION AGENT. 
See COMPENSATION, 7. 
PERFORMING DUTIES OF VA CANT OFFICE. 
See OFFICE 1, 2. 
PERSONAL EFFECTS. 
See CUSTOMS LAws, 20. 
PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS. 
See CusTOMs LAws, 18. 
PLEURO-PNEUMONIA. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 4. 
POINT PETER, GEORGIA. 
History of the title of the United States to the tract of land known 
as ''Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's River. 
Georgia, given, and adverse claims to ownership of the premises 
set up by one Alex. Curtis, a resident of Georgia, shown to be 
utterly groundless. 384. 
POSTAL SERVICE. 
1. Mode of ascertaining the average of the weight of mails trans-
ported. 71. 
2. Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying 
the mail should be in the name of the United States as directed by 
statute. (See sec. 3949 Rev. Stat.; also sec. 403, ibid.). 11~. 
3. The express condition mentioned in section 3741 Rev. Stat. need 




4. The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, 1878, 
chap. 359, to substitute, for the black printing inks and writ-
ing fluids used under section 721, Postal Regulations, any can-
celing ink which is uniform and which actual experiment and 
test have shown to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard 
against fraud, and to order its use in all post-offices where stamps 
are canceled. 131. 
5. The authority to make contracts for carrying the mail between 
ports of the United States and foreign ports, given by section 
4007, Rev. Stat., is limited by section 4009, Rev. Stat., with re-
spect to the amount of compensation; so that in such contracts 
under the former section no greater compensation can be allowed 
to American steam-ship lines than the sea and inland postage 
upon the mail transported. 24d. 
6. Letters and circulars known (nut merely supposed or suspected) to 
concern lott~ries are non-'llailable, and may properly be ex-
cluded from the mails. 306. 
7. But letters addressed w lottery associations or lottery agents can 
not, simply because they are thus addressed, be deemed to be 
letters concerning lotteries and as such excluded. Ibid. 
8. Newspapers or pel'iodicals containing lottery advertisements are 
not therl:lby rendered non-mailable. Ibid. 
9. A postmaster can not lawfully refuse to receive and forward reg-
istered packages addressed to lottery companies or persons de-
scribed as agents, officers, or managers therof; nor can he law-
fully refuse to issue money-orders payable to such companies or 
to persons described in the orders as agents, officers, or man-
agers thereof. 307. 
10. The power conferred upon the Postmaster-General by section 39!52 
Rev. Stat. to make deduct,ions from the pay of mail contractors 
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary. 313. 
11. Where a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General 
and he afterwards becomes satisfied that the order was made 
under a misapprehenl3ion of the facts, it is within his power eituer 
to directly rescind the order or to refer the matter to the Sixth 
Auditor under the provisions of section 409 Rev. Stat. Ibid. 
12. Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfac-
tory to himself, that any lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a 
means of fraudulently obtaining money through the mails, be is 
not authorizeu to instruct postmasters to return registered letters 
or to forbid them to pay money-orders because the same are ad-
dressed or made payable to an individual conduct,ing such lot-
tery, gift-enterprise, or scheme. 325. 
13. The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being 
limited by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is made 
"in compliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-Gen-
.eral," such compliance forms a necessary element in each case 
to bring it within the statute. 370 
INDEX. 649 
POSTAL SERVICE-Continued. 
14. The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chap. 342, authorizing the 
Postmaster-General " to contract for inland and foreign steam-
boat mail service, when it can be confined in one route, where 
the foreign office or offices are not more than two hundred miles 
distant from the domestic office, on the same terms and concli-
tions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the same out of 
the appropriation for inland steam-boat service," is permanent 
in character and amendatory ot the gener.al law; but the au-
thority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is limited by the 
terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the same 
clause. 411. 
15. Precious stoneFl and other articles, where the same are liable to 
customs duty, are prohibited by the Universal Postal Union 
Convention of J nne 1, 1878, to be sent through the mail; and if 
imported by mail they become subject to seizure and forfeiture 
under section 3061, Rev. Stat. 457. 
16. The provisions of the iuterstate-commerce act of February 4,1887, 
chap. 104, do not extend to the postal service of the United 
States, nor prohibit the transportation by railroad companies, 
free of charge, of such officers or agents of the Government as 
are employed in that service. 587. 
POSTAGE-STAMP, CANCELLATION OF. 
See PosTAL SERVICE, 2. 
POSTMASTER. 
See APPOINTMENT, 7; POSTAL SERVICE, 9. 
POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
1. The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, V378, 
chap. 359, to substitute, for the black printing inks and writing 
:fluids used under section 721, Postal Regulations, auy canceling 
ink which is uniform and which a.ctual experiment and test have 
shown to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard against 
fraud, and to order its use in all post-offices where stamps are 
canceled. 131. 
2. The power conferred npon the Postmaster-General by section 3962, 
Rev. Stat. to make deductions from the pay of mail contractors 
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary. 313. 
3. When a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General, 
and he afterwards becomes satisfied that. the order was made 
under a misapprehension of the facts, it is within his power 
either to directly rescind the order or to refer the matter to the 
Sixth Auditor under the provisions of section 409, Rev. Stat. 
Ibid. 
4. Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfac-
tory to himself, that ~ny lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a 
means of fraudulently obtaining money through the mails, he is 
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not authorized to instruct postmasters to return registered let-
·ters or to forbid them to pay money-orders because the same 
are addressed or made payable to an individual conducting such 
lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme. 32fi. 
5. The act of March 17, 1882, chap. 41, which authorizes the Post-
master-General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of 
money-order funds in certain cases, does not annul the require-
ments of regulation 1099 of the "Postal Laws and Regulations," 
whereby the postmaster is to make good the loss should he fail 
to comply with such regulation. :369. 
6. Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regulation 
is in force, to disregard it in a case where he is satisfied that the 
postmaster had in fact remitted the money lost, but did not have 
the remittance witnessed as the regulation requires. Ibid. 
7. The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 34:2, authorizing the 
Postmaster-General "to contract for inland and foreign steam-
boat mail service, when it can be confined in one route, where 
the foreign office or· offices are not more than two hundred miles 
distant from the domestic office, on the same terms and condi-
tions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the same out of 
the appropriation for inland steam-boat service, ·' is permanent 
in character and amendatory of the general law; but the 
authority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is limited by 
the terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the same 
clause. 411. 
See MONEY-ORDER FUNDS. 
POSTMASTER'S SALARY, RE-ADJUSTMENT OF.-




1. The existence of certain claims of title to the HPotomac flats" is not 
an obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation made by the 
act of July 5, 1884, chap. 229. 66. 
2. Title of the United States to certain parts (Sections II and Ill) of 
the Potomac Flats impr~vement considered, and adviBed that the 
prohibition contained in the acts of August 5, 1886, chap. 929 
and 930, against the expenditure of money appropriated for the 
improvement, does not apply to such parts. 437. 
POTTA W ATOMIE INDIANS. 
See POWER OF ATTORNEY; INDIAN CoNTRACT. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
1. Under the authority granted to the agents and attorneys named in 
the letter of attorney made by certain heads of families and in-
dividual members of the Pottawatomie Indians, the powers and 
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duties committed to such agents and attorneys can not be per-
formed by any two of them in the absence or without the con-
currence of the third. 447. 
2. Opinion of September 9, 1ssr {ante p. 447), as to the validity of a 
certain contract with Potta" atomie Indians, cited and reaf-
firmed; and advised that the approval of such contract by the 
"business committee of th~ Citizen Pottawatomies" does not 
cure the defect therein or authorize the Secretary of the Interior 
to approve it. 497. 
PRESIDENT. 
1. An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by 
the Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or valid-
ity of a resurvey of a private land claim. 31. 
2. The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the 
"Inventions International Exposition" at London, such office 
not existing by virtue of any law of the United States. 171. 
3. The power of the President to set apart a portion of the public 
domain for the exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include 
the case of a reservation for Indians not born or commorant in the 
United States. 557. 
See APPOINTMENT ; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 6, ll ; PARDON, 
PRINTING. 
1. The joint resolution of July 7, 1882, "to provide for the printing of 
public documents," etc., applies to all documents or reports or-
dered to be printed by Congress, whether by special act or other-
wise, so that such legislation does not forbid the printing of the 
"usual number" ofthe document. 51. 
2. The "usual number," within the meaning of the resolution, indi-
cated. Ibid. 
PROMOTION. 
See NAVY, 5. 
PROSECUTION OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. 
See CLAIMS, 2. 
PUBLIC BUILDING SITE. 




See LANDS, PUBLIC. 
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PURCHASE OF LAND. 
1. Under an act of the legislature of' New York, passed April2, 1885, 
a valid title to certain lands situated in the cities of Troy and 
Auburn, in that State, which have heretofore been selected for 
the sites of Government buildings authorized by Congress to be 
erected there, may be acquired by the United States by condem-
nation proceedings instituted in the State court pursuant to its 
provisions. 352. 
2. The acts of Congress of March 3, 1885, chap. 331 and 360, pro-
viding for the purchase of such sites, may properly be taken to 
authorize the acquisition thereof in any mode which is in con-
formity to the laws of the State. Hence where, by a law of the 
State, the property may be condemned and title thereto acquired 
under the eminent domain power of the State, recourse may be 
had as well to this mode of acquisition as to any other, under the 
authority conferred by those acts. 353. 
3. Title to the additional ground authorized to be purchased by the 
act of July 10, 1886, chap. 761, for the site of a public building 
to be erected in Williamsport, Pa., may be acquired by the in-
stitution of condemnation proceedings under the laws of the 
State of Pennsylvania, in case no agreement for the purchase 
thereof can be made with the owner. 484. 
QUARANTINE. 
See INSPECTORS OF CUSTOMS. 
RAILROAD BRIDGE AT ST. PAUL, MINN. 
See BRIDGE. 
REBELLION, CLAIM OF PARTICIPANT IN. 
See CLAIMS, 6. 
REFUND OF DUTY. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 23, 39, 46. 
REGISTRY OF LETTERS AND PACKETS. 
1. Under the second proviso of section 3 of the act of July 5, 1884, 
chap. 234, a departmental officer, in the discharge of his official 
duties, may register letters and packeti'J elsewhere than in the 
post-office at Washington. 49. 
2. That section does not authorize Indian agents or receivers and 
registers of land offices to register, free, official letters and 
packets. 54. 
REGISTRY OF VESSEL. 
1. A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in 
form or burden in a foreign port may be registered anew on her 
arrival in the United States; but the new registry can not be 
made unless the ship and owners conform to the requirements 
necessary for an original registry. 560 . 
• 
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REGISTRY OF VESSEL-Continued. 
2. If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the 
vessel as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it 
was built in the United States it would not be entitled to reg-
istry. Ibid. 
REIMPORTATION. 
See CuSTOMS LAws, 8, 12, 25. 
REMISSION OF FORFEITURE. 
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES, 1, 2, 6, 7. 
RESERVATION. 
See FORT BROWN RESERVATION; FORT KEOGH RESERVATION; 
HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK.; SHEYENNE ISLAND. 
RESURVEY OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS. 
See APPEAL. 
RETIRED LIST. 
See NAVY, 1, 2. 




REVISED STATUTES CONST.RUED, REFERRED TO, ETC. 
Page. 
Section 12.. . . . . • • • • • • . • .. 252 
Section 163. .. .. .. • • . . . . .. 245 
Section 164 .......•...... 245, 246 
Section 177. . . . . . • • • • .. • • • . 59 
Section 178. .... ...• ...... 50 
Section 179. .... .... •..••• 59 
Section 180 ............... 50,59 
Section 181. ...• ...• •..•.. 59 
Section 189 ........•..... 125,136 
Section 271 ....•..••..... 454,456 
Section 302. . . . . . . . .. • . . .. 276 
Section 349............... 60 
Section 354. .... .... ...... 489 
Section 356 .... 59,78,108,489,521 
Section 358. .... ...... .... 60 
Section 361. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . 60 
Section 362. . .. . .. .. .. .. ... 136 
Section 365 .......... 125,136,137 
Section 3R6 ....•.. 59,125,136,137 
Section 367. . . • • . .. • .. . . . . 137 
Section 369. .. .. • . .. • • • • • . 57 
Page. 
Section 396........... •••• 589 
Section 409 ....••••••.... 278,315 
Section 418. .... •••.•. .... 178 
Section 420. .... •.•. .... •. 178 
Section 439. . . .. .. • • • . • • • • 432 
Section 441. . .. .. .. • • • .. . . 454 
Section 453 .............. 435,454 
Section 456............... 455 
Section 479....... .• .. .. .. 276 
Section 770 .............. 122,192 
Section 771. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. 109 
Section 79b... ............ 276 
Section tl24... ............ 193 
Section 827 ....••.... 122,192,193 
Section 829 .............. 123,124 
Section 833 .......... 122,123,124 
Section 834............... 122 
Section 835... .. .. .. .. .. .. 122 
Section 836. .. . • .. • . ... .. .. 192 
Section 838 ............•. 126, 128 
Section 841....... .... .. .. 290 
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Section 1089.. .. •• .. .. •. .. 549 
Section 1090. •• •• •. .. .. . . . 549 
Section 1092...... •• .. •. •. 551 
Section 1133.............. 250 
Section 1191.............. 276 
Section 1202.. . . . . • . . • • . . . 281 
Section 1222 ..........•... 12,13 
Section 1223.............. 13 
Section 1224.. . • • . • . • . • • • . 13 
Section 1229 ..••.•••..••. 373,374 
Section 1235.. . . • • • • • . . . . . 204 
Section 1265. . . . • . • . . . . . . . 159 
Section 1287 . ..........•. 204, 206 
Section 1342 .....•.•••... 120,281 
Section 1349.............. 276 
Section 1:378. . • • • • • . . . . • • . 156 
Section 1381.. . . • • • • . • • • • . 156 
Section 1382. .••. ... . . ••.• 156 
Page. 
Section 2106...... . . . . . . . . 183 
Section 2116 ..•..•.•. 237,238,586 
Section 2117 .••..•.•••••.. 91,237 
Section 2125 .••...••..... 545,547 
Section 2134 ...•...•...... 35, 556 
Section 2137 ....•...•.... 545,557 
Section 2150.... ...•.. .... 545 
Section 2215.... .. . • . • • •• . 276 
Section 2461.... .••. .•.••• 435 
Section 2462 . . . • • . • • . . . • . . 435 
Section 24tl2 .... .••. ..•... 171 
Section 2491.... ...•.•.•.. 424 
Section 2499 ..••.•.••..... 63,368 
1::\ection 2500 .............. 82, 3r31 
Section 2502.... .••• .. .•.. 63 
Sect.ion 2503.... • • • • . . . • . . 263 
Section 2505.... . . . • • . . . . . 163 
Section 2506...... ••.• •••• 163 
Section 1383.. . . • • • • . • . • . . 276 Section 2508.... . • • • • • . • . • 163 
Section 1444 ...••••••••••• 
Section 1454 ....•....••... 
Section 1471. ..••••.•••••. 
Section 1475 ...... .••••... 
Section 1556 .....•...••••. 
Section 1562 ....••..•••••. 
Section 1588 ......•....•.. 
Section 1593 ....•...••••.. 
393 Section 2509.... .•.• .••••. 163 
96 Section 2533.... ...• ...•.. 591 
177 Section 2534 ..•. -~·~ -~ - ---591,592 
156 Section 2536.... ..•• .•••.. 98 
156 Section 2614........ ...•.. 360 
394 Section 2615.... .••••. .... 360 
96 Section 2619 ....•••.•.••. 275,458 
96 Section 2630...... . • • • . . . . 98 
Section 1594 ....•••..••••. 96,97 
Section 1678. ...... •••••.. 184 
Section 1697 ..• L ••••••••• 157,276 
Section 1698. . . . • . . . • . • • . . 276 
Section 1757 .. .••••. ..••.. 182 
Section 1763 ....•.••••••. 304,305 
Section 1765....... .•••... 206 
Section 1767.............. 576 
Section 1768 ..••••..•••.. 321,577 
Section 1769.. ...•....•••. 28 
Section 1772.. .•.•.. •..... 576 
Section 1882 .•••••...••.. 161,162 
Section 1861.. . . • • • . . • . • . . 540 
Section 1955.............. 139 
Section 1956.............. 585 
Section 1958.............. 585 
Section 1960.............. 586 
Section 1972...... . • . • . . . . 586 
Section 2103 .............. 8, 10, 
162,183,238,486,498 
Section 2785.... .••••••••. 360 
Section 2802 ..........•.. 326,327 
Section 2838.... . . . • . . . • . . 323 
Section 2864.... ...•..•••• 260 
Section 2899.... . . . . . • • • • . 579 
Section 2900 ...•.....••.. 259,260 
Section 2901.... • . . . . • . • • . 579 
Section 2902.............. 360 
Section 2906 ...••..... 46,470,478 
Section 2907...... . . . . . . . 289, 
469,470,471,496,516 
Section 2908 ...•......... 289,469 
Section 2922 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 
Sectio~ 2930 . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 360 
Section 2931 ..••......... 199,200 
Section 2949.. . . . . . . . • • • • • 360 
Section 2962.... . . . . . . . . . . 381 
Section 29tl4 ..... 519,520,578,580 
Section 3006 .... ·-~·-····· 262 
~ection 3019 .. ~. . . • • • . . . . . 82 
I 
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Section 3061.... • • • • • • • • . • 458 
Section 3084 • • • • • • • • • • • • • . 127 
Section 3085 ..•••••.••.•. 127,128 
Section 3086 ..••••••• 545,546,547 
Section 3114.... • • • • • • • . • . 562 
Section 3142 .....••... ---- 560 
Section 3143.............. 276 
Page. 
Section 3792 ...••••..••.•• 52,53 
Section 3834...... . . . . . • • • 276 
Section 3~70...... .••• ...• 276 
Section 3894 ...••.••• 307, 308, 309 
Section 3921.... .... .... .. 131 
Section 3929 ......•.. 307, 309, 325 
Section 3942.... ....•• .... 112 
Section 3144.. .•• ••• •• • ••• 276 Section 3949.. .. . ••• •• . ••• 11~ 
Section 3151 ••.••••••.•••• 27ti Section 3962.............. 313 
Section 3153.............. 276 
Section 3156 ....•••.• ~.... 276 
Section ~164........ •••••• 127 
Section 3221. ............ 379, 380 
Section 3248 .••.•••.•••••. 44,45 
Section 3288........ ••••.• 92 
Section 329:3........ .•.••• 380 
Section 3330. ....••. •...•• 246 
Section 3433. . . . . . . . . • • . • • 82 
Section 3469 .......•• 60,61,72,73 
Section 3480. . . . . . . • • . . . . • 421 
Section 3490 ........•••.•• 72,73 
Section 3491.... • . . • . . • . • • 72 
Section 3492.............. 72 
Section 3493...... . . . • • • • • '72 
Section 3496.... .••••• •••• 278 
Sechlon 3513 ..••••••••••• 418,419 
Section 3551.............. 276 
Section 3564 .•••••••••... 322,324 
Section 3586...... •... •••• 418 
Section 3600 ..•••••.• 275,276,277 
Section 3614. ••••. ••• • •.• • 276 
Section 3648.............. 93 
Section 3676. ••••••. •••••• 136 
Section 3678.... • • .. • • • • • • 466 
Section 3()79.... • • • • • . . • . . 216 
Se tion 3681. . • . • • • . • . . . . • 136 
Sec 10n 3683 ....••.•• 424,432,433 
Section 36£!0.... • • • • • • • . . . 413 
Section 3709 ..•.••.•••... 350,351 
Section 3732 ..•••••••••... 79,216 
Section 3737 . . . . • . . • . . • . • • R9 
Section 3738 ....•• 87,107,389,390 
Section 3739 •..•.•... 112,113,286 
Section 3740 .•••• 112,113,286,287 
Section 3741 ...•• 112, 113,286,~87 
Section 3742.............. 287 
Section 3759.. •••••••••••• 276 
Section 4007 ......••• 248,249,250 
Section 4009 .....•••• 248,249,~50 
Section 4032.... •••• •..... 234 
Section 4033.............. 234 
Section 4041 .•••.••••..•• 308,310 
Section 4086.............. 220 
Section 4087. . • • • • • • • • • • • • 220 
Section 4088 .....••...... 219,220 
Section 4113.. .••••• .•.... 276 
Section 4131.... .......... 99 
Section 4170 ...... - .. 560,561,562 
Section 4214.............. 565 
Section 4219 .....•..• 564, 565,566 
Section 4253...... . . . . . . . . 282 
Section 4312...... • . • • . . . . 562 
Section 4371 ......••••••. 564,565 
Section 4405.... ...• •..•••. 17 
Section 4414 .••••••••••... 30,31 
Section 4415 .••••.•.••.•.• 30,31 
Section 4418 ...•.• 78,365,366,367 
Section 4419 ..•... 78, 365,366,367 
Section 4421...... •..• ..•• 30 
Section 4426. . . . • • • • • • • • • • 17 
Section 4459.............. 276 
Section 4462.... •••.•• .•.. 17 
Section 4482.............. 30 
Section 4491 ....•• 78,365,366,367 
Section 4658 ........•.... 346,347 
Section 4669.346,347,348,528,529 
Section 4673.............. 345 
Section 4692 ...•...•.•..•• 40,74 
Section 4693...... ••.• ..•• 74 
Section 4695 ..••••••• 40,74,75,76 
Section 4697 .•.•..••••.... 41,75 
Section 4698 ...•..•.•..• 40, 41, 75 
Sect-ion 4702 .••••••.••.... 40,74 
Section 4769 .....••••••• .'251, 252 
Section 4779.... .••• ..••.• 276 
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Section 4950.............. 216 
Section 5159. .• • •• . • . • . . . 49~ 
Section 5249 ...••••• ·----~ 191 
Section 5260 ..•• ~.41,503,504,506 
Section 5261. . . . . . . . . . . • • . 504 
Section 5292.. .••••• ...••. 285 
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Page. 
Section 5293 ......••. 285,58C,586 
Section 5~88 .....•••. 555,556,557 
Section 5438.. . • • . • • • . . • . . 72 
Section 5498.......... ..•. 161 
Section 5595.............. 453 
Section 5596.... •• . . ••••. 98, 454 
See STATEN IsLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD. 
RIVER-BED. 
See IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS. 
SEAMEN. 
See SHIPPING AcT, 2, 3 ; SHIPPING CoMMISSIONER. 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
See HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK. ; INDIAN CONTRACT; 
SWAMP LAND INDEMNITY, 1. 
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
The Secretary of the Navy may assent to a modification of the 
contract for building the new cruisers where the interests of the 
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision 
violated thereby. 101. 
See CONTRACT, 6, 7. 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to make a regulation 
under which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in 
warehouse after the expiration of three years, upon the distiller 
or owner of the spirits filing a declaration of his purpose to ex-
port the same in good faith, and giving a bond to do so within 
a given period. 92. 
2. Section tl38 Rev. Stat. does not authorize an allowance to be made 
by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for serv-
·ices in internal-revenue case reported to the latter, wherein no 
judicial proceedings have been mstituted. 126. 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeit-
ure of articles contained in the same package with other articles 
imported in violation of section 2491 Rev. Stat. 424. 
See COMPtWMISE; FINES, PENALTIES, AND FoRFEITURES; INTER· 
NAL REVENUE, 7 j LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT, fi, 6. 
SECRETARY OF WAR. 
Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chap. 4, and 
February 14, 1883, chap. 44, authorizing and regulating the con-
struction of bridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary of War 
has power to disapprove ofthe plans of such bridges where he is 
of the opinion that £ihey would unduly obstruct the navigation 
of the river. 512. 
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SEIZOR. 
See Cu~TOMS LAWS, 7. 
SEIZURES IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY. 
1. Where property is seized by the military authorities in the Indian 
country for violation of the laws relating to the Indians, pn or 
as soon as practicable after report is made to the United States 
attorney it should be placed in the custody of the proper civil 
officers. 544. 
2. The provision of section 3086 Rev. Stat., by which property seized 
under any law relating to the customs is left in the custody of the 
collector or principal officer of the customs of the district, is not 
to be considered as embraced in the proceedings contemplated 
in section 2125 Rev. Stat., so as to permit the military employed 
in making seizures to retain the custody of the property to abide 
adjudication. Ibid. 
3. Property seized by the military under the provisions of section 2137 
Rev. Stat., should, as soon as praticable, after report of seizure 
to the United States attorney, be placed in the custody of the 
proper civil officers. 555. 
4. Section 5388 Rev. Stat., makes no provision for seizure of prop-
erty belonging to a wrong-doer. Ibid. 
SHEYENN.E ISLAND. 
At the date of the Sioux treaty of April 29, 1868, Sheyenne Island 
was within the reservation thereby established, the east line of 
which was the east ban'k of the Missouri River at low-water 
mark. The island having since gradually become attached t.o 
the mainland on the east bank of the river, so that it is wholly 
surrounded by water only in seasons when the water is high, 
the low-water mark is now on the west side of the island instead 
of the east side as formerly : Held that the island is still a part of 
the reservation, notwithstanding the abandonment of its former 
channel on the east side of the same; whether the island now 
belongs to the reservation being determinable by the line of low-
water mark on the east bank of the Missouri, not according tO> 
the present course of that river, but according to its course at 
the date of the treaty. 230. 
SHIPPING. 
1. Meaning of the terms '' A.nerican vessel" as used in the act of June 
26, 1884, chap. 121. 99. 
2. Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not 
exempted by the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, from the pay-
ment of fees for services of consuls. 111. 
3. Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are 
not within the provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 
121, forbidding the collection of fees by consular officers from 




4. Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, "to remove cer-
tain burdens on the American merchant marine and to encourage 
the American carrying trade," etc., considered in connection with 
the eighth article of the treaty of 1827 with Sweden and Nor-
way. 382. 
, 5. No warrant is found in the treaty for the claim that the shipping 
of that power is entitled to the benefits of the act without sub-
mitting to its conditions. Ibid. 
6. A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in 
form or burden in a foreign port may bo registered anew on her 
arrival in the United States; but the new registry can not be 
made unless the ship and owners conform to the requirements 
necessary for an original registry. 560. 
7. If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the 
vessel as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it 
was built in the United States it would not be entitled to regis-
try. Ibid. 
8. Vessels used exclusively for pleasure, and not carrying freight or 
passengers for pay, are not liabl~=~ to the penalty prescribed in 
section 4371 Rev. Stat. 564. 
9. Nor are such vessels, when navigating waters of the United States 
between district and district, or between different places in the 
same district, subject to the duties prescribed by section 4219 
Rev. Stat. Ibid. 
SHIPPING ACT. 
1. Section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, does not require 
that a protest shall have accompanied the payment of the :fine, 
etc., a refunding of which by the Secretary of the Treasury is 
asked. 63. 
2. The provisions of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 
121, prohibiting the payment of advance wages to seamen hired 
in our ports, in so far as those provisions apply to foreign s*p-
ping, are not in conflict with the stipulations of article 8 of the 
consular convention with France of February 23, 1853. 253. 
3. Nor do such provisions come in conflict with any rights which, upon 
principles of international law, other nations are entitled to ex-
ercise within our ports as regards their merchant vessels. Ibid. • 
SHIPPING COMMISSIONER. 
1. A shipping commissioner has no ant,hority to ship seamen on ''sail 
or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," unless such 
vessels come within the exceptions of the act of June 9, 1874, 
chap. 260; nor will the consent of the master and seaman 
operate to give such authority. 54. 
2. He should not receive fees for shipping seamen on coasting vessels 
E.ot within said exceptions. Ibid. 
3. Anything received by a shipping commissioner for such serv.ice is 
not required to be acounted for by the terms of section 27 of the 
act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121. Ibid. 
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SINKI.KG FUNDS. 
1. Section '5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chap. 345, relating to the 
sinking funds of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad 
Companies, applies to moneys belonging to those funds which 
are uninvested, and such moneys may be invested as therein pro-
vided. 598. 
2. But that section does not authorize a sale of the United States 
bonds in which the funds are already invested for the purpose 
of re-investment in the first-mortgage bonds of said companies. 
Ibid. 
3. Money paid into the sinking funds of said companies, under said 
act, may be invested (1) in United States bonds, as provided in 
act of May 7, 1878, chap. 96; (2) in any United States railroad 
subsidy bonds of any of the aided roads described in the act of 
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, and its supplements; and (3) in any 
of the first-mortgage bonds of said companies, such as are de-
scribed in section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chap. 345. 
Ibid. 
SOUTH PASS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER IMPROVEMENT. 
See PAYMENT, 2. 
SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE TREASURY. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF1 8. 
SPECIAL EXAMINERS OF THE PENSION OFFICE. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 2; OFFICE, 3. 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD. 
A tunnel constructed in the manner proposed by the Staten Island 
Rapid Transit Railroad Company across a part of the light-
house grounds at New Brighton, Staten Island, is within the 
provisions of the act of February 9, 1881, chap. 41, granting 
right of way through said grounds. 76. 
STATE OFFICE. 
1. The holding of a State office by an officer or employe in the civil 
service of the United States is not prohibited by any act of 
Congress. 3. 
2. But by Executive orders dated January 17 and 28, 1873, which have 
not been revoked, persons holding any civil office under the 
United States are expected, while holding such office, not to ac-
cept or hold any State, Territorial, or municipal office, with 
certain exceptions ; otherwise they will be regarded as having 
resigned the office held under the United States. Ibid. 
3. In the case of an employe of the United States Fish Commission, 
not in the service by appointment, who holds the office of village 
constable : Advised that he may properly exercise the functions 
of the latter office, provided this does not interfere with the regu-




1. Where a State imposed a tax upon the registration of deeds, and a. 
deed to the United States conveying land within such State was 
put on record by an agent of the Guvernment: Advised that, there 
being no provision in the State law exempting t,he registration 
of deeds to the United States from the tax, the Government is 
properly chargeable therewith, and that it should be paid. 491. 
2. The tax referred to is not, strictly speaking, a tax upon either the 
instrumentalities, -agencies, or property of the United States. 
Ibid. 
STATUTEf\, INTERPRETATION OF. 
1. The first section of the act of Aprilll, 1882, chap. 75, authorized 
a public building to be erected at Minneapolis, Minn., limiting 
the cost of the building, inclusive of its site, to $175,000, and the 
second section of same act appropriated $60,000 for purchase of 
site and toward construction of building; by act of March 3, 1883, 
chap. 143, an appropriation of $60,000 was made for continu-
ation of the building; and, by act of July 7, 1884, chap. 332, a 
further appropriation of $70,000 was made for extension of site 
and continuation of building-the whole of the appropriations 
aggregating $190,000: Advised that the limitation fixed by the 
act of 1882 as to cost of the building, etc., is not repealed by the 
subsequent appropriation acts, the only additional expenditure 
allowable bting for an "extension of site." 79. 
2. The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, chap. 366, 
in aid of the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposi-
tion, held in New Orleans, La., is not applicable to any objects 
other than those specifically enumerated in the act. 146. 
3. Opinion of April 2! 18t:35 (ante, p. 146), relative to the appropriation 
for the World'~:~ Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition at 
New Orleans, La., reaffirmed. 153. 
4 . The provision in the act of May 29, 1884, chap. 60, giving the 
Commissioner of Agriculture power to expend money in such 
disinfection and quarantine measures as may be necessary to pre-
vent the spread of pleuro-pneumonia from one State or Territory 
into another, does not authorize him to purchase animals in-
fected with that disease for the purpose of slaughter. 154. 
5. The provision in the act of March 3,1883, chap. 143, authorizing 
the Secretary of the Treasury "to acquire by private purchase 
or condemnation the necessary lands for public buildings and 
light-houses to be constructed, and for which money is appro-
priated, including all public building sites authorized to be ac-
quired under any of the acts of the first session of the Forty-
seventh Congress," does not empower him to acquire by con-
demnation the site for the proposed public building authorized 
to be erected at La Crosse, Wis., by the act of February 28, 1885, 
chap, 260. 174. 
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6. That provision is limited to lands for public buildings for which 
money is then (i.e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated, 
including building sites authorized to be acquired under acts 
of the previous session, and does not extend to other cases. Ibid. 
7. The indefinite appropriation made by the fourth section of the act 
of July 5, 1884, chap. 229, is not applicable to river and harbor 
improvements generally, but only to a particular class of public 
works, such as canals, locks, etc., in the use of which both 
operating expenses and expenses for repairs are necessarily in-
curred. 188. 
8. The appropriation for "contingent expenses, independent treas-
ury,'' is not applicable to the payment of expenses of special 
agents of the Treasury employed to investigate the affairs of sub-
treasurers. 232. 
9. Where a statute authorizes the building of vessels by the Navy 
Department, but makes no provision for procuring the necessary 
plans and specifications therefor, it is to be com;;trued as im-
pliedly authorizing the head of the Department to procure such 
plans and specifications in the mode and manner which he shall 
deem best. 244. 
10. In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chap. 305, the preamble 
thereto may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the 
meaning of the enacting clause. 316. 
11. Tho terms "persons engaged in navigating the vessel," as used in 
section 4419 Rev. Stat., comprehend the officers and crew, those 
who are in the service of the vessel, and employed in its man-
agement, the working of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. 
365. 
12. In determining the meaning of '' iron ore,'' as used in the provision 
of the act of March S, 1883, chap. 121, which imposes a duty 
thereon, regard should be bad to the commercial signification of 
the term, as Congress must be understood to have US<)d the same 
in its commercial sense. 466. 
13. The claur:;e in the provision of the act of August 5, 1886, chap. 
929, making an appropriation for the improvement of the Mo-
nongahela ~iver, which declares that "no charges or toile shall 
be collected on any other part of the river on any commerce on 
said river which originates above the works herein appropri-
ated for," does not impose any condition affecting the expendi-
ture of the approprilltion. There is nothing in its language 
which requires the assent thereto of any person, company, or 
corporation claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the 
relinquishment by any person, company, or corporation of such 
right, before the money appropriated can become available for 
expenditure. 481. 
14. The act of August 4, 1886, chap. 907, made an appropriation to pay 
certain claims, and directetl the Secretary of the Treasury to pay 
~o "Martin and P. B. Murphy $10,000." It being alleged that 
, 
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this was intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that amount,. 
of which Martin Murphy was a joint owner with Patrick W. 
Murphy: Advised that should the identity of their claim with 
that provided for in the act be clearly established, the fact that 
"B" is used in the act instead of "W" as the initial letter of 
the middle name of Patrick ,V. Murphy, is immaterial, and may 
be disregarded. 501. 
15. In the act of June 19, 1878, chap. 329, which repeals section 1861 
Rev. Stat., the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing clerk,_ 
at $5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employ-
ment of but one clerk at the per diem mentioned. 540. 
16. By the ninth section of the act of February 8, 1887, chap. 119,. 
an appropriation is made ''for the purpose of making the sur-
veys and resurveys mentioned in section ttvo" of that act. In sec-
tion 2 there is no mention of" surveys and resurveys." But sec-
tion one of the same act contains a provision for ''surveys and re-
surveys." Advised that the appropriation made as above is ap-
plicable to the making of "surveys and resurveys," as provided 
for in sai.:l. section 1--such being the clear intent of Congress. 
593. 
STEAM REGISTER. 
1. Sections 4418, 4419, and 4491, Rev. Stat., concerning steam registers. 
used on vessels propelleu by steam, considered ; and held that a 
steam register, in order to be the subject of approval under sec-
tion 4419, must be of a description which satisfies the:requirements. 
of both section 441o and section 4419. 365. 
2. The terms ''persons engaged in navigating vessels," as used in sec-
tion 4419, comprehend the officers and crew, those who are in the 
service of the vessel, and employed in its management, the work-
ing of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. The register is not 
only to be taken from the control of all persons so employed,_ 
but to be secured from such control by the inspectors. Ibid. 
S'fEAM-VESSELS. 
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS; STEAM REGISTER. 
ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 3. 
SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS. 
See COMPENSATION, 2. 
SURETY. 
1. The provisions of sections 3739, 3740, and 3741, Rev. Stat., con-
sidered, and held that, upon a fair construction thereof, a mem-
ber of Congress may be lawfully accepted as a surety on the 
bond of a contractor with the United States. 286. 
2. H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in the State 
of Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861, 
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up to which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the. 
Government in full what was due them. Afterwards they col-
lected from the State of Arkansas for the same period of service 
(January 1 to May 31, 1861) certain amounts, which were paid 
out of moneys belonging to the United ~tates that had been 
seized by the State: Advised that the contractors are under a 
legal liability to make restitution to the United States of. the 
amounts so collected, but t,hat their sureties can not be held re-
sponsible therefor upon the undertaking of the latter. 414. 
SURGEON-GENERAL. 
Under a statutory provision making an appropriation "for the 
care, support, and medical treatment of seventy-five transien, 
paupers, medical and surgical patients in the city of Washington 
under a contract to be made with such institution as the Sur-
geon-General of the Army may select," etc., that officer may, 
within the limits of such appropriation, contract with one or 
more hospitals, as in his judgment will best fulfill its pur-
poses. 33. 
SUSPENSION OF OFFICER. 
1. Case of the suspension of Marshall B. Blake as collector of internal 
revenue for the second district .of New York, and the designation 
of John A. Sullivan to perform the duties of that officer, con-
sidered. 318. 
2. The suspension of an officer involves a suspension ofhis bond; the 
bond required of the person designated to take the place of the 
former being substituted therefor while the person so designated 
is performing the duties of the office. Ibid. 
SWAMP-LAND INDEMNITY. 
1. The Secretary of the Interior is warranted in approving certain 
statements of account between the United States and the State' 
of Ohio, made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
for cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the period in-
tervening between the passage of the swamp-land act of Sep-
tember 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857. 170. 
2. Under the provisions of the acts of March 2, 1855, chap. 147, 
and March 3, 1857, chap. 117, the State of Louisiana is entit}ed 
to indemnity for any swamp lands granted theret·o by the act of 
March 2, 1849, chap. 87, which were sold by the United States 
between the date of this act and the 28th of September, 1850. 
522. 
3. But as to such swamp lands as were excepted out of the grant 
made by the said act of 1849 (viz, "lands fronting on rivers, 
creeks, bayous, water-courses," etc.), and as were first granted to 
that State by the act of September 28, !1:::50, chap. 84, it is en-
titled to indemnity only for those. which have heen sold by the 
United States since the 28th of September, 1850. Ibid. 
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TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT. 
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 2) 3. 
TENURE-OF-OFFICE LAW. 
1. The act of March 3, 1887, chap. 353, repealing the tenure-of-office 
law (sections 1767 to 1772, Rev. Stat., leaves unaffected such 
designations, nominations, and appointments as shall have been 
made before the repeal, and requires all business begun but un-
finished before the repeal to be completed under the law as it 
then stood. 576. 
2. Appointments and removals after the repeal are to be made under 
the law as it now exists. Ibid. 
TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE. 
In the act of June 19, 1878, chap. 329, which repeals section 1861; 
Rev. Stat., the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing ' clerk, 
at $5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employ-
ment of but one clerk at the per diem mentioned. 540. 
TIMBER UNLAWFULLY CUT ON PUBLIC LANDS. 
Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been seized 
by duly-authorized agents of the Land Department, and is in 
their custody, may be disposed of by that Department; and 
whether this be done by public or private sale, with or without 
previous advertisement, is a matter entirely discretionary there-
with. 434. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 1. 
'I'OBACCO. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 1 ; INTERNAL REVENUE, 1. 
TONNAGE DUTY. 
1. Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, does not sub-
ject the suspensiOn mentwned in its first proviso to the discre-
tion of the President. 53. 
2. Meaning of the phrase "government of the foreign country,'' in 
the same section. Ibid. 
3. The right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the first proviso of 
section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, takes effect 
from the proclamation of the President, and not before. 
4. By virtue of the third section of the act of July 5, 1884, chap. 
221, the decision of the Commis!'.'ioner of Navigation on questions 
involving a refund of the tonnage tax is final. That section su-
persedes or repeals the previous law vesting the Secretary of 
the Trea~mry with appellate power in t:iUCh cases. Ibid. 
5. The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels sailing 
from the regions mentioned in the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 
121, and entered in our ports, is purely geographical in character, 
inuring to the ad vantage of any vessel of any power that ;nay 
choose to transport between this country and any port em-
braced by the fourteenth section of that act. 260. 
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TRADE-DOLLAR. 
The United States Treasurer is not authorized to receive "trade-
dollars" at par in exchange for silver certificates under the third 
section of the act of February 2R, 1878, chap. 20. · Nor are such 




See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 1, 2. 
TRANSPORTATION OF THE MAIL. 
See CONTRACT, 4, 5, 9. 
TRANSPORTATION OVER BOND-SUBSIDIZED RAILROADS. 
In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific 
Railroad Company (whose road was in part constructed with 
the aid of subsidy bonds issued under the acts of July 1, 1862, 
chap. 120, and July 2, 1864, chap. 216) for Government trans-
portation over the subsidized portion of its road: Advised, that 
that the direction in the second section of the act of March 3, 
1873, chap. 226 (sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to withhold all pay-
ments," etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applicable 
thereto; that only one-half the amount of compensation due the 
company for such transportation should be withheld, to be ap-
plied as required by the act of J1.1ly 2, 1864; a!ld that the remain-
ing one-half should be paid over to the company. 503. 
TRAVELING ALLOWANCES. 
See MARSHAL i MILEAGE. 
TREATIES WITH FOREIGN NATIONS. ' 
See SHIPPING, 4, 5 
TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 2, 4 i SHEYENNE ISLAND. 
TRUST. 
See INDIAN TRUST FUNDS. 
UN~XPENDED BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
1. Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the 
Navy and Marine Corps for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884, 
are not available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for 
services rendered during the fiscal :year ending :June 30, 1885. 
412. 
2. The unexpended balances of the appropriations made by the act of 
March 3, 1883, chap. 97, under the headings " Bureau of Con-
struction and Repair," and "Bureau of Steam Engineering," 
may be used in completing the hulls and machinery of the cruis· 
• 
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UNEXPENDED BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS-Continued. 
ers Chicago, Boston, and .Atlap,ta, provided the total expenditure 
shall not exceed the total estimated cost thereof, as reported by 
the Naval Advisory Board. 566. 
3. The balance of an appropriation made for a .specific purpose may 
be used for that purpose in the discharge of obligations imposed 
by a lawful continuous contract. Ibid. 
UNiON PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See SINKING FUND. 
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION CONGRESS. 
See ADVANCES. 
UNMAILABLE MATTER. 
See PosTAL SERVICE, 6, 7, 8, !>. 
UTAH COMMISSION. 
See UTAH TERRITORY. 
UTAH TERRITORY. 
1. The Utah Commission, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882, 
chap. 47, have no duties or powers as regards the echool meet-
ings in Utah Territory. 94. 
2. Voting at meetingi of tax-payers called to fix the rate of taxation 
for school purposes is not voting at an ''election '' within the 
meaning of that act. Hence polygamists may vote at such meet-
ings, provided they are property-tax payers and residents of the 
school district in which the meeting is held. Ibid. 
3. The superintendent of district schools, auditor•of public accounts, 
and treasurer of Utah Territory should, in conformity to the or-
ganic law of the Territory, be appointed by the governor, with 
the advice and consent of the legislative conncil. The Terri-
torial statutes, in so far as they require sucb officers to be elected, 
are in conflict with the organic law and void. 193. 
4. The commissioners to locate the university lands, created by the 
Territorial legislature under the powers given by the act of Con-
gress of l!...,ebruary 21, 1855, chap. 117, should be elected in the 
manner prescribed by the Territorial statute. Ibid. 
5. Officers in the Territory of Utah who were commissioned and hold-
ing office previous to the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, 
chap. 397, are not required' to take the oath prescribed by the 
twenty-fourth section of that act. 595. 
6. The provision of that section making such oath a "condition pre-
cedent to hold office in or under said Territory" applies as well 
to officers thereafter appointed by the General Government as to 
those thereafter a.ppointed by the Territorial government or 
elected in the Territory. Ibid. · 
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VACANCY IN OFFICE. 
See APPOINTMENT; OFFICE. 
VANN A:ND ADAIR, CLAIM OF. 
See CLAIMS, 1. 
WASHINGTON CITY. 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1. 
WATCHMEN IN PUBLIC SQUARES OR RESERVATIONS, 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1. 
WHARVES IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON CITY. 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2. 
WIDOW'S PENSION. 
See PENSION, 1, 2. 
WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLIC LANDS. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 4. 
WITNESS. 
See COURT-MARTIAL, 5, 6. 
WORKS OF ART. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 14. 
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WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 2, 3. 
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